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Nintendo 3DS DNS Client Resolver Predictable TXID

Nintendo 3DS DNS Client Resolver Predictable TXID
Posted Apr 13, 2017
Authored by Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Research

The Nintendo 3DS DNS client resolver library uses a predictable (incremented) TXID allowing for the spoofing of responses.

tags | exploit, spoof
SHA-256 | f5c21a78f99b5f6cde7c75e94a484f05c6eb123b704e14150dcd8700cbaa9823

Nintendo 3DS DNS Client Resolver Predictable TXID

Change Mirror Download
 Nintendo: 3DS DNS Client Resolver Library Uses Predictable TXID 

I bought a New Nintendo 3DS XL (US) with firmware 11.2.0-35U, and I've noticed that that DNS client resolved on the 3DS uses a simple incrementing TXID for lookups. This does not provide enough entropy to prevent remote attackers from spoofing responses. (For example, see MS08-020 when this happened to Microsoft, although theirs was just not very random, yours is just incrementing so it's even worse). Note: this can also work behind NAT, because that just session matches and UDP has no ISN to verify.

<a href="https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2008/04/09/ms08-020-how-predictable-is-the-dns-transaction-id/" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/2008/04/09/ms08-020-how-predictable-is-the-dns-transaction-id/</a>

In general, you need an unpredictable src port (16 bits) and dns txid (16 bits) to prevent a remote attacker from spoofing responses.

An example attack scenario would be someone using the browser to visit attacker.com.

User visits attacker.com
Attacker forces a lookup to asdad839qd.attacker.com via <img src> or whatever.
Now attacker can guess your resolver, etc.
Attacker create an <iframe> to nintendo.com
Attacker spoofs dns responses saying nintendo.com is an address he controls.
Attacker can now send javascript and read document.cookie, etc.
That's just an example, I don't know if you also download any software or anything else without authentication.

If you do, then those can obviously be spoofed and the impact is worse.


Run tcpdump on some egress point on your network.
Open the browser and lookup blahblahtest1.com, blahblahtest2.com, etc.
Notice the requests are easy to guess.

I had to send this via HackerOne, as Nintendo are not easy to contact.

<a href="https://hackerone.com/nintendo" title="" class="" rel="nofollow">https://hackerone.com/nintendo</a>

This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. If 90 days elapse
without a broadly available patch, then the bug report will automatically
become visible to the public.

Found by: taviso

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