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OpenPKG Security Advisory 2005.4

OpenPKG Security Advisory 2005.4
Posted Jan 29, 2005
Authored by The OpenPKG Project, OpenPKG Foundation | Site openpkg.org

OpenPKG Security Advisory - A setuid and setgid application vulnerability was found in the Cyrus SASL library. At application startup, libsasl2 attempts to build a list of all available SASL plugins which are available on the system. To do so, the library searches for and attempts to load every shared library found within the plugin directory. This location can be set with the SASL_PATH environment variable.

tags | advisory
SHA-256 | 2b51683b908ec938cb13adb29012b0ee3eb294a7a742091ff113cd0c39e5a8c4

OpenPKG Security Advisory 2005.4

Change Mirror Download
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________________________________________________________________________

OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project
http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org
openpkg-security@openpkg.org openpkg@openpkg.org
OpenPKG-SA-2005.004 28-Jan-2005
________________________________________________________________________

Package: sasl
Vulnerability: arbitrary code execution
OpenPKG Specific: no

Affected Releases: Affected Packages: Corrected Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT <= sasl-2.1.19-20040920 >= sasl-2.1.20-20041025
OpenPKG 2.2 <= sasl-2.1.19-2.2.0 >= sasl-2.1.19-2.2.1
OpenPKG 2.1 <= sasl-2.1.18-2.1.0 >= sasl-2.1.18-2.1.1

Affected Releases: Dependent Packages:
OpenPKG CURRENT imapd kolab openldap::with_sasl
postfix::with_sasl sendmail::with_sasl
OpenPKG 2.2 imapd kolab openldap::with_sasl
postfix::with_sasl sendmail::with_sasl
OpenPKG 2.1 imapd kolab openldap::with_sasl
postfix::with_sasl sendmail::with_sasl

Description:
A setuid and setgid application vulnerability was found in the Cyrus
SASL library [0]. At application startup, libsasl2 attempts to build a
list of all available SASL plugins which are available on the system.
To do so, the library searches for and attempts to load every shared
library found within the plugin directory. This location can be set
with the SASL_PATH environment variable.

In situations where an untrusted local user can affect the environment
of a privileged process, this behavior could be exploited to run
arbitrary code with the privileges of a setuid or setgid application.
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project assigned the
identifier CAN-2004-0884 [1] to the problem.

Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/openpkg
rpm -q sasl". If you have the "sasl" package installed and its version
is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it
(see Solution) and any dependent packages as well [2][3].

Solution:
Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release
[4][5], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [6][7] or a mirror
location, verify its integrity [8], build a corresponding binary RPM
from it [2] and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the
binary RPM [3]. For the most recent release OpenPKG 2.2, perform the
following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for
other releases adjust accordingly).

$ ftp ftp.openpkg.org
ftp> bin
ftp> cd release/2.2/UPD
ftp> get sasl-2.1.19-2.2.1.src.rpm
ftp> bye
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -v --checksig sasl-2.1.19-2.2.1.src.rpm
$ <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm --rebuild sasl-2.1.19-2.2.1.src.rpm
$ su -
# <prefix>/bin/openpkg rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/sasl-2.1.19-2.2.1.*.rpm

Additionally, we recommend that you rebuild and reinstall
any dependent packages (see above) as well [2][3].
________________________________________________________________________

References:
[0] http://asg.web.cmu.edu/sasl/
[1] http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0884
[2] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source
[3] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-binary
[4] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/sasl-2.1.19-2.2.1.src.rpm
[5] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/sasl-2.1.18-2.1.1.src.rpm
[6] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.2/UPD/
[7] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/2.1/UPD/
[8] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature
________________________________________________________________________

For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the
OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkg@openpkg.org>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the
OpenPKG project which you can retrieve from http://pgp.openpkg.org and
hkp://pgp.openpkg.org. Follow the instructions on http://pgp.openpkg.org/
for details on how to verify the integrity of this advisory.
________________________________________________________________________

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