---------------------------------------------------------------------- "From 2007 to 2009 vulnerabilities in a typical end-user PC almost doubled from about 220 to 420." Non-Microsoft software to blame for increase in vulnerabilities affecting typical Windows end-users, read more: http://secunia.com/gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf ---------------------------------------------------------------------- TITLE: TYPO3 Multiple Vulnerabilities SECUNIA ADVISORY ID: SA40742 VERIFY ADVISORY: Secunia.com http://secunia.com/advisories/40742/ Customer Area (Credentials Required) https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40742 RELEASE DATE: 2010-08-05 DISCUSS ADVISORY: http://secunia.com/advisories/40742/#comments AVAILABLE ON SITE AND IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Last Update * Popularity * Comments * Criticality Level * Impact * Where * Solution Status * Operating System / Software * CVE Reference(s) http://secunia.com/advisories/40742/ ONLY AVAILABLE IN CUSTOMER AREA: * Authentication Level * Report Reliability * Secunia PoC * Secunia Analysis * Systems Affected * Approve Distribution * Remediation Status * Secunia CVSS Score * CVSS https://ca.secunia.com/?page=viewadvisory&vuln_id=40742 ONLY AVAILABLE WITH SECUNIA CSI AND SECUNIA PSI: * AUTOMATED SCANNING http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/personal/ http://secunia.com/vulnerability_scanning/corporate/wsus_sccm_3rd_third_party_patching/ DESCRIPTION: Multiple vulnerabilities and security issues have been reported in TYPO3, which can be exploited by malicious users to conduct SQL injection attacks, manipulate certain data, and compromise a vulnerable system and by malicious people to conduct cross-site scripting attacks, HTTP redirect attacks, HTTP response splitting attacks, session fixation attacks, bypass certain security restrictions, and disclose potentially sensitive information. 1) Input passed to unspecified parameters in the backend is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. 2) Input passed to unspecified parameters in the backend is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to redirect a user to an arbitrary site. 3) Input passed via the backend record editing forms is not properly sanitised before being used in a SQL query. This can be exploited to manipulate SQL queries by injecting arbitrary SQL code. Successful exploitation requires "editor" permissions. 4) A security issue exists when validating uploaded files via the "fileDenyPattern" configuration variable and can be exploited to execute arbitrary PHP code by uploading a PHP file with e.g. a ".phtml" file extension. Successful exploitation requires backend permissions. 5) A security issue exists when an extension with a defective backend module is installed and can be exploited to disclose the full path of the application via error messages. 6) Certain input is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user in the Extension Manager. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. 7) Input passed to unspecified parameters in the Extension Manager is not properly verified before being used to update files. This can be exploited to modify arbitrary files. Successful exploitation requires admin permissions. 8) Certain input is not properly sanitised before being used to construct an email message and can be exploited to inject arbitrary email addresses. 9) Input passed to the "jumpurl" parameter is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to insert arbitrary HTTP headers, which are included in a response sent to the user. 10) Input passed to the frontend login box is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. This vulnerability is reported in versions prior to 4.2.13, prior to 4.3.4 and in 4.4 only. 11) A security issue exists in the "Forgot password" mechanism due to predictable generation of the confirmation code. This can be exploited to reset the password of a valid user using a predicted confirmation code. This vulnerability is reported in versions prior to 4.3.4 and in 4.4 only. 12) An error in the handling of sessions of install tool users can be exploited to hijack another user's session. 13) Input passed to the extbase extension in the FLUID Templating Engine is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. This vulnerability is reported in versions prior to 4.3.4 and in 4.4 only. 14) A security issue exists in the HTML mailing API class "t3lib_htmlmail" and can be exploited to disclose the version of the application via mail headers. This vulnerability is reported in versions prior to 4.2.13, prior to 4.3.4 and in 4.4 only. 15) Input passed to the frontend search box is not properly sanitised before being returned to the user. This can be exploited to execute arbitrary HTML and script code in a user's browser session in context of an affected site. This vulnerability is reported in version 4.4 only. The vulnerabilities are reported in versions prior to 4.1.14, prior to 4.2.13, prior to 4.3.4 and in 4.4. SOLUTION: Update to version 4.1.14, 4.2.13, 4.3.4, and 4.4.1. PROVIDED AND/OR DISCOVERED BY: 1) The vendor credits Jelmer de Hen, Nikolas Hagelstein, Daniel Sloof, Tobias Liebig of TYPO3 Core Team, and TYPO3 Security Team members Georg Ringer, Dmitry Dulepov and Helmut Hummel. 2) The vendor credits Maxime Verroye and Helmut Hummel of TYPO3 Security Team. 3) The vendor credits Marc Bastian Heinrichs, Steffen Kamper of TYPO3 Core Team, and Helmut Hummel of TYPO3 Security Team. 4) The vendor credits Ernesto Baschny, TYPO3 Core Team. 5) The vendor credits Dmitry Dulepov, TYPO3 Core Team. 6,7) The vendor credits Tim Lochmuller. 8) The vendor credits Lars Houmark. 9) The vendor credits Maxime Verroye. 10) The vendor credits Franz G. Jahn. 11) The vendor credits Manuel Stofer. 12) The vendor credits Marcus Krause, TYPO3 Security Team. 13) The vendor credits Sebastian Kurfurst, TYPO3 Core Team. 14) The vendor credits Kai Vogel. 15) The vendor credits Alexandre Gravel-Raymond and Georg Ringer, TYPO3 Security Team. ORIGINAL ADVISORY: TYPO3-SA-2010-012: http://typo3.org/teams/security/security-bulletins/typo3-sa-2010-012/ OTHER REFERENCES: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ DEEP LINKS: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED DESCRIPTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXTENDED SOLUTION: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ EXPLOIT: Further details available in Customer Area: http://secunia.com/products/corporate/EVM/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- About: This Advisory was delivered by Secunia as a free service to help private users keeping their systems up to date against the latest vulnerabilities. Subscribe: http://secunia.com/advisories/secunia_security_advisories/ Definitions: (Criticality, Where etc.) http://secunia.com/advisories/about_secunia_advisories/ Please Note: Secunia recommends that you verify all advisories you receive by clicking the link. Secunia NEVER sends attached files with advisories. Secunia does not advise people to install third party patches, only use those supplied by the vendor. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Unsubscribe: Secunia Security Advisories http://secunia.com/sec_adv_unsubscribe/?email=packet%40packetstormsecurity.org ----------------------------------------------------------------------