Multiple DLL side loading vulnerabilities were found in various COM components. These issues can be exploited by loading various these components as an embedded OLE object. When instantiating a vulnerable object Windows will try to load one or more DLLs from the current working directory. If an attacker convinces the victim to open a specially crafted (Office) document from a directory also containing the attacker's DLL file, it is possible to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the target user. This can potentially result in the attacker taking complete control of the affected system.
54a85ca989c4eaff178f934a3bf1f889b5563dba98e78c59197f8309e65b7406A DLL side loading vulnerability was found in the Shutdown UX DLL. This issue can be exploited by loading the Authentication UI Shutdown Choices object as an embedded OLE object. When instantiating the object Windows will try to load the DLL wuaext.dll from the current working directory. If an attacker convinces the user to open a specially crafted (Office) document from a directory also containing the attacker's DLL file, it is possible to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the target user. This can potentially result in the attacker taking complete control of the affected system.
b96ff440d177a2b1c8d194a3eeb5ba6a3405ca91223f3d328cdc4c4755b3ac20It is possible for an attacker to execute a DLL planting attack in Microsoft Office 2010 on Windows 7 x86 with a specially crafted OLE object. This attack also works on Office 2013 running on Windows 7 x64. Other platforms were not tested. The attached POC document "planted-mqrt.doc" contains what was originally an embedded Packager object. The CLSID for this object was changed at offset 0x2650 to be {ecabafc9-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} (formatted as pack(">IHHBBBBBBBB")). This object has a InProcServer32 pointing to comsvcs.dll. Specifically the CQueueAdmin object implemented in the dll. When a user opens this document and single clicks on the icon for foo.txt ole32!OleLoad is invoked on our vulnerable CLSID. This results in a call to a class factory constructor that tries eventually tries to call mqrt!MQGetPrivateComputerInformation. Because mqrt is a delay loaded dll the loader has inserted a stub to call _tailMerge_mqrt_dll on the first call of this function. This results in a kernelbase!LoadLibraryExA call vulnerable to dll planting. If the attached mqrt.dll is placed in the same directory with the planted-mqrt.doc file you should see a popup coming from this DLL being loaded from the current working directory of Word.
5771239566a3dd5497acb6e81362fcbfc38081d79243fb0cdde1f2ddb41c01c8A DLL side loading vulnerability was found in the Windows Authentication UI DLL. This issue can be exploited by loading the Slide To Shut Down Screen object as an embedded OLE object. When instantiating the object Windows will try to load the DLL wuaext.dll from the current working directory. If an attacker convinces the user to open a specially crafted (Office) document from a directory also containing the attacker's DLL file, it is possible to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the target user. This can potentially result in the attacker taking complete control of the affected system.
b2bb672c4c110c7c16d0e9ef991684cd7daa9c8d8c09eced5e54ae7fe67e03c2Multiple DLL side loading vulnerabilities were found in the Event Viewer Snapin that ships with Windows. These issues can be exploited by loading various COM components as an embedded OLE object. When instantiating vulnerable object Windows will try to load the DLL elsext.dll from the current working directory. If an attacker convinces the user to open a specially crafted (Office) document from a directory also containing the attacker's DLL file, it is possible to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the target user. This can potentially result in the attacker taking complete control of the affected system.
ff6eb730c87054d650838455d83f9cca8cb8c8d8b89144297dc18cce97b656bdA DLL side loading vulnerability was found in the COM+ Services component that ships with Windows. This issue can be exploited by loading the QC Queue Administration Class as an embedded OLE object. When instantiating the object Windows will try to load the DLL mqrt.dll from the current working directory. If an attacker convinces the user to open a specially crafted (Office) document from a directory also containing the attacker's DLL file, it is possible to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the target user. This can potentially result in the attacker taking complete control of the affected system.
414f5627fbbd2443682471bf2dc35edb9723e7ade491a45806779d961f625826
© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.
%7Cutmcsr%3D(direct)%7Cutmcmd%3D(none)){kind=small}
Follow us on Twitter
Follow us on Facebook
Subscribe to an RSS Feed