## About Fancy Product Designer for WooCommerce
Fancy Product Designer for WooCommerce is a WordPress plugin which allows users to design custom products in a vendor's WooCommerce store. It is sold through the third-party marketplace "Envato Market" and boasts over 15,000 sales.

## Stored XSS via SVG upload
Fancy Product Designer for WooCommerce before version 4.5.1 permits the upload of unsanitized SVG files by unauthenticated users. SVG files can contain JavaScript which will be executed by the browser if the malicious SVG is accessed directly. This JavaScript will run in the context of the affected domain and logged in user.

The "Require Login" setting in FPD before version 4.5.1 does not succeed in requiring users to be logged in to upload files, meaning any unauthenticated user can exploit this vulnerability.

### Details
To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to upload a specially crafted SVG using Fancy Product Designer and convince a logged-in user or admin to access the SVG. Once accessed, the browser will execute the JavaScript payload in the context of the user or admin on the affected domain.

### Impact
This vulnerability can result in the takeover of any user's account on the affected domain. If an SVG containing a stored XSS payload is opened by a logged in administrator, it could lead to the compromise of the entire site. If opened by an anonymous user, it could attempt to phish the user's credentials by imitating a WordPress login page.

SVGs accessed in this way can trivially read out current `_wpnonce` values, giving an attacker unfettered access to the entire WordPress API of an affected site.

### Proof of Concept
 - Account takeover SVG: [change-user-email.svg](https://github.com/jdgregson/Disclosures/blob/master/fancy-product-designer/stored-xss-via-svg-upload/change-user-email.svg)
 - Demo video: [stored-xss-account-takover.mp4](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jdgregson/Disclosures/master/fancy-product-designer/stored-xss-via-svg-upload/stored-xss-account-takover.mp4)

### Disclosure Timeline
 - 10/10/2020: issue reported via ticket on developer's support form
 - 10/11/2020: developer responded discussing potential mitigations
 - 10/20/2020: developer released an update which did not address the issue
 - 10/26/2020: developer released an update which addressed the issue by only allowing a subset of tags and attributes in uploaded SVGs
 - 11/15/2020: full disclosure