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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco CallManager Memory Handling Vulnerabilities


Revision 1.0


For Public Release 2005 July 12 1500 UTC (GMT)

========================================================================


    Contents

    * Summary
    * Affected Products
    * Details
    * Impact
    * Software Versions and Fixes
    * Obtaining Fixed Software
    * Workarounds
    * Exploitation and Public Announcements
    * Status of This Notice: FINAL
    * Distribution
    * Revision History
    * Cisco Security Procedures

========================================================================


Summary
=======
Cisco CallManager (CCM) is the software-based call-processing component
of the Cisco IP telephony solution which extends enterprise telephony
features and functions to packet telephony network devices such as IP
phones, media processing devices, voice-over-IP (VoIP) gateways, and
multimedia applications. Cisco CallManager 3.3 and earlier, 4.0, and 4.1
are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, memory leaks, and
memory corruption which may result in services being interrupted,
servers rebooting, or arbitrary code being executed.

Cisco has made free software available to address these vulnerabilities.

This advisory will be posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050712-ccm.shtml.


Affected Products
=================

Vulnerable Products
- -----------------
    * Cisco CallManager 3.2 and earlier
    * Cisco CallManager 3.3, versions earlier than 3.3(5)
    * Cisco CallManager 4.0, versions earlier than 4.0(2a)SR2b
    * Cisco CallManager 4.1, versions earlier than 4.1(3)SR1


Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
- -------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these
vulnerabilities.


Details
=======
    * CSCed37403 -- Resource leak with RISDC -- CallManager does
      not time out RISDC (Realtime Information Server Data Collection)
      sockets aggressively enough, leading to a scenario where
      TaskManager indicates that RisDC.exe is using large amounts of
      non-paged pool memory and ports remain in the Close_Wait state.
      Non-paged pool memory allocation can be checked by opening
      Microsoft Windows Task Manager, going to the View menu, choosing
      Select Columns and selecting Non-paged Pool. Open ports are listed
      in the output of the netstat -an command.
    * CSCee00116 -- Cisco CallManager CTI Manager may restart
      with greater than 1GB memory used -- Repeated attacks with crafted
      packets can cause the CTI Manager to allocate greater than 1
      gigabyte of virtual memory. Memory allocation of the ctimgr.exe
      process can be checked by viewing the Microsoft Windows Task Manager.
    * CSCee00118 -- CallManager may restart with repeated attacks
      -- Crafted packets can cause the CallManager to inappropriately
      allocate 500MB to the ccm.exe process, which will return to the
      memory pool under normal conditions. Repeated attacks may cause a
      CallManager under load to exhaust memory resources and restart.
      Memory allocation of the ccm.exe process can be checked by viewing
      the Microsoft Windows Task Manager. Under attack, ccm.exe memory
      will jump repeatedly by 500MB.
    * CSCef47060 -- Failed logins create memory leak when MLA
      enabled -- When MLA (Multi Level Admin) is enabled and there are
      repeated, failed logons for the AST (Admin Service Tool) a memory
      leak may occur. While under normal operations inetinfo.exe will
      use between 20Mb and 30Mb of memory, systems facing this issue
      showed up to 750Mb of memory used. Memory allocation of the
      inetinfo.exe process can be checked by viewing the Microsoft
      Windows Task Manager. MLA is not on by default and the enable
      status can be checked under CCM/User/Access Rights/MLA
      Parameters/Enable Multi Level Admin.
    * CSCsa75554 -- Vulnerability to DoS and remote execution in
      aupair service -- Crafted packets directed at Cisco CallManager
      may cause a memory allocation failure and buffer overflow
      resulting in potential execution of arbitrary code, abnormal
      termination of the aupair process, or corruption of memory. The
      aupair.exe process is a database layer between ccm.exe and SQL
      which cannot be disabled for normal Cisco CallManager operation.
      When viewing Microsoft Windows Task Manager, the process is
      aupair.exe, but under the Service Control Manager it is called
      Cisco Database Layer Monitor. If the aupair.exe process
      terminates, a message will be logged to the events monitor and a
      drwatson report will be generated.


Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities may result in severe
issues with Cisco CallManager and related IP telephony services.
Triggering a memory allocation and buffer overflow may allow remote code
execution and breach of confidentiality. Excess memory allocation can
cause resource starvation resulting in high CPU utilization,
unresponsive terminal services, the inability to run CCM Admin, or map
drives. This may then lead to phones not responding, phones
unregistering from the Cisco CallManager, or Cisco CallManager restarting.


Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, please also consult
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_advisories_listing.html
and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete
upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") for assistance.

Each row of the Cisco CallManager software table (below) describes a
release train which will address all of the vulnerabilities mentioned in
this advisory. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest
possible releases that contain the fixes (the "First Fixed Release") and
the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the
"Engineering Special," "Service Release," and "Maintenance Release"
columns. A device running a Cisco CallManager release in the given train
that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the
First Fixed Release listed in the Engineering Special or Special Release
columns) is known to be vulnerable to one or more issues. The Cisco
CallManager should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a
later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label).

+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|   Train   |  Engineering   |  Service Release   | Maintenance Release  |
|           |    Special     |                    |                      |
|-----------+----------------+--------------------+----------------------|
| 3.2 and   |                |                    | migrate to 3.3 or    |
| earlier   |                |                    | later                |
|-----------+----------------+--------------------+----------------------|
| 3.3       | 3.3(3)ES61 3.3 |                    | 3.3(5)               |
|           | (4)ES25        |                    |                      |
|-----------+----------------+--------------------+----------------------|
| 4.0       | 4.0(2a)ES40    | 4.0(2a)SR2b        | no release planned,  |
|           |                |                    | migrate to 4.1       |
|-----------+----------------+--------------------+----------------------|
|           | 4.1(2)ES33 4.1 |                    | 4.1(4) -- release    |
| 4.1       | (3)ES07        | 4.1(3)SR1          | date to be           |
|           |                |                    | determined           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+


Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

Customers with Service Contracts
- ------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com <http://www.cisco.com/>.


Customers using Third-party Support Organizations
- -----------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as
Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should
contact that support organization for assistance with the upgrade, which
should be free of charge.


Customers without Service Contracts
- -----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of
sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

    * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
    * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
    * e-mail: tac@cisco.com <mailto:tac@cisco.com>

Please have your product serial number available and give the URL of
this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free
upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.

Please do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or
"security-alert@cisco.com" for software upgrades.

If you need assistance with the implementation of the workarounds, or
have questions on the workarounds, please contact the Cisco Technical
Assistance Center (TAC).

    * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
    * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
    * e-mail: tac@cisco.com <mailto:tac@cisco.com>

See http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for
additional TAC contact information, including special localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in
various languages.

Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they
have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using
such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of
Cisco's software license terms found at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise
set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
<http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml>.


Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds for these vulnerabilities. Cisco CallManager
security best practices may lessen the risk or mitigate the effects of
these vulnerabilities. Please refer to the SAFE: IP Telephony Security
in Depth White Paper located off the SAFE Blueprint
http://www.cisco.com/go/safe introduction page.


Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.

The aupair service vulnerability (CSCsa75554) was reported to Cisco by
Internet Security Systems who will also be making public announcements
regarding this issue.

Jeff Fay from PatchAdvisor will issue a report on his findings of
CSCee00116 on their vulnerability alert service.


Status of This Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS ADVISORY IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE ADVISORY OR
MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE ADVISORY IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES
THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS NOTICE AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or paraphrase of the text of this security advisory
that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual
errors.


Distribution
============
This advisory will be posted on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050712-ccm.shtml.

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following
e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

    * cust-security-announce@cisco.com
    * first-teams@first.org (includes CERT/CC)
    * bugtraq@securityfocus.com
    * vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
    * cisco@spot.colorado.edu
    * cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
    * full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
    * comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.


Revision History
================
Revision 1.0    2005-July-12    Initial public release.


Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security
notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.

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All contents are Copyright © 1992-2005 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights
reserved. Important Notices <http://www.cisco.com/public/copyright.html>
and Privacy Statement <http://www.cisco.com/public/privacy.html>.


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