-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hardened-PHP Project www.hardened-php.net -= Security Advisory =- Advisory: PHP ext/session HTTP Response Splitting Vulnerability Release Date: 2006/01/12 Last Modified: 2006/01/12 Author: Stefan Esser [sesser@hardened-php.net] Application: PHP5 <= 5.1.1 Not Affected: PHP4 PHP5 with Hardening-Patch Severity: PHP applications using PHP5's session extension are vulnerable to HTTP Response Splitting attacks Risk: Critical Vendor Status: Vendor has released a bugfixed version References: http://www.hardened-php.net/advisory_012006.112.html Overview: PHP is a widely-used general-purpose scripting language that is especially suited for Web development and can be embedded into HTML. During the development of the Hardening-Patch which adds security hardening features to the PHP codebase, several vulnerabilities within PHP were discovered. This advisory describes one of these flaws concerning a weakness in the session extension. Since PHP5 a user supplied session ID is sent back to the user within a Set-Cookie HTTP header. Because there were no checks performed on the validity of this session id, it was possible to inject arbitrary HTTP headers into the response body of applications using PHP's builtin session functionality by supplying a special crafted session id. This can be used to perform HTTP Response Splitting and Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks on all applications using the session extension. Details: PHP's own session functionality is using a so-called permissive system to accept any kind of user supplied session ID. While this is often criticized as the cause of easier session fixation attacks against PHP applications, it also means that the session ID has to be considered as user input in PHP applications. Therefore it is up to the PHP application to decide if it accepts the supplied session ID or rejects it because of f.e. not accepted characters. Until PHP5 the built-in session extension assumes that a user supplied session ID is already known on the client side and therefore it is not sent back to the client within a cookie. This behaviour has changed in PHP5 and because there was no additional checks added, this enables an attacker to inject anything he wants into the Set-Cookie HTTP header. This obviously leads to HTTP Response Splitting vulnerabilities in all applications using PHP's built-in session handling. By simply terminating the HTTP headers from within the Set-Cookie HTTP header it is of course possible to inject part of the request body and perform all kinds of Cross Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. Because PHP's default session storage module, files, will issue a PHP warning that a session ID with illegal characters was used, this is not exploitable in some situations where output buffering is switched off (on server and in the application), the files module is used and PHP is configured to display warnings. This means the recommended settings for PHP webservers are vulnerable and because at least one of the conditions above are not met on nearly all production servers, most PHP servers are vulnerable to this. PHP servers using our Hardening-Patch are not vulnerable to this because they ship with a HTTP Response Splitting protection enabled by default and also use a strict session ID mode, which disallows all session IDs not created by PHP itself. Proof of Concept: The Hardened-PHP project is not going to release exploits for this vulnerability to the public. Recommendation: It is strongly recommended to upgrade to the latest appropriate PHP release as soon as possible. On the one hand there are also other fixes in it and on the other hand it finally comes with a HTTP Response Splitting protection. Additionally we always recommend to run PHP with the Hardening-Patch applied, because this vulnerability once again proved that our users are protected against unknown vulnerabilities before they become public knowledge. GPG-Key: http://www.hardened-php.net/hardened-php-signature-key.asc pub 1024D/0A864AA1 2004-04-17 Hardened-PHP Signature Key Key fingerprint = 066F A6D0 E57E 9936 9082 7E52 4439 14CC 0A86 4AA1 Copyright 2006 Stefan Esser. All rights reserved. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (GNU/Linux) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iD8DBQFDxpDDRDkUzAqGSqERAoqyAJ4gFYE2bPVC1N4AAhidWFk2460gsACgmY2d qK3r8cAsVboCg0ca+cMqS1w= =HGR8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----