-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 National Cyber Alert System Technical Cyber Security Alert TA07-059A Sun Solaris Telnet Worm Original release date: February 28, 2007 Last revised: -- Source: US-CERT Systems Affected * Sun Solaris 10 (SunOS 5.10) * Sun "Nevada" (SunOS 5.11) Both SPARC and Intel (x86) architectures are affected. Overview A worm is exploiting a vulnerability (VU#881872) in the Sun Solaris telnet daemon (in.telnetd). I. Description A worm is exploiting a vulnerability in the telnet daemon (in.telnetd) on unpatched Sun Solaris systems. The vulnerability allows the worm (or any attacker) to log in via telnet (23/tcp) with elevated privileges. Further details about the vulnerability are available in Vulnerability Note VU#881872 (CVE-2007-0882). Because VU#881872 is trivial to exploit and sufficient technical detail is publicly available, any attacker, not just this worm, could exploit vulnerable systems. Characteristics of the worm include, but are not limited to: * Exploiting VU#881872 to log in via telnet as the users adm or lp * Changing permissions on /var/adm/wtmpx to -rw-r--rw- * Creating the directory .adm in /var/adm/sa/ * Adding .profile files to /var/adm/ and /var/spool/lp/ * Installing an authenticated backdoor shell on port 32982/tcp * Modifying crontab entries for the users adm and lp * Scanning for other hosts running telnet (23/tcp) Sun has published information about the worm in the Security Sun Alert Feed including an inoculation script that disables the telnet daemon and reverses known changes made by the worm. II. Impact VU#881872 allows remote attacker to log on to a vulnerable system via telnet and gain elevated privileges. The worm exploits this vulnerability to compromise systems as described above. Since the worm installs a backdoor shell, it is possible for an attacker with knowledge of the authentication tokens to access a compromised system and take any action with the privileges of the backdoor shell process, likely adm or lp. III. Solution Apply a patch To address VU#881872, apply the appropriate patches referenced in Sun Alert Notification 102802. Run inoculation script To recover compromised systems, Sun has provided an inoculation script that disables the telnet daemon and reverses known changes made by the worm. Note that the inoculation script only recovers from this particular worm. Running the inoculation script does not guarantee system integrity. A vulnerable system may be compromised in different ways by attackers exploiting VU#881872 or using the backdoor installed by the worm. To fully recover, it may be necessary to rebuild a compromised system using trusted software sources. For more information, see Recovering from an Incident. IV. Workarounds Until the appropriate patches can be applied, consider the following workarounds. Disable telnet Telnet can be disabled by issuing the following command as root: # /usr/sbin/svcadm disable telnet Restrict telnet access Restrict access to telnet (23/tcp) from untrusted networks such as the Internet. Use SSH instead of telnet SSH provides a comparatively more secure method for remotely logging into a system than telnet. As general advice, we recommend using SSH rather than telnet. V. References * US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#881872 - * Recovering from an Incident - * Sun Alert Notification 102802 - * Solaris in.telnetd worm seen in the wild + inoculation script - * inoculate.local - * CVE-2007-0882 - ____________________________________________________________________ The most recent version of this document can be found at: ____________________________________________________________________ Feedback can be directed to US-CERT Technical Staff. Please send email to with "TA07-059A Feedback VU#881872" in the subject. ____________________________________________________________________ For instructions on subscribing to or unsubscribing from this mailing list, visit . ____________________________________________________________________ Produced 2007 by US-CERT, a government organization. Terms of use: ____________________________________________________________________ Revision History February 28, 2007: Initial release -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux) iQEVAwUBReYctOxOF3G+ig+rAQKGUAf+LY2zbs3k8mx3mYhgtpLWCCOo5wDjd90a g+apWM4B9qEsAvlIsI/tWof5xSf682D7Yx47xwDDxUyIswHkovGaIWQ7TKmew1Be On7KUFSi0fHQ9Su4536COmr3aCOoeXhPpIIC8nFyb9rZ22aax6LowxH4THU1uFRO vITWFHKuWkSW75D4WQ9z19m1cdkXf2Y6SC9UcqADdImFo0ZG/mVzQ8as1sb3nHM7 0cBje0Dt4rEUtMkgBRrIMqoa1FquJXnLT0YnUtQp914SguxhD5sB/shjiIrttpVq uROeI77nsfGzAyWLes2K/fDik4/HJLIgiTpnONBTrXNYuuTsfKOJ0Q== =rcWZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----