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Posted Feb 25, 2005
Site netsec.net

NetSec Security Advisory - Due to multiple vulnerabilities resulting from the use of Apple OSX HFS+, remote users may be able to view arbitrary file data, including the source code of server side documents, such as PHP JSP documents.

tags | advisory, remote, arbitrary, php, vulnerability
systems | apple
SHA-256 | 590bb7808f716931c412c8a8e612a7a356747b4be22319b4a1247d4f86744067


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NetSec Security Advisory


Name: Multiple Vulnerabilities Resulting From Use Of Apple OSX
Impact: HIGH
Platform: Apple OS X (Darwin) <= 10.2
Method: Possible unauthorized access to file system data
Identifier: 07012005-01


In December 2004, NetSec released details of a vulnerability impacting
software running on versions of Apple OS X version 10.2 and greater.
Under OS X, userland applications are presented with two interface
methods to an underlying legacy HFS+ file system: resource and data
streams. Access of the individual streams from a file browser or shell
application permits users with appropriate access rights to retrieve
information from the data fork (content) or resource fork (resources).

The risk associated with any unauthorized file data disclosure to remote
users is often significant. This is because users may access the source
code of server-side interpreted scripts that may contain embedded
database credentials, specify known paths to sensitive files (shell
command history files for example), retrieve hidden files, and otherwise
retrieve arbitrary file content. All of these exploitation scenarios may
bypass default server access controls, unless requests for the data and
resource forks are trapped prior to request forwarding.

Subsequent research and testing, conducted by NetSec revealed at least
one method to leverage this 'feature' of the legacy HFS+ driver in OS X:
web services. The default configuration of several web server
applications does not adequately prevent remote access to these
protected file system resources. Testing of other network-enabled
applications did not result in the identification of other vectors;
however any server application that does not proactively filter requests
for local file system resources may expose underlying HFS+ file systems
to unauthorized remote access.

In the initial design requirements for the HFS file system, exporting
data across the network using a minimal abstraction layer was not
considered. The targeted use for Apple systems pre - OS X has largely
been desktop publishing, graphics, and other multimedia services. NetSec
considers the emergence of this disclosure vulnerability evidence of
"growing pains" associated with the recent Apple platform migration to
Berkeley Unix (BSD).

The HFS+ file system is not recommended for dedicated servers, but is
required to support numerous legacy Macintosh applications. At the time
of this technical advisory, NetSec strongly recommends that
organizations with public Internet-facing Apple servers consider
migration to the Berkeley Fast File System (FFS/UFS) option available in

The purpose of this security advisory is to increase community awareness
of potential risks associated with the Apple HFS+ file system as
implemented under OS X. It should be noted that NetSec exercises
responsible disclosure policy and has been in close contact with all
software vendors referenced herein. Specific examples should not be
interpreted as the full extent of affected server applications. Please
contact NetSec at info@netsec.net or reply to this message if you have
any additional questions about this issue.


Apple's HFS and HFS+ file systems allows two seperate data streams for
each file, referred to as the "data fork" and "resource fork". The
classic MacOS operating systems and Carbon API on MacOS X provide
separate functions for opening and manipulating the data and resource
forks. In MacOS X, however, support for addressing these seperate
streams has been integrated into the POSIX API. In MacOS X 10.2 and
above, opening the file by its pathname opens the data fork, but the
data fork or resource fork may also be opened for a given file by
respectively appending "/..namedfork/data" or "/..namedfork/rsrc" to the
pathname passed to the open(2) system call. In previous versions, they
may be addressed by appending the special pathnames "/.__Fork/data" or
"/.__Fork/rsrc". The resource fork may also be opened in most versions
of MacOS X by appending "/rsrc" to the file pathname.

Due to this feature being available throughout the operating system, via
the POSIX API, it is therefore available to any software involved in the
opening of file streams via the open() syscall, such as a web server
opening an html or PHP file present on the Darwin servers file system.

As a result, server daemons, such as web servers which open file
streams, based on user controlled data, may be fooled into opening the
respective files resource and/or file fork rather than the absolute file
name. This may allow users to view arbitrary data, such as the source
code of server interpreted documents (such as PHP and JSP files).


Remote users may be able to view arbitrary file data, including the
source code of server side documents, such as PHP JSP documents. This
data may contain sensitive information such as database usernames and
passwords and/or disclose vulnerabilities to an attacker which can then
be leveraged to further attack the respective web application.

It should be noted that this issue extends to any server software
running on the Darwin operating system, which is involved in the opening
of file streams, based on user input.


NetSec have been in touch with several software vendors, whose products
are affected by the OSX kernel feature.

Apache Foundation (Apache Web Server)

The Apache Foundations HTTPD server project is known to be vulnerable to
the issues resulting from the use of the Apple OSX HFS+ file system.
Users of OSX, who have not modified the default Apache configuration
file (httpd.conf) can install a mod_rewrite work around through
installing the OSX update, made available by Apple in December 2004.
See: http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=300422 for more

Users using Apache to serve files from an HFS+ file system, who have
modified the configuration file by hand (such as default users of OSX
10, who have made changes to the Apache configuration) can add the
following mod_rewrite rule to their httpd.conf as a work-around to the
issues inherent to the use of an HFS+ file system as a web root:

<Files "rsrc">
Order allow,deny
Deny from all
Satisfy All

<DirectoryMatch ".*\.\.namedfork">
Order allow,deny
Deny from all
Satisfy All

The above mod_rewrite rules, reflect those recommended by Apple, and
installed by the Apple update, in cases where the Apache configuration
file has not been modified.

Prior to the use of mod_rewrite, users of versions of Apache prior to
1.3.29 should ensure that they are not vulnerable to the stack overflow
conditions, as described in CAN-2003-0542.

4D (WebStar Web Server V)

Vulnerable: 4D WebStar 5.3.4 and below.

4D's WebStar web server was found to be vulnerable to the issues
resulting from the use of the OSX HFS+ file system. 4D have acknowledged
the existence of the issue and have implemented a fix in the latest
version of their product.

Further fix information for WebStar's product is available at:




Roxen (Roxen Web Server)

Vulnerable: Roxen Web Server Version 4.0.172 and below.

Roxen's freely available web server product was found to be vulnerable
to the issues resulting from the use of the OSX HFS+ file system. Roxen
have acknowledged that the issues result in an exploitable condition and
are currently working on a fix to in order to remedy the issues. Release
4 of the web server software is due for release in mid-January 2005 and
will be available from: http://download.roxen.com/4.0/

Roxen (Roxen Content Management System)

Vulnerable: Roxen Web Server Version 4.0 Release 3 and below.

Roxens Content Management System (Roxen CMS), which is based around the
freely available Roxen web server, is also affected by the vulnerability
caused by the use of an OSX HFS+ file system. Research concluded that,
although specific, customised applications running on Roxen CMS may be
affected in a more severe manner, default configurations are not
exploitable in the same manner in which these issues have found to be
exploitable on other web server suites (see technical information for
details). This said, attempts to access HFS+ named fork files via the
CMS interface result in an error being thrown by the CMS software, which
may cause the application to behave in an undesired manner.

Roxen have also commented that (as previously discussed in this
advisory), the fact that the HFS+ file system behaves in a
case-insensitive manner; remote users may also be able to access
sensitive files through bypassing the case-sensitive access controls
that Roxen provides users with. Roxen have stated that a work around for
this issue will also be provided in release four of the CMS product.

As with the freely available Roxen web server, Roxen CMS 4, R4 will be
made available to customers by mod-January 2004. The fixed, trial
version of the Roxen CMS product will be made available from:


Side note:

It should be noted that NetSec will not release technical information
until the point at which its responsible disclosure policy has been
satisfied and/or NetSec believes that sufficient technical and/or
exploitation vector related information already exists within the public
domain. In the case of the issues described herein, both of the above
were found to be true.

The following extract of code is taken from the forkcomponent()
function, which is part of the OSX HFS+ file system kernel module:

* There are only 3 valid fork suffixes
* "/..namedfork/rsrc"
* "/..namedfork/data"
* "/rsrc" (legacy)

As you can see, the HFS+ file system implements three fork named file
system forks, two of which pertain to the resource fork (suffixed with
rsrc) and the third, pertaining to the file data named fork. Because of
the case-insensitivity of the HFS+ file system, these can be accessed in
a number of ways (such as /rsrc or /rSrC), hence, any programmatic
checks for attempts to access resource forks must also occur in a case
insensitive manner (via constructs such as tolower() for example).

Two attack impacts have been identified, through the above semantics of

1) Software may be tricked into miss-interpreting files, through
accessing their respective data stream directly, for example,
/filename/..namedfork/data as opposed to /filename.

2) Software, implementing an internal access control systems may be
bypassed through either implementing access controls in a case sensitive
manner (when HFS+ behaves case-insensitivity) and/or accessing the files
respective files data steam directly. For example, a file access control
system preventing access to /filename, may be bypassed through
constructing a request to /filename/..namedfork/data. Such is the case,
when an attempt is made to access an Apache ".htaccess" file, via the
request construct:

GET /path/.htaccess/..namedfork/data HTTP/1.0

Where access to .htccess files should otherwise be denied.

As noted above, the following http server suites have been tested to be
affected by the HFS+ issues in this manner:

4D (WebStar Web Server V)
Roxen (Roxen Web Server)
Apache Foundation (Apache Web Server)

Although Roxens's Content Management System (CMS) is largely based
around the open source Roxen HTTP Server, it was not found to be
vulnerable to the HFS+ arbitrary data access issue in this manner. This
was for the following reasons:

i) By default, the CMS system will only permit access to files ending
with certain file extensions (such as .xml). Note: This can by bypassed
through issuing requests to files using a null byte, such as

ii) Prior to serving a file to a web client, the CMS interface will
attempt to chdir() to the respective directory, containing the file
requested. In the case of a request to:


the CMS daemon will attempt to chdir() to the path:
/path/filename.xml/..namedfork/ which of course will not exist.
Unfortunately, the chdir() is the second of two operations which the CMS
will perform in order serve the file, the first being a stat() of the
respective file to be served. Due to the stat() succeeding and the
chdir() failing, an exception will be thrown by the CMS daemon.

Although no obvious way exists to leverage this, such unexpected
behaviour may result in the manifestation of a security flaw in
customised applications, running on the CMS.

Whilst the more obvious attack vectors pertain to HTTP servers (as
above), it is important to note that HTTP servers are not the only group
of server software which will be impacted by the use of the HFS+ file
system on Apple OSX. In essence, any software attempting to access files
on an HFS+ file system may be affected in the two ways noted above. To
this end, developers should thoroughly test their software and analyse
the affects of attempts to access HFS+ named forks by either remote or
local users. NetSec are aware of several non-http server daemons which
are negatively impacted by the use of HFS+, but do not intend to release
details, given that the respective software publishers have yet to
remedy these issues.


As described above, flaws resulting from the HFS+ named fork issue can
be exploited through http servers to disclose the contents of files,
intended for server-side interpretation, such as files intended for
interpretation by the hyper-text pre-processor - PHP. The following
request may be made to a vulnerable web server, to disclose the
potentially sensitive contents of "test.php":

Expected behaviour:

# curl
hello world<br>

Expected behaviour if vulnerable:

# curl
<? print "hello world<br>\n"; ?>

To this end, web logs will display a request for a file, similar to the

a.b.c.d - - [02/Jan/2005:13:33:37 +0100] "GET
/path/test.php/..namedfork/data HTTP/1.0" 200 <size>

As part of a comprehensive risk management strategy, NetSec recommends
routine evaluation of anomalous web application log entries to detect
these types of exploitation attempts. Customer security devices managed
under NetSec's Managed Security Services received custom signatures to
detect this attack as of mid-November 2004.

Please contact the NetSec Security Operations Center if you have any
questions regarding this security issue.
NetSec Security Operations Center

13525 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon, VA 20171
866.444.6762 - Toll Free (North America)
+001.703.561.9042 - Phone (International)
+001.703.561.0426 - Fax

Corporate Site: http://www.netsec.net

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