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Insecure sprintf Of C

Insecure sprintf Of C
Posted Dec 20, 2021
Authored by x90c

This is a brief write up discussing insecure functions susceptible to classic buffer overflows.

tags | paper, overflow
SHA-256 | 6c56ef6f21fb5c517c4f05fbff6461b2f130d800355ad39593d8b2f06bee3943

Insecure sprintf Of C

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--
Subject: Insecure sprintf of C
Author: x90 <x90cx90c1 [at] gmail.com>, RealName: KyongJu, Jung
Date: 2021.12.17
Comment: I changed my a.k.a from x90c to x90
--


[TOC]

--------------------------------------------------------
1. Insecure Code
1.1 strcpy, sprintf, snprintf Insecure Code examples
1.2 reversing the string copy routine
2. Secure sprintf function calling
2.1 bound-checking method
2.2 format checking method
2.3 length checking method
2.4 snprintf function use
3. Code
4. Future Research
5. Conclusion
--------------------------------------------------------

Hello~ I'm a.k.a x90, a security researcher from south korea.

I decided to become a security researcher that specializes in
source code auditing, and so, I'm starting my research from today.
In 17th of December ~ 2022, I will try to overcome the hurdle to
research sky high road to point out the security bugs.
At least, more undermining or understanding of the pron bugs and
security bugs. Many thanks to all readers :-).


1. Insecure Code

1.1 strcpy, sprintf, snprintf Insecure Code examples

strcpy() and gets() are easily vulnerable for the stack based
buffer overflow. Hackers and programmers use sprintf and
snprintf function for C programming. But sometimes sprintf can be
vulnerable against string copy, and it occured as a strcpy variation
effect. As you know below function call is same.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
// strcpy() buffer overflow.
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf[32];

strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
}
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
// sprintf() buffer overflow.
...
// it's buffer overflow by sprintf function without bounds-checking routine.
sprintf(buf, "long buffer is vulnerable.%s%s", argv[1], argv[2]);
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


|snprintf function|

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
unsigned int buflen = atoi(argv[1]);
unsigned char buf[buflen];
int j = 0;

j = snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s\n", argv[2]);
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

above code's second argument is copy length ... but as you can see,
it's user-controlled. and ./program 150 "AAA...." then it's buffer
overflow. also mis coded length will be pron to vulnerable codes.

1.2 reversing the string copy routine
If you want to find in buffer overflow in '%s' format in sprintf
(1) find sprintf calls (2) check no-bounds check or vulnerable
(3) if youth could found a bug then writing a PoC.


2. Secure sprintf function calling

2.1 bound-checking method
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
...
char buf[128];
int clen = 26 + strlen(argv[1]) + strlen(argv[2]);

memset(buf, 0x0, 128);

/*
First way to the secure the code is by adding bounds-checking before sprintf.
if clen is size_t(unsigned int) type then no needs 'clen < 0' checking.
*/
if((clen >= sizeof(buf) || clen < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "error to be occured!\n");
return(-1);
}

sprintf(buf, "long buffer is vulnerable.%s%s", argv[1], argv[2]);

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

2.2 format checking method

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
...
char buf[128];

memset(buf, 0x0, 128);

/*
it's written 26+50+50(-2)=124 bytes into 128 buffer stack variable.
secure coding. second coding way!
*/
sprintf(buf, "long buffer is vulnerable.%50s%50s", argv[1], argv[2]);
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

2.3 length checking method

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
size_t buflen = snprintf(0, 0, "%s", message);
char *buf = malloc(buflen) + 1;

memset(buf, 0x0, sizeof(buflen) + 1);

if(buf)
{
sprintf(buf, "%s", message);

buf[buflen] = '\x00';
// code here ...
}
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

2.4 snprintf function use

snprintf function gives us length check-copy string to dest char *.
many researchers use snprintf and sprintf... same effect what is good
either.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
char buf[32];

// only buf sizeof length char * copying! (very simple code)
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s", argv[1]);
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

3. Code

I code a check-sc.c for the program for search vulnerable snprintf codes.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Pseudo-Code #1:
/*
* (1) abuf = readlinea()
* (2) find "sprintf("
* (3) if((strstr(abuf, ", ") + 2) != '[0~9]') ||
* ((strstr(abuf, ",") + 1) != ' ') &&
* strstr(abuf, "," + 1) == '[0~9]')) then
*/ (4) print weak code found.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
// check-sc.c

C #2:

#include <stdio.h>

/*

[x90@x90hack]-[~/check-sc]
>>> ./check-sc testcase.c.txt 15
1:
2: // argv1 == vuln length
3: // argv2 == overflow payload
4: int main(int argc, char *argv[]])
5: {
6:
7: char buf[32];
8: unsigned int lena = 0;
9:
10: snprintf(buf, 32, "%s\n", argv[2]);
11: snprintf(buf,lena, "%s\n", argv[1]])
weak code found!
12: snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, "%s\n", argv[2]);
13: snprintf(buf, atoi(argv[1]), "%s\n", argv[2]);
weak code found!
14:
15: }
[x90@x90hack]-[~/check-sc]
>>>

*/
int klen;
int stop_pr;

char *readlinea(char *orig)
{
int i = 0;
char *buf;

buf = malloc(128);

memset(buf, 0x0, sizeof(buf));

for(i = 0; i < 128; i++)
{
if(orig[i] == '\n')
break;

buf[i] = orig[i];
}

klen = strlen(buf);

if(buf[i] == '\n')
stop_pr = 1;

return(buf);
}

int lookup_codesnip(char *orig)
{
if(strstr(orig, "snprintf(") != NULL){
// printf("snprintf found!!\n");
return(1);
}

return(0);
}

char *token_test(char *orig)
{
char *ptr = strstr(orig, ", ");
char *ptr1 = strstr(orig, ",");
char *ascii = "0123456789";
int i = 0;

ptr += 2;
ptr1 += 1;

for(i = 0; i < sizeof(ascii); i++)
{
if(ptr[0] == ascii[i] || ptr1[0] == ascii[i])
return(1);
}

return 0;
}

int token_test2(char *orig)
{
if(strstr(orig, "sizeof(") != NULL)
{
return(1);
}

return(0);
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
FILE *fp;
char *pp;
char *orig_pp;
char *ptr;
int i = 0;
int lena = 0;
char *ptr1 = NULL;
int tret = 0, tret2 = 0;
unsigned int wanted_lc = atoi(argv[2]);

// x90:: if you want to know the line count then below command...
// $ lc -c [source code filename]

if(wanted_lc <= 0 || wanted_lc >= 10000)
{
fprintf(stderr, "error malloc'd() to failed\n");
return(-1);
}

pp = malloc(128*wanted_lc);

orig_pp = pp;

fp = fopen(argv[1], "r");

fread(pp, 128, 10000, fp);

ptr = readlinea(pp);
printf("1: %s\n", ptr);

for(i = 1; i < wanted_lc; i++)
{
pp = pp + klen + 1;
ptr = readlinea(pp);
if(stop_pr != 1)
{
printf("%d: %s\n", i+1, ptr);
}

if(lookup_codesnip(ptr) == 1)
{
tret = token_test(ptr);
tret2 = token_test2(ptr);

if(tret == 0 && tret2 == 0)
{
printf("weak code found!\n");
}
}
}

}


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


4. Future Research

Many other C and php functions are vulnerable to source code auditing
in Automatically. And If We made the good auditor then perhaps we can
found some of zeroday security bugs. The automation is important in
the future research. If you have any good ideas then mail me.
Welcome! your ideas.


5. Conclusion

Secure Coding is very important for researchers to learn many vulnerable
example codes. I added check-sc.c program source code to the purpose
that looking for the snprintf function's buffer overflow.

I showed to youth about to that two sprintf and snprintf vulnerable
examples in this article. Thanks.

Hack the planet!

Greetings all researchers.

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