****************************************************************************** ------ ----- ----- --- ----- | ----- ---- | | | | | |--- | | | | | | | | | |-- | | | | |-- | | | | | | | | \ | | ----- ---- ----- ----- | \ ----- A D V I S O R Y FA-98.20 ****************************************************************************** Topic: IRIX 6.3 & 6.4 mailcap vulnerability Source: CERT/CC Creation Date: April 6, 1998 Last Updated: To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, FedCIRC is forwarding the following information from CERT/CC Vendor Initiated Bulletin VB-98.03. FedCIRC urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. If you have any questions, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov =======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= CERT* Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-98.03.sgi_mailcap April 6, 1998 Topic: IRIX 6.3 & 6.4 mailcap vulnerability Source: Silicon Graphics Inc. To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from SGI. SGI you to act on this information as soon as possible. SGI contact information is included in the forwarded text below; please contact them if you have any questions or need further information. =======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory Title: IRIX 6.3 & 6.4 mailcap vulnerability Number: 19980403-01-PX Date: April 2, 1998 ______________________________________________________________________________ Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible. Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto, express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory. ______________________________________________________________________________ - - ----------------------- - - --- Issue Specifics --- - - ----------------------- The System Manager sysmgr(1M) provides a web-browser-like GUI interface to tasks that help you administer an SGI workstation. sysmgr(1M) uses multiple tools to manage its GUI interface, two of them being runtask(1M) and runexec(1M). By mimicking the descriptor files of runtask(1M) or runexec(1M), an SGI user browsing web pages or reading email can inadvertently download a "trojan horse" runtask(1M) or runexec(1M) descriptor file. The "trojan horse" descriptor file will execute a local System Manager Task with the privileges of the user web browsing and can lead to a local root compromise. Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX. - - -------------- - - --- Impact --- - - -------------- All IRIX 6.3/6.4 users that have Mailcap entries for x-sgi-task and x-sgi-exec have this vulnerability. On IRIX 6.3/6.4, these vulnerable Mailcap entries are installed by default in /usr/local/lib/netscape/mailcap . Users can add their own Mailcap entries in their home directories ($HOME/.mailcap) and these need to be inspected for the vulnerable x-sgi-task and x-sgi-exec entries. By default, this vulnerability requires an IRIX 6.3/6.4 user to use Netscape Navigator to web browse or read email from a malicious site and download a "trojan horse" System Manager Task which will execute locally with the privileges of the user web browsing. If the user is a privileged or root user, the "trojan horse" System Manger Task will execute with root privileges and can lead to a root compromise. - - -------------------------- - - --- Temporary Solution --- - - -------------------------- Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may not be possible. 1) Become the root user on the system. % /bin/su - Password: # 2) Edit the default Mailcap file. # vi /usr/local/lib/netscape/mailcap 3) Remove the following vulnerable mailcap entries: application/x-sgi-task; /usr/sysadm/bin/runtask %s; \ description="System Administration Task" application/x-sgi-exec; /usr/sysadm/bin/runexec %s; \ description="System Administration Executable" 4) Find any additional mailcap files and remove any vulnerable entries. You will need to run the find(1) command on each system you maintain because the command examines files on local disks only. Note that this is one long command, though we have separated it onto three lines using backslashes. # find / -local -type f -name 'mailcap' -o \ -name '.mailcap' -exec egrep 'runexec|runtask' {} \ /dev/null \; This command will find all files on a system that: are only in the local file system (/ -local) are regular files (-type f) have the name "mailcap" (-name 'mailcap') or the name ".mailcap" Once found, those files will be searched for the string "runexec" or "runtask" (-exec egrep 'runexec|runtask' {}) and have their path names printed . The addition of /dev/null as an argument causes grep to list the full pathname of any file containing the string, rather than just the basename. Edit the files that have the pathnames printed and remove any vulnerable runtask/runexec mailcap entries. 5) Return to previous level. # exit $ - - ---------------- - - --- Solution --- - - ---------------- OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions ---------- ----------- ------- ------------- IRIX 3.x no IRIX 4.x no IRIX 5.0.x no IRIX 5.1.x no IRIX 5.2 no IRIX 5.3 no IRIX 6.0.x no IRIX 6.1 no IRIX 6.2 no IRIX 6.3 yes 2336 IRIX 6.4 yes 2339 Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider. The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully. ##### Patch File Checksums #### The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files: Filename: README.patch.2336 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15417 8 README.patch.2336 Algorithm #2 (sum): 21104 8 README.patch.2336 MD5 checksum: C5FCA39F205EF1C306F28E95C811150C Filename: patchSG0002336 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64988 2 patchSG0002336 Algorithm #2 (sum): 38657 2 patchSG0002336 MD5 checksum: C38D6B81878377F470D1CC0ED43C8227 Filename: patchSG0002336.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05931 2 patchSG0002336.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 54651 2 patchSG0002336.idb MD5 checksum: 0C821C1BC07C08F279288F86E9807C93 Filename: patchSG0002336.netscape_gold_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52912 20 patchSG0002336.netscape_gold_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 51500 20 patchSG0002336.netscape_gold_sw MD5 checksum: 88CABDD9E4669CC6303876D77E491E4F Filename: README.patch.2339 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 11695 8 README.patch.2339 Algorithm #2 (sum): 21823 8 README.patch.2339 MD5 checksum: 114563D0D67F80E371C71EF3E6262900 Filename: patchSG0002339 Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 37814 2 patchSG0002339 Algorithm #2 (sum): 40753 2 patchSG0002339 MD5 checksum: E0B519F8ECD83396E29DFE07DF23517E Filename: patchSG0002339.idb Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 59311 2 patchSG0002339.idb Algorithm #2 (sum): 54667 2 patchSG0002339.idb MD5 checksum: 8E39530FD44C9087F0C07B1F75043764 Filename: patchSG0002339.netscape_gold_sw Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39233 20 patchSG0002339.netscape_gold_sw Algorithm #2 (sum): 53498 20 patchSG0002339.netscape_gold_sw MD5 checksum: 7FF56E22472B0797499920BAAB8CA9C5 - - - ------------------------ - - - --- Acknowledgments --- - - - ------------------------ Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center, and AUSCERT for their assistance in this matter. - - - ----------------------------------------------------------- - - - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts --- - - - ----------------------------------------------------------- If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely available to any person needing the information and is available via anonymous FTP and the Web. The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches, respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to cse-security-alert@sgi.com. For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please contact your SGI support provider. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web (http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email to SGI as outlined below. % mail wiretap-request@sgi.com subscribe wiretap end ^d In the example above, is the email address that you wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are finished composing the mail message. ------oOo------ Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site. This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html. ------oOo------ For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A support contract is not required for submitting a security report. ______________________________________________________________________________ This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and includes its valid PGP signature. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNSQtWrQ4cFApAP75AQELfAP/U7WG4C3rnY132uQh01QyvaZFbA6+4dA9 F3to6r4kXmv/sxCAJFshwCyYAYFWgnNWcRHkHfwVV/FM5LFEv12AAmV2omQyOCPO 16Vue8k88DDIsZsha71EtwShDZRYdm2jNiJYh1bJBxi9g+2nkO4oAzoRkqMpvl1m HHMC/P/x/c4= =StW5 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). See http://www.first.org/team-info/. We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by email. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP. Contact the CERT staff for more information. Location of CERT PGP key ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key CERT Contact Information - ------------------------ Email cert@cert.org Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax +1 412-268-6989 Postal address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other security-related information are available from http://www.cert.org/ ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/ CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce To be added to our mailing list for CERT advisories and bulletins, send your email address to cert-advisory-request@cert.org In the subject line, type SUBSCRIBE your-email-address * Registered U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI). The SEI is sponsored by the U. S. Department of Defense. This file: ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/cert_bulletins/VB-98.03.sgi_mailcap -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBNSklkXVP+x0t4w7BAQF6RgP/Uwd6E/pOCzYHIYBT20OeYT4U666q1kVs +gajk0gomD/GW4lk3jwglelhdBBURcZyIDBH7gxAuGqWbtDhQ30OhvIz4JGK+L5D st1Qel+NdHQDpK66689apMaZoIvo+m+89CaibYArT21TDmiTqg4Stq3sG70T7bni 9/NzNqe1kGA= =dx+1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has established a Federal Computer Incident response Capability (FedCIRC) to assist federal civilians agencies in their incident handling efforts by providing proactive and reactive computer security related services. FedCIRC is a partnership among NIST, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability (CIAC), and the CERT* Coordination Center (CERT/CC). If you believe that your system has been compromised, please contact FedCIRC: Telephone: +1 888 282 0870 Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov Web Server: http://www.fedcirc.gov/ * Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering Institute. The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense. CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.