exploit the possibilities
Home Files News &[SERVICES_TAB]About Contact Add New

Microsoft Server 2008 Denial Of Service

Microsoft Server 2008 Denial Of Service
Posted Feb 25, 2014
Authored by Pedro Luis Karrasquillo

There is a minor bug on the Microsoft Server 2008 DNS service that responds with the list of all root servers when queried for non-authoritative domains, even when recursion is set to OFF. This allows a malicious party to spoof the source ip on a udp DNS request to any Microsoft Server 2008 DNS and elicit a 533 byte response to a victim, making the server a contributor to coordinated distributed denial of service attacks. The response contains the default list of root DNS servers.

tags | advisory, denial of service, root, udp, spoof
SHA-256 | 3ab734fcb865afbabdc1004a74625865444aad1020e90004c4aa22a1133b0f2a

Microsoft Server 2008 Denial Of Service

Change Mirror Download
Microsoft has responded to my report to secure@microsoft.com and I can now disclose what I found.




There is a minor bug on the MS Server 2008 DNS service that responds
with the list of all root servers when queried for non-authoritative
domains, EVEN when recursion is set to OFF. This allows a malicious
party to spoof the source ip on a udp DNS request to any MS Server 2008
DNS and elicit a 533 byte response to a victim, making the server a
contributor to coordinated Distributed Denial of Service attacks. The
response contains the default list of root DNS servers.


Version tested: MS DNS on MS Server 2008 R2 version 6.1.7601.17514

Server is Authoritative to only one .com domain.

Config Parameters:

DNS Recursion set to "disable"
Enable Round Robin
Enable Netmask Ordering
Secure Cache against pollution


And My Mitigation steps:

Remove all root DNS servers listed on the "Root Hints" tab.


This will not negatively affect the DNS functionality of the server
when deployed only as an authoritative server for a specific domain.






Although RFC1034
on page 21 does allow the DNS to reply with the list of root servers (if
configured) as a response option, ultimately it is preferable for it to
mimic the behavior of BIND and not respond at all under these test
conditions, to discourage abuse from malicious entities.


More details with images and packet captures and MS responses, in my web file http://pe.lúka.com/


Pedro
CCNP, CCDA, CCNA-Security, SANS GPEN
...But mostly a curious guy.


Login or Register to add favorites

File Archive:

September 2024

  • Su
  • Mo
  • Tu
  • We
  • Th
  • Fr
  • Sa
  • 1
    Sep 1st
    261 Files
  • 2
    Sep 2nd
    17 Files
  • 3
    Sep 3rd
    38 Files
  • 4
    Sep 4th
    52 Files
  • 5
    Sep 5th
    23 Files
  • 6
    Sep 6th
    27 Files
  • 7
    Sep 7th
    0 Files
  • 8
    Sep 8th
    1 Files
  • 9
    Sep 9th
    16 Files
  • 10
    Sep 10th
    38 Files
  • 11
    Sep 11th
    21 Files
  • 12
    Sep 12th
    40 Files
  • 13
    Sep 13th
    18 Files
  • 14
    Sep 14th
    0 Files
  • 15
    Sep 15th
    0 Files
  • 16
    Sep 16th
    21 Files
  • 17
    Sep 17th
    51 Files
  • 18
    Sep 18th
    23 Files
  • 19
    Sep 19th
    48 Files
  • 20
    Sep 20th
    36 Files
  • 21
    Sep 21st
    0 Files
  • 22
    Sep 22nd
    0 Files
  • 23
    Sep 23rd
    38 Files
  • 24
    Sep 24th
    65 Files
  • 25
    Sep 25th
    24 Files
  • 26
    Sep 26th
    0 Files
  • 27
    Sep 27th
    0 Files
  • 28
    Sep 28th
    0 Files
  • 29
    Sep 29th
    0 Files
  • 30
    Sep 30th
    0 Files

Top Authors In Last 30 Days

File Tags

Systems

packet storm

© 2024 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.

Services
Security Services
Hosting By
Rokasec
close