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CA-2003-21.gnuFTP

CA-2003-21.gnuFTP
Posted Aug 14, 2003
Site cert.org

CERT Advisory CA-2003-21 - The systems housing the primary FTP servers for the GNU software project were compromised. Valid hostnames for this machine were gnuftp.gnu.org, ftp.gnu.org, and alpha.gnu.org. The compromise took place in March of 2003 and it is possible that malicious code may have been injected into various software distributed from this server.

tags | advisory
SHA-256 | d7df7a407fea77a7763785762a75814d0d1ba7380567a8719be1d0cb89bb54f2

CA-2003-21.gnuFTP

Change Mirror Download

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

CERT Advisory CA-2003-21 GNU Project FTP Server Compromise

Original issue date: August 13, 2003
Last revised: --
Source: CERT/CC

A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Overview

The CERT/CC has received a report that the system housing the primary
FTP servers for the GNU software project was compromised.

I. Description

The GNU Project, principally sponsored by the Free Software Foundation
(FSF), produces a variety of freely available software. The CERT/CC
has learned that the system housing the primary FTP servers for the
GNU software project, gnuftp.gnu.org, was root compromised by an
intruder. The more common host names of ftp.gnu.org and alpha.gnu.org
are aliases for the same compromised system. The compromise is
reported to have occurred in March of 2003.

The FSF has released an announcement describing the incident.

Because this system serves as a centralized archive of popular
software, the insertion of malicious code into the distributed
software is a serious threat. As the above announcement indicates,
however, no source code distributions are believed to have been
maliciously modified at this time.

II. Impact

The potential exists for an intruder to have inserted back doors,
Trojan horses, or other malicious code into the source code
distributions of software housed on the compromised system.

III. Solution

We encourage sites using the GNU software obtained from the
compromised system to verify the integrity of their distribution.

Sites that mirror the source code are encouraged to verify the
integrity of their sources. We also encourage users to inspect any and
all other software that may have been downloaded from the compromised
site. Note that it is not always sufficient to rely on the timestamps
or file sizes when trying to determine whether or not a copy of the
file has been modified.

Verifying checksums

The FSF has produced PGP-signed lists of known-good MD5 hashes of the
software packages housed on the compromised server. These lists can be
found at

ftp://ftp.gnu.org/before-2003-08-01.md5sums.asc
ftp://alpha.gnu.org/before-2003-08-01.md5sums.asc

Note that both of these files and the announcement above are signed by
Bradley Kuhn, Executive Director of the FSF, with the following PGP
key:

pub 1024D/DB41B387 1999-12-09 Bradley M. Kuhn <bkuhn@fsf.org>
Key fingerprint = 4F40 645E 46BE 0131 48F9 92F6 E775 E324 DB41 B387
uid Bradley M. Kuhn (bkuhn99) <bkuhn@ebb.org>
uid Bradley M. Kuhn <bkuhn@gnu.org>
sub 2048g/75CA9CB3 1999-12-09

The CERT/CC believes this key to be valid.

As a matter of good security practice, the CERT/CC encourages users to
verify, whenever possible, the integrity of downloaded software. For
more information, see IN-2001-06.

Appendix A. - Vendor Information

This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
advisory. As vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we will
update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
comments.

Free Software Foundation


The current files on alpha.gnu.org and ftp.gnu.org as of 2003-08-02 have
all been verified, and their md5sums and the reasons we believe the
md5sums can be trusted are in:

ftp://ftp.gnu.org/before-2003-08-01.md5sums.asc
ftp://alpha.gnu.org/before-2003-08-01.md5sums.asc

We are updating that file and the site as we confirm good md5sums of
additional files. It is theoretically possible that downloads between
March 2003 and July 2003 might have been source-compromised, so we
encourage everyone to re-download sources and compare with the current
copies for files on the site.

Appendix B. References

* FSF announcement regarding the incident -
ftp://ftp.gnu.org/MISSING-FILES.README
* CERT Incident Note IN-2001-06 -
http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-2001-06.html
_________________________________________________________________

The CERT/CC thanks Bradley Kuhn and Brett Smith of the Free Software
Foundation for their timely assistance in this matter.
_________________________________________________________________

Feedback can be directed to the author: Chad Dougherty.
______________________________________________________________________

This document is available from:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-21.html
______________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information

Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.

CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) /
EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies
during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.

Using encryption

We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
Our public PGP key is available from
http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key

If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
information.

Getting security information

CERT publications and other security information are available from
our web site
http://www.cert.org/

To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your
message

subscribe cert-advisory

* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office.
______________________________________________________________________

NO WARRANTY
Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
______________________________________________________________________

Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information

Copyright 2002 Carnegie Mellon University.

Revision History
August 13, 2003: Initial release

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