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Posted Jan 10, 2000

Subject SATAN / SANTA specifics for SUN systems Date 06-Apr-95

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===============================================================================
>> CERT-NL, 01-Mar-2000 <<
>> All CERT-NL information has been moved to http://cert.surfnet.nl. Links <<
>> to CERT-NL information contained in this advisory are therefore outdated. <<
>> <<
>> CERT-NL also has stopped the CERT-CC-Mirror service. Due to this the <<
>> links to the CERT-CC mirror are obsolete. Visit the CERT-CC site for the <<
>> complete CERT-CC advisory texts: http://www.cert.org <<
===============================================================================
===============================================================================
Security Advisory CERT-NL
===============================================================================
Author/Source : Nico de Koo Index :S-95-10.SUN
Distribution : World Page : 1
Classification: External Version: 2
Subject : SATAN / SANTA specifics for SUN systems Date : 06-Apr-95
===============================================================================

By courtesy of SUN Microsystems we received SATAN/SANTA information
specific for SUN systems, presented below in a slightly abridged version.

Version 2 of this document reflects the update of the SUN Advisory.

=============================================================================

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00130A, 5 April 1995
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

ADDENDUM

This is an amended version of Sun Microsystems Security Bulletin #00130
containing an updated list of recently released security patches.

BULLETIN TOPICS


In this bulletin Sun discusses the potential impact of the release of
"SATAN", a public domain software package which probes UNIX systems for
security holes. We also include here a list of available security
patches for each supported SUNOS release, and a set of procedures we
recommend to help protect Sun systems against external attack.

SATAN was released today, 5 April 1995.

This package is the same one discussed in the recent CERT bulletin
CA-95:06.


I. Discussion of SATAN's potential impact on customer systems.

II. List of currently available Sun security patches.

III. Set of recommended security procedures.


APPENDICES

A. How to obtain Sun security patches

B. How to report or inquire about Sun security problems

C. How to obtain Sun security bulletins

- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00130, 4 April 1995
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Discussion of SATAN's potential impact

Many people have asked for our evaluation of the package. What can
it do? How will it be used? What steps, if any, should
administrators of Sun systems take in reaction to the software's
release? Our answers here are based on our study of a pre-release
version made available to UNIX vendors last month.

A. What can it do?

SATAN provides a new and easy way to test UNIX systems for the
presence of several well-known security holes. None of the
problems probed for are new. Each one (in the version we have
seen) has already been discussed in previous CERT and Sun bulletins
and each can be countered either by installing the appropriate
patch or fixing a system configuration flaw. SATAN does not
introduce a distinct new threat to UNIX systems.


B. How will it be used?

Its authors, free-lance programmers Dan Farmer of the U.S. and
Wietse Venema of the Netherlands, intend SATAN as a protective tool
for system and network administrators. Its simple point-and-click
interface and broad distribution, however, make it likely that
SATAN will also be used to locate vulnerable systems for malicious
reasons.

C. What steps should system administrators take?

Sun recommends that customers:

1. Install all available security patches. A comprehensive list is
included in this bulletin.

2. Tighten up system and network configurations to close the other
security holes probed by SATAN. We have included here a set of
specific recommendations as a guide for your use.

3. Obtain a copy of SATAN and study it. Learn how it can be used
and familiarize yourself with its attacks.

II. List of currently available security patches.

Solaris 1.1 (SunOS 4.1.3) Patches Containing Security Fixes:
- --------------------------------------------------------------

100103-12 SunOS 4.1.3;4.1.3_U1: set file permissions to more secure mode
100272-07 SunOS 4.1.3: Security update for in.comsat.
100296-04 SunOS 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3: netgroup exports to world
100305-15 SunOS 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3: lpr Jumbo Patch
100372-02 * SunOS 4.1.1;4.1.2;4.1.3: tfs and c2 do not work together
100377-19 SunOS 4.1.3: sendmail jumbo patch
100383-06 SunOS 4.0.3;4.1;4.1.1;4.1.2;4.1.3: rdist security and hard links enhancement,
100482-06 SunOS 4.1;4.1.1;4.1.2;4.1.3: ypserv and ypxfrd fix, plus DNS fix
100507-06 SunOS 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3: tmpfs jumbo patch
100513-04 * SunOS 4.1.1;4.1.2;4.1.3: Jumbo tty patch
100564-07 * SunOS 4.1.2, 4.1.3: C2 Jumbo patch
100567-04 SunOS 4.1,4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3: mfree and icmp redirect security patch
100593-03 SunOS 4.1.3: Security update for dump.
100623-03 SunOS 4.1.2;4.1.3: UFS jumbo patch
100630-02 SunOS 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.3: SECURITY: methods to exploit login/su
100631-01 SunOS 4.1 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3: env variables can be used to exploit login
100890-10 SunOS 4.1.3: domestic libc jumbo patch
100891-10 SunOS 4.1.3: international libc jumbo patch
100909-03 SunOS 4.1.1;4.1.2;4.1.3: Security update for syslogd.
101072-02 SunOS 4.1.1;4.1.2;4.1.3: Non-related data filled the last block tarfile
101080-01 SunOS 4.1.1 4.1.2 4.1.3: security problem with expreserve
101200-03 SunOS 4.1.3: Breach of security using modload
101480-01 SunOS 4.1.1;4.1.2;4.1.3: Security update for in.talkd.
101481-01 SunOS 4.1.3: Security update for shutdown.
101482-01 SunOS 4.1.3, 4.1.2, 4.1.1: Security update for write.
101640-03 SunOS 4.1.3: in.ftpd logs password info when -d option is used.
102023-03 SunOS 4.1.3: Root access possible via forced passwd race condition
100448-02 OpenWindows 3.0: loadmodule is a security hole.
100452-68 OpenWindows 3.0: XView 3.0 Jumbo Patch
100478-01 OpenWindows 3.0: xlock crashes leaving system open

Solaris 1.1.1 (SunOS 4.1.3_U1) Patches Containing Security Fixes:
- -------------------------------------------------------------------

100103-12 SunOS 4.1.3;4.1.3_U1: set file permissions to more secure mode
101434-03 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: lpr Jumbo Patch
101436-08 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: patch for mail executable
101440-01 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: security problem: methods to exploit login/su
101558-04 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: international libc jumbo patch
101579-01 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: Security problem with expreserve for Solaris 1.1.1
101587-01 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: security patch for mfree and icmp redirect
101621-02 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: Jumbo tty patch
101665-04 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: sendmail jumbo patch
101679-01 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: Breach of security using modload
101759-02 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: domestic libc jumbo patch
102060-01 SunOS 4.1.3_U1: Root access possible via passwd race condition
100448-02 OpenWindows 3.0: loadmodule is a security hole.
100452-68 OpenWindows 3.0: XView 3.0 Jumbo Patch
100478-01 OpenWindows 3.0: xlock crashes leaving system open

Solaris 1.1.2 (SunOS 4.1.4) Patches Containing Security Fixes:
- ----------------------------------------------------------------

102414-01 SunOS 4.1.4: mail jumbo patch
102423-01 SunOS 4.1.4: Sendmail jumbo patch
100448-02 OpenWindows 3.0: loadmodule is a security hole.
100452-68 OpenWindows 3.0: XView 3.0 Jumbo Patch
100478-01 OpenWindows 3.0: xlock crashes leaving system open

Solaris 2.2 Patches Containing Security Fixes:
- ------------------------------------------------

100999-71 SunOS 5.2: jumbo kernel patch
101090-01 SunOS 5.2: fixes security hole in expreserve
101301-03 SunOS 5.2: security bug & tar fixes
101842-01 SunOS 5.2: sendmail jumbo patch

Solaris 2.3 Patches Containing Security Fixes:
- ------------------------------------------------

101318-70 SunOS 5.3: Jumbo patch for kernel (includes libc, lockd)
101327-08 SunOS 5.3: security and miscellaneous tar fixes
101572-03 SunOS 5.3: cron and at fixes
101582-03 * SunOS 5.3: POINT PATCH: Password aging & NIS+ don't work (together)
101615-02 SunOS 5.3: miscellaneous utmp fixes
101620-01 * SunOS 5.3: keyserv has a file descriptor leak
101631-02 SunOS 5.3: kd and ms fixes
101712-01 SunOS 5.3: uucleanup isn't careful enough when sending mail
101736-03 * SunOS 5.3: nisplus patch
101739-07 SunOS 5.3: sendmail jumbo patch - security
101786-02 * SunOS 5.3: inetd fixes
102034-01 SunOS 5.3: portmapper security hole
102167-01 SunOS 5.3: dns fix
102220-02 * SunOS 5.3: libbsm fixes
101513-06 * OpenWindows 3.3: Security loophole cm with access list and permissions
101889-03 OpenWindows 3.3: filemgr forked executable ff.core has a security hole.

Solaris 2.4 Patches Containing Security Fixes:
- ------------------------------------------------

101945-23 SunOS 5.4: jumbo patch for kernel
102044-01 SunOS 5.4: bug in mouse code makes "break root" attack possible
102066-04 SunOS 5.4: sendmail bug fixes
102070-01 SunOS 5.4: Bugfix for rpcbind/portmapper
102216-01 SunOS 5.4: NFS client starts using unreserved UDP port numbers
102218-02 * SunOS 5.4: libbsm fixes
102277-02 * SunOS 5.4: nss_nisplus.so.1 fixes
102336-01 * SunOS 5.4: POINT PATCH: 1091205 - Password aging & NIS+ don't work
102922-01 * SunOS 5.4: inetd fix

Solaris 2.4_x86 Patches Containing Security Fixes:
- ------------------------------------------------

101946-12 SunOS 5.4_x86: jumbo patch for kernel
101982-02 SunOS 5.4_x86: login & security fixes
102064-04 SunOS 5.4_x86: sendmail bug fixes
102071-01 SunOS 5.4_x86: Bugfix for rpcbind/portmapper
102217-01 SunOS 5.4_x86: NFS client starts using unreserved UDP port numbers
102219-02 * SunOS 5.4_x86: libbsm fixes

*=indicates if a security patch is not listed in the Recommended Patch List,
usually because the patch is determined to be more application dependent
and may not be generally relevant.

III. Set of recommended procedures


........................................................................
Improving security on your Sun workstation
4 April 1995
........................................................................

This document is intended as a "cookbook" for improving security on
Sun workstations.

In addition to following the steps below, you should consult the following
CERT documents for guidance on improving the security of your systems:

ftp://info.cert.org/tech_tips/security_info
ftp://info.cert.org/tech_tips/anonymous_ftp
ftp://info.cert.org/tech_tips/packet_filtering


Notes on this document:

SunOS versions 4.x will be referenced as "4.x", Solaris versions 2.x
will be referenced as "5.x" in this document.

........................................................................


a. Security patches

Install all applicable security patches for the OS you are running.

It is important to keep up with the security patches. The patches
change over time. Keep your internet machines up to date. SunSolve
Online provides an easy way of doing this: select the appropriate
patches, and add them to your "notify" list. You will be notified
any time the patches are revised.

b. Single user boot security

Set up servers to ensure a password must be given upon single user
boot. Additionally, remote login as root should be disabled.
Root logins can still be accomplished, but users must first login
as a user and then su to root. This is done for logging and
accountability purposes.

SunOS:

Remove all of the "secure" keywords from all /etc/ttytab entries.

Solaris:

Include the line "CONSOLE=/dev/console" in /etc/default/login
file.

c. Trust

Servers should not trust any other server or host, including dump
servers. "Trust" is defined as trusted network access via the files:
/.rhosts, /etc/hosts.equiv and ~/.rhosts

If servers must trust others, trust should be given to a user as well
as a host. The /.rhosts, /etc/hosts.equiv and ~/.rhosts file should
contain two entries per line, one entry for the host and an additional
entry for the particular user that is to be trusted from the host.
Example:

Trust user bgp from host umnp1

umnp1 bgp

d. Root's Path

Root's path should be restricted. The root user should not include
the current directory in the search path. Root's .cshrc, .login or
.profile files should not contain the current directory in the
execute path for commands. remove any "." or ":.:" entry from /.cshrc,
/.profile and /.login files.

e. NIS

Master slave servers should not use NIS for password information.
Additionally, under SunOS, NIS clients should contain strings which
specify the server in their /etc/password file of the form
"+servername" as opposed to the default of "+::-:0:". Under 5.x, NIS
clients should bind using a list of servers (see ypinit -c) as
opposed to using a broadcast to find a server.

f. Aliases

Remove the "decode" alias in /etc/aliases. The file permissions for
/etc/aliases should be 0644 and owned by root.

g. Login accounting file permissions

The /etc/utmp file should not be world writable.

chmod 644 /etc/utmp

h. Turn off all unnecessary RPC services

Comment out the rpc services that aren't needed in the
/etc/inetd.conf file (4.x) or the /etc/inet/inetd.conf file.
In particular, disable the following services: rexd, fingerd, systat,
netstat, rusersd, sprayd, and *uucpd.

Make sure to restart inetd once the changes are made:

5.x:
# ps -ef | grep inetd
4.x:
# ps -auxww | grep inetd

both:

root 121 1 80 Mar 22 ? 2:52 /usr/sbin/inetd -s

# kill -HUP 121

i. TFTPD

Disable tftpd. If it must be running, configure it to run within
a particular directory by specifying the "-s /tftpboot" in the
/etc/inetd.conf file (4.x) or the /etc/inet/inetd.conf file (5.x).

4.x:

tftp dgram udp wait root /usr/etc/in.tftpd in.tftpd -s /tftpboot

5.x:

tftp dgram udp wait root /usr/sbin/in.tftpd in.tftpd -s /tftpboot

j. Passwords

All local and NIS passwords should have a password. The *uucp, bin,
audit, sys, ftp, nobody, daemon, news and sync accounts should be
disabled by adding a "*" in the password field (4.x) or a "NP" in
the /etc/shadow file password field (5.x).

The login shell should be set to /bin/false for all the specified
accounts as well. The uucp accounts (if any) should have the shell
set to /usr/lib/uucp/uucico.

k. UID restrictions

No accounts other than root should have the user id (UID) of 0.

l. NFS Export restrictions

NFS exports should be restricted to particular hosts, and no exports
should be writable.

For example, in 4.x the /etc/exports file could contain:

/home -access=upk1,ro

or for 5.x the /etc/dfs/dfstab file could contain:

share -F nfs -o ro=upk1 /home

m. NFS mount restrictions

NFS mount file systems with the "nosuid" options if at all:

4.x:

mount -o nosuid,bg big1:/home /bighome

5.x:

mount -F nfs -o nosuid,bg big1:/home /bighome

n. NIS configuration

If the server is an NIS master server, it should be configured not to
include the password maps, or at least not include the actual
encrypted password information. Additionally, yppasswdd should be
turned off on the NIS server since NIS clients will not need to
change the NIS password information.

o. EEPROM Security

The eeprom on the server should be set to require a password before
being booted from CD or tape from the prom monitor:

eeprom secure=command

p. IP Spoofing

Many of the above attacks can be combined with IP spoofing
to allow false IP authentication to occur. Configure firewall
routers to prevent externally initiated connections, as
described in the recent bulletins on IP spoofing (like CERT-NL
advisory S-95-04).

q. Passwords

If you ftp or telnet or rlogin across an insecure network,
your password has traveled cleartext across networks which
might be traced by sniffers. Change your password as soon as
possible.

r. Security Checks

Perform regular security checks of the system (weekly at least).



APPENDICES

A. How to obtain Sun security patches

1. If you have a support contract

Customers with Sun support contracts can obtain the patches listed
here--and all other Sun security patches--from:

- Local Sun answer centers, worldwide
- SunSolve Online, and SunSITEs worldwide

The patches are available via World Wide Web at http://sunsolve1.sun.com.

You should also contact your answer center if you have a support
contract and:

- You need assistance in installing a patch
- You need additional patches
- You want an existing patch ported to another platform
- You believe you have encountered a bug in a Sun patch
- You want to know if a patch exists, or when one will be ready

2. If you do not have a support contract

Sun also makes its security patches available to customers who do
not have a support contract, via anonymous ftp:

ftp://ftp.nic.surfnet.nl/surfnet/net-security/cert-nl/patches/sun-fixes


3. About the checksums

Patches announced in a Sun security bulletin are uploaded to the
ftp.*.net sites just before the bulletin is released, and seldom
updated. In contrast, the "supported" patch databases are
refreshed nightly, and will often contain newer versions of a patch
incorporating changes which are not security-related.

So that you can quickly verify the integrity of the patch files
themselves, we supply checksums for the tar archives in each
bulletin. The listed checksums should always match those on the
ftp.*.net systems. (The rare exceptions are listed in the
"checksums" file there.)

Normally, the listed checksums will also match the patches on the
SunSolve database. However, this will not be true if we have
changed (as we sometimes do) the README file in the patch after the
bulletin has been released.

In the future we plan to provide checksum information for the
individual components of a patch as well as the compressed archive
file. This will allow customers to determine, if need be, which
file(s) have been changed since we issued the bulletin containing
the checksums.

If you would like assistance in verifying the integrity of a patch
file please contact this office or your local answer center.


B. How to report or inquire about Sun security problems

If you discover a security problem with Sun software or wish to
inquire about a possible problem, contact one or more of the
following:

- Your local Sun answer centers
- Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT
- This office. Address postal mail to:

Sun Security Coordinator
MS MPK2-04
2550 Garcia Avenue Mountain
View, CA 94043-1100

Phone: 415-688-9081
Fax: 415-688-9101
E-mail: security-alert@Sun.COM

We strongly recommend that you report problems to your local Answer
Center. In some cases they will accept a report of a security bug
even if you do not have a support contract. An additional notification
to the security-alert alias is suggested but should not be used as your
primary vehicle for reporting a bug.


C. How to obtain Sun security bulletins

1. Subscription information

Sun Security Bulletins are available free of charge as part of
our Customer Warning System. It is not necessary to have a Sun
support contract in order to receive them.

To subscribe to this bulletin series, send mail to the address
"security-alert@Sun.COM" with the subject "subscribe CWS
your-mail-address" and a message body containing affiliation and
contact information. To request that your name be removed from the
mailing list, send mail to the same address with the subject
"unsubscribe CWS your-mail-address". Do not include other requests
or reports in a subscription message.

Due to the volume of subscription requests we receive, we cannot
guarantee to acknowledge requests. Please contact this office if
you wish to verify that your subscription request was received, or
if you would like your bulletin delivered via postal mail or fax.

2. Obtaining old bulletins

Sun Security Bulletins are archived on ftp.uu.net (in the same
directory as the patches) and on SunSolve. Please try these
sources first before contacting this office for old bulletins.

------------
==============================================================================
CERT-NL is the Computer Emergency Response Team for SURFnet customers. SURFnet
is the Dutch network for educational, research and related institutes. CERT-NL
is a member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST).

All CERT-NL material is available under:
http://cert.surfnet.nl/

In case of computer or network security problems please contact your local
CERT/security-team or CERT-NL (if your institute is NOT a SURFnet customer
please address the appropriate (local) CERT/security-team).

CERT-NL is one/two hour(s) ahead of UTC (GMT) in winter/summer,
i.e. UTC+0100 in winter and UTC+0200 in summer (DST).

Email: cert-nl@surfnet.nl ATTENDED REGULARLY ALL DAYS
Phone: +31 302 305 305 BUSINESS HOURS ONLY
Fax: +31 302 305 329 BUSINESS HOURS ONLY
Snailmail: SURFnet bv
Attn. CERT-NL
P.O. Box 19035
NL - 3501 DA UTRECHT
The Netherlands

NOODGEVALLEN: 06 22 92 35 64 ALTIJD BEREIKBAAR
EMERGENCIES : +31 6 22 92 35 64 ATTENDED AT ALL TIMES
CERT-NL'S EMERGENCY PHONENUMBER IS ONLY TO BE USED IN CASE OF EMERGENCIES:
THE SURFNET HELPDESK OPERATING THE EMERGENCY NUMBER HAS A *FIXED*
PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH YOUR ALERT AND WILL IN REGULAR CASES RELAY IT
TO CERT-NL IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER. CERT-NL WILL THEN CONTACT YOU.
===============================================================================

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