WebKit JSC suffers from a use-after-free vulnerability that can be used to bypass write barriers.
e2420c7cbbee92aac272000675d9ecac14ee6bdf6f20e39b27fbf5fba2af6409WebKit JSC suffers from out-of-bounds read and write vulnerabilities in JSArray::shiftCountWithArrayStorage.
c4b1f3aa03b2cfee8c12ef1dd3ea676dd2720b30657ed4e85a3e0f70a77f9a7cWebKit JSC suffers from an incorrect optimization in BytecodeGenerator::emitGetByVal.
9220b5c0f6c932addd44fe7106dc05e5e8eeaef81b30f43920c0a1f5cdb633c7WebKit JSC suffers from incorrect LoadVarargs handling in ArgumentsEliminationPhase::transform.
edbf79d7990323abaf4336e6c20ceed747d95e780f4b02cba2012766bb547326WebKit JSC suffers from an ObjectPatternNode::appendEntry stack use-after-free.
33b5aee90d54dea0a033cb5bc2360e1678605183705f19824210b8a033b4dff6WebKit JSC suffers from an uninitialized memory reference in arrayProtoFuncSplice.
ce1c4741e5611858900581d7df034b8e7542529547943c3348da1dbda9904227WebKit JSC suffers from a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in Intl.getCanonicalLocales.
3ce6984b8d5f3496724b9fd295322f1da9540728a002a8b0b7dee8bd77113aedWebKit JSC suffers from a JSGlobalObject::haveABadTime type confusion vulnerability.
1f481998f2bb5916dc1ba80de838274187ae1882f6a50f6e4569df9b5d0d75baWebKit JSC suffers from a JIT optimization check failure in IntegerCheckCombiningPhase::handleBlock.
5f12e99ad1584896ed16974eedb9cb9acb232c0a88d9e26de9c971d18be09ec8WebKit JSC suffers from an incorrect check in emitPutDerivedConstructorToArrowFunctionContextScope.
a896a4670ad6e45a86257f2de8b28d8691ca919a2a4457017498eeb0b85ae85eThe Task Scheduler can be made to delete a task after it's trigger has expired. No check is made to ensure the task file is not a junction which allows arbitrary files to be deleted by the system user leading to EoP.
c30785bf661d0d66daa78abe61a94c360587d6e66ae875cfc5a81dc4ec54b02eThe NtUserGetClipboardAccessToken win32k system call exposes the access token of the last user to lower-privileged users. It can also be used to open an anonymous impersonation thread token which normally OpenThreadToken shouldn't be able to do. This is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2015-0078.
9bcf7274e363f1dc579d9ed68048a01019d56cc2f841f1a4a04c182389196296A bounds check crash was observed in Microsoft Office 2007 Excel with Microsoft Office File Validation Add-In disabled and Application Verifier enabled for testing and reproduction. This bug did not reproduce in Office 2010 or 2013.
05a60e7019067851141f1787a5bbda75454773b40b9acf97e8b754f2fad758fdMicrosoft Excel 2007 running on Windows 2003 suffers from a use-after-free vulnerability.
460bd27af88f7165a795d698b85d2e4cd8c83732200f70dc5c84e7b8e4818f79The host process for the UMFD runs as a normal user but with a heavily restrictive process DACL. It's possible execute arbitrary code within the context of the process because it's possible to access the processes threads leading to local EoP.
f0ec77ee8811de8feb9edad30b69fae9734672773f9e5a37d08fdba2317cebd5A use-after-free crash was observed in Microsoft Office 2007 with Microsoft Office File Validation Add-In disabled and Application Verifier enabled for testing and reproduction. This bug did not reproduce in Office 2010 or 2013.
3b2e620089c3777eb2d36942713f33cf68f9865e894dbaee83bdbdb3af57385cA type confusion crash was observed in Microsoft Office 2007 with Microsoft Office File Validation Add-In disabled and Application Verifier enabled for testing and reproduction. This bug did not reproduce in Office 2010 or 2013.
247823ed9395d266e8674965a149848a04a5b7380aa2bf3723839d71d6ca65a6The Microsoft\Windows\Shell\CreateObjectTask initializes a shell32 based ICreateObject COM server as local system. This is marked as being accessible from a normal user account so once created we can attach to it. The server only has one method, CreateObject which checks the CLSID against a list of known safe classes before allowing it to be instantiated. One of these classes is allows a user to set their account picture for the logon screen.
6a43091589e97afa78001dc6e8f0c4e88aed1de975f8578e7b0706c3c45901f3The Microsoft\Windows\Shell\CreateObjectTask initializes a shell32 based ICreateObject COM server as local system. This is marked as being accessible from a normal user account so once created we can attach to it. The server only has one method, CreateObject which checks the CLSID against a list of known safe classes before allowing it to be instantiated. One of these classes is a diagnostic class for setting synchronization implemented in SettingSync.dll.
6aef4dd16b7085d61fe94cd118f3ece652f9cd33df0722b63a4bf31f53557554An OS X IOKit kernel memory corruption issue occurs due to a bad bzero in IOBluetoothDevice.
f3d2f3b8051f90b86f0cfd263f09f98a7e0e04c1e1fcff20c13e3ca8f318052cAdobe Reader X and XI for windows suffers from an out-of-bounds write in CoolType.dll.
94d511f0b5c52532ba8c4998f0ae71bb9ef6d1788cd193c33ea257be138b259fThe Windows Kernel is subject to two related kernel-mode type-confusion vulnerabilities inside win32k!xxxRemoteReconnect. In both cases, a user-mode parameter passed to the syscall is incorrectly resolved to its underlying kernel representation via ObReferenceObjectByHandle passing NULL as the "ObType" field (rather than *IoFileTypeObject and *IoDeviceTypeObject respectively). Because the type is not checked, if a handle of a type other than a HANDLE to a file and a device are passed, the kernel incorrectly uses the underlying representation of the object as a PFILE_OBJECT and a PDEVICE_OBJECT, causing memory corruption in the kernel.
1fc87129199a0c6cd9e6a9fa146cc6e891c7331266896538d14fc884c57013baThe Install.framework runner suid root binary does not correctly account for the fact that Distributed Objects can be connected to by multiple clients at the same time. By connecting two proxy objects to an IFInstallRunner and calling [IFInstallRunner makeReceiptDirAt:asRoot:] in the first and passing a custom object as the directory name we can get a callback to our code just after the makeReceiptDirAt code has called seteuid(0);setguid(0) to regain privs. Since BSD priviledges are per-process this means that our other proxy object will now have euid 0 without having to provide an authorization reference. In this second proxy we can then just call runTaskSecurely and get a root shell before returning from the first proxy's callback function which will then drop privs.
1fd4f2bf985f7460d71d17680841dc5c059fe7c05b9a7ac1a776291868ff74e3The private Install.framework has a few helper executables in /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Install.framework/Resources, one of which is suid root and exploitable.
a34aa2485110ffeff9b63cf7063d71e3ac6548549f001e7517073b7f1ffaa5caInstall.framework has a suid root binary at /System/Library/PrivateFrameworks/Install.framework/Resources/runner that allows for arbitrary mkdir, unlink, and chown.
4b9ea14e8540ddbdec18fe305074224119369e420b4ed663a1f2bac393fa7f15The Windows Kernel is subject to a kernel-mode type-confusion vulnerability inside win32k!NtUserSetInformationThread due to referencing a user-mode handle via ObReferenceObjectByHandle with a "NULL" type specified (it should instead be using *LpcPortObjectType to protect against this vulnerability). This vulnerability can be triggered from inside CSRSS via the syscall win32k!NtUserSetInformationThread with ThreadInformationClass set to "UserThreadCsrApiPort" and the parameter of the syscall set to a HANDLE that is not an LPC object.
f08ca467d2241babc70e51da65057abb65b9ecf85249b35405cfc513910c45d6
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