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First Active2021-01-04
Last Active2022-05-17
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Trojan-Ransom.Thanos MVID-2022-0607 Code Execution
Posted May 17, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Thanos ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 5533b7c50594024a4e1314f9732abe9064dda34616ffe16430cdf34c04e4c992
Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0606 Code Execution
Posted May 16, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 416d676d2dba2bc714a0f32899777fc4ac6ccc2dee1d321fbce06785689158e1
Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0605 Code Execution
Posted May 16, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | f795b475d29adfdf8b620a90005e0f383bdd74c416a7b0a03d67e03d43a0cbc0
Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0604 Code Execution
Posted May 16, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 4d905cb2862459d4fecc48e165734150e7824debee83563d1c97370c68c37f49
Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0603 Code Execution
Posted May 16, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 0ce9d83fdb3abb054ddf70fa9d218732ae0b6e0c7a630b1391d656e794fc6b19
Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0602 Code Execution
Posted May 16, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 9ba5c2eaaec9a657238330273ff40e343857a13f4d7407516463e0e13b810726
Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0601 Code Execution
Posted May 16, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 5f702738bda0d77ea713340e950f9f2bd08db678fa6f2ebafafefa803ec45bc0
Ransom.REvil MVID-2022-0600 Code Execution
Posted May 12, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 523695a11b3ac263c4750ad26a0863bafd1277bc8d7ee5e5f09039a4c903c94c
Ransom.REvil MVID-2022-0599 Code Execution
Posted May 12, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | c812238e5aec810b86cabbd3dbd8ea70c29dd0b071934148238665f8001da715
Ransom.REvil MVID-2022-0598 Code Execution
Posted May 12, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | aa6d045f0425bce26082463e9007553e34835ed1462eb3775f23793b2efde0b9
Ransom.REvil MVID-2022-0597 Code Execution
Posted May 12, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | e50e0f8dd0340a49a1f263f8304a8f67e25520134dc09f97a203083bb23437ee
Ransom.REvil MVID-2022-0595 Code Execution
Posted May 12, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 4c448e0e5a0914fcc57d5d435b52042feff16ca95bf5c04fea342caeb1515eac
Ransom.REvil MVID-2022-0596 Code Execution
Posted May 12, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 0cfd4ed7809eaa6bf784adff2f043dc32b8327dd12669f01b586f7bbc080223c
APT28 MVID-2022-0594 FancyBear Code Execution
Posted May 9, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

FancyBear looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 6c9b981fb52c57e5101af2cf1b3b81f816bca03e29ff6f1e4765d923fb513d91
Ransom.Satana MVID-2022-0593 Code Execution
Posted May 9, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Satana ransomware searches for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 8e9fad2d0891098b240a5be94c33ac547f4a261cfbe5fc26bc3d0ea2a0a36c17
Ransom.Conti MVID-2022-0592 Code Execution
Posted May 9, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 52f6486bf24b541e770aac1c5ed3c3b2261c89fb9688a718a0b779cbf5c4f7d6
Ransom.Petya MVID-2022-0591 Code Execution
Posted May 9, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Petya ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | ff2605c77ee1a143de808be0bf172ffc2beea61f4206bbac09c5de2b270c2ba8
Ransom.Cryakl MVID-2022-0590 Code Execution
Posted May 9, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Cryakl ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 8aaf8b642e1e25f6c399f8930a1a544edf572881836d06083d17c2a2115f678f
Trojan-Ransom.Radamant MVID-2022-0589 Code Execution
Posted May 6, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Radamant ransomware tries to load a DLL named "PROPSYS.dll" and execute a hidden PE file "DirectX.exe" from the AppData\Roaming directory. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | c051794bad7a43ea258023a806d4f4fb80b0f47db0954c5c9d9a7a978d7bf71e
Trojan.CryptoLocker MVID-2022-0588 Code Execution
Posted May 6, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Cryptolocker ransomware drops a PE file in the AppData\Roaming directory which then tries to load a DLL named "netapi32.dll". Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 87f31671bdc48150392fcb17c91a7b099cc962f81d837de716d2134df56aebad
Adversary3 2.0
Posted May 6, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Adversary3 is a tool to navigate the vast www.malvuln.com malware vulnerability dataset.

Changes: Added new exploit class Code Execution and Ransomware vulnerabilities targeting Conti, REvil, BlackBasta, Lokilocker, WannaCry, etc.
tags | tool
systems | unix
SHA-256 | db3216d29a33f761f3f5971b760c344d0ec4ceceed18eb0654f31683dba10f40
Ransom.CTBLocker MVID-2022-0586 Code Execution
Posted May 6, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

CTBLocker ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 6e2944ce63bc0324698d09842f6ec75f7d70d5c7264acd72536d9cdc7967e728
Trojan-Ransom.Cerber MVID-2022-0585 Code Execution
Posted May 6, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Cerber ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | e28c63a5a97b689389b1885103160cadd3799c70135f4baf81ea45f327748187
Trojan-Ransom.LockerGoga MVID-2022-0587 Code Execution
Posted May 6, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

LockerGoga ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. Four processes are created. For instance, there is "imtvknqq9737.exe" running under AppData\Local\Temp, the process name is "imtvknqq" plus an appended random number. Our exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective, you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit, local
systems | windows
SHA-256 | da575e6182321f1a1552e1e5e6da8af1c3614bcb1ff944dc57bf56d87fd9b925
Trojan.Ransom.Cryptowall MVID-2022-0584 Code Execution
Posted May 6, 2022
Authored by malvuln | Site malvuln.com

Cryptowall ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 03640ad85ec0becb4b494889fa75f6777ce2e1282d935c707cd228016fbea182
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