There's an off-by-one heap-overflow in the ieee802.11 printer,
which can be triggered by a maliciously crafted 802.11 frame.
The link type must have been explicitly specified for this to
work.

The function parse_elements() in print-802_11.c checks the
length pbody->tim.length from the frame for too small values in
line 265, but then uses the wrong variable in the following
range check in line 267. Since pbody->tim.length is defined as
a u_int8_t it can hold a maximum value of 255, which in turn
would copy 252 bytes into pbody->tim.bitmap, which is only
251 bytes of size.

253  case E_TIM:
254    /* Present, possibly truncated */
255    pbody->tim_status = TRUNCATED;
256    if (!TTEST2(*(p + offset), 2))
257      return;
258    memcpy(&pbody->tim, p + offset, 2);
259    offset += 2;
260    if (!TTEST2(*(p + offset), 3))
261      return;
262    memcpy(&pbody->tim.count, p + offset, 3);
263    offset += 3;
264
265    if (pbody->tim.length <= 3)
266      break;
267    if (pbody->rates.length > sizeof pbody->tim.bitmap)
268      return;
269    if (!TTEST2(*(p + offset), pbody->tim.length - 3))
270      return;
271    memcpy(pbody->tim.bitmap, p + (pbody->tim.length - 3),
272        (pbody->tim.length - 3))

The current tcpdump release 3.9.5 is still vulnerable.
This got fixed [1] in CVS Head and in the tcpdump_3_9 branch.

[1] http://cvs.tcpdump.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/tcpdump/print-802_11.c?r1=1.42&r2=1.43

Best,
Moritz Jodeit