| Email address | private |
|---|---|
| Website | malvuln.com |
| First Active | 2021-01-04 |
| Last Active | 2024-06-18 |
Petya ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
ff2605c77ee1a143de808be0bf172ffc2beea61f4206bbac09c5de2b270c2ba8Cryakl ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
8aaf8b642e1e25f6c399f8930a1a544edf572881836d06083d17c2a2115f678fRadamant ransomware tries to load a DLL named "PROPSYS.dll" and execute a hidden PE file "DirectX.exe" from the AppData\Roaming directory. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
c051794bad7a43ea258023a806d4f4fb80b0f47db0954c5c9d9a7a978d7bf71eCryptolocker ransomware drops a PE file in the AppData\Roaming directory which then tries to load a DLL named "netapi32.dll". Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
87f31671bdc48150392fcb17c91a7b099cc962f81d837de716d2134df56aebadAdversary3 is a tool to navigate the vast www.malvuln.com malware vulnerability dataset.
db3216d29a33f761f3f5971b760c344d0ec4ceceed18eb0654f31683dba10f40CTBLocker ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
6e2944ce63bc0324698d09842f6ec75f7d70d5c7264acd72536d9cdc7967e728Cerber ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
e28c63a5a97b689389b1885103160cadd3799c70135f4baf81ea45f327748187LockerGoga ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. Four processes are created. For instance, there is "imtvknqq9737.exe" running under AppData\Local\Temp, the process name is "imtvknqq" plus an appended random number. Our exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective, you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
da575e6182321f1a1552e1e5e6da8af1c3614bcb1ff944dc57bf56d87fd9b925Cryptowall ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
03640ad85ec0becb4b494889fa75f6777ce2e1282d935c707cd228016fbea182REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
111b653e7522b76e8edf9e7a923244651c58b4723ffc3384a3138c38c6ef1977WannaCry ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL to execute our own code in order to control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware vulnerability does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
75c864ef881d1530855d950ce35620da320dafb0cebe2d176ad34757f23f3194REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code in order to control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
07f3d9e3cb24992e24316fe7f8e41fc64fee499196a59b0f4d1594fec2186777Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code to control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32". If not, we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products, the malware vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
9cc7ba098e7d73f1ba5a406536afb6daff209000bfc578d3f4921cd931a7e23fConti ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). Our Conti.Ransom exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products, the malware vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
aa9ce885d596135e2fe0d53ecbaf0150134e9b1069abbd9201051712bdcaffadRedLine looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). Our RedLine exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
ba283ac98afc491c29dfdfeab95f8ae1dc56fd58e9ff0dffa31fbe553d191fb0REvil looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware's own vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
268cdb6f1c42815be3079d4e45fd4bf006bd0c4df1203a033c3ddc55bcdb5be7Conti looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware's own vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
7dfe899925fd75a7afdeed1c0bdaa8c98cc8b87367a6bd9420dbd8bbcce7f3d3LokiLocker looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
cf6779cc7e8fc059a533a276d417fb4939fa7a55fba0ba4f6accd93a624ae862BlackBasta looks for and loads a DLL named wow64log.dll in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). Our BlackBasta exploit DLL must export the InterlockedExchange function or it fails with error. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
e1c4bddb5154781ba56ed838fb4186594dda0485db70b5497982ad2473999d9aRansom.AvosLocker ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a vulnerable DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on a hash signature or third-party product, the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
d0857628bf3ad43e446a4d3786f1d51b4eb563b6e22153fe746ce5261e315ec4LockBit ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. This can potentially allow us to execute our own code, control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
2309d126cc5ad752cce17568336336941a74bd3cad316628d72b23e6103bbdc2Backdoor.Win32.Agent.aegg malware suffers from a hardcoded credential vulnerability.
53f75d30a3e68a34d3ff3b8c12346375b8a937d60fb31ffaddd254aa7ebb9972Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Agent malware suffers from an insecure permissions vulnerability.
ae8f3ba20d2bc86c8d5582c66c01389075677ff6a3c6b3d0b14a4c7de160bb24Backdoor.Win32.GF.j malware suffers from a remote command execution vulnerability.
b1a0b3788ebf3189fc9856839cbb6a4e7b4cb2713556227380bc4d05ab71f4a0Backdoor.Win32.Cafeini.b malware suffers from a man-in-the-middle vulnerability.
6ea04b9be8a714b935c785d50f095eed0d536a8bdcc3b0eaaa74d588e9b19a41
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