RESTRICTIONS: NONE _____________________________________________________ The Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | / \ / \___ __|__ /___\ \___ _____________________________________________________ Information Bulletin Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability January 22, 1993, 1400 PST Number D-05 _________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Allows unauthorized access to NIS data. PLATFORM: HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers. DAMAGE: Remote and local users can obtain unauthorized privileges. SOLUTION: Install revised patches. _________________________________________________________________________ Critical Information about Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind The inclosed advisory was issued by the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) and is an update to a previous advisory CA-92:17. ============================================================================= CA-93:01 CERT Advisory January 13, 1993 Revised Hewlett-Packard NIS ypbind Vulnerability ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** THIS IS A REVISED CERT ADVISORY *** *** IT CONTAINS NEW INFORMATION REGARDING AVAILABILITY OF IMAGE KITS *** *** SUPERSEDES CERT ADVISORY CA-92:17 *** The CERT Coordination Center has received information concerning a vulnerability in the NIS ypbind module for the Hewlett-Packard (HP) HP/UX Operating System for series 300, 700, and 800 computers. HP has provided revised patches for all of the HP/UX level 8 releases (8.0, 8.02, 8.06, and 8.07). This problem is fixed in HP/UX 9.0. The following patches have been superseded: Patch ID Replaced by Patch ID PHNE_1359 PHNE_1706 PHNE_1360 PHNE_1707 PHNE_1361 PHNE_1708 All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture as described below. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description A vulnerability in HP NIS allows unauthorized access to NIS data. II. Impact Root on a remote host running any vendor's implementation of NIS can gain root access on any local host running HP's NIS ypbind. Local users of a host running HP's NIS ypbind can also gain root access. III. Solution 1) All HP NIS clients and servers running ypbind should obtain and install the patch appropriate for their machine's architecture. These patches contain a version of ypbind that accepts ypset requests only from a superuser port on the local host. This prevents a non-superuser program from sending rogue ypset requests to ypbind. The patches also include the mod from the superseded patches that prevents a superuser on a remote system from issuing a ypset -h command to the local system and binding the system to a rogue ypserver. These patches may be obtained from HP via FTP (this is NOT anonymous FTP) or the HP SupportLine. To obtain HP security patches, you must first register with the HP SupportLine. The registration instructions are available via anonymous FTP at cert.org (192.88.209.5) in the file "pub/vendors/hp/supportline_and_patch_retrieval". The new patch files are: Architecture Patch ID Filename Checksum ------------ -------- -------- -------- Series 300 PHNE_1706 /hp-ux_patches/s300_400/8.X/PHNE_1706 38955 212 Series 700 PHNE_1707 /hp-ux_patches/s700/8.X/PHNE_1707 815 311 Series 800 PHNE_1708 /hp-ux_patches/s800/8.X/PHNE_1708 56971 299 2) The instructions for installing the patch are provided in the PHNE_xxxx.text file (this file is created after the patch has been unpacked). The checksums listed above are for the patch archive files from HP. Once unpacked, each shell archive contains additional checksum information in the file "patchfilename.text". This checksum is applicable to the binary patch file "patchfilename.updt". If you have any questions about obtaining or installing the patches, contact the USA HP SupportLine at 415-691-3888, or your local HP SupportLine number. Please note that the telephone numbers in this advisory are appropriate for the USA and Canada. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center wishes to thank Brian Kelley of Ford Motor Company for bringing this vulnerability to our attention. We would also like to thank Hewlett-Packard for their response to this problem. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- =========================================================================== CIAC would like to acknowledge the contributions of: CERT/CC. For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC at (510)422-8193/FTS or send E-mail to ciac@llnl.gov. FAX messages to (510)423-8002/FTS. The CIAC Bulletin Board, Felicia, can be accessed at 1200 or 2400 baud at (510) 423-4753 and 9600 baud at (510) 423-3331. Previous CIAC bulletins and other information is available via anonymous ftp from irbis.llnl.gov (ip address 128.115.19.60). PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE and ESnet computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Some of the other teams include the NASA NSI response team, DARPA's CERT/CC, NAVCIRT, and the Air Force response team. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained by sending email to Docserver@First.Org with a null subject line, and the first line of the message reading: send first-contacts. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.