F5 BIG-IP remote code execution proof of concept exploit that leverages the vulnerability identified in CVE-2022-1388.
2c3224e25af9797e9d7139c7d759da88b2eae07b09d164c4bf3a7423cfb95c06Linux suffers from two bugs in PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP. One allows for permission bypass and the other relates to a ptracer death race.
090e7e5a723be850497afe230306c956241cce0eb429877bf07e8c0f06eb2a40A use-after-free issue exists in Chrome 100 and earlier versions. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution in the browser process.
84b488e3a4db5db9d8a3df99b628eaaf0e1c8d462ed33ed2d967d6a09c443252Ubuntu Security Notice 5244-2 - USN-5244-1 fixed a vulnerability in DBus. This update provides the corresponding update for Ubuntu 18.04 LTS and Ubuntu 20.04 LTS. Daniel Onaca discovered that DBus contained a use-after-free vulnerability, caused by the incorrect handling of usernames sharing the same UID. An attacker could possibly use this issue to cause DBus to crash, resulting in a denial of service.
945e6909654f0c47ea89dac5eda071afc5a92017802d7031d63cefcdad8721d0FancyBear looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
6c9b981fb52c57e5101af2cf1b3b81f816bca03e29ff6f1e4765d923fb513d91Red Hat Security Advisory 2022-1745-01 - Red Hat OpenShift Serverless Client kn 1.22.0 provides a CLI to interact with Red Hat OpenShift Serverless 1.22.0. The kn CLI is delivered as an RPM package for installation on RHEL platforms, and as binaries for non-Linux platforms.
ccd2002cdc4680a406e7076590dc3584c6d5e8a9cf51ccaa031c66c92477d306School Dormitory Management System version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.
35eface303d338348fb6d3c2744228b1f44d4ff33f83a1ac39f419a593227e06Satana ransomware searches for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
8e9fad2d0891098b240a5be94c33ac547f4a261cfbe5fc26bc3d0ea2a0a36c17Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
52f6486bf24b541e770aac1c5ed3c3b2261c89fb9688a718a0b779cbf5c4f7d6School Dormitory Management version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.
d5de6e90441b347a90dcfbbe5aa109c73945042d00234b05626402f8ca6fabd9Travel Management System version 1.0 suffers from multiple remote SQL injection vulnerabilities. Original discovery of SQL injection in this version is attributed to Bobby Cooke and hyd3sec in August of 2020.
f7311337903077370ca96820928b9ff6db3f39ef420a109bc94cdf0d6358dc4fPetya ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
ff2605c77ee1a143de808be0bf172ffc2beea61f4206bbac09c5de2b270c2ba8Cryakl ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
8aaf8b642e1e25f6c399f8930a1a544edf572881836d06083d17c2a2115f678f
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