-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 Advisory ID: SYSS-2019-005 Product: ABUS Secvest (FUAA50000) Manufacturer: ABUS Affected Version(s): v3.01.01 Tested Version(s): v3.01.01 Vulnerability Type: Cryptographic Issues (CWE-310) Risk Level: Medium Solution Status: Open Manufacturer Notification: 2019-03-15 Solution Date: - Public Disclosure: 2019-05-02 CVE Reference: CVE-2019-9861 Authors of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, Gerhard Klostermeier (SySS GmbH) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: ABUS Secvest (FUAA50000) is a wireless alarm system with different features. Some of the supported features as described by the manufacturer are (see [1]): " * Convenient operation via the app (Android/iOS), integrated web browser and also at the alarm panel * For up to 50 users with freely selectable control options (code/chip key/remote control) * Active intrusion protection in combination with additional mechatronic wireless window/door locks * Video verification of alarms via email, push notifications or via the app * Up to 48 individually identifiable wireless detectors, eight control panels, 50 remote controls * Integrated dialling device * VdS Home certified and EN 50131-1 Level 2 * Alarm verification via the integration of up to six IP cameras * 32 additional wireless outputs for flexible event control * Switching to monitoring station via protocols possible " Due to the use of an insecure RFID technology (MIFARE Classic), ABUS proximity chip keys (RFID tokens) [2] of the ABUS Secvest wireless alarm system can easily be cloned and used to deactivate the alarm system in an unauthorized way. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: SySS GmbH found out that the RFID technology used by the ABUS Secvest wireless alarm system and its ABUS proximity keys (MIFARE Classic RFID tags) is vulnerable to RFID cloning attacks. The information stored on the used proximity keys can be read easily in a very short time from distances up to 1 meter, depending on the used RFID reader. A working cloned RFID token is ready for use within a couple of seconds using freely available tools. Thus, an attacker with one-time access to the information of an ABUS proximity key for an ABUS Secvest wireless alarm system is able to create a rogue RFID token that can be used to deactivate the alarm system in an unauthorized manner. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): SySS GmbH could successfully clone ABUS proximity keys of an ABUS Secvest wireless alarm system using different freely available off-the-shelf tools like an Android smartphone with the Mifare Classic Tool (MCT) [3], a ChameleonMini [4], and an RFID/NFC reader/writer [5] and disarm the wireless alarm system in an unauthorized way. All three RFID cloning attacks are demonstrated in our SySS proof-of-concept video "ABUS Secvest Proximity Key Cloning PoC Attack" [6]. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: SySS GmbH is not aware of a solution for this reported security vulnerability. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2019-03-15: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2016-05-02: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] Product website for ABUS Secvest wireless alarm system https://www.abus.com/eng/Home-Security/Alarm-systems/Secvest-wireless-alarm-system/Alarm-panels-and-kits/Secvest-Wireless-Alarm-System [2] Product website for ABUS proximity chip key https://www.abus.com/eng/Home-Security/Alarm-systems/Secvest-wireless-alarm-system/Control-devices-and-extensions/Proximity-Chip-Key [3] MIFARE Classic Tool - MCT https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.syss.MifareClassicTool [4] GitHub repository of ChameleonMini https://github.com/emsec/ChameleonMini [5] OBO Hands RFID/NFC Reader/Writer https://www.amazon.de/dp/B07DHL9XQ4/ [6] SySS Proof-of-Concept Video: ABUS Secvest Proximity Key Cloning PoC Attack https://youtu.be/sPyXTQXTEcQ [7] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2019-005 https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2019-005.txt [8] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/news/responsible-disclosure-policy/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg and Gerhard Klostermeier of SySS GmbH. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Materialien/PGPKeys/Matthias_Deeg.asc Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB E-Mail: gerhard.klostermeier (at) syss.de Public Key: https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/PGPKeys/Gerhard_Klostermeier.asc Key fingerprint = 8A9E 75CC D510 4FF6 8DB5 CC30 3802 3AAB 573E B2E7 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS Web site. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 3.0 URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEE0fCgNfBs5nXNuQUU2aS/ajStTasFAlzKsdkACgkQ2aS/ajSt TaujyQ/9FASdsNHxRgsOvBhw0V4+VPsVDprGjA4h39bhDJ8f4XIcAzz6ZUiXnR+0 2/0N7MkbFV4gjAmq6TVLQjw6bAlLVRHpLaWsWWQQGjDedynljMlls+bBNsIDLmfz 9mBl8S2lp26jycLgtPgL0hdjzBok9Gf6UZt5H2AnXkfDwthjqR7Ln+x4t3potLJt d87l4Xe/C1x1aMmiJWRy3CxzGTDtCoD/CwBTGvTCTPHnF/9gRobHPLIho6RKzwRE WUtTKQ9me19E5NYX7lPgF3UUcMxVP3f5Yf32K6XnuByEbk0LHiJzKxXNdMT/MCP4 jWAVkWtXHshWb17aGBCbcI1zt9DJEis6dPgm2PJ+qVE/C4s4EszDe/Hc7wgH3fU9 iXY/+SHhgBml55WyNssH+u6TBiIr20/YyABcPQmzCP97sPWzBxMrUlzaad88dsGO I6O9TlcveBrKDcyj8+frv/c+7BU95ZOZmUDLZJ99/KXF1APRGG6JaIQsJm1pi36W O4gUFgUSZ+SiELf/ZsFP3dgPaHMG/pyEVH6mYQKVrm8hEYL/Iyi9WYk4G9TztGN2 g7fkpTI4cTcPYkj9uPBMc5RWCPKCRflkG8QAxf92FBA1rNF3oJYEXQH2RQuvzYqB ghpsBL30GyEjh2DFo/sUzMPUt1Wl1otw3CzEH4eVqIX5J620ol4= =km71 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----