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Code is not a crime -- Down with the DMCA!!!








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Network Printers and Other Network Devices
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Vulnerabilities and Fixes
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Version 1.4



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The Paper for this presentation is available in PDF and this presentation
is available in Magicpoint Presentation format.  Download any of these at
http://members.cox.net/ltlw0lf/printers/.


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LittleW0lf
ltlw0lf@cox.net


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Copyright 2000-2001 by Dennis W. Mattison (AKA LittleW0lf)
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Topics of Discussion



  Why this talk DOESN'T violate the DMCA
  The Problem with Printers and Other Devices
  Printer History
  Other Devices
  Theory vs Practice
  Attacks
  Ok, Why aren't These Being Exploited yet?
  Manufacturer's Normal Responses to Attacks
  What Manufacturers Should Be Doing
  What can WE do?

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Why This Talk Doesn't Violate the DMCA



  No cryptographic algorithms
  No software to break cryptographic algorithms
  No hardware to break cryptographic algorithms
  (Printers rarely use encryption anyway)

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This Talk Will not Break Any other Laws Either:

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  Not exceeding access (lawful access to MY printers) 
  Discovering vulnerabilities not illegal (yet?!)
  Full Disclosure is Key to Security Awareness 

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The Problem with Printers & Other Devices



  Application and OS Bugs
  Security Necessary for Business
  Security of Computers ... Growing
  Security of Printers and Other Devices ... Not Growing
  Potential attacks increase as computer security improves

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Printer History
(or why users still think all printers do is print)


  Users have had a long history with printers:
    Printers as old as computers
    Older (non-networked) printers fairly secure

  Serial/Parallel Printers
    Unidirectional vs Bi-Directional
    Small number of flaws
    Scripting Languages (PS, PJL, PCL)
    Easy tracking of attackers
    Attacking a bad professional decision

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Printer History
(or why users still think all printers do is print)


  Print Servers
    Network protocols (SMB, IPX, LPR) on server
    Server more likely to be compromised

  Network Printers
    Manufacturers now adding protocols to printers
    Satisfies "Bang-for-the-Buck"
    Large number of insecure protocols
    Functionality over security

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Other Peripherals



  Other insecure devices include:
    Webcams
    Photocopiers
    Web appliances
    Network File Systems

  Again, Functionality over security


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Theory vs Practice



  Theoretical attacks
    Several practical examples
    Will not work on every printer
    Not many known attacks, still experimenting
      It takes time
      We welcome the help

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Physical Security Attacks



  Physical and Addressable devices
  Can be easily replaced by another device
  Can also have a device placed inline

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Physical Security Attacks
Easy Mistakes


  Users innocently unplug devices for resources
  Users steal ip address or network identification
  Traffic for printer now intercepted by another device

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Physical Security Attacks
Hard Core Espionage


  Attacker uses ip/port
    Surf sensitive internal datastores or protocols
    Disrupt normal traffic

  Replace printer with espionage-friendly device
  Physical Man-in-the-Middle attack
  Hard Disks ...
    Laboratory attack
      IDE based disk, with proprietary file system
      Proprietary (non-standard) or no encryption
      Rarely erase data, usually overwrite with next job

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Physical Security Attacks
Printer Firmware


  What about firmware?
    Firmware is static software
    Can be disassembled or source code stolen
    Recompiled and updated via firmware update

  Gulf War?
    No! (An April Fools Joke)
    Don't need a virus to bring down the network
      Simple denial of service attacks
      Back door allowing access to network device
      Sniffer to discover enemy actions or plans

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Unauthenticated Remote Access



  Allowing remote access to any machine is risky
  Allowing remote access to a printer is very risky
  Allowing unauthenticated and unencrypted remote access to the printer's configuration mechanism is just plain stupid
  There are a lot of stupid printers out there

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol)


  SNMP by its very nature is unauthenticated remote access
    Extremely simple authentication, prone to guessing or sniffing
    Once authentication is broken, read or write access to configuration possible
    SNMP default on most printers
    Few allow it to be turned off
    Some printers have additional -- non-standard community strings
      Allow greater access
      Run a sniffer during a firmware update...
      Steal administrator password via private community string

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
Anonymous FTP/LPR/IPP/Appsocket


  Network Protocols allow access to configuration:
    FTP, LPR, IPP, AppSocket, SMB, IPX
      Post-Script, PCL, or PJL Scripts
      Undocumented commands
    HTTP & Telnet may lack administrator password

  Can be turned off in majority of cases, on by default
  AppSocket (port 9100) is bi-directional
    Use nc or telnet
    Send PCL/PJL commands, get responses

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
AppSocket PJL Example


"^[" = Escape Character     "^C"=Control-C

pjl file:

^[%-12345X@PJL 
@PJL ECHO 16:43:00 07-12-01 HP Printer
@PJL RDYMSG DISPLAY="LTLWOLF OWNZ U"
@PJL INFO FILESYS
^[%-12345X 
^C

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
AppSocket PJL Example


% size 3
<ltlw0lf@attacker> $ nc printer 9100 < pjl
@PJL ECHO 16:43:00 07-12-01 HP Printer

@PJL RDYMSG DISPLAY="LTLW0LF OWNZ U"

@PJL INFO FILESYS
VOLUME  TOTAL SIZE  FREE SPACE  LOCATION   LABEL  STATUS
   0:     2048000   2025472    RAM     ?  READ-WRITE


punt!

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
Back Doors


  Common (and flawed) access control mechanism
  Used to access system after administrator locks it down
    Usually done in the name of techincal support or licensing
      Forgotten passwords
      Unlicensed software
    May be used for other reasons

  Relies on security solely through obscurity for protection
  Rarely protected by other means
  If it fails, nothing else to fall back on
  Exposure is likely and consequences are forever

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
Back Doors in Printer allow Unauthorized Remote Access


  One of the best examples of a printer back door
    Web-server on printer allows unfiltered and unauthenticated access to the printer's configuration by simply entering a simple URL in a web-browser (http://printername/ncl_subjects.html)
    Access to more configuration options than afforded anywhere else
    Changes made are instant and unauthenticated
    Allowed plain-text access to the administrator password
    Number of potential denial of service and access to/distribution of information attacks given to unauthenticated attacker

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
Back Doors in Printer allow Unauthorized Remote Access

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%IMAGE "remote1.jpg"

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
Back Doors in Printer allow Unauthorized Remote Access

%CENTER
%IMAGE "remote2.jpg"

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
Oops, We Did It Again


  A year later, a new vulnerability was discovered:
    URL had been changed, but same vulnerability
    Previous fix (turning off the server) no longer available
    Manufacturer responded (6 weeks later, and to wrong person):
       Claimed new URL wasn't security fix
       Necessary for functionality reasons

    Ignored or failed to implement safeguards previously discussed
      Claimed 4 months was not enough time to fix 
      To date (2 years) vendor has not fixed

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Unauthenticated Remote Access
Third Party Back Doors


  Potential for third party back doors (as previously discussed)
  Recompile firmware to include back doors
    Install firmware via remote update features, or
    Social engineer admin to install firmware

  Few methods available to assure "safe" firmware is being installed

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Denial of Service Attacks



  Performing DoS Attacks is easier than any other attack
  Printers are rarely as rock solid (even though nothing is "rock-solid")
    Little understanding of security risk
    Slow at releasing fixes (usually only on newer versions)

  Even script kiddies using scripts designed for other systems manage to take down printers
    ISAPI IDA Attack (a.k.a. Code Red Worm)
    Telnet Attacks
    FTP Attacks

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Denial of Service Attacks
Overwhelm with Traffic


  Easiest DoS to perform
  Anonymous print capabilities to DoS printer
    Allows attacker to waste physical resources
    Administrator must cancel the print jobs manually

  Multiple idle connections to AppSocket
    HP only allows 8 concurrent connections, with no time-out
    New connections get "Connection Refused"

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Denial of Service Attacks
Configuration Based Nuisances


  Using unauthenticated remote access methods to Deny Service
    Changing the IP address to non-existant or duplicate address
    Clicking the "Reset Printer to Factory Default" option
    Changing the run-level for the printer to "Emergency Power Off"
    Removing or changing services running on the machine
    Changing passwords

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Access to & Distribution of Information



  Information important, sensitive, and worth money
  Exposure of that information may lead to
    Loss of profit
    Loss of capital
    Loss of employees
    Loss of business
    Embarrassment

  Vulnerabilities in printers may allow this type of attack

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Access to & Distribution of Information
Sniffers


  Adding sniffer via firmware update
  Printer can forward printed documents or packets to an attacker via e-mail, data stream, or covert channels
  Back door may allow an attacker to access the sniffer data without needing to expose their e-mail or ip-address

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Access to & Distribution of Information
Print Job Forwarding


  At this time, no known vulnerabilities that allow a printer to automatically forward a print job to another machine
  A firmware modification could make this possible
  Also, a configuration option may be included to do this
    Several have appeared to expose information about the job
    Still researching in printers I have access to

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Access to & Distribution of Information
Print Job Notification Forwarding & Printer Logs


  One feature discovered is the ability to send status reports
    Includes a lot of information useful for analysis or social engineering
      Title of document printed
      Number of bytes, characters, pictures and pages
      Total number of documents sorted by length

  Syslog logging is also available, logging info to syslog server

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Access to & Distribution of Information
Print Job Notification Forwarding & Printer Logs

%CENTER
%IMAGE "access1.jpg"

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Access to & Distribution of Information
Print Job Notification Forwarding & Printer Logs

%size 3 
Subject: PhaserLink (TM) Status Notification from Phaser 850DX
Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2001 12:40:14 +0000
From: Phaser850@mydomain.com
To: ltlw0lf@mydomain.com

Printer Phaser 850DX (<Printer Location>) (M0E1624) job 19 finished
Tektronix Job Report
Printer Name  : Phaser 850DX
Job Id    : 19 / LPR Microsoft Word, cfA315, Printers.rtf, dwmatt
Finished at  : Fri Apr 13 12:40:14 2001
Duration (mins)  : 4.9
Media Class      : Paper
Media Size       : Letter
Unique Pages     : 6
Copies           : 1
Total Pages      : 6
Coverage (%)     : Cyan:      1.2, Magenta:      4.6, Yellow:      3.5, Black:       2.6
Supplies Usage   : Cyan: 0.048098, Magenta: 0.187394, Yellow: 0.144214, Black:  0.104980
Pixels Printed (1K)  : Cyan:      326, Magenta:     1276, Yellow:      982, Black:  715
END Tektronix Job Report

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Access to & Distribution of Information
Print Job Notification Forwarding & Printer Logs

%size 3 
Subject: PhaserLink (TM) Status Notification from Phaser 850DX
Date: Fri, 13 Apr 2001 12:39:14 +0000
From: Phaser850@mydomain.com
To: ltlw0lf@mydomain.com

Printer Phaser 850DX (<Printer Location>) (M0E1624) web
1 Date of Report=Fri Apr 13 12:38:42 2001
2 Activation Date=Mon Aug 14 15:38:42 2000
3 Printer IDs=M0E1624, 00:11:22:33:44:55, 10.0.0.1
4 Printer Name=Phaser 850DX
5 Printer Type=Phaser 850DX, Solid Ink
6 Adobe Firmware=3010.108 (9)
7 Tektronix Firmware=2.16, 12.38, 12.22, 11.92.11.05.1999
8 Installed RAM (MBs)=128
9 Installed Trays (incl. Manual)=3
10 Accessories=Duplexer, IDE Disk

... 

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Access to & Distribution of Information
Print Job Notification Forwarding & Printer Logs

%size 3 
...

111 Total Pages & Sheets=Pages:18889, Sheets:17235
112 Total Pixels Printed (1K)=Cyan:4118815, Magenta:3230270, Yellow:3049825, Black:13519575
113 Average Coverage (%)=Cyan:2, Magenta:1, Yellow:1, Black:5
114 Coverage-Last 1000 Pages (%)=Cyan:1, Magenta:1, Yellow:1, Black:5
121 Paper vs. Transparency (pages)=Paper:16679, Transparency:2210
122 Pixels Printed-Paper (1K)=Cyan:2908166, Magenta:2334341, Yellow:1972535, Black:11045875

...

162 Jobs By Document Length=0-1:1000, 2-4:569, 5-9:218, 10-19:258, 20-29:84,30-49:67, 50-74:26, 75-99:13, 100-249:28, 250+:1

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Access to & Distribution of Information
RAM Disks and File Systems


  Printers now include the ability to create RAM Disks for storing files
  Many printers include ability to add IDE/SCSI disks for storing files
  Printers may use these storage devices to spool print jobs
  Attacker may be able to grab files off of the spooler
  HP has a write only spool directory, others may not be as stringent

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Bouncing and ACL Hopping



  Bouncing traffic though printer to hide attacks
    Victim believes the printer is attacking them
    Printer owner argues that their printer couldn't be responsible
    No logs of bounced traffic

  Bouncing can also allow an attacker to get access to data they weren't able to get access to before
    Bypassing ACLs by using printer as gateway
    Why is the FTP Get command allowed on most printers?
    What could a user possibly need to get from a printer?

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Bouncing and ACL Hopping
Passive Mode FTP Proxy Browsing


  FTP Servers in passive mode may act as a proxy
    Allows access to sensitive, internal information
    Most FTP software fixed, not so with printers
    If attacker has read/write access to server, they can perform this attack

  To attack:
    Attacker issues QUOT PASV on server, grabs port number
    Uses ftp server as poor man's proxy

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Bouncing and ACL Hopping
Bouncing Network Scans through Passive FTP Proxy


  We can also use Passive FTP to scan internal machines
    Victim thinks printer is scanning them

nmap -b <printername> -sT -O <victim>
'-b' option allows forwarding of packets through an ftp server

  Phrack 51 contains an article by fyodor on port scanning
    Discussed in article as the FTP bounce attack

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Bouncing and ACL Hopping
Redirecting Network Attacks through Printers


  Bouncing traffic through Passive FTP hides attacks
  If a printer has two NICs, it is possible for an attacker to use the printer as a gateway, as some printers may allow IP forwarding
    HP Printers with two NICs supposedly cannot do this
    However, IP Forwarding config is available via SNMP
    Believe this is an artifact of borrowed code

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Bouncing and ACL Hopping
Internet Printing Protocol


  IPP allows sending of URIs
    Potential attack is to request URI, then grab it back
      Can this be done?
      What about "requesting properties of print job?"

  IPP also allows grabbing of URIs through user configurable proxy server
    Potential attack for a rogue proxy server
      Allows man-in-the-middle
      Not available in IPP v1.1, which uses TLS and SSL

  IPP is a new protocol
    Being implemented in most newer printers and OSs
    Not received its share of security review
    Not much on security in IPP's RFC

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Other Maliciousness
File Storage (Establishing a Beachhead)


  Files can be stored and retrieved from the printer
    FTP Server which allows saving and retrieving of documents
    PJL Commands to download and upload
      They are reversed (upload downloads a file)

  Storing exploits or spoils on printers
    Will likely foil investigators
      Not likely to think about a printer storing exploits or spoils
    Won't likely be found by users or administrators
    Aren't logged, making it a little more difficult to find attacker

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Why aren't these attacks used?



  How are we so sure they aren't?
    Tektronix vulnerability known well before I published it
    Numerous attacks spotted on class B network's IDS

  Most likely there would be two reasons Hackers aren't
    Hackers don't know or understand vulnerabilities
      Vulnerabilities too new
      Unexplored territory
    Too many easier targets

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What are Printer Manufacturers Doing?...



  So, what are printer manufacturers doing?
    Nothing
    Blame the user or the researcher
    Threaten lawsuit for disclosure of "Trade Secrets"
    Hide (or attempt to hide) vulnerability
    Talk down risk of vulnerability
    Fix the problem, only release fix to those who ask
    Fix the problem, publish the fix

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What Should Manufacturers be Doing?



  "What do you want us to do?"
    Think outside the box
    Access Control, Authentication, Encryption, and Filtering
    Give administrator control
    Educate -- Document -- Communicate
    Be open-minded about security

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What Can We Do?



  Never install a printer with the defaults
    Change the printer password
    Disable unnecessary services
    Secure necessary services

  Use a firewall (or packet filtering)
  Contact vendors about security concerns
    More interest from customers brings more security

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Questions?




%size 3, center
The Paper for this presentation is available in PDF and this presentation
is available in Magicpoint Presentation format.  Download any of these at
http://members.cox.net/ltlw0lf/printers/.

%center, size 5
Littlew0lf -- ltlw0lf@cox.net