Government/Military Defense Telecommunications Systems.
[AUTODIN] [DMS] [DSN] [DAASC DDN] [CSP] June 1999
by hybrid [ http://hybrid.dtmf.org hybrid@dtmf.org ]
-------------------------------------------------------

HI. This is a small article designed to be an introduction to the AUTODIN,
DMS and surrounding DSN government networks. It is not intended as a
definitive guide, I have only listed a few of many networks, it is more
focused on the summerisations and definitions of these networks :) So why
write an article on this subject?, Well basically I personaly find the
networks featured in this article very interesting, in the sense that I'm
curious as to why and how there where implemented and/or integrated with the
networks that exist today. I am in no way interested in gaining access to any
of these networks, All I have done here is done a little research through the
means of http, and news articles.

About this article..

In respect of the information sources of this article, any parts I have
copied, or used as an example are enclosed in speech marks (") or begun and
ended within a --- line. ALL of the information in this article has been
obtained from public domain resources, to find out more about the systems
and networks covered in this brief article, see the http links at the end of
the file. Thanks for reading this, hope you enjoy the article..

A U T O D I N
*************
DoD Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN)

The AUTODIN digital network is a worldwide data communications network of the
Defense Communications System, and the US Department of Defense. It is
currently being upgraded and phased out by newer networks such as the DSN
(Defence Switched Network) and the Inter-Service/Agency Automated Message
Proccessing Exchange (I-S/A AMPE). This article will begin by focusing in on
the AUTODIN network, then progress to describe and summerise the more
contempory networks such as AMPE and the DSN. Currently the entire AUTODIN
network is being replaced mainly by the Defence Messaging System (DMS), again
I will discuss these networks in more detail after we've taken a look at
AUTODIN as you will provide better understanding of the newer networks.

The AUTODIN network is operated and maintained by the Defense Information
System Agency (DISA). The network is colosal in size and spans the globe,
and is intended for secret computer-controlled communications for the DoD,
and other Federal linked organisations and entitys. The whole system works on
a multi-level security platform, and operates using digital store and message
forwarding switching technolgys. Other majour government and military entitys
that use the AUTODIN network include the NSA (National Security Agency), the
DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), and other well known organisations such as
NATO. Obviously the bodies that use the AUTODIN network for secure
communications can be very secretive, so the entire network was designed to
be extreamly secure with its user access levels. An external penetration of
this network would prove to be extreamly damaging to the the privacy of the
concerned government entitys, so it has been quite difficult to obtain raw
technical specifications of this network. 

   "National security could be affected if classified messages are not
   delivered on secure lines in a timely manner." 

The AUTODIN network can be accessed many ways, but primarily via the use of
a terminal called 'GateGuard'. GateGaurd operates on a desktop or laptop
computer, and is usually installed on AUTODIN subscriber premises. Origionaly
the AUTODIN network had to have human couriers to carry messages between
organisations by hand, now the GateGuard software does all that. The system
is designed to be an electronic gateway between the AUTODIN network and the
local phone office automation system (OAS). The idea is that no sensitive
messages or data can be lost during there travels through the OAS center. At
the moment, the gateway software is being used by many AUTODIN linked entitys
such as the Navy, the Army, Air Force Marine Corps, FAA, The Coast Guard, and
the DNA. The software is very versatile, but at the same time extreamly
secure. It enables users of the network to load the software onto there own
terminals, or laptops and then connect there STU III's (via the PSTN)
directly to the AUTODIN interface, essentialy forming a portable AUTODIN
terminal. The portable terminals can be linked to the AUTODIN network via
standard phone lines, cellualr lines, or via IMMARSAT (A Satelite network).
If you are like me you are probably thinking 'hey, this cant be secure..'
wrong: It appears that this kind of link is very secure, do you really think
the DoD would use non-secure phone lines as direct links to AUTODIN?.. To
get around this security flaw, the AUTODIN terminal system is operated by a
TCC telecommunications center, and links to and from the TCC implement
strong encryption techniqes such as KG Key Generators.
 
Of course, all phone/data networks need switches and routers, so the AUTODIN
network is controled and routed by a system called ASC (The AUTODIN Switching
Center). The system is one of the primary elements in the Defense
Communications System, and operates over high-speed secured data links
spanning the globe. The ASC system handles a large amount of classified data,
(4 million messages a month). The switching system consists of 14 trunks and
75 circuits and is connected to Defense communications centers accross the
world, the system also implements DCS HF radio to mobile forces on the
ground. The system also handles data traffic for highly classified aircraft
missions for the 1st and 99th airlift sqaudrons. The switching/routing system
was designed so well it bareley suffers any downtime, and would obviously be
extreamly secure.

The AUTODIN network was origionaly a backbone and stand-alone system,
serving as a primary network for secret data transmission. In June 1998, a
communications company managed to develop a system that would enable the
AUTODIN network to be connected to the SIPRNET Defense network. Because
SIPRNET is based upon the IP protocol, it was incompatable with the AUTODIN
protocols which operate over point-to-point leased lines. The new routing
system (by Sm@rtRouters) enables the two networks to operate similtaniously
integrating each others protocols (IP + leased lines). The system works by
integrating MDTs and AISs (Automated Information Systems) onto the SIPRNET
network.  When an MDT/AIS sends a message, the locally connected router
translates the AUTODIN data stream into IP packets and sends them out on the
SIPRNET network. Then on the SIPRNET another router receives the IP packets,
translates them back into the AUTODIN format, and then passes the message to
its MDT or AIS. The sending and receiving MDTs and AISs are unaware that they
are communicating via the SIPRNET, therefore the whole system works just as
the older AUTODIN network did, but with the use of IP networks. The routing
works a little like ss#7 telephoney, whereas signals are looked up in
translation tables, and sorted in order of importance, or as the DoD would
say ('order of precedence').

The DMS System (Defense Messaging System) is one of the newest developments
designed to take place of the AUTODIN network. The new DMS network will be
fully implemented in august 1999, and as before will operate on highly
calssified information transmission links. The idea is to make the entire
DoD communications network fully automated, without the use of man-power in
the maintanance of network nodes etc. Again, the network is controled by the
DSA, and opertates on a message-to-reader protocol, I guess this eliminates
the securty flaws of similtanious message formats. The entire system is
proposed to be fully operational by the year 2OOO, and be fully accessable by
DoD members.
  
    "DMS is a network-centric application that rides on the Defense
     Information Systems Network." 
   
The Defense Automatic Addressing System Center DDN..
Where non-AUTODIN communication is concerned, the DAASC system has been
implemented. The system covers other government networks such as DISN, SNA,
DECNET etc. The system operates over the DAASC DDN file format protocol,
and is designed for the exchange of data with accountablity and tracability.
To get access to the DDN, the subscribers are expected to submit a 'DAASC
DDN' questionare, which will then be passed though various channels until it
can be verified and approved for connection to the DDN network. Once the
applicant has been approved for connection to the network, they are given a
login and password, which is used to various file transfer protocols such as
FTP on the DDN servers. The applicant will first be made to login to one of
the servers at Dayton/Tracy on a test basis, there account will subseqentialy
be activated for future use. The DAASC DDN network servers are as follows,

-------------------->
The DAASC DDN circuits at DAASC Dayton, Ohio and DAASC Tracy, California
                                      
   dayf1b.daas.dla.mil  198.97.76.200   * The DAASC system can be accessed
   dayf2b.daas.dla.mil  198.97.76.201   * via many ways, icluding dialup,
   dayf1.daas.dla.mil   192.67.251.15   * FTP etc. I do have the actual 
   dayf2.daas.dla.mil   192.67.251.16   * login procedures for each node, 
                                        * which I obtained from [public] 
   trafe1.daas.dla.mil  198.97.75.15    * HTTP, I feel it is un-nesasery to
   trafe2.daas.dla.mil  198.97.75.16    * provide such details, as I am not
   trafe1b.daas.dla.mil 198.97.74.15    * encouraging such access to these
   trafe2b.daas.dla.mil 198.97.74.16    * networks and servers. 
<--------------------

The DAASC network will terminate connectivity to the AUTODIN network at the
end of this year (1999). The DAASC system operates on many different software
and mechanisms. For example, a system called DAMES is designed to be run on
a DAASC network subscibers pc, and like conventional pstn communication, is
designed to implement phone lines as a means of transporting information with
the use of a standard modem.
                                      
------------------------->
   " DAMES: DAAS Automated Message Exchange System. A connection between
     user PC and DAAS via switched dial-up modem or via network (ftp)
     connection. PC Software is furnished free of charge to United States
     Government Activities and authorized Defense Contractors. "
                                    
   " DIELOG: DAAS Integrated E-Mail Logistics System. Allows users to
     transmit and receive data via their electronic mail system. "
                                     
   " DDN: Defense Data Network. DAASC developed a capability, and
     associated messaging format to support the exchange of JANAP-128 and
     user defined variable length message data across the DDN/DISN using
     the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). This capability has been in place
     since mid 1993. The DDN file format is the preferred method of the
     exchange of data between the DAASC, and our over 177,000 customers. "
                                      
   " DARS: DAAS AUTODIN Replacement System. A suite of programs that were
     developed to allow DAASC customers to transmit and receive data
     pattern messages via their UNIX based systems. The software will
     manage and control the transmission of data pattern traffic via
     Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) utilizing the functions of
     FTP. "
<-------------------------

Communications Support Processor (CSP)

The CSP is a message processing system that is designed to provide trusted
handeling of data traffic, it runs on a multi-level secure MLS mode operation
basis, for tactical communications. The CSP handles message switching and
security checks for communication throught the AUTODIN and surrounding
networks/systems. During the metamorph from AUTODIN to DMS, the CSP system
will run alongside and be integrated with TCP/IP encryption techniqes,
eventually the CSPs will be connected to satelite communication nodes, and
therefore eliminate the DoD's dependancy on the older AUTODIN network. The
CSP system will be used for secure writer-to-reader transmissions, using
protocols such as X.400/X.500 messaging formats. The CSP has been designed to
be able to convert DMS X.400 messages to the older AUTODIN format, and vice
versa, the TCP/IP encryption will be used to allow messages to be passed
though the JWICS WAN or SPECAT over the SIPRNET network, ensuring 'bullet-
proof' communication transmission. SMART (Secure Messaging and Routing
Terminal, is used to segregate less-sensitive information from the more
classified data, the SMART system is capable of delivering AUTODIN messages
to email users who are located either on the JWICS, SIPRNET or NIPRNET
communications networks. A 'secure' email techniqe has been developed for
this network that allows users on a secure LAN to send and recieve AUTODIN
messages via a Netscape browser, obviously Microshaft browsers where
incapable of supplying addiquit security for the DSN ;) The software is
called SMART:SecureMail, and is said to be capable of strict privacy and
authentification. Because of this network can contain very sensitive data,
the following security measures have been tested and implemented on the CSP..
      
-------------------->
     Software Security Provisions
    
     * TCP/IP Selectable Triple DES Encryption
     * User authentication and verification with automatic password aging
     * Advanced user permission schemes
     * Security audit trail storage and retrieval
     * Message level CRC on input and output
     * Color coded security labels on all windows
     * Link level and message level protocol handshaking
     * Message security validation to input/output
     * Redundant message file storage
     * Send Authentication and Validation
     * Operating System monitored and protected against unauthorized
       intrusions.
       
     Security/Accreditation/Certifications
    
     * DIA accredited for consolidated R/Y communications with AUTODIN
     * Certified DoDIIS Core/Key Product
     * DISA Category I/III Certification
     * Meets AMPE security requirements of DIA Cir 5030.58-M
     * Accredited for MLS Mode of Operation (DCID 1/16 compliant)
<-----------------------       

More on the Defense Messaging System (DMS)

The Defense Message System (DMS) is a DoD system designed to replace the
AUTODIN network, previously discussed in this article. The DMS Program was
established by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition in order to
"facilitate and coordinate development of an integrated, common-user message
system" for organizational and individual users. The main concept of the DMS
system as said before is to reduce DoD costs on the demanding AUTODIN
networks, ie: the newer DMS network is more or less fully automated, the DMS
preogram is operated and maintained by the DISA (www.disa.mil). The older
less-advanced AUTODIN system has served as a secret communications network
for the DoD and surrounding orgainisations for over 30 years, and is said to
be at times very slow, and limited to textual data, it used to operate on
a 2.4 Kbps connection. The new DMS system is capable of both textual and
graphical messages with also multi-media attachments. The DMS service is
designed to provide 3 main services to it's subscribers.. Messaging,
Information Security, and Directory services.

----->
DMS Messaging Services
are built around an X.400 Message Transfer System (MTS), a collection of all
the system components which store and forward messages to the user at their
desktop computer. DMS compliant software, and in some cases hardware, are
required to access DMS messaging services.

DMS Information Security (INFOSEC) Services
use the National Security Agency's (NSA) Multi-level Information Systems
Security Initiative (MISSI) products to provide information security
services. Guards and firewalls provide security and a certain degree of
interoperability between different user communities. FORTEZZA cards, about
the size of inch thick credit card, provide encryption and digital signature
services at the desktop. Current DoD plans that each user be issued a
FORTEZZA card; however, this requirement may be relaxed in the near future so
that only organizational releasers need FORTEZZA cards. The FORTEZZA card is
inserted into the PCMCIA slot on a DMS compliant workstation.

DMS X.500 Directory Services
include a distributed global database that contains addressing and security
information about all DMS users. The Directory Services ensure messages sent
to organizations, collective addressees (CAD's) or individuals are properly
addressed. DMS compliant workstations, such as the CGSW-III, facilitate
access to DMS directory services.
<-----

The DMS system is designed to share telecommunications circuits with other
networks, unlike the previous AUTODIN network that used dedicated trunks.
Like all networks, the DMS has its own layer of physical and meta-physical
layers, in the case of DMS we see a hardaware layer and configuration,
software, and like other networks the DMS has it's own set of procedures and
standards. The DMS system can handle secure messaging via the X.400 message
protocol, ie: messaging--distribution--proccessing, the term for the DMS
messaging system is (Message Handeling System) or MHS. All these networks
are supposed to be very secure, I doubt the DoD would use them ubless they
undergo extream levels of security testing, the data that travels the DMS is
very sensitive so the DoD and other departments would not want a security
leak on there hands, therefore the DMS network has integrated security
features to ensure the privacy an protection of classified data. Some of
these security procedures and implementations are as follows..

--->
FORTEZZA Cards
**************       
The FORTEZZA PCMCIA card provides four essential security services: data
confidentiality (privacy of information), data integrity (assures message is
unaltered), user non-repudiation (undeniable proof that the information was
sent by the sender), and user authentication (proof that the individual users
and hardware components are who or what they are supposed to be). The cards
use Type II encryption/decryption, data hashing, and digital (electronic)
signatures. Type II algorithms are those algorithms that have been approved
by the National Security Agency (NSA) for the protection of Sensitive But
Unclassified (SBU) information. NSA has approved the use of the Fortezza card
for Secret-high messages for an interim period. This policy is known as
"Fortezza for Classified" (FFC). In addition to these Type II algorithms,
FORTEZZA cards contains user certificates. Each certificate contains the name
of the issuer (the certification authority), expiration date, user name,
public key information, clearance level (e.g., Top Secret (TS), Secret (S),
Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU)) and privileges (e.g., message releaser).
   
Guards
******       
The DMS Guard is used in the end-state DMS architecture to permit the
exchange of Secret DMS messages over an Unclassified backbone by protecting
the connection to the Unclassified backbone and by performing a check on all
outgoing messages to ensure that they were encrypted. The Guard also checks
to see if the message originator and/or recipients can send and/or receive
messages from a system-high enclave. In the SBU solution set, the Guard will
permit the exchange of Unclassified DMS messages between the Secret enclave
and an Unclassified enclave.
   
Firewalls
*********       
The typical firewall ensures that only authorized message packets and service
requests are allowed to pass through the firewall. The firewall will protect
LANs, NIPRNET, Internet, or modem attack by blocking direct access to
unauthorized users. In addition to maintaining access controls to the
network, the firewall will maintain extensive audit records detailing both
successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the system.
   
Certification Authority Workstation (CAW)
*****************************************
The CAW is used to manage DMS X.500 certificates and program FORTEZZA
cryptographic cards with a user's security profile, including security
certificates, credentials and cryptographic key. The CA uses an
Administrative Directory User Agent (ADUA) to post the public portion of the
user's certificate to the Directory. Within the Coast Guard, it's expected
that CA duties will primarily be performed by the traditional CMS Custodian.
   
Organizational Registration Authority Workstation (ORAW)
********************************************************
The ORAW is a COTS workstation used by the Organizational Registration
Authority (ORA) at individual commands to assist the CA in the FORTEZZA card
management process. The ORAW enables the ORA to gather and format user
information for electronic submission to the CA in order to register the
user. This user information consists of the user's distinguished name (unique
DMS user name), release authorizations (e.g., organizational message,
individual message), and classification level (e.g., SBU, Secret). The ORAW
cannot sign user security certificates.
<----

Acronyms and abbreviations.
***************************
ACP-120 NATO classified X.400 message operation
ACP-123 Common Messaging Strategy & Procedures (X.400 Military Messaging)
ADNET Anti-Drug Network
ADUA Administrative Directory User Agent
API Application Programming Interface
ASC AUTODIN Switching Center
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Network
BAH Booz, Allen & Hamilton - Government Contractor
BMTA Backbone Message Transfer Agent
C3I Command, Control, Communications & Intelligence
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence
CA Certificate Authority
CAMS Communication Area Master Station (USCG)
CAP Component Approval Process
CARD Cost Analysis Requirements Document
CAW Certificate Authority Workstation
CCB Communications Configuration Board
CGDN Coast Guard Data Network (56Kbps backbone)
CGDN+ Coast Guard Data Network Plus (T1 backbone)
CGISS Coast Guard Intelligence Support System
CKL Compromised Key List
CMS Communications Security Material System
CN Common Name
CNO Chief, Naval Operations
COMDT Commandant USCG
COMSEC Communications Security
COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf
CRL Certificate Revocation List
CS2K COMMSYS 2000 (USCG TISCOM)
CSSAMPS Classified Standard Semi-Automated Message Processing System
CTOS Convergent Technologies Operating System (SW-II)
DAA Designated Approving Authority
DAG DMS Advisory Group
DAP Directory Access Protocol
DAPP Defense AUTODIN Phase Out/DMS Phase In Plan
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIB Directory Information Base
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DISN Defense Information Systems Network
DISP Directory Information Shadowing Protocol
DIT Directory Information Tree
DL Distribution List
DMS Defense Message System
DN Distinguished Name
DNS Distinguished Name Server
DON Department of the Navy
DRB Discrepancy Review Board
DSA Directory System Agent
DSP Directory System Protocol
DSS Digital Signature Standard
DSCS Defense Satellite Communications System
DUA Directory User Agent email Electronic Mail
EC/EDI Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange
ECP Emergency Command Precedence
EFA Engineering Field Activity
EI&A Enhanced Identification & Authentication
EOS Element of Service
ESL Enterprise Solutions, Ltd. (contractor)
EXM Enterprise eXtended Mail
FAMIS Fleet Automated Messaging Interface System
FFC Fortezza for Classified
FORTEZZA Personal credit card sized encryption device
FSP Functional Security & Performance (testing)
G/G Gate Guard
G-SCT Commandant, USCG Telecommunications Branch
GCC Global Control Center
GCCS Global Command & Control System
GCSS Global Combat Support System
GDS Global Directory Service
GENSER General Service (U, C, S, T)
GUI Graphic User Interface
HD Help Desk
HP Hewlett Packard
IDUA Integrated Directory User Agent
IEM Information Exchange Meeting
IG Implementation Group
IMTA Intermediate Message Transfer Agent
INE In-Line Network Encryption
IOC Initial Operational Capability
IOT&E Initial Operational Test & Evaluation
IP Internet Protocol
IPMS InterPersonal Message Service (P22 format)
IPT Integrated Process Team
IPWG Implementation Planning Working Group
ISO International Standards Organization
ISSO Information Systems Security Officer
ISWG Integrated Security Working Group
ITDS Information Transfer Distribution System
JANAP Joint Army Navy Air Force Publication
JMCISS
JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System
KEA Key Encryption Algorithm
KMID Key Material Identifier
KP Key Processor (LMD/KP)
LAN Local Area Network
LANTAREA Commander Atlantic Area USCG
LAT Logistics Action Team
LCC Local Control Center
LDAP Local Directory Access Protocol
LMD Local Management Device (LMD/KP)
LMFS Lockheed Martin Federal Systems
MADMAN Mail & Directory Management
MAFB Maxwell Air Force Base
MAISRC Major Acquisition Information Systems Review Committee
MAN Metro Area Network
MARCORPSYSCOM Marine Corps Systems Command
MCEB Military Communications Electronics Board
MCS Message Conversion System
MDT Message Distribution Terminal
MEK Message Encryption Key
MFG Multi-Function Gateway
MFI Multi-Function Interpreter
MHS Message Handling System
MIB Management Information Base
MIME Multi-purpose Internet Mail Extensions
MISSI Multi-Level Information System Security Initiative
ML Mail List
MLA Mail List Agent
MLS Multi-Level Security
MM Military Message
MMHS Military Message Handling System
MMS Multi-Level Mail Server
MPRS Message Prep & Review Software (USCG)
MROC Multi-Command Required Operational Characteristics
MS Message Store
MSP Message Security Protocol
MTA Message Transfer Agent
MTDS Message Transfer Distribution System
MTS Message Transfer System
MWS Management Work Station
NAVCOMPARS Naval Communications Processing & Routing System
NAVMACS Navy Modular Automated Communications System
NAVMACS II Navy Modular Automated Communications System 2nd Generation
NCP-II Naval Communications Processing & Routing System 2nd Generation
NCTAMS Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station
NCTC Naval Computer & Telecommunications Command
NCTS Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station
NDN Non Delivery Notice
NDR Non Delivery Report
NIPRNET Non-classified Internet Protocol Routed NETwork
NISE East Naval In Service Engineering East
NOVA NSA developed Message Handling System
NSA National Security Agency
NSANET National Security Agency Network
NSAP Network Service Access Point
NSM Network Security Manager
NSS Network Security System
O Operational Immediate Precedence
O/R Originator/Recipient
OA Operational Assessment
OLE Object Linking & Embedding
OM Operations Manager
OPWG Operations Planning Working Group
ORA Organizational Registration Authority
ORAW Organizational Registration Authority Work Station
OSC Operations Systems Center (USCG, Martinsburg, WV)
OSD(C3I) Office of the Secretary of Defense for Command, Control &
Communications
OT&E Operational Test & Evaluation
OU Organizational Unit
P Priority Precedence
P772 Military Message Format
PAA Policy Approving Authority
PACAREA Commander Pacific Area USCG
PCA Policy Creation Authority
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association
PDU Protocol Data Unit
PIN Personal Identification Number
PLA Plain-Language Address
PMO Program Management Office
PMSS Program Management Support System (Database)
PN Personal Name
POM Program Operating Memorandum
POP Point of Presence
PRMD Private Management Domains
PUA Profiling User Agent
R Routine Precedence
RCC Regional Control Center
RCDB Routing & Configuration Database
RCP Resource Change Proposal
RDN Relative Distinguished Name
RI Routing Indicators
ROMC Required Operational Messaging Characteristics
S/A Service Agency
SA System Administrator
SBU Sensitive But Unclassified
SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information
SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SDA System Design Architecture
SDN Secure Data Network (USCG Dial-up via STU-III)
SEC Single Enabling Capability
SEMCOR Government Contractor
SEWG System Evolution Working Group
SHA Security Hash Algorithm
SIMWHG Special Intelligence Message Handling Working Group
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Routed NETwork
SMS Service Management System
SMTA Subordinate Message Transfer Agent
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SNS Secure Network Server
SO Security Officer
SPAWAR Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command
SRA Sub-Registration Authority
SSAMPS Standard Semi-Automated Message Processing System
ST&E Security Test & Evaluation
STU-III Secure Telephone Unit 3rd Generation
SW-II CG Standard Work Station II
SW-III CG Standard Work Station III
TAIS Target Architecture & Implementation Strategy
TCC Telecommunications Center
TCP/IP Transport Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
TEWG Test & Evaluation Working Group
TIIWG Transition Implementation & Integration Working Group
TISCOM Telecommunication & Information Systems Command (USCG)
TT Trouble Ticket
TWG Tactical Working Group
UA User Agent
UNIX Common Operating System
USAF U. S. Air Force
USCG U. S. Coast Guard
USMC U. S. Marine Corps
USMTF U. S. Message Text Format
USN U. S. Navy
VPN Virtual Private Network
W Critic Precedence
WAGB Icebreaker (USCG)
WAN Wide Area Network
WHEC High Endurance Cutter (USCG)
WinNT Windows NT Operating System (SW-III)
WMEC Medium Endurance Cutter (USCG)
X.400 Messaging Message Handling System Standard
X.500 Directory Directory System Standard
Y Emergency Command Precedence (ECP)
Z Flash Precedence

References & Source Material
**************************** 
U. S. Navy DMS Master Plan 
U. S. Navy DMS Transition Plan 
U. S. Coast Guard DMS Transition Plan 
Lockheed Martin Federal Systems (LMFS) DMS Product Guide 
U. S. Navy DMS Ordering Guide 
DMS System Design Architecture (SDA) 
http://www.disa.mil/
http://fmpweb.nctsw.navy.mil/manual/ManolAUTODIN.htm
http://www.andrews.af.mil/89cg/789cs/System_Flight/autodin.htm
http://www.periscope.ucg.com/terms/t0000059.html
http://www.periscope.usni.com/demo/terms/t0000059.html
http://www.cio.dla.mil/dms/AUTODIN.htm
http://199.209.74.26/mastats.htm
http://www.ld.com/cbd/archive/1995/01(January)/24-Jan-1995/Dawd001.
http://www.af.mil/news/Jan1999/n19990115_990057.html
http://www.daas.dla.mil/daashome/daasc_dars.htm
http://daynt2.daas.dla.mil/daasc_dars.htm
----------

Shouts to D4RKCYDE 9X and B4B0.    
http://darkcyde.system7.org        
http://hybrid.dtmf.org             
http://b4b0.org
http://ninex.com

hybrid@dtmf.org

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