IPv6 Extension Headers with Neighbor Discovery messages can be leveraged to circumvent simple local network protections, such as "Router Advertisement Guard". Since there is no legitimate use for IPv6 Extension Headers in Neighbor Discovery messages, and such use greatly complicates network monitoring and simple security mitigations such as RA-Guard, this document proposes that hosts silently ignore Neighbor Discovery messages that use IPv6 Extension Headers. Revision 2 of this document. This revision includes, among other things, a discussion of possible issues with SEND as a result of IPv6 fragmentation.
a8b7a492cc8ab102f8884547a7f042ea0e94a1cdbbad648050eb655bf675f524IPv6 Extension Headers with Neighbor Discovery messages can be leveraged to circumvent simple local network protections, such as "Router Advertisement Guard". Since there is no legitimate use for IPv6 Extension Headers in Neighbor Discovery messages, and such use greatly complicates network monitoring and simple security mitigations such as RA-Guard, this document proposes that hosts silently ignore Neighbor Discovery messages that use IPv6 Extension Headers.
ae1239dbe215828238bde7e4d18f0fa35e3f33bfb61ed97549a17cb1ea60cd42The IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) mechanism is commonly employed to mitigate attack vectors based on forged ICMPv6 Router Advertisement messages. Many existing IPv6 deployments rely on RA-Guard as the first line of defense against the aforementioned attack vectors. This document describes possible ways in which current RA- Guard implementations can be circumvented, and discusses possible mitigations.
419dbe3a0dedd1c464fb648a00b9ab7d264f3801038e9c2fc543db909c6fa908This is a new IETF Internet-Draft about TCP timestamps generation, entitled "On the generation of TCP timestamps".
706d4c976b9a4d43fde3407213a244580f6013abde7186a11a9b2884600aa55bThis is the IETF Internet-Draft entitled "On the implementation of TCP urgent data". This document describes current issues relevant to the implementation and use of TCP urgent data, aims to change the IETF specifications so that they accommodate what virtually all implementations have been doing with urgent data.
384e21ff4feb6dfa943d320a646ab513ba681507acc08360bf5b6874ae7476f9This is the IETF Internet-Draft entitled "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol version 4", which is heavily based on the "Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol".
0f89100a070e0ace98c2f792a2e4cd5cbb04302b6669f80341ba345815d8dcdbThis document describes a simple and efficient method for random selection of a client port number, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. While this is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead. The mechanisms described in this document are a local modification that may be incrementally deployed, and that does not violate the specifications of any of the transport protocols that may benefit from it, such as TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, and RTP.
61b14f84224795032551d1a5e2ebfe45a4f86868563581fff491e9408e636381This document describes a simple and efficient method for random selection of a client port number, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. While this is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead. The mechanisms described in this document are a local modification that may be incrementally deployed, and that does not violate the specifications of any of the transport protocols that may benefit from it, such as TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, and RTP.
1ce58606d3eddff9223fe3a488f8c0cc0f6238e521811ffc418b4dd84491b12bThis document describes a simple and efficient method for random selection of a client port number, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. While this is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead. The mechanisms described in this document are a local modification that may be incrementally deployed, and that does not violate the specifications of any of the transport protocols that may benefit from it, such as TCP, UDP, SCTP, DCCP, and RTP.
f6784276bc77577f72c09f503deab41ce6fabf7bb9a8b44edd61410211141a2cRecently, awareness has been raised about a number of "blind" attacks that can be performed against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and similar protocols. The consequences of these attacks range from throughput-reduction to broken connections or data corruption. These attacks rely on the attacker's ability to guess or know the four- tuple (Source Address, Destination Address, Source port, Destination Port) that identifies the transport protocol instance to be attacked. This document describes a simple and efficient method for random selection of the client port number, such that the possibility of an attacker guessing the exact value is reduced. While this is not a replacement for cryptographic methods, the described port number randomization algorithms provide improved security/obfuscation with very little effort and without any key management overhead. Both text and pdf formats of this paper are included.
a3c77823856bb629693170ad41bbf3eb04803b3943bb64a88f319af02d2327dbThis document discusses the use of the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) to perform a variety of attacks against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and other similar protocols. It proposes several counter-measures to eliminate or minimize the impact of these attacks.
eb26edb362c9db7aef2e0588ce1edd7b2f8dc2c57ec441e0f593bc216e865275This document discusses the use of the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) to perform a variety of attacks against the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and other similar protocols. It proposes several counter-measures to eliminate or minimize the impact of these attacks.
bafb48eca640a455dbb85cd6293af2853c07b0c0e758cd9e2820797a6f2459aeDefcon 10 Presentation: draft-moeller-mixmaster2-protoc
b545835ecd0815230b522aaa221b132b990633239677a49eddc657643d3bc615Defcon 10 Presentation: draft-ietf-idwg-beep-idxp-05
62fba059f9e1322ed3fc996f9b1031481f956ddf13303717020df16f1e494fcbDefcon 10 Presentation: draft-ietf-idwg-idmef-xml-07
c3c1102c582557eeed8c26fd85fbaf13405334d2ff37fcce9af614b58ab3f877Defcon 10 Presentation: draft-ietf-ipsec-properties-01
b922ce78e2c3a2fb8452605163be13052200520797fd5829aff7dbf93e17d573draft-ietf-wu-srp-auth-02.txt
7113e64c9fddb12aa6e31f9d02683748a0b8f4ac6bf43ec19f5e8f8ad4580a1cdraft-wu-telnet-auth-srp-02.txt
7c48a7a88e70860064927ebd52e8edd1e572b59232dad92a61fbede13d3f19cfdraft-simpson-photuris-current.txt
ad065eafe567d5cf222d927bbdcfe1ba9902e8cee6751eeca5e3e27cb2eebbb4
© 2024 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.
%7Cutmcsr%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none)){kind=small}
Follow us on Twitter
Follow us on Facebook
Subscribe to an RSS Feed