-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Alkacon OpenCms 6.0.2 login Cross Site Scripting scip AG Vulnerability Advisory ID 1910 (11/22/2005) http://www.scip.ch/cgi-bin/smss/showadvf.pl?id=1910 I. INTRODUCTION Alkacon OpenCms is a professional level open source website content management system. OpenCms helps to create and manage complex websites easily without knowledge of html. More Information are available on the official Alkacon product web site at the following URL: http://www.opencms.org II. DESCRIPTION Users are able to login to the system over the web front end by accessing /system/login. In there the user name and the corresponding password is required. If a wrong password is used, an error message will occur. On this re-loaded web site the user name from the last login attempt is re-written to the textbox ocUname. An attacker may use the string "> to inject his own html or active code. An important remark remains that the http request in this case is done with the POST command which gives some limitations for the automated remote-attack. III. EXPLOITATION To exploit this vulnerability no dedicated exploit is required. As described before the classic script and code injection can be realized with the string "> on the beginning of users input. A proof-of-concept can be realised with the following input line: "> A plugin for our open-source exploiting framework "Attack Tool Kit" (ATK) will be published in the near future. [1] IV. IMPACT This is a serious problem due the fact non-authenticated users are able to launch such an attack. The main limitation of the vulnerability remains in the fact that HTTP POST requests are used. Thus, fully automated attacks are not easy to launch. V. DETECTION Detection of web based attacks require a specialiced web proxy and/or intrusion detection system. Patterns for such a detection are available and easy to implement. Especially active code should not be part of user inputs. VI. WORKAROUND The administrative web frontend of OpenCms should be protected by further access limitations (e.g. htaccess authentication) and/or firewalling. VII. VENDOR RESPONSE Alkacon has been informed on an early stage on 11/01/2005 via email to info-at-alkacon.com. Within the first response the fix for the CVS HEAD repository and a fixed release 6.0.3 was announced for the same month. Everything was handled very professional and quickly by the vendor. VIII. SOURCES scip AG - Security Consulting Information Process (german) http://www.scip.ch scip AG Vulnerability Database (german) http://www.scip.ch/cgi-bin/smss/showadvf.pl?id=1910 computec.ch document data base, web server documents (german) http://www.computec.ch/download.php?list.26 IX. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 10/27/05 Detection of the flaw 11/01/05 Reporting the flaw to Alkacon via email 11/09/05 First response by Alexander Kandzior, Alkacon Software 11/10/05 Immediate fix on the CVS HEAD repository 11/25/05 Official release of OpenCms 6.0.3 inclusive fixes 12/15/05 Public advisory by scip AG IX. CREDITS The vulnerability was discovered by Marc Ruef. Marc Ruef, scip AG, Zuerich, Switzerland maru-at-scip.ch http://www.scip.ch A1. BIBLIOGRAPHY [1] http://www.computec.ch/projekte/atk/ A2. LEGAL NOTICES Copyright (c) 2005 scip AG, Switzerland. Permission is granted for the re-distribution of this alert. It may not be edited in any way without permission of scip AG. The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect or consequential loss or damage from use of or reliance on this advisory. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.0 Comment: http://www.scip.ch iQA/AwUBQ6FUiRe5hzJzqVMhEQIJwACbBL7wWPWIs5sEa+81Mso0E1xa+xoAn0HZ hgY6MWBsXeoQd/lFdbrOc2nU =s/h7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----