exploit the possibilities

0401.txt

0401.txt
Posted May 7, 2004
Authored by Joel Eriksson | Site 0xbadc0ded.org

DeleGate versions 8.9.2 and below have a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability that exists in the SSLway filter.

tags | advisory, overflow
MD5 | 445eeac5fcf2a83fe07bb922dd565578

0401.txt

Change Mirror Download
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

==========================================================================
0xbadc0ded Advisory #03 - 2004/05/06 - DeleGate <= 8.9.2 (SSL-filter)
==========================================================================

Reference http://0xbadc0ded.org/advisories/0401.txt
PGP-key http://0xbadc0ded.org/advisories/pubkey.asc

Application DeleGate <= 8.9.2 (SSL-filter)
Discovered By Joel Eriksson <je@bitnux.com>
Researched By Joel Eriksson <je@bitnux.com>

Overview

DeleGate is a multi-purpose application level gateway which runs on
a variety of platforms, such as Unix, Windows, MacOS X and OS/2.
DeleGate can be used to mediate communication of various protocols,
including but not limited to HTTP, FTP, NTTP, SMTP, POP, Telnet and
SOCKS. It has the ability to apply caching and conversion for mediated
data, access control from clients and routing towards servers. It
is also able to translate between protocols and apply SSL (TLS) to
arbitrary protocols.

Problem

A remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the
SSLway filter that is used when SSL should be applied to a client
or server connection.

The bug can be triggered using a certificate with field contents
large enough to make the subject or issuer name larger than 256 bytes.
The vulnerability is caused by this piece of code in filters/sslway.c:

static ssl_prcert(ssl,show,outssl,outfd,what)
SSL *ssl;
char *what;
{ X509 *peer;
char subjb[256],*sb,issrb[256],*is;
char *dp,ident[256];

ident[0] = 0;
if( peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl) ){
sb = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer),subjb,1024);
is = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),issrb,1024);

The second argument to X509_NAME_oneline() is the buffer to write to and
the third argument is the size of that buffer. In the case above a
buffer size of 1024 is specified, but the buffers are only 256 bytes
large. This allows us to, for instance, overwrite the saved return
address in ssl_prcert()'s stack frame.

Exploit

X509_NAME_oneline() converts chars below 0x20 or above 0x7e to '\xHH'
where HH is the hexadecimal value of the char. This makes the bug pretty
hard to exploit on at least x86 Unix variants since we will usually need
to write chars outside that range to construct a valid address where we
can place shellcode. Creative use of a partially overwritten pointer or
address is likely to be possible, but I haven't investigated that
thouroughly.

For instance, the "peer" or "ssl" pointers may be of use, since at least
the SSL struct contains pointers to callback functions, and of course
partially overwriting the saved ebp or eip is a possibility. Any pointer
that is dereferenced and written or called to can possibly be abused.

What I find most ironic about this flaw and other flaws where a
restricted set of characters can be written is that the address space
randomization feature in kernel patches such as PaX can actually make
the flaws easier to exploit. The sendmail prescan() bug comes to mind..

The only protection against standard return-to-lib(c) techniques in PaX
is address space randomization, with 16 bits of entropy (e.g. 65536
possibilities). This means bruteforcing the offset can be done in a few
minutes on most systems.

For bugs that the attacker only has one shot to succeed with,
randomization may be considered good enough by some. However, in the
case of daemons that handle each connection in a separate process (which
is the case here) or for local SUID/SGID vulnerabilities, randomization
is no adequate protection.

To create an SSL certificate that can be used to trigger this bug, it's
easiest to use the OpenSSL command line tool:

[je@vudo ~]$ cat>openssl.cnf<<EOF
> [ req ]
> distinguished_name = req_dn
> prompt = no
> [ req_dn ]
> CN=bof
> 0.OU=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
> 1.OU=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
> 2.OU=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
> 3.OU=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
EOF
[je@vudo ~]$ openssl req -x509 -new -nodes -out bof.pem -keyout bof.pem -config openssl.cnf
Generating a 512 bit RSA private key
.........++++++++++++
..........++++++++++++
writing new private key to 'bof.pem'

For an example of an actual exploit using the return-to-lib(c) technique
to defeat address space randomization as provided by PaX, and possibly
also restricted charset such as in X509_NAME_oneline(), take a look at:

http://0xbadc0ded.org/exploits/pax-poc.tar.gz

Fix

Upgrade to DeleGate 8.9.3 or edit filters/sslway.c and change:

sb = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer),subjb,1024);
is = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),issrb,1024);

to:

sb = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer),subjb,sizeof(subjb));
is = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),issrb,sizeof(issrb));

Disclosure Timeline

2004/05/02 Notified the DeleGate team
2004/05/05 DeleGate 8.9.3 was released with fix (without notifying us)
2004/05/06 Public release

==========================================================================
The 0xbadc0ded.org team is hosted and sponsored by Bitnux: www.bitnux.com
==========================================================================

Bitnux is a company located in Sweden focused on security
research and system development. We offer services such as:

- Code Reviews
- Exploit Development
- Reverse Engineering of Code
- Security Revisions of Systems and Software
- Custom System Development for Unix/Linux/BSD and Windows

E-mail : info@bitnux.com
Phone : +46-70-228 64 16
Chat : http://bitnux.com/live

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFAmiNuqnq6VG/4jhQRAokjAKDQbc79S5KGkawUYBSAyPnVaF6RKACeJimZ
d3DpniP2OMX/HiCEHKuAGaA=
=jfZJ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Login or Register to add favorites

File Archive:

December 2020

  • Su
  • Mo
  • Tu
  • We
  • Th
  • Fr
  • Sa
  • 1
    Dec 1st
    22 Files
  • 2
    Dec 2nd
    33 Files
  • 3
    Dec 3rd
    16 Files
  • 4
    Dec 4th
    22 Files
  • 5
    Dec 5th
    0 Files
  • 6
    Dec 6th
    0 Files
  • 7
    Dec 7th
    0 Files
  • 8
    Dec 8th
    0 Files
  • 9
    Dec 9th
    0 Files
  • 10
    Dec 10th
    0 Files
  • 11
    Dec 11th
    0 Files
  • 12
    Dec 12th
    0 Files
  • 13
    Dec 13th
    0 Files
  • 14
    Dec 14th
    0 Files
  • 15
    Dec 15th
    0 Files
  • 16
    Dec 16th
    0 Files
  • 17
    Dec 17th
    0 Files
  • 18
    Dec 18th
    0 Files
  • 19
    Dec 19th
    0 Files
  • 20
    Dec 20th
    0 Files
  • 21
    Dec 21st
    0 Files
  • 22
    Dec 22nd
    0 Files
  • 23
    Dec 23rd
    0 Files
  • 24
    Dec 24th
    0 Files
  • 25
    Dec 25th
    0 Files
  • 26
    Dec 26th
    0 Files
  • 27
    Dec 27th
    0 Files
  • 28
    Dec 28th
    0 Files
  • 29
    Dec 29th
    0 Files
  • 30
    Dec 30th
    0 Files
  • 31
    Dec 31st
    0 Files

Top Authors In Last 30 Days

File Tags

Systems

packet storm

© 2020 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.

Services
Security Services
Hosting By
Rokasec
close