Date: Mon, 7 Jun 1999 11:29:55 -0700 From: Sun Security Coordination Team To: CWS@sunsc.Eng.Sun.COM Subject: Sun Security Bulletin #00186 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ________________________________________________________________________________ Sun Microsystems, Inc. Security Bulletin Bulletin Number: #00186 Date: June 7, 1999 Cross-Ref: Title: rpc.statd ________________________________________________________________________________ The information contained in this Security Bulletin is provided "AS IS." Sun makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this Security Bulletin. ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF NON-INFRINGEMENT OR IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED AND EXCLUDED TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW. IN NO EVENT WILL SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE, PROFIT OR DATA, OR FOR DIRECT, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS SECURITY BULLETIN, EVEN IF SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. If any of the above provisions are held to be in violation of applicable law, void, or unenforceable in any jurisdiction, then such provisions are waived to the extent necessary for this disclaimer to be otherwise enforceable in such jurisdiction. ________________________________________________________________________________ 1. Bulletins Topics Sun announces the release of patches for Solaris(tm) 2.6, 2.5.1, 2.5, 2.4, and 2.3 (SunOS(tm) 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, 5.4 and 5.3), which relate to a vulnerability involving rpc.statd. Sun recommends that you install the patches listed in section 4 immediately on systems running SunOS 5.6, 5.5.1, 5.5, 5.4, and 5.3. 2. Who is Affected Vulnerable: SunOS 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5, 5.5_x86, 5.4, 5.4_x86, and 5.3. Not vulnerable: All other supported versions of SunOS. 3. Understanding the Vulnerability rpc.statd is the NFS file-locking status monitor. It interacts with rpc.lockd to provide the crash and recovery functions for file locking across NFS. rpc.statd allows indirect RPC calls to other RPC services. Because rpc.statd runs as root, this allows remote attackers to bypass access controls of other RPC services. 4. List of Patches The following patches are available in relation to the above problem. OS Version Patch ID __________ _________ SunOS 5.6 106592-02 SunOS 5.6_x86 106593-02 SunOS 5.5.1 104166-04 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 104167-04 SunOS 5.5 103468-04 SunOS 5.5_x86 103469-05 SunOS 5.4 102769-07 SunOS 5.4_x86 102770-07 SunOS 5.3 102932-05 _______________________________________________________________________________ APPENDICES A. Patches listed in this bulletin are available to all Sun customers at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-license&nav=pub-patches B. Checksums for the patches listed in this bulletin are available at: ftp://sunsolve.sun.com/pub/patches/CHECKSUMS C. Sun security bulletins are available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/secBulletin.pl D. Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key is available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pgpkey.txt E. To report or inquire about a security problem with Sun software, contact one or more of the following: - Your local Sun answer centers - Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT - Sun Security Coordination Team. Send email to: security-alert@sun.com F. To receive information or subscribe to our CWS (Customer Warning System) mailing list, send email to: security-alert@sun.com with a subject line (not body) containing one of the following commands: Command Information Returned/Action Taken _______ _________________________________ help An explanation of how to get information key Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key list A list of current security topics query [topic] The email is treated as an inquiry and is forwarded to the Security Coordination Team report [topic] The email is treated as a security report and is forwarded to the Security Coordination Team. Please encrypt sensitive mail using Sun Security Coordination Team's PGP key send topic A short status summary or bulletin. For example, to retrieve a Security Bulletin #00138, supply the following in the subject line (not body): send #138 subscribe Sender is added to our mailing list. To subscribe, supply the following in the subject line (not body): subscribe cws your-email-address Note that your-email-address should be substituted by your email address. unsubscribe Sender is removed from the CWS mailing list. ________________________________________________________________________________ Copyright 1999 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. Sun, Sun Microsystems, Solaris and SunOS are trademarks or registered trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other countries. This Security Bulletin may be reproduced and distributed, provided that this Security Bulletin is not modified in any way and is attributed to Sun Microsystems, Inc. and provided that such reproduction and distribution is performed for non-commercial purposes. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBN1v0lrdzzzOFBFjJAQFBRwQAuf9lbE6VUaMPIZ2nBiiVXuRsmLJqIQUQ zZvGpx9//DO5UQt4U/kOMmyv8m8SSNCoZfrmu4I7WqiX1OKvr+H9FLR6OEnUVqPC 7hLQl0PBmkcLkRsUpFvEG4zTnI4D7SUcWb5rOcUYdpWF/XUnjRp9Yx0wbQClWvG2 ZxBjl97qw1Y= =07wv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Jun 1999 16:27:53 -0400 From: CERT Advisory Reply-To: cert-advisory-request@cert.org To: cert-advisory@coal.cert.org Subject: CERT Advisory CA-99.05 - statd-automountd -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- CERT Advisory CA-99-05 Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in automountd Original issue date: June 9, 1999 Source: CERT/CC Systems Affected Systems running older versions of rpc.statd and automountd I. Description This advisory describes two vulnerabilities that are being used together by intruders to gain access to vulnerable systems. The first vulnerability is in rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state changes among NFS clients and servers. The second vulnerability is in automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain types of file systems. Both of these vulnerabilities have been widely discussed on public forums, such as BugTraq, and some vendors have issued security advisories related to the problems discussed here. Because of the number of incident reports we have received, however, we are releasing this advisory to call attention to these problems so that system and network administrators who have not addressed these problems do so immediately. The vulnerability in rpc.statd allows an intruder to call arbitrary rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process. The called rpc service may be a local service on the same machine or it may be a network service on another machine. Although the form of the call is constrained by rpc.statd, if the call is acceptable to another rpc service, the other rpc service will act on the call as if it were an authentic call from the rpc.statd process. The vulnerability in automountd allows a local intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd process. This vulnerability has been widely known for a significant period of time, and patches have been available from vendors, but many systems remain vulnerable because their administrators have not yet applied the appropriate patches. By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a remote intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the rpc.statd service to the automountd service on the same targeted machine. Although on many systems the automountd service does not normally accept traffic from the network, this combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative privileges of the automountd service, typically root. Note that the rpc.statd vulnerability described in this advisory is distinct from the vulnerabilities described in CERT Advisories CA-96.09 and CA-97.26. II. Impact The vulnerability in rpc.statd may allow a remote intruder to call arbitrary rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process, typically root. The vulnerablility in automountd may allow a local intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd service. By combining attacks exploiting these two vulnerabilities, a remote intruder is able to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd service. Note It may still be possible to cause rpc.statd to call other rpc services even after applying patches which reduce the privileges of rpc.statd. If there are additional vulnerabilities in other rpc services (including services you have written), an intruder may be able to exploit those vulnerabilities through rpc.statd. At the present time, we are unaware of any such vulnerabilitity that may be exploited through this mechanism. III. Solutions Install a patch from your vendor Appendix A contains input from vendors who have provided information for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly. Appendix A: Vendor Information Caldera Caldera's currently not shipping statd. Compaq Computer Corporation (c) Copyright 1998, 1999 Compaq Computer Corporation. All rights reserved. SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation Compaq Services Software Security Response Team USA This reported problem has not been found to affect the as shipped, Compaq's Tru64/UNIX Operating Systems Software. - Compaq Computer Corporation Data General We are investigating. We will provide an update when our investigation is complete. Hewlett-Packard Company HP is not vulnerable. The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. No SCO products are vulnerable. Silicon Graphics, Inc. % IRIX % rpc.statd IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable. IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable, but no longer supported. % automountd With patches from SGI Security Advisory 19981005-01-PX installed, IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable. % Unicos Currently, SGI is investigating and no further information is available for public release at this time. As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be issued via the normal SGI security information distribution method including the wiretap mailing list. SGI Security Headquarters http://www.sgi.com/Support/security Sun Microsystems Inc. The following patches are available: rpc.statd: Patch OS Version _____ __________ 106592-02 SunOS 5.6 106593-02 SunOS 5.6_x86 104166-04 SunOS 5.5.1 104167-04 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103468-04 SunOS 5.5 103469-05 SunOS 5.5_x86 102769-07 SunOS 5.4 102770-07 SunOS 5.4_x86 102932-05 SunOS 5.3 The fix for this vulnerability was integrated in SunOS 5.7 (Solaris 7) before it was released. automountd: 104654-05 SunOS 5.5.1 104655-05 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103187-43 SunOS 5.5 103188-43 SunOS 5.5_x86 101945-61 SunOS 5.4 101946-54 SunOS 5.4_x86 101318-92 SunOS 5.3 SunOS 5.6 (Solaris 2.6) and SunOS 5.7 (Solaris 7) are not vulnerable. Sun security patches are available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-li cense&nav=pub-patches _______________________________________________________________ Our thanks to Olaf Kirch of Caldera for his assistance in helping us understand the problem and Chok Poh of Sun Microsystems for his assistance in helping us construct this advisory. _______________________________________________________________ This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-05-statd-automountd.html. _______________________________________________________________ CERT/CC Contact Information Email: cert@cert.org Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 U.S.A. CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key. If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information. Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site http://www.cert.org/. To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to cert-advisory-request@cert.org and include SUBSCRIBE your-email-address in the subject of your message. Copyright 1999 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be found in http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html. * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office _______________________________________________________________ NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBN17H2HVP+x0t4w7BAQHspgP+JHCLMDLqm+n64pito2B5jQijAKkK0yEK P3/Lb8ZVgHgzAG9SuuOqBXY9ZxpaxM/gUEE3u4MAyo4ykJi6t3cMQfVDN0h+Ivn4 hogmZa+Z4GeocXNvC6KF0KvTA/wgDvA45EXZTJM9tDYNhc93yEJBmUZl7v36WXWM nJ+/XDo+EP4= =fAiP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Thu, 10 Jun 1999 09:18:20 -0700 From: Mark Zielinski To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org Subject: Re: CERT Advisory CA-99.05 - statd-automountd This CERT Advisory has failed to mention a few things that I would like to point out. CERT Advisory CA-99.05 reports SunOS 5.6 automountd as not being susceptible to the rpc.statd bounce attack. This is incorrect. SunOS 5.6 is indeed vulnerable, it is just harder to exploit because it involves DNS spoofing. Solaris 7 is not vulnerable because the RPC services are no longer run as root and automountd will only accept connections from a uid of zero. This has nothing to due with Sun incorporating a patch into version 7. System Administrators should also consider the following. A system running SunOS 5.5.1 with a patched automountd (that has not patched rpc.statd) is STILL vulnerable. This is because the automountd patch for SunOS 5.5.1 only stops non-root local users from specifying the command to be run for mounting filesystems. Any system running rpc.statd in this situation as root (which is default) can still be exploited remotely. System administrators should also take note that simply disabling rpcbind will not stop this problem from being exploited. Both SUN Microsystems and CERT fail to mention that earlier versions of SunOS are also affected. I understand that most systems these days are not running these versions, however patches and advisories should still be released for those who are running them. SunOS versions 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 are still vulnerable to the rpc.statd bounce attack with no patches currently released. Best regards, Mark Zielinski System Security Engineer Inficad Communications -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzdE6tAAAAEEAMfnIe65PMbIGxZsegpaMME7hSxpJ0HsM0G9hrkR+EXXOLnH Rn6oFnaR8mKLGW+3LyAVrDE34O87EyaQ8GKqpDlN9n3wLn7Wm5WuCCRJvEHxwCZZ XgQpQoCMQEZNexal3dwVJNRKAvWDFE+rltplYLM8uGLyDnaXOt6aFnLygXxNAAUR tA5NYXJrIFppZWxpbnNraQ== =+Gj/ -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Jun 1999 13:10:19 -0700 (PDT) From: CIAC Mail User To: ciac-bulletin@rumpole.llnl.gov Subject: CIAC Bulletin J-045: Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in automountd [ For Public Release ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- __________________________________________________________ The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________ INFORMATION BULLETIN Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in automountd June 10, 1999 21:00 GMT Number J-045 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Two vulnerabilities are address in this advisory: 1) rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state changes among NFS clients and servers. 2) automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain types of file systems. By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a Remote intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the rpc.statd service to the automountd service on the same targeted machine. PLATFORM: SGI IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable to rpc.statd but no longer supported. Unpatched IRIX 6.2 and above are vulnerable to automountd. SunOS 5.6, 5.6_x86, 5.5.1, 5.5.1_x86, 5.5, 5.5_x86, 5.4, 5.4_x86, and 5.3. DAMAGE: This combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative privileges of the automountd service, typically root. SOLUTION: Apply the vendor-supplied patch. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY Risk is high due to these vulnerabilities having been widely ASSESSMENT: discussed on public forums such as BugTraq. ______________________________________________________________________________ [ Start CERT Advisory ] CERT Advisory CA-99-05 Vulnerability in statd exposes vulnerability in automountd Original issue date: June 9, 1999 Source: CERT/CC Systems Affected Systems running older versions of rpc.statd and automountd I. Description This advisory describes two vulnerabilities that are being used together by intruders to gain access to vulnerable systems. The first vulnerability is in rpc.statd, a program used to communicate state changes among NFS clients and servers. The second vulnerability is in automountd, a program used to automatically mount certain types of file systems. Both of these vulnerabilities have been widely discussed on public forums, such as BugTraq, and some vendors have issued security advisories related to the problems discussed here. Because of the number of incident reports we have received, however, we are releasing this advisory to call attention to these problems so that system and network administrators who have not addressed these problems do so immediately. The vulnerability in rpc.statd allows an intruder to call arbitrary rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process. The called rpc service may be a local service on the same machine or it may be a network service on another machine. Although the form of the call is constrained by rpc.statd, if the call is acceptable to another rpc service, the other rpc service will act on the call as if it were an authentic call from the rpc.statd process. The vulnerability in automountd allows a local intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd process. This vulnerability has been widely known for a significant period of time, and patches have been available from vendors, but many systems remain vulnerable because their administrators have not yet applied the appropriate patches. By exploiting these two vulnerabilities simultaneously, a remote intruder is able to "bounce" rpc calls from the rpc.statd service to the automountd service on the same targeted machine. Although on many systems the automountd service does not normally accept traffic from the network, this combination of vulnerabilities allows a remote intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the administrative privileges of the automountd service, typically root. Note that the rpc.statd vulnerability described in this advisory is distinct from the vulnerabilities described in CERT Advisories CA-96.09 and CA-97.26. II. Impact The vulnerability in rpc.statd may allow a remote intruder to call arbitrary rpc services with the privileges of the rpc.statd process, typically root. The vulnerability in automountd may allow a local intruder to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd service. By combining attacks exploiting these two vulnerabilities, a remote intruder is able to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the automountd service. Note It may still be possible to cause rpc.statd to call other rpc services even after applying patches which reduce the privileges of rpc.statd. If there are additional vulnerabilities in other rpc services (including services you have written), an intruder may be able to exploit those vulnerabilities through rpc.statd. At the present time, we are unaware of any such vulnerabilitity that may be exploited through this mechanism. III. Solutions Install a patch from your vendor Appendix A contains input from vendors who have provided information for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly. Appendix A: Vendor Information Caldera Caldera's currently not shipping statd. Compaq Computer Corporation (c) Copyright 1998, 1999 Compaq Computer Corporation. All rights reserved. SOURCE: Compaq Computer Corporation Compaq Services Software Security Response Team USA This reported problem has not been found to affect the as shipped, Compaq's Tru64/UNIX Operating Systems Software. - Compaq Computer Corporation Data General We are investigating. We will provide an update when our investigation is complete. Hewlett-Packard Company HP is not vulnerable. The Santa Cruz Operation, Inc. No SCO products are vulnerable. Silicon Graphics, Inc. % IRIX % rpc.statd IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable. IRIX 5.3 is vulnerable, but no longer supported. % automountd With patches from SGI Security Advisory 19981005-01-PX installed, IRIX 6.2 and above ARE NOT vulnerable. % Unicos Currently, SGI is investigating and no further information is available for public release at this time. As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be issued via the normal SGI security information distribution method including the wiretap mailing list. SGI Security Headquarters http://www.sgi.com/Support/security Sun Microsystems Inc. The following patches are available: rpc.statd: Patch OS Version _____ __________ 106592-02 SunOS 5.6 106593-02 SunOS 5.6_x86 104166-04 SunOS 5.5.1 104167-04 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103468-04 SunOS 5.5 103469-05 SunOS 5.5_x86 102769-07 SunOS 5.4 102770-07 SunOS 5.4_x86 102932-05 SunOS 5.3 The fix for this vulnerability was integrated in SunOS 5.7 (Solaris 7) before it was released. automountd: 104654-05 SunOS 5.5.1 104655-05 SunOS 5.5.1_x86 103187-43 SunOS 5.5 103188-43 SunOS 5.5_x86 101945-61 SunOS 5.4 101946-54 SunOS 5.4_x86 101318-92 SunOS 5.3 SunOS 5.6 (Solaris 2.6) and SunOS 5.7 (Solaris 7) are not vulnerable. Sun security patches are available at: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/show.pl?target=patches/patch-li cense&nav=pub-patches _______________________________________________________________ Our thanks to Olaf Kirch of Caldera for his assistance in helping us understand the problem and Chok Poh of Sun Microsystems for his assistance in helping us construct this advisory. _______________________________________________________________ This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-05-statd-automountd.html. _______________________________________________________________ [ End CERT Advisory ] ______________________________________________________________________________ CIAC wishes to acknowledge CERT for the information contained in this bulletin. ______________________________________________________________________________ For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC: CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide. CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC can be contacted at: Voice: +1 925-422-8193 FAX: +1 925-423-8002 STU-III: +1 925-423-2604 E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites, and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM - 8AM PST), use one of the following methods to contact CIAC: 1. Call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message, or 2. Call 888-449-8369 to send a Sky Page to the CIAC duty person or 3. Send e-mail to 4498369@skytel.com, or 4. Call 800-201-9288 for the CIAC Project Leader. Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive. World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/ (or http://ciac.llnl.gov) Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org (or ciac.llnl.gov) Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud) +1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud) CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic publications: 1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical information and Bulletins, important computer security information; 2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector (SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and availability; 3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the use of SPI products. Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the following request as the E-mail message body, substituting ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name: E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@rumpole.llnl.gov: subscribe list-name e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question. If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address, it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe, get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc. PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these communities, please contact your agency's response team to report incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/. This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC) J-035: Linux Blind TCP Spoofing J-036: LDAP Buffer overflow against Microsoft Directory Services J-037: W97M.Melissa Word Macro Virus J-038: HP-UX Vulnerabilities (hpterm, ftp) J-039: HP-UX Vulnerabilities (MC/ServiceGuard & MC/LockManager, DES J-040: HP-UX Security Vulnerability in sendmail J-041: Cisco IOS(R) Software Input Access List Leakage with NAT J-042: Web Security J-043: (bulletin in process) J-044: Tru64/Digital UNIX (dtlogin) Security Vulnerability -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.0 Business Edition iQCVAwUBN2E1qrnzJzdsy3QZAQHcqQQAzStiURTt0eWZTvrLlPeNIVyNyshW4bpP vz5J1hum0BRYVdSAD07iGfdjooGJrKSGQY7PhvFskOK/ylbrx/tAhkdcvz423Mvw y7lUN9RlMV3W0nxYTF75+IIr1CM1x6GP6Ahj+G+b8FwNojY0JQWdXj2AbKUrXEC5 Xk8uCoJIehM= =Vkr8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Jun 1999 15:43:33 -0400 From: Nadeem Riaz To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org Subject: Re: CERT Advisory CA-99.05 - statd-automountd Hi, Is there a more complete list of systems that are or are not vulnerable to these latest security holes. The advisory implies that only vendors who responded with information are in the list of vulnerable or non-vulnerable operating systems. Are the statd's shipped with the latest version of RedHat (6.0) or FreeBSD-stable (3.2) vulnerable? -- Thanks -- Nadeem Riaz ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Fri, 11 Jun 1999 17:37:10 -0400 From: Scott Cromar To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org Subject: Re: CERT Advisory CA-99.05 - statd-automountd Re: the SunOS 4.1.4 dimension of this problem: Sun tells me that patch 102516-06 and later protect against this issue. (This response was in reaction to Sun Service Order 3993470.) I am not in a position to check the validity of their response. --Scott On Thu, 10 Jun 1999, Mark Zielinski wrote: > This CERT Advisory has failed to mention a few things that I would like to > point out. > > CERT Advisory CA-99.05 reports SunOS 5.6 automountd as not being susceptible > to the rpc.statd bounce attack. This is incorrect. SunOS 5.6 is indeed > vulnerable, it is just harder to exploit because it involves DNS spoofing. > > Solaris 7 is not vulnerable because the RPC services are no longer run as > root and automountd will only accept connections from a uid of zero. This > has nothing to due with Sun incorporating a patch into version 7. > > System Administrators should also consider the following. A system > running SunOS 5.5.1 with a patched automountd (that has not patched rpc.statd) > is STILL vulnerable. This is because the automountd patch for SunOS 5.5.1 > only stops non-root local users from specifying the command to be run for > mounting filesystems. Any system running rpc.statd in this situation as > root (which is default) can still be exploited remotely. > > System administrators should also take note that simply disabling rpcbind > will not stop this problem from being exploited. > > Both SUN Microsystems and CERT fail to mention that earlier versions of > SunOS are also affected. I understand that most systems these days are > not running these versions, however patches and advisories should still be > released for those who are running them. > > SunOS versions 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 are still vulnerable to the rpc.statd > bounce attack with no patches currently released. > > Best regards, > > Mark Zielinski > System Security Engineer > Inficad Communications