FreeBSD Security Advisory - The input path in routed(8) will accept queries from any source and attempt to answer them. However, the output path assumes that the destination address for the response is on a directly connected network. Upon receipt of a query from a source which is not on a directly connected network, routed(8) will trigger an assertion and terminate. The affected system's routing table will no longer be updated. If the affected system is a router, its routes will eventually expire from other routers' routing tables, and its networks will no longer be reachable unless they are also connected to another router.
4417c0ac7112fd0a1df452df61df6f5046872f2983c2f925f6d59dcf0333ff89FreeBSD Security Advisory - Due to a missing length check in the code that handles DNS parameters, a malformed router advertisement message can result in a stack buffer overflow in rtsold(8). Receipt of a router advertisement message with a malformed DNSSL option, for instance from a compromised host on the same network, can cause rtsold(8) to crash. While it is theoretically possible to inject code into rtsold(8) through malformed router advertisement messages, it is normally compiled with stack protection enabled, rendering such an attack extremely difficult. When rtsold(8) crashes, the existing DNS configuration will remain in force, and the kernel will continue to receive and process periodic router advertisements.
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