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trojans.txt

trojans.txt
Posted Feb 8, 2000
Authored by Mixter | Site mixter.void.ru

trojans.txt is a paper that deals with methods of analyzing, debugging and disassembling unix binaries, looking for viruses, trojans and other malicious code.

tags | trojan
systems | unix
SHA-256 | 2f61e64d50b8c2d733f5e9c50f4c109ea0f3666891cdbb2f2f1d557a1acfded7

trojans.txt

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Finding and analyzing trojans under unix
==========================================

Security papers - mixtersecurity.tripod.com/papers.html


This paper will try to give a brief introduction to methods of analyzing
executables under unix to recapitulate the operations they are intended to
perform on a system. These methods can be applied to the investigation of
captured trojans and other malicious software, and they are also useful when
you want to analyze pre-compiled software to ensure that it can be
considered as trusted.

Using open source software, one of the opportunities that users have is
that they can review the programs source, and compile their own, trusted
version of a program. However, there can also be hidden trojan features in
source codes which can't be spotted easily. Some of the sophisticated source
code backdoors include using system() or exec calls to pass commands to a shell,
creating intended overflows or insecure conditions which are easy to exploit,
or directly evaluating assembler instructions by pointing a function pointer
("void (*fp)()") at binary strings and calling it. However, there are also
cases where programs are pre-compiled, for example, as part of a rpm or similar
binary package from an untrusted source, or as a part of a commercial
application, or if you have binaries lying around compiled from source that
you haven't checked and which you might have deleted after compilation.

Fortunately, most unix environments provide a variety of development and
debugging tools that make analysis of binaries easy. First of all, this
should be done from a "clean", i.e. trusted, environment, where a captured
binary is examined, but has not been executed. Of course it should be done
from an unprivileged account. If you really have to find and analyze
possible trojans on an untrusted system, you should use sash, the
stand-alone shell, which must be statically linked. The only thing that
could then be acting as trojan/backdoor would be a kernel module wrapping
open and read system calls, and such trojans are not used very often.
Using the stand-alone shell, the most useful commands are -ls, -more and -ed.

The first thing that should be done to find trojans is to look for obvious
patterns in the binary. This can be done by using 'strings', or by viewing
it with 'less'. My favorite common editor for viewing binaries is 'joe',
which is useful for displaying and editing almost all non-ascii characters.
Patterns typically include hard-coded file names that are accessed by the
program, ascii strings that the program writes to other files, or static
strings it might search for, as well as names of the library functions it
uses, if it isn't stripped. It might also contain names of unusual libraries,
or libraries it isn't intended to use, if it is a trojan. The best thing to
do to check this is using 'ldd' to determine the library dependencies, and
'file' to determine whether the program is stripped, statically linked, or
in any other special format.

As a next step of program analysis, the function calls that the program
makes should be traced, and compared with the function that the program is
actually supposed to perform. System calls can be traced on most systems
using strace, ktrace on BSD, or truss on Solaris. Interesting functions are
all file accesses (open/stat/access/read/write), socket calls, especially
listen(), and fork() calls. Child processes can be traced with the -f option
under all these programs. A similar, interesting tool for Linux is ltrace,
which recognizes all library calls a program makes instead of system programs,
which allows creating a very detailed profile of the program.

Last but not least, the program can and should be disassembled, preferrably
using gdb. Disassembling basically means locating functions inside the
binary and translating back the binary code to assembler instructions. To
start off, the entry point of the program must be located. This is the
start address of the function that will be executed on program startup,
which is, if the program systems have not been stripped or modified otherwise,
always 'main' or '_start'. By following that function, the programs executional
flow can be traced, and one can exactly see what the program is able to do
and what not. Particularly of interest are the call instructions (function
calls), and jmp/int instructions, if it uses non-library kernel calls or
is statically compiled. Typical entries for x86 binaries look like this:

0x8048f97 <_start+7>: call 0x8048eac <atexit>
0x8048f9d <_start+13>: call 0x8048dcc <__libc_init_first>
0x69662 <__open+18>: int $0x80

A last detail that might need to be observed are the strings contained in
the program at certain locations, and the arguments passed to functions.
String (contained in character or other buffers) entries are referenced by
a program in certain common ways. An example:

void do_something (char *y) {};
char *h = "hello world";
int main() {
char *text = h;
int x = getchar();
do_something(text);
return 0;
}

This is equal to the following assembler instructions:

0x804847e <main+6>: movl 0x804950c,%eax
0x8048483 <main+11>: movl %eax,0xfffffffc(%ebp)
Store a pointer at a relative address. The pointer references the
address of the static, hard-coded string "hello world" in the code.

0x8048486 <main+14>: call 0x80483cc <getchar>
0x804848b <main+19>: movl %eax,%eax
0x804848d <main+21>: movl %eax,0xfffffff8(%ebp)
Call a function, getchar, and move the result (it apparently
returns an int which is stored in the EAX register) onto the
stack. EBP is the base pointer which is used to reference addresses
relative to the current function on the stack.

0x8048490 <main+24>: movl 0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax
0x8048493 <main+27>: pushl %eax
0x8048494 <main+28>: call 0x8048470 <do_something>
Here, the string pointer is fetched back, and pushed as first and only
argument to the function do_something onto the stack. It is therefore
obvious that the string referenced by the pointer is passed to the function.

We can now manually dereference the pointer using the 'x' command:

(gdb) x/a 0x804950c
/* x option /a displays the memory content as an address, to
see which address a pointer actually points to */
0x804950c <h>: 0x80484fc <_fini+28>
(gdb) x/s 0x80484fc
/* x option /s displays the memory content as string up to the
point where a terminating \0 is found */
0x80484fc <_fini+28>: "hello world"

In big and complex programs, I admit that this can take some time, until
all of the programs possible operations are found, however, it is a quite
fool proof method of determining what the program really does, no matter
if it is precompiled, statically linked, stripped or in any other form.

_______________________________________________________________________________

Mixter <mixter@newyorkoffice.com>
http://members.tripod.com/mixtersecurity
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