This document document provides advice on the filtering of IPv4 packets based on the IPv4 options they contain. Additionally, it discusses the operational and interoperability implications of dropping packets based on the IP options they contain.
f955987c95afee36773fb986f0bf5b02f89c6d9a9973c325dcbc1e926676ad9aThis Internet Draft specifies the security implications of predictable fragment identification values in IPv6. It primarily focuses on countermeasures and mitigations.
797c390e09afddabe88fd2b44a2368bbbcd4539539cf70a92b9a03e8ffc6de92This IETF Internet Draft discusses security and interoperability implications of oversized IPv6 header chains.
8ec27e6f6b09e69798fd08859eb67352a7f027ed6076d6512288a35a48b32023IPv6 Extension Headers with Neighbor Discovery messages can be leveraged to circumvent simple local network protections, such as "Router Advertisement Guard". Since there is no legitimate use for IPv6 Extension Headers in Neighbor Discovery messages, and such use greatly complicates network monitoring and simple security mitigations such as RA-Guard, this document proposes that hosts silently ignore Neighbor Discovery messages that use IPv6 Extension Headers. Revision 2 of this document. This revision includes, among other things, a discussion of possible issues with SEND as a result of IPv6 fragmentation.
a8b7a492cc8ab102f8884547a7f042ea0e94a1cdbbad648050eb655bf675f524This Internet Draft focuses on providing advice to RA-Guard implementations, rather than on the evasion techniques that have been found effective against most popular implementations of RA-Guard.
b94a267d451834a19ba9db5489c12513c4c414f2e2934e7d487b0a5d8d337180This Internet Draft specifies the security implications of predictable fragment identification values in IPv6. It primarily focuses on countermeasures and mitigations.
460fd180c573767e12e1ffa15a9dc5ae08637e6d06e765a8c0e9f2d0c204a17cThis document specifies a method for generating IPv6 Interface Identifiers to be used with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), such that addresses configured using this method are stable within each subnet, but the Interface Identifier changes when hosts move from one network to another. The aforementioned method is meant to be an alternative to generating Interface Identifiers based on IEEE identifiers, such that the same manageability benefits can be achieved without sacrificing the privacy of users.
542e6aa994a33734dc569e8c3b291d6929f88f48ab8d12f2e29320b1c816faddIPv6 Extension Headers with Neighbor Discovery messages can be leveraged to circumvent simple local network protections, such as "Router Advertisement Guard". Since there is no legitimate use for IPv6 Extension Headers in Neighbor Discovery messages, and such use greatly complicates network monitoring and simple security mitigations such as RA-Guard, this document proposes that hosts silently ignore Neighbor Discovery messages that use IPv6 Extension Headers.
ae1239dbe215828238bde7e4d18f0fa35e3f33bfb61ed97549a17cb1ea60cd42The IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) mechanism is commonly employed to mitigate attack vectors based on forged ICMPv6 Router Advertisement messages. Many existing IPv6 deployments rely on RA-Guard as the first line of defense against the aforementioned attack vectors. This document describes possible ways in which current RA- Guard implementations can be circumvented, and discusses possible mitigations.
419dbe3a0dedd1c464fb648a00b9ab7d264f3801038e9c2fc543db909c6fa908Cisco Security Advisory - Tandberg C Series Endpoints and E/EX Personal Video units that are running software versions prior to TC4.0.0 ship with a root administrator account that is enabled by default with no password. An attacker could use this account in order to modify the application configuration or operating system settings. Resolving this default password issue does not require a software upgrade and can be changed or disabled by a configuration command for all affected customers. The workaround detailed in this document demonstrates how to disable the root account or change the password.
0bf1d1a2a5073105e6e57bd85957a61f87e2f9a536784275c073ea397c43b70bThis is a new IETF Internet-Draft about TCP timestamps generation, entitled "On the generation of TCP timestamps".
706d4c976b9a4d43fde3407213a244580f6013abde7186a11a9b2884600aa55bThis document discusses cookie hijacking in Google Docs through PDF repurposing attacks. This has since been fixed by Google.
84043a14c6b544193ef554abc031b0e021f2e7a63dfe4048ecfc5c7db290d8e8This is the IETF Internet-Draft entitled "On the implementation of TCP urgent data". This document describes current issues relevant to the implementation and use of TCP urgent data, aims to change the IETF specifications so that they accommodate what virtually all implementations have been doing with urgent data.
384e21ff4feb6dfa943d320a646ab513ba681507acc08360bf5b6874ae7476f9This is the IETF Internet-Draft entitled "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol version 4", which is heavily based on the "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol".
0f89100a070e0ace98c2f792a2e4cd5cbb04302b6669f80341ba345815d8dcdbThis document describes a simple and efficient method for random selection of a client port number, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. While this is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead. The mechanisms described in this document are a local modification that may be incrementally deployed, and that does not violate the specifications of any of the transport protocols that may benefit from it, such as TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, and RTP.
61b14f84224795032551d1a5e2ebfe45a4f86868563581fff491e9408e636381This document describes a simple and efficient method for random selection of a client port number, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. While this is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead. The mechanisms described in this document are a local modification that may be incrementally deployed, and that does not violate the specifications of any of the transport protocols that may benefit from it, such as TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, and RTP.
1ce58606d3eddff9223fe3a488f8c0cc0f6238e521811ffc418b4dd84491b12bThis document describes a simple and efficient method for random selection of a client port number, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. While this is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead. The mechanisms described in this document are a local modification that may be incrementally deployed, and that does not violate the specifications of any of the transport protocols that may benefit from it, such as TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, and RTP.
f6784276bc77577f72c09f503deab41ce6fabf7bb9a8b44edd61410211141a2cRecently, awareness has been raised about a number of "blind" attacks that can be performed against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and similar protocols. The consequences of these attacks range from throughput-reduction to broken connections or data corruption. These attacks rely on the attacker's ability to guess or know the four- tuple (Source Address, Destination Address, Source port, Destination Port) that identifies the transport protocol instance to be attacked. This document describes a simple and efficient method for random selection of the client port number, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. While this is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead. Both text and pdf formats of this paper are included.
a3c77823856bb629693170ad41bbf3eb04803b3943bb64a88f319af02d2327dbThis document describes a new syscall hooking technique for Linux systems and exposes how it can be implemented as part of a virus or a backdoor in order to take full control over an userland application. Although there are some well- known methods for hooking functions, they are mostly based on the ELF format itself. This technique is focused on those pieces of code that are externally called by the main program and invoke a system call or system service.
30fdbdfab2efb4eab95a25eb94384d63a0a3f4af1470486ff3e9730bb54e262cThis document discusses the use of the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) to perform a variety of attacks against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and other similar protocols. It proposes several counter-measures to eliminate or minimize the impact of these attacks.
eb26edb362c9db7aef2e0588ce1edd7b2f8dc2c57ec441e0f593bc216e865275This document discusses the use of the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) to perform a variety of attacks against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and other similar protocols. It proposes several counter-measures to eliminate or minimize the impact of these attacks.
bafb48eca640a455dbb85cd6293af2853c07b0c0e758cd9e2820797a6f2459aeThis document details the procedure for performing microcode updates on the AMD K8 processors. It also gives background information on the K8 microcode design and provides information on altering the microcode and loading the altered update for those who are interested in microcode hacking. Source code is included for a simple Linux microcode update driver for those who want to update their K8's microcode without waiting for the motherboard vendor to add it to the BIOS. The latest microcode update blocks are included in the driver.
4ecff8d0555e0bd10657e9dff39c32e92fc331ea26ca0cac5995390818707ac2Defcon 10 Presentation: draft-moeller-mixmaster2-protoc
b545835ecd0815230b522aaa221b132b990633239677a49eddc657643d3bc615Defcon 10 Presentation: draft-ietf-idwg-beep-idxp-05
62fba059f9e1322ed3fc996f9b1031481f956ddf13303717020df16f1e494fcbDefcon 10 Presentation: draft-ietf-idwg-idmef-xml-07
c3c1102c582557eeed8c26fd85fbaf13405334d2ff37fcce9af614b58ab3f877Defcon 10 Presentation: draft-ietf-ipsec-properties-01
b922ce78e2c3a2fb8452605163be13052200520797fd5829aff7dbf93e17d573
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