what you don't know can hurt you
Home Files News &[SERVICES_TAB]About Contact Add New

Eclipse DLL Hijacking

Eclipse DLL Hijacking
Posted Jul 19, 2016
Authored by Stefan Kanthak

Various Eclipse installers suffer from a dll hijacking vulnerability.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
SHA-256 | 84b5c68827c357cd3a4657dba69c010f190130548f9e8a0dd72d6263002c004d

Eclipse DLL Hijacking

Change Mirror Download
Hi @ll,

eclipse-inst-win32.exe (and of course eclipse-inst-win64.exe
too) loads and executes multiple DLLs (in version 4.5 also
CMD.EXE) from its "application directory".

* version 4.5 ("Mars") on Windows 7:
UXTheme.dll, WindowsCodecs.dll, AppHelp.dll, SrvCli.dll,
Slc.dll, NTMarta.dll, ProfAPI.dll, SAMLib.dll

* version 4.6 ("Neon") on Windows 7:
IEFrame.dll, Version.dll

* version 4.5 on Windows XP:
ClbCatQ.dll, SetupAPI.dll, UXTheme.dll, RichEd20.dll

(version 4.6 not tested on Windows Embedded POSReady 2009
alias Windows XP).

For the vulnerable command line "cmd /c start <URL>" see
<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms14-019.aspx>
and CVE-2014-0315


For software downloaded with a web browser the application
directory is typically the user's "Downloads" directory: see
<https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/cert/2008/09/carpet-bombing-and-directory-poisoning.html>,
<http://blog.acrossecurity.com/2012/02/downloads-folder-binary-planting.html>
and <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2012/Aug/134> for
"prior art" about this well-known and well-documented vulnerability.

If an attacker places the DLLs named above and/or CMD.EXE in the
users "Downloads" directory (for example per drive-by download
or social engineering) this vulnerability becomes a remote code
execution.


Proof of concept/demonstration:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

On a fresh (but fully patched) Windows installation (where a Java
Runtime is NOT installed) perform the following actions:

1. visit <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html>, download
<http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.DLL>, save it
as UXTheme.dll in your "Downloads" directory, then copy it as
RichEd20.dll, SetupAPI.dll, ClbCatQ.dll, WindowsCodecs.dll,
AppHelp.dll, SrvCli.dll, Slc.dll, NTMarta.dll, ProfAPI.dll,
SAMLib.dll, IEFrame.dll, Version.dll;

2. Download <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/download/SENTINEL.EXE>
and save it as CMD.EXE in your "Downloads" directory;

3. download eclipse-inst-win32.exe and save it in your "Downloads"
directory;

4. run eclipse-inst-win32.exe per double-click from your "Downloads"
directory;

5. click [Yes] in the message box

| Eclipse Installer
| (?) The required 32-bit Java 1.7.0 virtual machine could not be found.
| Do you want to browse your system for it?

6. notice the message boxes displayed from the DLLs placed in step 1
and CMD.EXE placed in step 2.

PWNED!


See <http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Nov/101> and
<http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2015/Dec/86> as well as
<http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html> and the not yet
finished <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/!execute.html> for details
about these well-known and well-documented BEGINNER'S errors!


Mitigation:
~~~~~~~~~~~

DUMP executable installers, build packages for the target OS' native
installer instead!

See <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/!execute.html>
as well as <http://home.arcor.de/skanthak/sentinel.html> for the long
sad story of these vulnerabilities.


stay tuned
Stefan Kanthak


Timeline:
~~~~~~~~~

2016-02-12 vulnerability report sent to Eclipse Foundation

NO RESPONSE

2016-02-22 vulnerability report resent to Eclipse Foundation

2016-02-23 answer from Eclipse Foundation:
"we investigate"

2016-02-24 provided guidance to fix both vulnerabilities

2016-02-28 developer opens bug <https://bugs.eclipse.org/488644>

2016-07-01 second vulnerability report sent to Eclipse Foundation:
recently released installer 4.6 "Neon" still vulnerable!

2016-07-12 answer from developer:
"We analyzed this again and came to the conclusion
that the code of our installer is now safe (i.e.,
with the fix from bug 488644). Indications are that
your new check shows a problem much later in the
process and that the list of loaded DLLs is totally
different (i.e., not the one that you originally
reported).
Moreover we're convinced that it is a security problem
in rundll32.exe itself."

2016-07-12 OUCH!
It's DEFINITIVELY your "fixed" installer which STILL
loads DLLs from its application directory; it's NOT
safe, but VULNERABLE!

NO RESPONSE

2016-07-19 report published
Login or Register to add favorites

File Archive:

September 2024

  • Su
  • Mo
  • Tu
  • We
  • Th
  • Fr
  • Sa
  • 1
    Sep 1st
    261 Files
  • 2
    Sep 2nd
    17 Files
  • 3
    Sep 3rd
    38 Files
  • 4
    Sep 4th
    52 Files
  • 5
    Sep 5th
    23 Files
  • 6
    Sep 6th
    27 Files
  • 7
    Sep 7th
    0 Files
  • 8
    Sep 8th
    0 Files
  • 9
    Sep 9th
    0 Files
  • 10
    Sep 10th
    0 Files
  • 11
    Sep 11th
    0 Files
  • 12
    Sep 12th
    0 Files
  • 13
    Sep 13th
    0 Files
  • 14
    Sep 14th
    0 Files
  • 15
    Sep 15th
    0 Files
  • 16
    Sep 16th
    0 Files
  • 17
    Sep 17th
    0 Files
  • 18
    Sep 18th
    0 Files
  • 19
    Sep 19th
    0 Files
  • 20
    Sep 20th
    0 Files
  • 21
    Sep 21st
    0 Files
  • 22
    Sep 22nd
    0 Files
  • 23
    Sep 23rd
    0 Files
  • 24
    Sep 24th
    0 Files
  • 25
    Sep 25th
    0 Files
  • 26
    Sep 26th
    0 Files
  • 27
    Sep 27th
    0 Files
  • 28
    Sep 28th
    0 Files
  • 29
    Sep 29th
    0 Files
  • 30
    Sep 30th
    0 Files

Top Authors In Last 30 Days

File Tags

Systems

packet storm

© 2024 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.

Services
Security Services
Hosting By
Rokasec
close