Linux suffers from two bugs in PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP. One allows for permission bypass and the other relates to a ptracer death race.
090e7e5a723be850497afe230306c956241cce0eb429877bf07e8c0f06eb2a40
A use-after-free issue exists in Chrome 100 and earlier versions. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution in the browser process.
84b488e3a4db5db9d8a3df99b628eaaf0e1c8d462ed33ed2d967d6a09c443252
FancyBear looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
6c9b981fb52c57e5101af2cf1b3b81f816bca03e29ff6f1e4765d923fb513d91
School Dormitory Management System version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.
35eface303d338348fb6d3c2744228b1f44d4ff33f83a1ac39f419a593227e06
Satana ransomware searches for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
8e9fad2d0891098b240a5be94c33ac547f4a261cfbe5fc26bc3d0ea2a0a36c17
Conti ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
52f6486bf24b541e770aac1c5ed3c3b2261c89fb9688a718a0b779cbf5c4f7d6
School Dormitory Management version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.
d5de6e90441b347a90dcfbbe5aa109c73945042d00234b05626402f8ca6fabd9
Travel Management System version 1.0 suffers from multiple remote SQL injection vulnerabilities. Original discovery of SQL injection in this version is attributed to Bobby Cooke and hyd3sec in August of 2020.
f7311337903077370ca96820928b9ff6db3f39ef420a109bc94cdf0d6358dc4f
Petya ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
ff2605c77ee1a143de808be0bf172ffc2beea61f4206bbac09c5de2b270c2ba8
Cryakl ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export the "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
8aaf8b642e1e25f6c399f8930a1a544edf572881836d06083d17c2a2115f678f
Radamant ransomware tries to load a DLL named "PROPSYS.dll" and execute a hidden PE file "DirectX.exe" from the AppData\Roaming directory. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
c051794bad7a43ea258023a806d4f4fb80b0f47db0954c5c9d9a7a978d7bf71e
Cryptolocker ransomware drops a PE file in the AppData\Roaming directory which then tries to load a DLL named "netapi32.dll". Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
87f31671bdc48150392fcb17c91a7b099cc962f81d837de716d2134df56aebad
Craft CMS version 3.7.36 suffers from a password reset poisoning vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker who knows valid email addresses or account names of Craft CMS backend users is able to manipulate the password reset functionality in a way that the registered users of the CMS receive password reset emails containing a malicious password reset link.
de06127d774e506b909f777e221d9940b8410ddd11923cc82b9c59ebc88211e5
CTBLocker ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
6e2944ce63bc0324698d09842f6ec75f7d70d5c7264acd72536d9cdc7967e728
Cerber ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products as the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
e28c63a5a97b689389b1885103160cadd3799c70135f4baf81ea45f327748187
LockerGoga ransomware looks for and loads a DLL named "wow64log.dll" in Windows\System32. Therefore, we can drop our own DLL to intercept and terminate the malware pre-encryption. Four processes are created. For instance, there is "imtvknqq9737.exe" running under AppData\Local\Temp, the process name is "imtvknqq" plus an appended random number. Our exploit DLL will simply display a Win32API message box and call exit(). The exploit DLL must export "InterlockedExchange" function or it fails with an error. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware's own flaw will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective, you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
da575e6182321f1a1552e1e5e6da8af1c3614bcb1ff944dc57bf56d87fd9b925
ChatBot Application with a Suggestion Feature version 1.0 suffers from a remote blind SQL injection vulnerability.
6e5561beff591b12af8e2999685edb97e47363e65c7da33e3edf5c64ff8b548d
Cryptowall ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
03640ad85ec0becb4b494889fa75f6777ce2e1282d935c707cd228016fbea182
REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL, execute our own code, and control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware's flaw does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there's nothing to kill as the DLL just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
111b653e7522b76e8edf9e7a923244651c58b4723ffc3384a3138c38c6ef1977
This Metasploit module exploits an arbitrary file write in the debug log file option chained with a path traversal in the language settings that leads to remote code execution in ZoneMinder surveillance software versions before 1.36.13 and before 1.37.11
de41d6871c9da39a780698ac61a0da551342a2766821ef00b00ff323d0ac1fe6
PHProjekt PhpSimplyGest and MyProjects version 1.3.0 suffer from a cross site scripting vulnerability.
683da3b4055369ad271be51cb81dbf94818591a437064ded4119628be26cc697
SAP Web Dispatcher suffers from an HTTP request smuggling vulnerability.
13d3e2b23a840dab61234f2b6d3787259a7efde984a35e90339e0cdc4c879d9a
Red Planet Laundry Management System version 1.0 suffers from a remote SQL injection vulnerability.
fb9ca577051e583a14d2a46cbefa9a6c1b563f29cdf20a68500709adaf8dd589
WannaCry ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can hijack a DLL to execute our own code in order to control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit DLL checks if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signatures or third-party products, the malware vulnerability does the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
75c864ef881d1530855d950ce35620da320dafb0cebe2d176ad34757f23f3194
REvil ransomware looks for and executes DLLs in its current directory. Therefore, we can potentially hijack a DLL to execute our own code in order to control and terminate the malware pre-encryption. The exploit dll will check if the current directory is "C:\Windows\System32" and if not we grab our process ID and terminate. We do not need to rely on hash signature or third-party products as the malware vulnerability will do the work for us. Endpoint protection systems and or antivirus can potentially be killed prior to executing malware, but this method cannot as there is nothing to kill the DLL that just lives on disk waiting. From a defensive perspective you can add the DLLs to a specific network share containing important data as a layered approach. All basic tests were conducted successfully in a virtual machine environment.
07f3d9e3cb24992e24316fe7f8e41fc64fee499196a59b0f4d1594fec2186777