exploit the possibilities
Home Files News &[SERVICES_TAB]About Contact Add New

ic2kreport.htm

ic2kreport.htm
Posted Dec 21, 1999

ic2kreport.htm

tags | encryption
SHA-256 | b7e1063635383ee98548b1beaee1d1f7fef2b6b7aae630553c06f4061c51a7f4

ic2kreport.htm

Change Mirror Download
<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
<meta name="Generator" content="Microsoft Word 97">
<meta name="keywords" content="VORTEX, MERCURY, RUTLEY">
<meta name="Description" content="Interception Capabilities 2000 Report to the Director General for Research of the European Parliament (Scientific and Technical Options Assessment programme office) on the development of surveillance technology and risk of abuse of economic information.">
<meta name="Date" content="19/4/99">
<meta name="Template" content="C:\WORD\OFFICE\html.dot">
<meta name="GENERATOR" content="Mozilla/4.5 [en] (Win95; I) [Netscape]">
<title>Interception capabilities 2000</title>
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFCC" link="#0000FF" vlink="#800080" alink="#FFB6C1">

<dir>
<dir>&nbsp;
<center>
<p><b><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+4><font color="#FF0000">Interception
</font>Capabilities
2000</font></font></b>
<p><img SRC="line1.gif" height=12 width=550></center>

<p><b><i><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+4>Contents</font></font></i></b>
<p><b><font size=+3><a href="#Report">1. Organisations and methods</a></font></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><b><a href="#_Toc448565514">What is communications intelligence?</a></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><a href="#_Toc448565515">UKUSA alliance</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565516">Other Comint organisations</a></dir>

<p><br><b><a href="#_Toc448565517">How intelligence works</a></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><a href="#_Toc448565518">Planning</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565519">Access and collection</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565520">Processing</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565521">Production and dissemination</a>
<br>&nbsp;
<br>&nbsp;</dir>
</dir>
<b><font size=+3><a href="#_Toc448565522">2. Intercepting international
communications</a></font></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><b><a href="#_Toc448565523">International Leased Carrier (ILC) communications</a></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><a href="#_Toc448565524">High frequency radio</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565525">Microwave radio relay</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565526">Subsea cables</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565527">Communications satellites</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565528">Communications techniques</a></dir>

<p><br><b><a href="#_Toc448565529">ILC communications collection</a></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><a href="#_Toc448565530">Access</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565531">Operation SHAMROCK</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565532">High frequency radio interception</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565533">Space interception of inter-city networks</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565534">Sigint satellites</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565535">COMSAT ILC collection</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565536">Submarine cable interception</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565537">Intercepting the Internet</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565538">Covert collection of high capacity signals</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565539">New satellite networks</a>
<br>&nbsp;
<br>&nbsp;</dir>
</dir>
<b><font size=+3><a href="#_Toc448565540">3. ECHELON and Comint production</a></font></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><b><a href="#_Toc448565541">The "Watch List"</a></b>
<dir>&nbsp;</dir>
<b><a href="#_Toc448565542">New information about ECHELON sites and systems</a></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><a href="#_Toc448565543">Westminster, London : Dictionary computer</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565544">Sugar Grove, Virginia : COMSAT interception
at ECHELON site</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565545">Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico and Leitrim, Canada
: COMSAT interception sites</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565546">Waihopai, New Zealand : Intelsat interception
at ECHELON site</a>
<br>&nbsp;</dir>
<b><a href="#_Toc448565547">ILC processing techniques</a></b>
<br>&nbsp;</dir>
<b><font size=+3><a href="#_Toc448565548">4. Comint and Law Enforcement</a></font></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><b><a href="#_Toc448565549">Misrepresentation of law enforcement interception
requirements</a></b>
<p><b><a href="#_Toc448565550">Law enforcement communications interception
- policy development in Europe</a></b>
<br>&nbsp;
<br>&nbsp;</dir>
<b><font size=+3><a href="#_Toc448565551">5. Comint and economic intelligence</a></font></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><b><a href="#_Toc448565552">Tasking economic intelligence</a></b>
<p><b><a href="#_Toc448565553">Disseminating economic intelligence</a></b>
<p><b><a href="#_Toc448565554">The use of Comint economic intelligence
product</a></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><a href="#_Toc448565555">Panavia European Fighter Aircraft consortium
and Saudi Arabia</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565556">Thomson CSF and Brazil</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565557">Airbus Industrie and Saudi Arabia</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565558">International trade negotiations</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565559">Targeting host nations</a>
<br>&nbsp;
<br>&nbsp;</dir>
</dir>
<b><font size=+3><a href="#_Toc448565560">6. Comint capabilities after
2000</a></font></b>
<dir>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><b><a href="#_Toc448565561">Developments in technology</a></b></dir>
</dir>
<b><font size=+3><a href="#Recommend">Policy issues for the European Parliament</a></font></b>
<br>&nbsp;
<p><b><font size=+3><a href="#Annexe">Technical annexe</a></font></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><b><a href="#_Toc448565564">Broadband (high capacity multi-channel)
communications</a></b>
<p><b><a href="#_Toc448565565">Communications intelligence equipment</a></b>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><a href="#_Toc448565566">Wideband extraction and signal analysis</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565567">Filtering, data processing, and facsimile analysis</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565568">Traffic analysis, keyword recognition, text
retrieval, and topic analysis</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565569">Speech recognition systems</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565570">Continuous speech recognition</a>
<p><a href="#_Toc448565571">Speaker identification and other voice message
selection techniques</a>
<br>&nbsp;</dir>
<b><a href="#_Toc448565572">"Workfactor reduction"; the subversion of cryptographic
systems</a></b>
<br>&nbsp;</dir>
</dir>
<b><font size=+3><a href="#Glossary">Glossary and definitions</a></font></b>
<br>&nbsp;
<p><b><font size=+3><a href="#Notes">Footnotes</a></font></b>
<br>&nbsp;
<dir>&nbsp;
<br>&nbsp;
<p><img SRC="line1.gif" height=12 width=550><a NAME="Summary"></a>
<p><b><i><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+4>Summary</font></font></i></b></dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>1. <b>Communications intelligence</b>
(Comint) involving the covert interception of foreign communications has
been practised by almost every advanced nation since international telecommunications
became available. Comint is a large-scale industrial activity providing
consumers with intelligence on diplomatic, economic and scientific developments.
The capabilities of and constraints on Comint activity may usefully be
considered in the framework of the "intelligence cycle" (section 1).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>2. Globally, about 15-20 billion Euro
is expended annually on Comint and related activities. The largest component
of this expenditure is incurred by the major English-speaking nations of
the UKUSA alliance.</font></font><b><a href="#N_1_">(1)</a></b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
This report describes how Comint organisations have for more than 80 years
made arrangements to obtain access to much of the world's international
communications. These include the unauthorised interception of commercial
satellites, of long distance communications from space, of undersea cables
using submarines, and of the Internet. In excess of 120 satellite systems
are currently in simultaneous operation collecting intelligence (section
2).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>3. The highly automated UKUSA system
for processing Comint, often known as ECHELON, has been widely discussed
within Europe following a 1997 STOA report.</font></font><a href="#N_2_"><b>(</b>2<b>)</b></a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
That report summarised information from the only two primary sources then
available on ECHELON.</font></font><b><a href="#N_3_">(3)</a></b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
This report provides original new documentary and other evidence about
the ECHELON system and its involvement in the interception of communication
satellites (section 3). A technical annexe give a supplementary, detailed
description of Comint processing methods.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>4. Comint information derived from
the interception of international communications has long been routinely
used to obtain sensitive data concerning individuals, governments, trade
and international organisations. This report sets out the organisational
and reporting frameworks within which economically sensitive information
is collected and disseminated, summarising examples where European commercial
organisations have been the subject of surveillance (section 4).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>5. This report identifies a previously
unknown international organisation - "ILETS" - which has, without parliamentary
or public discussion or awareness, put in place contentious plans to require
manufacturers and operators of new communications systems to build in monitoring
capacity for use by national security or law enforcement organisations
(section 5).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>6. Comint organisations now perceive
that the technical difficulties of collecting communications are increasing,
and that future production may be costlier and more limited than at present.
The perception of such difficulties may provide a useful basis for policy
options aimed at protective measures concerning economic information and
effective encryption (section 6).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>7. <b>Key findings</b> concerning the
state of the art in Comint include :</font></font>
<ul>
<ul>
<li>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Comprehensive systems exist to access,
intercept and process every important modern form of communications, with
few exceptions (section 2, technical annexe);</font></font></li>

<li>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Contrary to reports in the press, effective
"word spotting" search systems automatically to select telephone calls
of intelligence interest are not yet available, despite 30 years of research.
However, speaker recognition systems - in effect, "voiceprints" - have
been developed and are deployed to recognise the speech of targeted individuals
making international telephone calls;</font></font></li>

<li>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Recent diplomatic initiatives by the United
States government seeking European agreement to the "key escrow" system
of cryptography masked intelligence collection requirements, and formed
part of a long-term program which has undermined and continues to undermine
the communications privacy of non-US nationals, including European governments,
companies and citizens;</font></font></li>

<li>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>There is wide-ranging evidence indicating
that major governments are routinely utilising communications intelligence
to provide commercial advantage to companies and trade.</font></font></li>
</ul>
</ul>

<dir>
<dir>
<dir><a NAME="Report"></a></dir>
<b><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+3>1. Organisations and methods</font></font></b><a NAME="_Toc448565514"></a></dir>

<p><br><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>What is communications intelligence?</font></font></u></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>1. Communications intelligence (Comint)
is defined by NSA, the largest agency conducting such operations as "technical
and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other
than their intended recipient". </font></font><a href="#N_4_">(4)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Comint
is a major component of Sigint (signals intelligence), which also includes
the collection of non-communications signals, such as radar emissions.</font></font><a href="#N_5_">(5)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Although this report deals with agencies and systems whose overall task
may be Sigint, it is concerned only with Comint.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>2. Comint has shadowed the development
of extensive high capacity new civil telecommunications systems, and has
in consequence become a large-scale industrial activity employing many
skilled workers and utilising exceptionally high degrees of automation.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>3. The targets of Comint operations
are varied. The most traditional Comint targets are military messages and
diplomatic communications between national capitals and missions abroad.
Since the 1960s, following the growth of world trade, the collection of
economic intelligence and information about scientific and technical developments
has been an increasingly important aspect of Comint. More recent targets
include narcotics trafficking, money laundering, terrorism and organised
crime.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>4. Whenever access to international
communications channels is obtained for one purpose, access to every other
type of communications carried on the same channels is automatic, subject
only to the tasking requirements of agencies. Thus, for example, NSA and
its British counterpart GCHQ, used Comint collected primarily for other
purposes to provide data about domestic political opposition figures in
the United States between 1967 and 1975.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565515"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>UKUSA
alliance</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>5. The United States Sigint
System (USSS) consists of the National Security Agency (NSA), military
support units collectively called the Central Security Service, and parts
of the CIA and other organisations. Following wartime collaboration, in
1947 the UK and the US made a secret agreement to continue to conduct collaborative
global Comint activities. Three other English-speaking nations, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand joined the UKUSA agreement as "Second Parties".
The UKUSA agreement was not acknowledged publicly until March 1999, when
the Australian government confirmed that its Sigint organisation, Defence
Signals Directorate (DSD) "does co-operate with counterpart signals intelligence
organisations overseas under the UKUSA relationship".<a href="#N_6_">(6)</a>
The UKUSA agreement shares facilities, tasks and product between participating
governments.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>6. Although UKUSA Comint agency staffs
and budgets have shrunk following the end of the cold war, they have reaffirmed
their requirements for access to all the world's communications. Addressing
NSA staff on his departure in 1992, then NSA director Admiral William Studeman
described how "the demands for increased global access are growing". The
"business area" of "global access" was, he said, one of "two, hopefully
strong, legs upon which NSA must stand" in the next century.</font></font><a href="#N_7_">(7)</a>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565516"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Other
Comint organisations</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>7. Besides UKUSA, there at least
30 other nations operating major Comint organisations. The largest is the
Russian FAPSI, with 54,000 employees</font></font><b>.</b><a href="#N_8_">(8)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
China maintains a substantial Sigint system, two stations of which are
directed at Russia and operate in collaboration with the United States.
Most Middle Eastern and Asian nations have invested substantially in Sigint,
in particular Israel, India and Pakistan.</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565517"></a>
<dir><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>How intelligence works</font></font></u></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>8. In the post cold war era, Comint interception
has been constrained by recognisable industrial features, including the
requirement to match budgets and capabilities to customer requirements.
The multi-step process by means of which communications intelligence is
sought, collected, processed and passed on is similar for all countries,
and is often described as the "intelligence cycle". The steps of the intelligence
cycle correspond to distinct organisational and technical features of Comint
production. Thus, for example, the administration of NSA's largest field
station in the world, at Menwith Hill in England and responsible for operating
over 250 classified projects, is divided into three directorates: OP, Operations
and Plans; CP, Collection Processing; and EP, Exploitation and Production<b>.</b></font></font>
<p><img SRC="intelligence_cycle.jpg" HSPACE=9 VSPACE=9 height=346 width=500 align=LEFT>
<br>&nbsp;
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565518"></a><b><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Planning</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>9. Planning first involves determining
customer requirements. Customers include the major ministries of the sponsoring
government - notably those concerned with defence, foreign affairs, security,
trade and home affairs. The overall management of Comint involves the identification
of requirements for data as well as translating requirements into potentially
achievable tasks, prioritising, arranging analysis and reporting, and monitoring
the quality of Comint product.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>10. Once targets have been
selected, specific existing or new collection capabilities may be tasked,
based on the type of information required, the susceptibility of the targeted
activity to collection, and the likely effectiveness of collection.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565519"></a><b><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Access
and collection</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>11. The first essential of Comint
is access to the desired communications medium so that communications may
be intercepted. Historically, where long-range radio communications were
used, this task was simple. Some important modern communications systems
are not "Comint friendly" and may require unusual, expensive or intrusive
methods to gain access. The physical means of communication is usually
independent of the type of information carried. For example, inter-city
microwave radio-relay systems, international satellite links and fibre
optic submarine cables will all usually carry mixed traffic of television,
telephone, fax, data links, private voice, video and data.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>12. Collection follows interception,
but is a distinct activity in that many types of signals may be intercepted
but will receive no further processing save perhaps technical searches
to verify that communications patterns remain unchanged. For example, a
satellite interception station tasked to study a newly launched communications
satellite will set up an antenna to intercept all that the satellite sends
to the ground. Once a survey has established which parts of the satellite's
signals carry, say, television or communications of no interest, these
signals will not progress further within the system.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>13. Collection includes both acquiring
information by interception and passing information of interest downstream
for processing and production. Because of the high information rates used
in many modern networks, and the complexity of the signals within them,
it is now common for high speed recorders or "snapshot" memories temporarily
to hold large quantities of data while processing takes place. Modern collection
activities use secure, rapid communications to pass data via global networks
to human analysts who may be a continent away. Selecting messages for collection
and processing is in most cases automated, involving large on-line databanks
holding information about targets of interest.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565520"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Processing</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>14. Processing is the conversion
of collected information into a form suitable for analysis or the production
of intelligence, either automatically or under human supervision. Incoming
communications are normally converted into standard formats identifying
their technical characteristics, together with message (or signal) related
information (such as the telephone numbers of the parties to a telephone
conversation).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>15. At an early stage, if it is not
inherent in the selection of the message or conversation, each intercepted
signal or channel will be described in standard "case notation". Case notation
first identifies the countries whose communications have been intercepted,
usually by two letters. A third letter designates the general class of
communications: C for commercial carrier intercepts, D for diplomatic messages,
P for police channels, etc. A fourth letter designates the type of communications
system (such as S for multi-channel). Numbers then designate particular
links or networks. Thus for example, during the 1980s NSA intercepted and
processed traffic designated as "FRD" (French diplomatic) from Chicksands,
England, while the British Comint agency GCHQ deciphered "ITD" (Italian
diplomatic) messages at its Cheltenham headquarters. </font></font><a href="#N_9_">(9)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>16. Processing may also involve translation
or "gisting" (replacing a verbatim text with the sense or main points of
a communication). Translation and gisting can to some degree be automated.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565521"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Production
and dissemination</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>17. Comint production involves
analysis, evaluation, translation and interpretation of raw data into finished
intelligence. The final step of the intelligence cycle is dissemination,
meaning the passing of reports to the intelligence consumers. Such reports
can consist of raw (but decrypted and/or translated) messages, gists, commentary,
or extensive analyses. The quality and relevance of the disseminated reports
lead in turn to the re-specification of intelligence collection priorities,
thereby completing the intelligence cycle.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>18. The nature of dissemination is
highly significant to questions of how Comint is exploited to obtain economic
advantage. Comint activities everywhere are highly classified because,
it is argued, knowledge of the success of interception would be likely
to lead targets to change their communications methods to defeat future
interception. Within the UKUSA system, the dissemination of Comint reports
is limited to individuals holding high-level security "SCI" clearances.</font></font><a href="#N_10_">(10)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Further, because only cleared officials can see Comint reports, only they
can set requirements and thus control tasking. Officials of commercial
companies normally neither have clearance nor routine access to Comint,
and may therefore only benefit from commercially relevant Comint information
to the extent that senior, cleared government officials permit. The ways
in which this takes place is described in Section 5, below.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>19. Dissemination is further restricted
within the UKUSA organisation by national and international rules generally
stipulating that the Sigint agencies of each nation may not normally collect
or (if inadvertently collected) record or disseminate information about
citizens of, or companies registered in, any other UKUSA nation. Citizens
and companies are collectively known as "legal persons". The opposite procedure
is followed if the person concerned has been targeted by their national
Comint organisation.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>20. For example, Hager has described
</font></font><a href="#N_11_">(11)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
how New Zealand officials were instructed to remove the names of identifiable
UKUSA citizens or companies from their reports, inserting instead words
such as "a Canadian citizen" or "a US company". British Comint staff have
described following similar procedures in respect of US citizens following
the introduction of legislation to limit NSA's domestic intelligence activities
in 1978.</font></font><a href="#N_12_">(12)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The Australian government says that "DSD and its counterparts operate internal
procedures to satisfy themselves that their national interests and policies
are respected by the others ... the Rules [on Sigint and Australian persons]
prohibit the dissemination of information relating to Australian persons
gained accidentally during the course of routine collection of foreign
communications; or the reporting or recording of the names of Australian
persons mentioned in foreign communications".</font></font><a href="#N_13_">(13)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The corollary is also true; UKUSA nations place no restrictions on intelligence
gathering affecting either citizens or companies of any non-UKUSA nation,
including member states of the European Union (except the UK).</font></font>
<br>&nbsp;
<dir>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565522"></a><b><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+3>2.
Intercepting international communications</font></font></b><a NAME="_Toc448565523"></a></dir>

<p><br><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>International Leased Carrier
(ILC) communications</font></font></u></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>21. It is a matter of record that foreign
communications to and from, or passing through the United Kingdom and the
United States have been intercepted for more than 80 years.</font></font><a href="#N_14_">(14)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Then and since, most international communications links have been operated
by international carriers, who are usually individual national PTTs or
private companies. In either case, capacity on the communication system
is leased to individual national or international telecommunications undertakings.
For this reason, Comint organisations use the term ILC (International Leased
Carrier) to describe such collection.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565524"></a><b><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>High
frequency radio</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>22. Save for direct landline
connections between geographically contiguous nations, high frequency (HF)
radio system were the most common means of international telecommunications
prior to 1960, and were in use for ILC, diplomatic and military purposes.
An important characteristic of HF radio signals is that they are reflected
from the ionosphere and from the earth's surface, providing ranges of thousands
of miles. This enables both reception and interception.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565525"></a><b><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Microwave
radio relay</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>23. Microwave radio was introduced
in the 1950s to provide high capacity inter-city communications for telephony,
telegraphy and, later, television. Microwave radio relay communications
utilise low power transmitters and parabolic dish antennae placed on towers
in high positions such as on hilltops or tall buildings. The antennae are
usually 1-3m in diameter. Because of the curvature of the earth, relay
stations are generally required every 30-50km.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565526"></a><b><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Subsea
cables</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>24. Submarine telephone cables
provided the first major reliable high capacity international communications
systems. Early systems were limited to a few hundred simultaneous telephone
channels. The most modern optical fibre systems carry up to 5 Gbps (Gigabits
per second) of digital information. This is broadly equivalent to about
60,000 simultaneous telephone channels.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565527"></a><b><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Communications
satellites</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>25. Microwave radio signals
are not reflected from the ionosphere and pass directly into space. This
property has been exploited both to provide global communications and,
conversely, to intercept such communications in space and on land. The
largest constellation of communications satellites (COMSATs) is operated
by the International Telecommunications Satellite organisation (Intelsat),
an international treaty organisation. To provide permanent communications
from point to point or for broadcasting purposes, communications satellites
are placed into so-called "geostationary" orbits such that, to the earth-based
observer, they appear to maintain the same position in the sky.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>26. The first geostationary
Intelsat satellites were orbited in 1967. Satellite technology developed
rapidly. The fourth generation of Intelsat satellites, introduced in 1971,
provided capacity for 4,000 simulataneous telephone channels and were capable
of handling all forms of communications simultaneously -telephone, telex,
telegraph, television, data and facsimile. In 1999, Intelsat operated 19
satellites of its 5<sup>th </sup>to 8th generations. The latest generation
can handle the equivalent to 90,000 simultaneous calls.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565528"></a><b><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Communications
techniques</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>27. Prior to 1970, most communications
systems (however carried) utilised analogue or continuous wave techniques.
Since 1990, almost all communications have been digital, and are providing
ever higher capacity. The highest capacity systems in general use for the
Internet, called STM-1 or OC-3, operates at a data rate of 155Mbs. (Million
bits per second; a rate of 155 Mbps is equivalent to sending 3 million
words every second, roughly the text of one thousand books a minute.) For
example, links at this capacity are used to provide backbone Internet connections
between Europe and the United States. Further details of communications
techniques are given in the technical annexe.</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565529"></a>
<dir><b><u><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=+1>ILC communications
collection</font></font></u></b>
<p><a NAME="_Toc448565530"></a><b><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Access</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>28. Comint collection cannot
take place unless the collecting agency obtains access to the communications
channels they wish to examine. Information about the means used to gain
access are, like data about code-breaking methods, the most highly protected
information within any Comint organisation. Access is gained both with
and without the complicity or co-operation of network operators.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565531"></a><b><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Operation
SHAMROCK</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>29. From 1945 onwards in the
United States the NSA and predecessor agencies systematically obtained
cable traffic from the offices of the major cable companies. This activity
was codenamed SHAMROCK. These activities remained unknown for 30 years,
until enquiries were prompted by the Watergate affair. On 8 August 1975,
NSA Director Lt General Lew Allen admitted to the Pike Committee of the
US House of Representatives that :</font></font>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>"NSA systematically
intercepts international communications, both voice and cable".</font></font></i></dir>
</dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>30. He also admitted that "messages
to and from American citizens have been picked up in the course of gathering
foreign intelligence". US legislators considered that such operations might
have been unconstitutional. During 1976, a Department of Justice team investigated
possible criminal offences by NSA. Part of their report was released in
1980. It described how intelligence on US citizens:</font></font>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>"was obtained incidentally in
the course of NSA's interception of aural and non-aural (e.g., telex) international
communications and the receipt of GCHQ-acquired telex and ILC (International
Leased Carrier) cable traffic (SHAMROCK)<sup>"</sup> (emphasis in original).</font></font><a href="#N_15_">(15)</a></i>
<dir>&nbsp;
<center><table BORDER COLS=2 WIDTH="66%" >
<tr ALIGN=CENTER>
<td ALIGN=CENTER VALIGN=CENTER>
<center><img SRC="chicksands_an-flr9.jpg" height=298 width=454></center>
</td>

<td>
<center><img SRC="chicksands_dodjocc.jpg" height=295 width=362></center>
</td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td>
<center><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>High frequency radio interception
antenna (AN/FLR9)</font></font></i></center>
</td>

<td>
<center><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>DODJOCC sign at NSA station,
Chicksands</font></font></i></center>
</td>
</tr>
</table></center>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>

<p><br><a NAME="_Toc448565532"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>High
frequency radio interception</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>31. High frequency radio signals are relatively
easy to intercept, requiring only a suitable area of land in, ideally,
a "quiet" radio environment. From 1945 until the early 1980s, both NSA
and GCHQ operated HF radio interception systems tasked to collect European
ILC communications in Scotland.</font></font><a href="#N_16_">(16)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>32. The most advanced type of HF monitoring
system deployed during this period for Comint purposes was a large circular
antenna array known as AN/FLR-9. AN/FLR-9 antennae are more than 400 metres
in diameter. They can simultaneously intercept and determine the bearing
of signals from as many directions and on as many frequencies as may be
desired. In 1964, AN/FLR-9 receiving systems were installed at San Vito
dei Normanni, Italy; Chicksands, England, and Karamursel, Turkey.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>33. In August 1966, NSA transferred
ILC collection activities from its Scottish site at Kirknewton, to Menwith
Hill in England. Ten years later, this activity was again transferred,
to Chicksands. Although the primary function of the Chicksands site was
to intercept Soviet and Warsaw Pact air force communications, it was also
tasked to collect ILC and "NDC" (Non-US Diplomatic Communications). Prominent
among such tasks was the collection of FRD traffic (i.e., French diplomatic
communications). Although most personnel at Chicksands were members of
the US Air Force, diplomatic and ILC interception was handled by civilian
NSA employees in a unit called DODJOCC.</font></font><a href="#N_17_">(17)</a>
<p><font size=-1><font face="Arial,Helvetica">34. During the 1970s, British
Comint units on Cyprus were tasked to collect HF communications of allied
NATO nations, including Greece and Turkey. The interception took place
at a British army unit at Ayios Nikolaos, eastern Cyprus.<a href="#N_18_">(18)</a>
In the United States in 1975, investigations by a US </font><font face="Arial">Congressional
Committee revealed that NSA was collecting diplomatic messages sent to
and from Washington from an army Comint site at Vint Hill Farms, Virginia.
The targets of this station included the United Kingdom.</font></font><a href="#N_19_">(19)</a>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565533"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Space
interception of inter-city networks</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>35. Long distance microwave
radio relay links may require dozens of intermediate stations to receive
and re-transmit communications. Each subsequent receiving station picks
up only a tiny fraction of the original transmitted signal; the remainder
passes over the horizon and on into space, where satellites can collect
it. These principles were exploited during the 1960s to provide Comint
collection from space. The nature of microwave "spillage" means that the
best position for such satellites is not above the chosen target, but up
to 80 degrees of longitude away.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>36. The first US Comint satellite,
CANYON, was launched In August 1968, followed soon by a second. The satellites
were controlled from a ground station at Bad Aibling, Germany. In order
to provide permanent coverage of selected targets, CANYON satellites were
placed close to geostationary orbits. However, the orbits were not exact,
causing the satellites to change position and obtain more data on ground
targets.</font></font><a href="#N_20_">(20)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Seven CANYON satellites were launched between 1968 and 1977.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>37. CANYON's target was the Soviet
Union. Major Soviet communications links extended for thousands of miles,
much of it over Siberia, where permafrost restricted the reliable use of
underground cables. Geographical circumstances thus favoured NSA by making
Soviet internal communications links highly accessible. The satellites
performed better than expected, so the project was extended.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>38. The success of CANYON led to the
design and deployment of a new class of Comint satellites, CHALET. The
ground station chosen for the CHALET series was Menwith Hill, England.
Under NSA project P-285, US companies were contracted to install and assist
in operating the satellite control system and downlinks (RUNWAY) and ground
processing system (SILKWORTH). The first two CHALET satellites were launched
in June 1978 and October 1979. After the name of the first satellite appeared
in the US press, they were renamed VORTEX. In 1982, NSA obtained approval
for expanded "new mission requirements" and were given funds and facilities
to operate four VORTEX satellites simultaneously. A new 5,000m<sup>2</sup>
operations centre (STEEPLEBUSH) was constructed to house processing equipment.
When the name VORTEX was published in 1987, the satellites were renamed
MERCURY.</font></font><a href="#N_21_">(21)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>39. The expanded mission given to Menwith
Hill after 1985 included MERCURY collection from the Middle East. The station
received an award for support to US naval operations in the Persian Gulf
from 1987 to 1988. In 1991, a further award was given for support of the
Iraqi war operations, Desert Storm and Desert Shield.</font></font><a href="#N_22_">(22)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Menwith Hill is now the major US site for Comint collection against its
major ally, Israel. Its staff includes linguists trained in Hebrew, Arabic
and Farsi as well as European languages. Menwith Hill has recently been
expanded to include ground links for a new network of Sigint satellites
launched in 1994 and 1995 (RUTLEY). The name of the new class of satellites
remains unknown.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565534"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Sigint
satellites</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>40. The CIA developed a second
class of Sigint satellite with complementary capabilities over the period
from 1967 to 1985. Initially known as RHYOLITE and later AQUACADE, these
satellites were operated from a remote ground station in central Australia,
Pine Gap. Using a large parabolic antenna which unfolded in space, RHYOLITE
intercepted lower frequency signals in the VHF and UHF bands. Larger, most
recent satellites of this type have been named MAGNUM and then ORION. Their
targets include telemetry, VHF radio, cellular mobile phones, paging signals,
and mobile data links.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>41. A third class of satellite, known
first as JUMPSEAT and latterly as TRUMPET, operates in highly elliptical
near-polar orbits enabling them to "hover" for long period over high northern
latitudes. They enable the United States to collect signals from transmitters
in high northern latitudes poorly covered by MERCURY or ORION, and also
to intercept signals sent to Russian communications satellites in the same
orbits.</font></font>
<br>&nbsp;
<center><table BORDER=2 CELLSPACING=0 CELLPADDING=7 WIDTH="865" >
<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP COLSPAN="2" WIDTH="80%">
<center><img SRC="sigint_sats.jpg" height=267 width=624></center>
</td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="20%">
<center><img SRC="radio_relay.jpg" height=269 width=146></center>
</td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="78%">
<center><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Comint satellites in geostationary
orbits, such as VORTEX, intercept terrestial microwave spillage</font></font></i></center>
</td>

<td VALIGN=TOP COLSPAN="2" WIDTH="22%">
<center><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Inter-city microwave radio
relay tower</font></font> pills" signals into space</i></center>
</td>
</tr>
</table></center>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>42. Although precise details of US space-based
Sigint satellites launched after 1990 remain obscure, it is apparent from
observation of the relevant ground centres that collection systems have
expanded rather than contracted. The main stations are at Buckley Field,
Denver, Colorado; Pine Gap, Australia; Menwith Hill, England; and Bad Aibling,
Germany. The satellites and their processing facilities are exceptionally
costly (of the order of $1 billion US each). In 1998, the US National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) announced plans to combine the three separate classes of Sigint
satellites into an Integrated Overhead Sigint Architecture (IOSA) in order
to " improve Sigint performance and avoid costs by consolidating systems,
utilising ... new satellite and data processing technologies". </font></font><a href="#N_23_">(23)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>43. It follows that, within constraints
imposed by budgetary limitation and tasking priorities, the United States
can if it chooses direct space collection systems to intercept mobile communications
signals and microwave city-to-city traffic anywhere on the planet. The
geographical and processing difficulties of collecting messages simultaneously
from all parts of the globe suggest strongly that the tasking of these
satellites will be directed towards the highest priority national and military
targets. Thus, although European communications passing on inter-city microwave
routes can be collected, it is likely that they are normally ignored. But
it is very highly probable that communications to or from Europe and which
pass through the microwave communications networks of Middle Eastern states
are collected and processed.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>44. No other nation (including the
former Soviet Union) has deployed satellites comparable to CANYON, RHYOLITE,
or their successors. Both Britain (project ZIRCON) and France (project
ZENON) have attempted to do so, but neither persevered. After 1988 the
British government purchased capacity on the US VORTEX (now MERCURY) constellation
to use for unilateral national purposes.</font></font><a href="#N_24_">(24)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
A senior UK Liaison Officer and staff from GCHQ work at Menwith Hill NSA
station and assist in tasking and operating the satellites.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565535"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>COMSAT
ILC collection</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>45. Systematic collection of COMSAT ILC
communications began in 1971. Two ground stations were built for this purpose.
The first at Morwenstow, Cornwall, England had two 30-metre antennae. One
intercepted communications from the Atlantic Ocean Intelsat; the other
the Indian Ocean Intelsat. The second Intelsat interception site was at
Yakima, Washington in the northwestern United States. NSA's "Yakima Research
Station" intercepted communications passing through the Pacific Ocean Intelsat
satellite.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>46. ILC interception capability against
western-run communications satellites remained at this level until the
late 1970s, when a second US site at Sugar Grove, West Virginia was added
to the network. By 1980, its three satellite antenna had been reassigned
to the US Naval Security Group and were used for COMSAT interception. Large-scale
expansion of the ILC satellite interception system took place between 1985
and 1995, in conjunction with the enlargement of the ECHELON processing
system (section 3). New stations were constructed in the United States
(Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico), Canada (Leitrim, Ontario), Australia (Kojarena,
Western Australia) and New Zealand (Waihopai, South Island). Capacity at
Yakima, Morwenstow and Sugar Grove was expanded, and continues to expand.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Based on a simple count of the number
of antennae currently installed at each COMSAT interception or satellite
SIGINT station, <b>it appears that the UKUSA nations are between them currently
operating at least 120 satellite based collection systems. The approximate
number of antennae in each category are:</b></font></font>
<br>&nbsp;
<center><table BORDER=0 CELLSPACING=0 CELLPADDING=7 WIDTH="571" >
<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="95%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>- Tasked
on western commercial communications satellites (ILC)</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="5%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>40</font></font></b></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="95%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>- Controlling
space based signals intelligence satellites</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="5%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>30</font></font></b></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="95%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>- Currently
or formerly tasked on Soviet communications satellites</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="5%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>50</font></font></b></td>
</tr>
</table></center>

<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1><b>Systems in the third category may
have been reallocated to ILC tasks since the end of the cold war</b>.</font></font><a href="#N_25_">(25)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>47. Other nations increasingly collect
Comint from satellites. Russia's FAPSI operates large ground collection
sites at Lourdes, Cuba and at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam.</font></font><a href="#N_26_">(26)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Germany's BND and France's DGSE are alleged to collaborate in the operation
of a COMSAT collection site at Kourou, Guyana, targeted on "American and
South American satellite communications". DGSE is also said to have COMSAT
collection sites at Domme (Dordogne, France), in New Caledonia, and in
the United Arab Emirates.</font></font><a href="#N_27_">(27)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The Swiss intelligence service has recently announced a plan for two COMSAT
interception stations.</font></font><a href="#N_28_">(28)</a>
<br>&nbsp;
<center><table BORDER WIDTH="606" >
<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="50%">
<center><img SRC="etam.jpg" height=484 width=396></center>
</td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="50%">
<center><img SRC="bude_nite.jpg" height=482 width=382></center>
</td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="50%" HEIGHT="50">
<center><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Satellite ground terminal at
Etam, West Virginia&nbsp; connecting Europe and the US via Intelsat IV</font></font></i></center>
</td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="50%" HEIGHT="50">
<center><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>GCHQ constructed an identical
"shadow" station in 1972 to intercept Intelsat messages for UKUSA</font></font></i></center>
</td>
</tr>
</table></center>

<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565536"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Submarine
cable interception</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>48. Submarine cables now play a dominant
role in international telecommunications, since - in contrast to the limited
bandwidth available for space systems - optical media offer seemingly unlimited
capacity. Save where cables terminate in countries where telecommunications
operators provide Comint access (such as the UK and the US), submarine
cables appear intrinsically secure because of the nature of the ocean environment.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>49. In October 1971, this security
was shown not to exist. A US submarine, Halibut, visited the Sea of Okhotsk
off the eastern USSR and recorded communications passing on a military
cable to the Khamchatka Peninsula. Halibut was equipped with a deep diving
chamber, fully in view on the submarine's stern. The chamber was described
by the US Navy as a "deep submergence rescue vehicle". The truth was that
the "rescue vehicle" was welded immovably to the submarine. Once submerged,
deep-sea divers exited the submarine and wrapped tapping coils around the
cable. Having proven the principle, USS Halibut returned in 1972 and laid
a high capacity recording pod next to the cable. The technique involved
no physical damage and was unlikely to have been readily detectable.</font></font><a href="#N_29_">(29)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>50. The Okhotsk cable tapping operation
continued for ten years, involving routine trips by three different specially
equipped submarines to collect old pods and lay new ones; sometimes, more
than one pod at a time. New targets were added in 1979. That summer, a
newly converted submarine called USS Parche travelled from San Francisco
under the North Pole to the Barents Sea, and laid a new cable tap near
Murmansk. Its crew received a presidential citation for their achievement.
The Okhotsk cable tap ended in 1982, after its location was compromised
by a former NSA employee who sold information about the tap, codenamed
IVY BELLS, to the Soviet Union. One of the IVY BELLS pods is now on display
in the Moscow museum of the former KGB. The cable tap in the Barents Sea
continued in operation, undetected, until tapping stopped in 1992.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>51. During 1985, cable-tapping operations
were extended into the Mediterranean, to intercept cables linking Europe
to West Africa. </font></font><a href="#N_30_">(30)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
After the cold war ended, the USS Parche was refitted with an extended
section to accommodate larger cable tapping equipment and pods. Cable taps
could be laid by remote control, using drones. USS Parche continues in
operation to the present day, but the precise targets of its missions remain
unknown. The Clinton administration evidently places high value on its
achievements, Every year from 1994 to 1997, the submarine crew has been
highly commended.</font></font><a href="#N_31_">(31)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Likely targets may include the Middle East, Mediterranean, eastern Asia,
and South America. The United States is the only naval power known to have
deployed deep-sea technology for this purpose.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>52. Miniaturised inductive taps recorders
have also been used to intercept underground cables.</font></font><a href="#N_32_">(32)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Optical fibre cables, however, do not leak radio frequency signals and
cannot be tapped using inductive loops. NSA and other Comint agencies have
spent a great deal of money on research into tapping optical fibres, reportedly
with little success. But long distance optical fibre cables are not invulnerable.
The key means of access is by tampering with optoelectronic "repeaters"
which boost signal levels over long distances. It follows that any submarine
cable system using submerged optoelectronic repeaters cannot be considered
secure from interception and communications intelligence activity.</font></font>
<br>&nbsp;
<center><table BORDER WIDTH="802" >
<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="47%">
<center><img SRC="uss_halibut.jpg" height=270 width=400></center>
</td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="53%">
<center><img SRC="ivy_bells_pod.jpg" height=271 width=452></center>
</td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="47%">
<center><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>USS halibut with disguised
chamber for diving</font></font></i></center>
</td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="53%">
<center><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Cable tapping pod laid by US
submarine off Khamchatka</font></font></i></center>
</td>
</tr>
</table></center>

<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565537"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Intercepting
the Internet</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>53. The dramatic growth in the size and
significance of the Internet and of related forms of digital communications
has been argued by some to pose a challenge for Comint agencies. This does
not appear correct. During the 1980s, NSA and its UKUSA partners operated
a larger international communications network than the then Internet but
based on the same technology.</font></font><a href="#N_33_">(33)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
According to its British partner "all GCHQ systems are linked together
on the largest LAN [Local Area Network] in Europe, which is connected to
other sites around the world via one of the largest WANs [Wide Area Networks]
in the world ... its main networking protocol is Internet Protocol (IP).</font></font><a href="#N_34_">(34)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
This global network, developed as project EMBROIDERY, includes PATHWAY,
the NSA's main computer communications network. It provides fast, secure
global communications for ECHELON and other systems.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>54. Since the early 1990s, fast and
sophisticated Comint systems have been developed to collect, filter and
analyse the forms of fast digital communications used by the Internet.
Because most of the world's Internet capacity lies within the United States
or connects to the United States, many communications in "cyberspace" will
pass through intermediate sites within the United States. Communications
from Europe to and from Asia, Oceania, Africa or South America normally
travel via the United States.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>55. Routes taken by Internet "packets"
depend on the origin and destination of the data, the systems through which
they enter and leaves the Internet, and a myriad of other factors including
time of day. Thus, routers within the western United States are at their
most idle at the time when central European traffic is reaching peak usage.
It is thus possible (and reasonable) for messages travelling a short distance
in a busy European network to travel instead, for example, via Internet
exchanges in California. It follows that a large proportion of international
communications on the Internet will by the nature of the system pass through
the United States and thus be readily accessible to NSA.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>56.Standard Internet messages are composed
of packets called "datagrams" . Datagrams include numbers representing
both their origin and their destination, called "IP addresses". The addresses
are unique to each computer connected to the Internet. They are inherently
easy to identify as to country and site of origin and destination. Handling,
sorting and routing millions of such packets each second is fundamental
to the operation of major Internet centres. The same process facilitates
extraction of traffic for Comint purposes.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>57. Internet traffic can be accessed
either from international communications links entering the United States,
or when it reaches major Internet exchanges. Both methods have advantages.
Access to communications systems is likely to be remain clandestine - whereas
access to Internet exchanges might be more detectable but provides easier
access to more data and simpler sorting methods. Although the quantities
of data involved are immense, NSA is normally legally restricted to looking
only at communications that start or finish in a foreign country. Unless
special warrants are issued, all other data should normally be thrown away
by machine before it can be examined or recorded.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>58. Much other Internet traffic (whether
foreign to the US or not) is of trivial intelligence interest or can be
handled in other ways. For example, messages sent to "Usenet" discussion
groups amounts to about 15 Gigabytes (GB) of data per day; the rough equivalent
of 10,000 books. All this data is broadcast to anyone wanting (or willing)
to have it. Like other Internet users, intelligence agencies have open
source access to this data and store and analyse it. In the UK, the Defence
Evaluation and Research Agency maintains a 1 Terabyte database containing
the previous 90 days of Usenet messages.</font></font><a href="#N_35_">(35)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
A similar service, called "Deja News", is available to users of the World
Wide Web (WWW). Messages for Usenet are readily distinguishable. It is
pointless to collect them clandestinely.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>59. Similar considerations affect the
World Wide Web, most of which is openly accessible. Web sites are examined
continuously by "search engines" which generate catalogues of their contents.
"Alta Vista" and "Hotbot" are prominent public sites of this kind. NSA
similarly employs computer "bots" (robots) to collect data of interest.
For example, a New York web site known as JYA.COM </font></font><a href ="http://www.jya.com/crypto.htm">(http://www.jya.com/crypto.htm)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
offers extensive public information on Sigint, Comint and cryptography.
The site is frequently updated. Records of access to the site show that
every morning it is visited by a "bot" from NSA's National Computer Security
Centre, which looks for new files and makes copies of any that it finds.</font></font><a href="#N_36_">(36)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>60. It follows that foreign Internet
traffic of communications intelligence interest - consisting of e-mail,
file transfers, "virtual private networks" operated over the internet,
and some other messages - will form at best a few per cent of the traffic
on most US Internet exchanges or backbone links. According to a former
employee, NSA had by 1995 installed "sniffer" software to collect such
traffic at nine major Internet exchange points (IXPs).</font></font><a href="#N_37_">(37)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The first two such sites identified, FIX East and FIX West, are operated
by US government agencies. They are closely linked to nearby commercial
locations, MAE East and MAE West (see table). Three other sites listed
were Network Access Points originally developed by the US National Science
Foundation to provide the US Internet with its initial "backbone".</font></font>
<br>&nbsp;
<center><table BORDER=2 CELLSPACING=0 WIDTH="634" >
<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Internet
site</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Location</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Operator</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Designation</font></font></b></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FIX East</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>College
Park, Maryland</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>US government</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Federal
Information Exchange</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FIX West</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Mountain
View, California</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>US government</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Federal
Information Exchange</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>MAE East</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Washington,
DC</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>MCI</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Metropolitan
Area Ethernet</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>New York
NAP</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Pennsauken,
New Jersey</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Sprintlink</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Network
Access Point</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SWAB</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Washington,
DC</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>PSInet /
Bell Atlantic</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SMDS Washington
Area Bypass</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Chicago
NAP</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Chicago,
Illinois</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Ameritech
/ Bellcorp</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Network
Access Point</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>San Francisco
NAP</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>San Francisco,
California</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Pacific
Bell</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Network
Access Point</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>MAE West</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>San Jose,
California</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>MCI</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Metropolitan
Area Ethernet</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="20%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CIX</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="26%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Santa Clara
California</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="22%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CIX</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="32%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Commercial
Internet Exchange</font></font></td>
</tr>
</table></center>

<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Table 1 NSA Internet Comint access
at IXP sites (1995) </font></font><a href="#N_38_">(38)</a></i></dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>61. The same article alleged that a leading
US Internet and telecommunications company had contracted with NSA to develop
software to capture Internet data of interest, and that deals had been
struck with the leading manufacturers Microsoft, Lotus, and Netscape to
alter their products for foreign use. The latter allegation has proven
correct (see technical annexe). Providing such features would make little
sense unless NSA had also arranged general access to Internet traffic.
Although NSA will not confirm or deny such allegations, a 1997 court case
in Britain involving alleged "computer hacking" produced evidence of NSA
surveillance of the Internet. Witnesses from the US Air Force component
of NSA acknowledged using packet sniffers and specialised programmes to
track attempts to enter US military computers. The case collapsed after
the witnesses refused to provide evidence about the systems they had used.</font></font><a href="#N_39_">(39)</a>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565538"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Covert
collection of high capacity signals</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>62. Where access to signals of interest
is not possible by other means, Comint agencies have constructed special
purpose interception equipment to install in embassies or other diplomatic
premises, or even to carry by hand to locations of special interest. Extensive
descriptions of operations of this kind have been published by Mike Frost,
a former official of CSE, the Canadian Sigint agency.</font></font><a href="#N_40_">(40)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Although city centre embassy premises are often ideally situated to intercept
a wide range of communications, ranging from official carphone services
to high capacity microwave links, processing and passing on such information
may be difficult. Such collection operations are also highly sensitive
for diplomatic reasons. Equipment for covert collection is therefore specialised,
selective and miniaturised.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>63. A joint NSA/CIA "Special Collection
Service" manufactures equipment and trains personnel for covert collection
activities One major device is a suitcase-sized computer processing system.
ORATORY. ORATORY is in effect a miniaturised version of the Dictionary
computers described in the next section, capable of selecting non-verbal
communications of interest from a wide range of inputs, according to pre-programmed
selection criteria. One major NSA supplier ("The IDEAS Operation") now
offers micro-miniature digital receivers which can simultaneously process
Sigint data from 8 independent channels. This radio receiver is the size
of a credit card. It fits in a standard laptop computer. IDEAS claim, reasonably,
that their tiny card "performs functions that would have taken a rack full
of equipment not long ago".</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565539"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>New
satellite networks</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>64. New network operators have constructed
mobile phone systems providing unbroken global coverage using satellites
in low or medium level earth orbits. These systems are sometimes called
satellite personal communications systems (SPCS). Because each satellite
covers only a small area and moves fast, large numbers of satellites are
needed to provide continuous global coverage. The satellites can relay
signals directly between themselves or to ground stations. The first such
system to be completed, Iridium, uses 66 satellites and started operations
in 1998. Iridium appears to have created particular difficulties for communications
intelligence agencies, since the signals down from the Iridium and similar
networks can only be received in a small area, which may be anywhere on
the earth's surface.</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565540"></a>
<br>&nbsp;
<dir>
<dir><b><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+3>3. ECHELON and Comint
production</font></font></b></dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>65. The ECHELON system became well known
following publication of the previous STOA report. Since then, new evidence
shows that ECHELON has existed since the 1970s, and was greatly enlarged
between 1975 and 1995. Like ILC interception, ECHELON has developed from
earlier methods. This section includes new information and documentary
evidence about ECHELON and satellite interception.</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565541"></a>
<p><b><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <u>The
"Watch List"</u></font></font></b>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>66. After the public revelation of
the SHAMROCK interception programme, NSA Director Lt General Lew Allen
described how NSA used "'watch lists" as an aid to watch for foreign activity
of reportable intelligence interest".</font></font><a href="#N_41_">(41)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
"We have been providing details ... of any messages contained in the foreign
communications we intercept that bear on named individuals or organisations.
These compilations of names are commonly referred to as 'Watch Lists'",
he said.</font></font><a href="#N_42_">(42)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Until the 1970s, Watch List processing was manual. Analysts examined intercepted
ILC communications, reporting, "gisting" or analysing those which appeared
to cover names or topics on the Watch List.</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565542"></a>
<p><b><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <u>New
information about ECHELON sites and systems</u></font></font></b>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>67. It now appears that the system
identified as ECHELON has been in existence for more than 20 years. The
need for such a system was foreseen in the late 1960s, when NSA and GCHQ
planned ILC satellite interception stations at Mowenstow and Yakima. It
was expected that the quantity of messages intercepted from the new satellites
would be too great for individual examination. According to former NSA
staff, the first ECHELON computers automated Comint processing at these
sites.</font></font><a href="#N_43_">(43)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>68. NSA and CIA then discovered that
Sigint collection from space was more effective than had been anticipated,
resulting in accumulations of recordings that outstripped the available
supply of linguists and analysts. Documents show that when the SILKWORTH
processing systems was installed at Menwith Hill for the new satellites,
it was supported by ECHELON 2 and other databanks (see illustration).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>69. By the mid 1980s, communications
intercepted at these major stations were heavily sifted, with a wide variety
of specifications available for non-verbal traffic. Extensive further automation
was planned in the mid 1980s as NSA Project P-415. Implementation of this
project completed the automation of the previous Watch List activity. From
1987 onwards, staff from international Comint agencies travelled to the
US to attended training courses for the new computer systems.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>70. Project P-415/ECHELON made heavy
use of NSA and GCHQ's global Internet-like communication network to enable
remote intelligence customers to task computers at each collection site,
and receive the results automatically. The key component of the system
are local "Dictionary" computers, which store an extensive database on
specified targets, including names, topics of interest, addresses, telephone
numbers and other selection criteria. Incoming messages are compared to
these criteria; if a match is found, the raw intelligence is forwarded
automatically. Dictionary computers are tasked with many thousands of different
collection requirements, described as "numbers" (four digit codes).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>71. Tasking and receiving intelligence
from the Dictionaries involves processes familiar to anyone who has used
the Internet. Dictionary sorting and selection can be compared to using
search engines, which select web pages containing key words or terms and
specifying relationships. The forwarding function of the Dictionary computers
may be compared to e-mail. When requested, the system will provide lists
of communications matching each criterion for review, analysis, "gisting"
or forwarding. An important point about the new system is that before ECHELON,
different countries and different stations knew what was being intercepted
and to whom it was sent. Now, all but a fraction of the messages selected
by Dictionary computers at remote sites are forwarded to NSA or other customers
without being read locally.</font></font>
<br>&nbsp;
<center><table BORDER WIDTH="670" >
<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="40%">
<center><img SRC="echelon_mhs.jpg" height=259 width=248></center>
</td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="60%">
<center><img SRC="sugar_grove.jpg" height=259 width=385></center>
</td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="40%" HEIGHT="50">
<center><i><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>List of intelligence
databanks operating at ECHELON Menwith Hill in 1979 included the second
generation of ECHELON</font></font></i></center>
</td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="60%" HEIGHT="50">
<center><i><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Satellite interception
site at Sugar Grove, West Virginia, showing six antennae targeted on European
and Atlantic</font></font></i>
<br><i><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=-1>Ocean regional communications
satellites</font></font></i></center>
</td>
</tr>
</table></center>

<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565543"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Westminster,
London - Dictionary computer</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>72. In 1991, a British television programme
reported on the operations of the Dictionary computer at GCHQ's Westminster,
London office. The system "secretly intercepts every single telex which
passes into, out of or through London; thousands of diplomatic, business
and personal messages every day. These are fed into a programme known as
`Dictionary'. It picks out keywords from the mass of Sigint, and hunts
out hundreds of individuals and corporations".</font></font><a href="#N_44_">(44)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The programme pointed out that the Dictionary computers, although controlled
and tasked by GCHQ, were operated by security vetted staff employed by
British Telecom (BT), Britain's dominant telecommunications operator.</font></font><a href="#N_45_">(45)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The presence of Dictionary computers has also been confirmed at Kojarena,
Australia; and at GCHQ Cheltenham, England.</font></font><a href="#N_46_">(46)</a>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565544"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Sugar
Grove, Virginia - COMSAT interception at ECHELON site</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>73. US government documents confirm that
the satellite receiving station at Sugar Grove, West Virginia is an ECHELON
site, and that collects intelligence from COMSATs. The station is about
250 miles south-west of Washington, in a remote area of the Shenandoah
Mountains. It is operated by the US Naval Security Group and the US Air
Force Intelligence Agency.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>74. An upgraded system called TIMBERLINE
II, was installed at Sugar Grove in the summer of 1990. At the same time,
according to official US documents, an "ECHELON training department" was
established.</font></font><a href="#N_47_">(47)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
With training complete, the task of the station in 1991 became "to maintain
and operate an ECHELON site".</font></font><a href="#N_48_">(48)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>75. The US Air Force has publicly identified
the intelligence activity at Sugar Grove: its "mission is to direct satellite
communications equipment [in support of] consumers of COMSAT information
... This is achieved by providing a trained cadre of collection system
operators, analysts and managers".</font></font><a href="#N_49_">(49)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
In 1990, satellite photographs showed that there were 4 satellite antennae
at Sugar Grove. By November 1998, ground inspection revealed that this
had expanded to a group of 9.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565545"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Sabana
Seca, Puerto Rico and Leitrim, Canada - COMSAT interception sites</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>76. Further information published by the
US Air Force identifies the US Naval Security Group Station at Sabana Seca,
Puerto Rico as a COMSAT interception site. Its mission is "to become the
premier satellite communications processing and analysis field station".</font></font><a href="#N_50_">(50)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>77. Canadian Defence Forces have published
details about staff functions at the Leitrim field station of the Canadian
Sigint agency CSE. The station, near Ottawa, Ontario has four satellite
terminals, erected since 1984. The staff roster includes seven Communications
Satellite Analysts, Supervisors and Instructors.</font></font><a href="#N_51_">(51)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>78. In a publicly available resume,
a former Communication Satellite Analyst employed at Leitrim describes
his job as having required expertise in the "operation and analysis of
numerous Comsat computer systems and associated subsystems ... [utilising]
computer assisted analysis systems ... [and] a broad range of sophisticated
electronic equipment to intercept and study foreign communications and
electronic transmissions.</font></font><a href="#N_52_">(52)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Financial reports from CSE also indicate that in 1995/96, the agency planned
payments of $7 million to ECHELON and $6 million to Cray (computers). There
were no further details about ECHELON.</font></font><a href="#N_53_">(53)</a>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565546"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Waihopai,
New Zealand - Intelsat interception at ECHELON site</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>79. New Zealand's Sigint agency GCSB operates
two satellite interception terminals at Waihopai, tasked on Intelsat satellites
covering the Pacific Ocean. Extensive details have already been published
about the station's Dictionary computers and its role in the ECHELON network.</font></font><a href="#N_54_">(54)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
After the book was published, a New Zealand TV station obtained images
of the inside of the station operations centre. The pictures were obtained
clandestinely by filming through partially curtained windows at night.
The TV reporter was able to film close-ups of technical manuals held in
the control centre. These were Intelsat technical manuals, providing confirmation
that the station targeted these satellites Strikingly, the station was
seen to be virtually empty, operating fully automatically. One guard was
inside, but was unaware he was being filmed.</font></font><a href="#N_55_">(55)</a><a NAME="_Toc448565547"></a>
<dir><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>ILC processing techniques</font></font></u></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>80. The technical annexe describes the
main systems used to extract and process communications intelligence. The
detailed explanations given about processing methods are not essential
to understanding the core of this report, but are provided so that readers
knowledgeable about telecommunications may fully evaluate the state of
the art.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>81. Fax messages and computer data
(from modems) are given priority in processing because of the ease with
which they are understood and analysed. The main method of filtering and
analysing non-verbal traffic, the Dictionary computers, utilise traditional
information retrieval techniques, including keywords. Fast special purpose
chips enable vast quantities of data to be processed in this way. The newest
technique is "topic spotting". The processing of telephone calls is mainly
limited to identifying call-related information, and traffic analysis.
Effective voice "wordspotting" systems do not exist are not in use, despite
reports to the contrary. But "voiceprint" type speaker identification systems
have been in use since at least 1995. The use of strong cryptography is
slowly impinging on Comint agencies' capabilities. This difficulty for
Comint agencies has been offset by covert and overt activities which have
subverted the effectiveness of cryptographic systems supplied from and/or
used in Europe.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>82. The conclusions drawn in the annexe
are that Comint equipment currently available has the capability, as tasked,
to intercept, process and analyse every modern type of high capacity communications
system to which access is obtained, including the highest levels of the
Internet. There are few gaps in coverage. The scale, capacity and speed
of some systems is difficult fully to comprehend. Special purpose systems
have been built to process pager messages, cellular mobile radio and new
satellites.</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565548"></a>
<br>&nbsp;
<br>&nbsp;
<dir>
<dir><b><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+3>4. Comint and Law Enforcement</font></font></b></dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>83. In 1990 and 1991, the US government
became concerned that the marketing of a secure telephone system by AT&T
could curtail Comint activity. AT&T was persuaded to withdraw its product.
In its place the US government offered NSA "Clipper" chips for incorporation
in secure phones. The chips would be manufactured by NSA, which would also
record built-in keys and pass this information to other government agencies
for storage and, if required, retrieval. This proposal proved extremely
unpopular, and was abandoned. In its place, the US government proposed
that non government agencies should be required to keep copies of every
user's keys, a system called "key escrow" and, later, "key recovery". Viewed
in retrospect, the actual purpose of these proposals was to provide NSA
with a single (or very few) point(s) of access to keys, enabling them to
continue to access private and commercial communications.</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565549"></a>
<dir><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>Misrepresentation of law enforcement
interception requirements</font></font></u></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>84. Between 1993 to 1998, the United States
conducted sustained diplomatic activity seeking to persuade EU nations
and the OECD to adopt their "key recovery" system. Throughout this period,
the US government insisted that the purpose of the initiative was to assist
law enforcement agencies. Documents obtained for this study suggest that
these claims wilfully misrepresented the true intention of US policy. Documents
obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act indicate that policymaking
was led exclusively by NSA officials, sometimes to the complete exclusion
of police or judicial officials. For example, when the specially appointed
US "Ambassador for Cryptography", David Aaron, visited Britain on 25 November
1996, he was accompanied and briefed by NSA's most senior representative
in Britain, Dr James J Hearn, formerly Deputy Director of NSA. Mr Aaron
had did not meet or consult FBI officials attached to his Embassy. His
meeting with British Cabinet officials included NSA's representative and
staff from Britain's GCHQ, but police officers or justice officials from
both nations were excluded.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>85. Since 1993, unknown to European
parliamentary bodies and their electors, law enforcement officials from
many EU countries and most of the UKUSA nations have been meeting annually
in a separate forum to discuss their requirements for intercepting communications.
These officials met under the auspices of a hitherto unknown organisation,
ILETS (International Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar). ILETS
was initiated and founded by the FBI. Table 2 lists ILETS meetings held
between 1993 and 1997.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>86. At their 1993 and 1994 meetings,
ILETS participants specified law enforcement user requirements for communications
interception. These appear in a 1974 ILETS document called "IUR 1.0". This
document was based on an earlier FBI report on "Law Enforcement Requirements
for the Surveillance of Electronic Communications", first issued in July
1992 and revised in June 1994. The IUR requirement differed little in substance
from the FBI's requirements but was enlarged, containing ten requirements
rather than nine. IUR did not specify any law enforcement need for "key
escrow" or "key recovery". Cryptography was mentioned solely in the context
of network security arrangements.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>87. Between 1993 and 1997 police representatives
from ILETS were not involved in the NSA-led policy making process for "key
recovery", nor did ILETS advance any such proposal, even as late as 1997.
Despite this, during the same period the US government repeatedly presented
its policy as being motivated by the stated needs of law enforcement agencies.
At their 1997 meeting in Dublin, ILETS did not alter the IUR. It was not
until 1998 that a revised IUR was prepared containing requirements in respect
of cryptography. It follows from this that the US government misled EU
and OECD states about the true intention of its policy.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>88. This US deception was, however,
clear to the senior Commission official responsible for information security.
In September 1996, David Herson, head of the EU Senior Officers' Group
on Information Security, stated his assessment of the US "key recovery"
project :</font></font>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>"'Law Enforcement' is a protective
shield for all the other governmental activities ... We're talking about
foreign intelligence, that's what all this is about. There is no question
[that] 'law enforcement' is a smoke screen".</font></font></i><a href="#N_56_">(56)</a></dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>89. It should be noted that technically,
legally and organisationally, law enforcement requirements for communications
interception differ fundamentally from communications intelligence. Law
enforcement agencies (LEAs) will normally wish to intercept a specific
line or group of lines, and must normally justify their requests to a judicial
or administrative authority before proceeding. In contract, Comint agencies
conduct broad international communications "trawling" activities, and operate
under general warrants. Such operations do not require or even suppose
that the parties they intercept are criminals. Such distinctions are vital
to civil liberty, but risk being eroded it the boundaries between law enforcement
and communications intelligence interception becomes blurred in future.</font></font>
<br>&nbsp;
<center><table BORDER=2 CELLSPACING=0 WIDTH="742" >
<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="8%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Year</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="17%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Venue</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="27%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Non-EU
participants</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="48%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>EU participants</font></font></b></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="8%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>1993</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="17%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Quantico,
Virginia, USA</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="27%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Australia,
Canada, Hong Kong, Norway United States</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="48%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Denmark,
France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="8%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>1994</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="17%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Bonn, Germany</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="27%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Australia,
Canada, Hong Kong, Norway, United States</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="48%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="8%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>1995</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="17%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Canberra,
Australia</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="27%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Australia,
Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Norway, United States</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="48%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="8%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>1997</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="17%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Dublin,
Ireland</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="27%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Australia,
Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Norway, United States</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=CENTER WIDTH="48%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom</font></font></td>
</tr>
</table></center>

<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Table 2 ILETS meetings, 1993-1997</font></font></i><a NAME="_Toc448565550"></a>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>&nbsp;</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
<b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>Law enforcement communications interception
- policy development in Europe</font></font></u></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>90. Following the second ILETS meeting
in Bonn in 1994, IUR 1.0 was presented to the Council of Ministers and
was passed without a single word being altered on 17January 1995.</font></font><a href="#N_57_">(57)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
During 1995, several non EU members of the ILETS group wrote to the Council
to endorse the (unpublished) Council resolution. The resolution was not
published in the Official Journal for nearly two years, on 4 November 1996.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>91. Following the third ILETS meeting
in Canberra in 1995, the Australian government was asked to present the
IUR to International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Noting that "law enforcement
and national security agencies of a significant number of ITU member states
have agreed on a generic set of requirements for legal interception", the
Australian government asked the ITU to advise its standards bodies to incorporate
the IUR requirements into future telecommunications systems on the basis
that the "costs of [providing] legal interception capability and associated
disruptions can be lessened by providing for that capability at the design
stage".</font></font><a href="#N_58_">(58)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>92. It appears that ILETS met again
in 1998 and revised and extended its terms to cover the Internet and Satellite
Personal Communications Systems such as Iridium. The new IUR also specified
"additional security requirements for network operators and service providers",
extensive new requirements for personal information about subscribers,
and provisions to deal with cryptography.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>93. On 3 September 1998, the revised
IUR was presented to the Police Co-operation Working Group as ENFOPOL 98.
The Austrian Presidency proposed that, as in 1994, the new IUR be adopted
verbatim as a Council Resolution on interception "in respect of new technology".</font></font><a href="#N_59_">(59)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The group did not agree. After repeated redrafting, a fresh paper has been
prepared by the German Presidency, for the eventual consideration of Council
Home and Justice ministers.</font></font><a href="#N_60_">(60)</a><a NAME="_Toc448565551"></a>
<br>&nbsp;
<dir>
<dir><b><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+3>5. Comint and economic
intelligence</font></font></b></dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>94. During the 1998 EP debate on "Transatlantic
relations/ECHELON system" Commissioner Bangeman observed on behalf of the
Commission that "If this system were to exist, it would be an intolerable
attack against individual liberties, competition and the security of the
states".</font></font><a href="#N_61_">(61)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The existence of ECHELON was described in section 3, above. This section
describes the organisational and reporting frameworks within which economically
sensitive information collected by ECHELON and related systems is disseminated,
summarising examples where European organisations have been the subject
of surveillance.</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565552"></a>
<dir><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>Tasking economic intelligence</font></font></u></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>95. US officials acknowledge that NSA
collects economic information, whether intentionally or otherwise. Former
military intelligence attach&eacute; Colonel Dan Smith worked at the US
Embassy, London until 1993. He regularly received Comint product from Menwith
Hill. In 1998, he told the BBC that at Menwith Hill:</font></font>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>"In terms of scooping up communications,
inevitably since their take is broadband, there will be conversations or
communications which are intercepted which have nothing to do with the
military, and probably within those there will be some information about
commercial dealings"</font></font></i>
<p><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>"Anything would be possible technically.
Technically they can scoop all this information up, sort through it and
find out what it is that might be asked for . . . But there is not policy
to do this specifically in response to a particular company's interest</font></font></i><a href="#N_62_">(62)</a></dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>96. In general, this statement is not
incorrect. But it overlooks fundamental distinctions between tasking and
dissemination, and between commercial and economic intelligence. There
is no evidence that companies in any of the UKUSA countries are able to
task Comint collection to suit their private purposes. They do not have
to. Each UKUSA country authorises national level intelligence assessment
organisations and relevant individual ministries to task and receive economic
intelligence from Comint. Such information may be collected for myriad
purposes, such as: estimation of future essential commodity prices; determining
other nation's private positions in trade negotiations; monitoring international
trading in arms; tracking sensitive technology; or evaluating the political
stability and/or economic strength of a target country. Any of these targets
and many others may produce intelligence of direct commercial relevance.
The decision as to whether it should be disseminated or exploited is taken
not by Comint agencies but by national government organisation(s).</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565553"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Disseminating
economic intelligence</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>97. In 1970, according to its former Executive
Director, the US Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board recommended that "henceforth
economic intelligence be considered a function of the national security,
enjoying a priority equivalent to diplomatic, military, technological intelligence".</font></font><a href="#N_63_">(63)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
On 5 May 1977, a meeting between NSA, CIA and the Department of Commerce
authorised the creation of secret new department, the "Office of Intelligence
Liaison". Its task was to handle "foreign intelligence" of interest to
the Department of Commerce. Its standing orders show that it was authorised
to receive and handle SCI intelligence - Comint and Sigint from NSA. The
creation
of this office THUS provided a formal mechanism whereby NSA data could
be used to support commercial and economic interests. After this system
was highlighted in a British TV programme in 1993, its name was changed
to the "Office of Executive Support".</font></font><a href="#N_64_">(64)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Also in 1993, President Clinton extended US intelligence support to commercial
organisations by creating a new National Economic Council, paralleling
the National Security Council.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>98. The nature of this intelligence
support has been widely reported. "Former intelligence officials and other
experts say tips based on spying ... regularly flow from the Commerce Department
to U.S. companies to help them win contracts overseas.</font></font><a href="#N_65_">(65)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The Office of Executive Support provides classified weekly briefings to
security officials. One US newspaper obtained reports from the Commerce
Department demonstrating intelligence support to US companies:</font></font>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>One such document consists of
minutes from an August 1994 Commerce Department meeting [intended] to identify
major contracts open for bid in Indonesia in order to help U.S. companies
win the work. A CIA employee ... spoke at the meeting; five of the 16 people
on the routine distribution list for the minutes were from the CIA.</font></font></i></dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>99. In the United Kingdom, GCHQ is specifically
required by law (and as and when tasked by the British government) to intercept
foreign communications "in the interests of the economic well-being of
the United Kingdom ...in relation to the actions or intentions of persons
outside the British Islands". Commercial interception is tasked and analysed
by GCHQ's K Division. Commercial and economic targets can be specified
by the government's Overseas Economic Intelligence Committee, the Economic
Staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Treasury, or the Bank of
England.</font></font><a href="#N_66_">(66)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
According to a former senior JIC official, the Comint take routinely includes
"company plans, telexes, faxes, and transcribed phone calls. Many were
calls between Europe and the South[ern Hemisphere]".</font></font><a href="#N_67_">(67)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>100. In Australia, commercially relevant
Comint is passed by DSD to the Office of National Assessments, who consider
whether, and if so where, to disseminate it. Staff there may pass information
to Australian companies if they believe that an overseas nation has or
seeks an unfair trade advantage. Targets of such activity have included
Thomson-CSF, and trade negotiations with Japanese purchasers of coal and
iron ore. Similar systems operate in the other UKUSA nations, Canada and
New Zealand.</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565554"></a>
<dir><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>The use of Comint economic
intelligence product</font></font></u></b>
<p><a NAME="_Toc448565555"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Panavia
European Fighter Aircraft consortium and Saudi Arabia</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>101. In 1993, former National Security
Council official Howard Teicher described in a programme about Menwith
Hill how the European Panavia company was specifically targeted over sales
to the Middle East. "I recall that the words 'Tornado' or 'Panavia' - information
related to the specific aircraft - would have been priority targets that
we would have wanted information about".</font></font><a href="#N_68_">(68)</a>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565556"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Thomson
CSF and Brazil</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>102. In 1994, NSA intercepted phone calls
between Thomson-CSF and Brazil concerning SIVAM, a $1.3 billion surveillance
system for the Amazon rain forest. The company was alleged to have bribed
members of the Brazilian government selection panel. The contract was awarded
to the US Raytheon Corporation - who announced afterwards that "the Department
of Commerce worked very hard in support of U.S. industry on this project".</font></font><a href="#N_69_">(69)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Raytheon also provide maintenance and engineering services to NSA's ECHELON
satellite interception station at Sugar Grove.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565557"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Airbus
Industrie and Saudi Arabia</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>103. According to a well-informed 1995
press report :"from a commercial communications satellite, NSA lifted all
the faxes and phone calls between the European consortium Airbus, the Saudi
national airline and the Saudi government. The agency found that Airbus
agents were offering bribes to a Saudi official. It passed the information
to U.S. officials pressing the bid of Boeing Co and McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
which triumphed last year in the $6 billion competition." </font></font><a href="#N_70_">(70)</a>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565558"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>International
trade negotiations</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>104. Many other accounts have been published
by reputable journalists and some firsthand witnesses citing frequent occasions
on which the US government has utlitised Comint for national commercial
purposes. These include targeting data about the emission standards of
Japanese vehicles;</font></font><a href="#N_71_">(71)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
1995 trade negotiations the import of Japanese luxury cars;</font></font><a href="#N_72_">(72)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
French participation in the GATT trade negotiations in 1993; the Asian-Pacific
Economic Conference (APEC), 1997.</font></font>
<dir><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Targeting host nations</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>105. The issue of whether the United States
utilises communications intelligence facilities such as Menwith Hilll or
Bad Aibling to attack host nations' communications also arises. The available
evidence suggests that such conduct may normally be avoided. According
to former National Security Council official Howard Teicher, the US government
would not direct NSA to spy on a host governments such as Britain:</font></font>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>" [But] I would never say never
in this business because, at the end of the day, national interests are
national interests ... sometimes our interests diverge. So never say never
- especially in this business"</font></font></i>
<br><a NAME="_Toc448565560"></a>
<br><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>.</font></font></dir>
</dir>
<b><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+3>6. Comint capabilities after
2000</font></font></b><a NAME="_Toc448565561"></a></dir>

<p><br><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>Developments in technology</font></font></u></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>106. Since the mid-1990s, communications
intelligence agencies have faced substantial difficulties in maintaining
global access to communications systems. These difficulties will increase
during and after 2000. The major reason is the shift in telecommunications
to high capacity optical fibre networks. Physical access to cables is required
for interception. Unless a fibre network lies within or passes through
a collaborating state, effective interception is practical only by tampering
with optoelectronic repeaters (when installed). This limitation is likely
to place many foreign land-based high capacity optical fibre networks beyond
reach. The physical size of equipment needed to process traffic, together
with power, communications and recording systems, makes clandestine activity
impractical and risky.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>107. Even where access is readily available
(such as to COMSATs), the proliferation of new systems will limit collection
activities, partly because budgetary constraint will restrict new deployments,
and partly because some systems (for example, Iridium) cannot be accessed
by presently available systems.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>108. In the past 15 years the substantial
technological lead in computers and information technology once enjoyed
by Comint organisations has all but disappeared. Their principal computer
systems are bought "off the shelf" and are the equal of or even inferior
to those used by first rank industrial and academic organisations. They
differ only in being "TEMPEST shielded", preventing them emitting radio
signals which could be used to analyse Sigint activity.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>109. Communications intelligence organisations
recognise that the long war against civil and commercial cryptography has
been lost. A thriving academic and industrial community is skilled in cryptography
and cryptology. The Internet and the global marketplace have created a
free flow in information, systems and software. NSA has failed in its mission
to perpetuate access by pretending that that "key escrow" and like systems
were intended to support law enforcement (as opposed to Comint) requirements.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>110. Future trends in Comint are likely
to include limits on investment in Comint collection from space; greater
use of human agents to plant collection devices or obtain codes than in
the past; and an intensified effort to attack foreign computer systems,
using the Internet and other means (in particular, to gain access to protected
files or communications before they are encrypted).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>111. Attempts to restrict cryptography
have nevertheless delayed the large-scale introduction of effective cryptographic
security systems. The reduced cost of computational power has also enabled
Comint agencies to deploy fast and sophisticated processing and sorting
tools.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>112. Recent remarks to CIA veterans
by the head of staff of the US House of Representatives Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, ex CIA officer John Millis illustrate how NSA
views the same issues:</font></font>
<ol>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>"Signals intelligence is in a
crisis. ... Over the last fifty years ... In the past, technology has been
the friend of NSA, but in the last four or five years technology has moved
from being the friend to being the enemy of Sigint.</font></font></i>
<p><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>The media of telecommunications
is no longer Sigint-friendly. It used to be. When you were doing RF signals,
anybody within range of that RF signal could receive it just as clearly
as the intended recipient. We moved from that to microwaves, and people
figured out a great way to harness that as well. Well, we're moving to
media that are very difficult to get to.</font></font></i>
<p><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Encryption is here and it's going
to grow very rapidly. That is bad news for Sigint ... It is going to take
a huge amount of money invested in new technologies to get access and to
be able to break out the information that we still need to get from Sigint".</font></font></i>
<p><a NAME="Recommend"></a><a NAME="BM__Recommend"></a></dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</ol>
<b><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+3>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Policy issues for the European Parliament</font></font></b>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>1.&nbsp; The 1998 Parliamentary resolution
on "Transatlantic relations/ECHELON system"</font></font><a href="#N_73_">(73)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
called for "protective measures concerning economic information and effective
encryption". Providing such measures may be facilitated by developing an
in-depth understanding of present and future Comint capabilities.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>2.&nbsp; At the technical level, protective
measures may best be focused on defeating hostile Comint activity by denying
access or, where this is impractical or impossible, preventing processing
of message content and associated traffic information by general use of
cryptography.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>3.&nbsp; As the SOGIS group within
the Commission has recognised,</font></font><a href="#N_74_">(74)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
the contrasting interests of states is a complex issue. Larger states have
made substantial investments in Comint capabilities. One member state is
active in the UKUSA alliance, whilst others are either "third parties"
to UKUSA or have made bilateral arrangements with NSA. Some of these arrangements
were a legacy of the cold war; others are enduring. These issues create
internal and international conflicts of interest. Technical solutions are
not obvious. It should be possible to define a shared interest in implementing
measures to defeat future external Comint activities directed against European
states, their citizens and commercial activities.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>4.&nbsp; A second area of apparent
conflict concerns states' desires to provide communications interception
for legitimate law enforcement purposes. The technical and legal processes
involved in providing interception for law enforcement purpose differ fundamentally
from those used in communications intelligence. Partly because of the lack
of parliamentary and public awareness of Comint activities, this distinction
is often glossed over, particularly by states that invest heavily in Comint.
Any failure to distinguish between legitimate law enforcement interception
requirements and interception for clandestine intelligence purposes raises
grave issues for civil liberties. A clear boundary between law enforcement
and "national security" interception activity is essential to the protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>5.&nbsp; At the present time, Internet
browsers and other software used in almost every personal computer in Europe
is deliberately disabled such that "secure" communications they send can,
if collected, be read without difficulty by NSA. US manufacturers are compelled
to make these arrangements under US export rules. A level playing field
is important. Consideration could be given to a countermeasure whereby,
if systems with disabled cryptographic systems are sold outside the United
States, they should be required to conform to an "open standard" such that
third parties and other nations may provide additional applications which
restore the level of security to at least enjoyed by domestic US customers.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>6.&nbsp; The work of ILETS has proceeded
for 6 years without the involvement of parliaments, and in the absence
of consultation with the industrial organisations whose vital interests
their work affects. It is regrettable that, prior to the publication of
this report, public information has not been available in states about
the scope of the policy-making processes, inside and outside the EU, which
have led to the formulation of existing and new law enforcement "user requirements".
As a matter of urgency, the current policy-making process should be made
open to public and parliamentary discussion in member states and in the
EP, so that a proper balance may be struck between the security and privacy
rights of citizens and commercial enterprises, the financial and technical
interests of communications network operators and service providers, and
the need to support law enforcement activities intended to suppress serious
crime and terrorism.</font></font><a NAME="Annexe"></a>
<br>&nbsp;
<ul>
<dir><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+4>Technical annexe</font></font><a NAME="_Toc448565564"></a>
<p><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>Broadband (high capacity multi-channel)
communications</font></font></u></b></dir>
</ul>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>1. From 1950 until the early 1980s, high
capacity multi-channel analogue communications systems were usually engineered
using separate communications channels carried at different frequencies
The combined signal, which could include 2,000 or more speech channels,
was a "multiplex". The resulting "frequency division multiplex" (FDM) signal
was then carried on a much higher frequency, such as by a microwave radio
signal.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>2. Digital communications have almost
universally taken over from analogue methods. The basic system of digital
multi-channel communications is time division multiplexing (TDM). In a
TDM telephony system, the individual conversational channels are first
digitised. Information concerning each channel is then transmitted sequentially
rather than simultaneously, with each link occupying successive time "slots".</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>3. Standards for digital communications
evolved separately within Europe and North America. In the United States,
the then dominant public network carrier (the Bell system, run by AT&T)
established digital data standards. The basic building block, a T-1 link,
carries the equivalent of 24 telephone channels at a rate of 1.544 Mbps.
Higher capacity systems operate at greater data transmission rates Thus,
the highest transmission rate, T-5, carries the equivalent of 8,000 speech
channels at a data rate of 560 Mbps.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>4. Europe adopted a different framework
for digital communications, based on standards originally agreed by the
CEPT. The basic European standard digital link, E-1, carries 30 telephone
channels at a data rate of 2 Mbps. Most European telecommunications systems
are based on E-1 links or (as in North America), multiples thereof. The
distinction is significant because most Comint processing equipment manufactured
in the United States is designed to handle intercepted communications working
to the European forms of digital communications.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>5. Recent digital systems utilise synchronised
signals carried by very high capacity optical fibres. Synchronising signals
enables single channels to be easily extracted from high capacity links.
The new system is known in the US as the synchronous optical network (SONET),
although three equivalent definitions and labels are in use.</font></font><a href="#N_75_">(75)</a><a NAME="_Toc448565565"></a>
<dir>
<dir><b><u><font face="Arial,Helvetica"><font size=+1>Communications intelligence
equipment</font></font></u></b></dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>6. Dozens of US defence contractors, many
located in Silicon Valley (California) or in the Maryland "Beltway" area
near Washington, manufacture sophisticated Sigint equipment for NSA. Major
US corporations, such as Lockheed Martin, Space Systems/Loral, TRW, Raytheon
and Bendix are also contracted by NSA to operate major Sigint collection
sites. A full report on their products and services is beyond the scope
of this study. The state of the art in contemporary communications intelligence
may usefully be demonstrated, however, by examining some of the Comint
processing products of two specialist NSA niche suppliers: Applied Signal
Technology Inc (AST), of Sunnyvale, California, and The IDEAS Operation
of Columbia, Maryland (part of Science Applications International Corporation
(SAIC)).</font></font><a href="#N_76_">(76)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>7. Both companies include senior ex-NSA
staff as directors. When not explicitly stated, their products can be identified
as intended for Sigint by virtue of being "TEMPEST screened". AST states
generally that its "equipment is used for signal reconnaissance of foreign
telecommunications by the United States government". One leading cryptographer
has aptly and and engagingly described AST as a "one-stop ECHELON shop".</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565566"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Wideband
extraction and signal analysis</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>8. Wideband (or broadband) signals are
normally intercepted from satellites or tapped cables in the form of multiplex
microwave or high frequency signals. The first step in processing such
signals for Comint purposes is "wideband extraction". An extensive range
of Sigint equipment is manufactured for this purpose, enabling newly intercepted
systems to be surveyed and analysed. These include transponder survey equipment
which identify and classify satellite downlinks, demodulators, decoders,
demultiplexers, microwave radio link analysers, link survey units, carrier
analysis systems, and many other forms of hardware and software.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>9. A newly intercepted communications
satellite or data link can be analysed using the AST Model 196 "Transponder
characterisation system". Once its basic communications structure has been
analysed, the Model 195 "Wideband snapshot analyser", also known as SNAPPER,
can record sample data from even the highest capacity systems, sufficient
to analyse communications in minute detail. By the start of 1999, operating
in conjunction with the Model 990 "Flexible Data Acquisition Unit", this
systems was able to record, playback and analyse at data rates up to 2.488
Gbps (SONET OC-48). This is 16 times faster than the largest backbone links
in general use on the Internet; larger than the telephony capacity of any
current communications satellite; and equivalent to 40,000 simultaneous
telephone calls. It can be fitted with 48 Gbyte of memory (500-1000 times
larger than found in an average personal computer), enabling relatively
lengthy recordings of high-speed data links. The 2.5 Gbps capacity of a
single SNAPPER unit exceeds the current daily maximum data rate found on
a typical large Internet exchange.</font></font><a href="#N_77_">(77)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>10. Both AST and IDEAS offer a wide
range of recorders, demultiplexers, scanners and processors, mostly designed
to process European type (CEPT) E-1, E-3 (etc) signals at data rates of
up to 160 Mbps. Signals may be recorded to banks of high-speed tape recorders,
or into high capacity "RAID"</font></font><a href="#N_78_">(78)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
hard disk networks. Intercepted optical signals can be examined with the
AST Model 257E "SONET analyser".</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>11. Once communications links have
been analysed and broken down to their constituent parts, the next stage
of Comint collection involves multi-channel processors which extract and
filter messages and signals from the desired channels. There are three
broad categories of interest: "voice grade channels", normally carrying
telephony; fax communications; and analogue data modems. A wide selection
of multi-channel Comint processors are available. Almost all of them separate
voice, fax and data messages into distinct "streams" for downstream processing
and analysis.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>12. The AST Model 120 multi-channel
processor - used by NSA in different configurations known as STARQUAKE,
COBRA and COPPERHEAD - can handle 1,000 simultaneous voice channels and
automatically extract fax, data and voice traffic. Model 128, larger still,
can process 16 European E-3 channels (a data rate of 500 Mbps) and extract
480 channels of interest. The 1999 giant of AST's range, the Model 132
"Voice Channel Demultiplexer", can scan up to 56,700 communications channels,
extracting more than 3,000 voice channels of interest. AST also provides
Sigint equipment to intercept low capacity VSAT</font></font><a href="#N_79_">(79)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
satellite services used by smaller businesses and domestic users. These
systems can be intercepted by the AST Model 285 SCPS processor, which identifies
and extracts up to 48 channels of interest, distinguished between voice,
fax and data.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>13. According to US government publications,
an early Wideband Extraction system was installed at NSA's Vint Hill Farms
field station in 1970, about the time that systematic COMSAT interception
collection began. That station is now closed. US publications identify
the NSA/CSS Regional Sigint Operations Centre at San Antonio, Texas, as
a site currently providing a multi-channel Wideband Extraction service.</font></font>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565567"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Filtering,
data processing, and facsimile analysis</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>14. Once communications channels have
been identified and signals of interest extracted, they are analysed further
by sophisticated workstations using special purpose software. AST's ELVIRA
Signals Analysis Workstation is typical of this type of Sigint equipment.
This system, which can be used on a laptop computer in covert locations,
surveys incoming channels and extracts standard Comint data, including
technical specifications (STRUM) and information about call destinations
(SRI, or signal related information). Selected communications are relayed
to distant locations using NSA standard "Collected Signals Data Format"
(CSDF).</font></font><a href="#N_80_">(80)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>15. High-speed data systems can also
be passed to AST's TRAILMAPPER software system, which works at a data rate
of up to 2.5 Gbps. It can interpret and analyse every type of telecommunications
system, including European, American and optical standards. TRAILMAPPER
appears to have been designed with a view to analysing ATM (asynchronous
transfer mode) communications. ATM is a modern, high-capacity digital communications
system. It is better suited than standard Internet connections to carrying
multimedia traffic and to providing business with private networks (VPN,
LAN or WAN). TRAILMAPPER will identify and characterise such business networks.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>16. In the next stage downstream, intercepted
signals are processed according to whether they are voice, fax or data.
AST's "Data Workstation" is designed to categorise all aspects of data
communications, including systems for handling e-mail or sending files
on the Internet.</font></font><a href="#N_81_">(81)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Although the very latest modem systems (other than ISDN) are not included
in its advertised specification, it is clear from published research that
AST has developed the technology to intercept and process the latest data
communications systems used by individuals and business to access the Internet.</font></font><a href="#N_82_">(82)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The Data Workstation can stored and automatically process 10,000 different
recorded signals.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>17. Fax messages are processed by AST's
Fax Image Workstation. This is described as a "user friendly, interactive
analysis tool for rapid examination images stored on disk. Although not
mentioned in AST's literature, standard fax pre-processing for Dictionary
computers involves automatic "optical character recognition" (OCR) software.
This turns the typescript into computer readable (and processable) text.
The</font><font size=+2> </font><font size=-1>effectiveness of these systems
makes fax-derived Comint an important collection subsystem. It has one
drawback. OCR computer systems that can reliably recognise handwriting
do not exist. No one knows how to design such a system. It follows that,
perversely, hand-written fax messages may be a secure form of communication
that can evade Dictionary surveillance criteria, provided always that the
associated "signal related information" (calling and receiving fax numbers)
have not been recognised as being of interest and directed to a Fax Image
Workstation.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>18. AST also make a "Pager Identification
and Message Extraction" system which automatically collects and processes
data from commercial paging systems. IDEAS offer a Video Teleconferencing
Processor that can simultaneously view or record two simultaneous teleconferencing
sessions. Sigint systems to intercept cellular mobile phone networks such
as GSM are not advertised by AST or IDEAS, but are available from other
US contractors. The specifications and ready availability of such systems
indicate how industrialised and pervasive Comint has became. It has moved
far from the era when (albeit erroneously), it was publicly associated
only with monitoring diplomatic or military messages.</font></font>
<center>
<p><img SRC="trail_orig.jpg" height=650 width=668>
<p><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>&nbsp;NSA "Trailmapper software
showing atomatic detection of private networks inside</font></font></i>
<br><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>intercepted high capacity STM-1
digital communications system</font></font></i></center>

<dir>&nbsp;
<br><a NAME="_Toc448565568"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Traffic
analysis, keyword recognition, text retrieval, and topic analysis</font></font></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>19. Traffic analysis is a method of obtaining
intelligence from signal related information, such as the number dialled
on a telephone call, or the Calling Line Identification Data (CLID) which
identifies the person making the call. Traffic analysis can be used where
message content is not available, for example when encryption is used.
By analysing calling patterns, networks of personal associations may be
analysed and studied. This is a principal method of examining voice communications.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>20. Whenever machine readable communications
are available, keyword recognition is fundamental to Dictionary computers,
and to the ECHELON system. The Dictionary function is straightforward.
Its basic mode of operation is akin to web search engines. The differences
are of substance and of scale. Dictionaries implement the tasking of their
host station against the entire mass of collected communications, and automate
the distribution of selected raw product.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>21. Advanced systems have been developed
to perform very high speed sorting of large volumes of intercepted information.
In the late 1980s, the manufacturers of the RHYOLITE Sigint satellites,
TRW, designed and manufactured a Fast Data Finder (FDF) microchip for NSA.
The FDF chip was declassified in 1972 and made available for commercial
use by a spin-off company, Paracel. Since then Paracel has sold over 150
information filtering systems, many of them to the US government. Paracel
describes its current FDF technology as the "fastest, most accurate adaptive
filtering system in the world":</font></font>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>A single TextFinder application
may involve trillions of bytes of textual archive and thousands of online
users, or gigabytes of live data stream per day that are filtered against
tens of thousands of complex interest profiles ... the TextFinder chip
implements the most comprehensive character-string comparison functions
of any text retrieval system in the world.</font></font></i></dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Devices like this are ideal for use in
ECHELON and the Dictionary system.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>22. A lower capacity system, the PRP-9800
Pattern Recognition Processor, is manufactured by IDEAS. This is a computer
card which can be fitted to a standard PC. It can analyse data streams
at up to 34 Mbps (the European E-3 standard), matching every single bit
to more than 1000 pre-selected patterns.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>23. Powerful though Dictionary methods
and keyword search engines may be, however, they and their giant associated
intelligence databases may soon seem archaic. Topic analysis is a more
powerful and intuitive technique, and one that NSA is developing and promoting
with confidence. Topic analysis enables Comint customers to ask their computers
to "find me documents about subject X". X might be "Shakespeare in love"
or "Arms to Iran".</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>24. In a standard US test used to evaluate
topic analysis systems,</font></font><a href="#N_83_">(83)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
one task the analysis program is given is to find information about "Airbus
subsidies". The traditional approach involves supplying the computer with
the key terms, other relevant data, and synonyms. In this example, the
designations A-300 or A-320 might be synonymous with "Airbus". The disadvantage
of this approach is that it may find irrelevant intelligence (for example,
reports about export subsidies to goods flown on an Airbus) and miss relevant
material (for example a financial analysis of a company in the consortium
which does not mention the Airbus product by name). Topic analysis overcomes
this and is better matched to human intelligence.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>25. The main detectable thrust of NSA
research on topic analysis centres on a method called N-gram analysis.
Developed inside NSA's Research group - responsible for Sigint automation
- N-gram analysis is a fast, general method of sorting and retrieving machine-readable
text according to language and/or topic. The N-gram system is claimed to
work independently of the language used or the topic studied. NSA patented
the method in 1995.</font></font><a href="#N_84_">(84)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>26. To use N-gram analysis, the operator
ignores keywords and defines the enquiry by providing the system with selected
written documents concerning the topic of interest. The system determines
what the topic is from the seed group of documents, and then calculates
the probability that other documents cover the same topic. In 1994, NSA
made its N-gram system available for commercial exploitation. NSA's research
group claimed that it could be used on "very large data sets (millions
of documents)", could be quickly implemented on any computer system and
that it could operate effectively "in text containing a great many errors
(typically 10-15% of all characters)".</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>27. According to former NSA Director
William Studeman, "information management will be the single most important
problem for the (US) Intelligence Community" in the future.</font></font><a href="#N_85_">(85)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
Explaining this point in 1992, he described the type of filtering involved
in systems like ECHELON:</font></font>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>One [unidentified] intelligence
collection system alone can generate a million inputs per half hour; filters
throw away all but 6500 inputs; only 1,000 inputs meet forwarding criteria;
10 inputs are normally selected by analysts and only one report Is produced.
These are routine statistics for a number of intelligence collection and
analysis systems which collect technical intelligence.</font></font></i></dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>

<center><img SRC="data_work_station.jpg" height=419 width=724>
<p><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>The "Data Workstation" Comint software
system analyses up to 10,000 recorded messages,</font></font></i>
<br><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>identifying Internet traffic, e-mail
messages and attachments</font></font></i></center>

<dir>&nbsp;
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565569"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Speech
recognition systems</font></font></b></dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>28. For more than 40 years, NSA, ARPA,
GCHQ and the British government Joint Speech Research Unit have conducted
and sponsored research into speech recognition. Many press reports (and
the previous STOA report) have suggested that such research has provided
systems which can automatically select telephone communications of intelligence
interest based on the use of particular "key words" by a speaker. If available,
such systems would enable vastly more extensive Comint information to be
gathered from telephone conversations than is available from other methods
of analysis. The contention that telephone word-spotting systems are readily
available appears to by supported by the recent availability of a string
of low-cost software products resulting from this research. These products
permit PC users to dictate to their computers instead of entering data
through the keyboard. </font></font><a href="#N_86_">(86)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>29. The problem is that for Comint
applications, unlike personal computer dictation products, speech recognition
systems have to operate in a multi-speaker, multi-language environment
where numerous previously never heard speakers may each feature physiological
differences, dialect variations, and speech traits. Commercial PC systems
usually require one or more hours of training in order reliably to recognise
a single speaker. Even then, such systems may mistranscribe 10% or more
of the words spoken.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>30. In PC dictation applications, the
speaker can correct mistranscriptions and continually retrain the recognition
system, making a moderate error rate acceptable. For use in Comint, where
the interception system has no prior knowledge of what has been said (or
even the language in use), and has to operate in the poorer signal environment
of a telephone speech channel, such error rates are unachievable. Worse
still, even moderate error rates can make a keyword recognition system
worthless by generating both false positive outputs (words wrongly identified
as keywords) and false negative outputs (missing genuine keywords).</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>31. This study has found no evidence
that voice keyword recognition systems are currently operationally deployed,
nor that they are yet sufficiently accurate to be worth using for intelligence
purposes.</font></font>
<dir>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565570"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Continuous
speech recognition</font></font></b></dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>32. The fundamental technique in many
speech recognition applications is a statistical method called Hidden Markov
Modelling (HMM). HMM systems have been developed at many centres and are
claimed academically to offer "good word spotting performance ... using
very little or no acoustic speech training".</font></font><a href="#N_87_">(87)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The team which reported this result tested its system using data from the
US Department of Defense "Switchboard Data", containing recordings of thousand
of different US telephone conversations. On a limited test the probabilities
of correctly detecting the occurrences of 22 keywords ranged from 45-68%
on settings which allowed for 10 false positive results per keyword per
hour. Thus if 1000 genuine keywords appeared during an hour's conversation,
there would be at least 300 missed key words, plus 220 false alarms.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>33. At about the same time, (February
1990), the Canadian Sigint organisation CSE awarded a Montreal-based computer
research consultancy the first of a series of contracts to develop a Comint
wordspotting system.</font></font><a href="#N_88_">(88)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
The goal of the project was to build a word-spotter that worked well even
for noisy calls. Three years later, CRIM reported that "our experience
has taught us that, regardless of the environmental conditions, wordspotting
remains a difficult problem". The key problem, which is familiar to human
listeners, is that a single word heard on its own can easily be misinterpreted,
whereas in continuous speech the meaning may be deduced from surrounding
words. CRIM concluded in 1993 that "it is probable that the most effective
way of building a reliable wordspotter is to build a large vocabulary continuous
speech recognition (CSR) system".</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>34. Continuous speech recognition software
working in real time needs a powerful fast, processor. Because of the lack
of training and the complex signal environment found in intercepted telephone
calls, it is likely that even faster processors and better software than
used in modern PCs would yield poorer results than are now provided by
well-trained commercial systems. Significantly, an underlying problem is
that voice keyword recognition is, as with machine-readable messages, an
imperfect means to the more useful intelligence goal - topic spotting.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>35. In 1993, having failed to build
a workable wordspotter, CRIM suggesting "bypassing" the problem and attempting
instead to develop a voice topic spotter. CRIM reported that "preliminary
experiments reported at a recent meeting of American defense contractors
... indicate that this may in fact be an excellent approach to the problem".
They offered to produce an "operational topic spotting" system by 1995.
They did not succeed. Four years later, they were still experimenting on
how to built a voice topic spotter.</font></font><a href="#N_89_">(89)</a><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>
They received a further research contract. One method CRIM proposed was
NSA's N-gram technique.</font></font>
<dir>
<dir><a NAME="_Toc448565571"></a><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Speaker
identification and other voice message selection techniques</font></font></b></dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>36. In 1993, CRIM also undertook to supply
CSE with an operational speaker identification module by March 1995. Nothing
more was said about this project, suggesting that the target may have been
met. In the same year, according to NSA documents, the IDEAS company supplied
a "Voice Activity Detector and Analyser", Model TE464375-1, to NSA's offices
inside GCHQ Cheltenham. The unit formed the centre of a 14-position computer
driven voice monitoring system. This too may have been an early speaker
identification system.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>37. In 1995, widely quoted reports
suggested that NSA speaker identification had been used to help capture
the drug cartel leader Pablo Escobar. The reports bore strong resemblance
to a novel by Tom Clancy, suggesting that the story may have owed more
to Hollywood than high tech. In 1997, the Canadian CRE awarded a contract
to another researcher to develop "new retrieval algorithms for speech characteristics
used for speaker identification", suggesting this method was not by then
a fully mature technology. According to Sigint staff familiar with the
current use of Dictionary, it can be programmed to search to identify particular
speakers on telephone channels. But speaker identification is still not
a particularly reliablr or effective Comint technique.</font></font><a href="#N_90_">(90)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>38. In the absence of effective wordspotting
or speaker identification techniques, NSA has sought alternative means
of automatically analysing telephone communications. According NSA's classification
guide, other techniques examined include Speech detection - detecting the
presence or absence of speech activity; Speaker discrimination - techniques
to distinguish between the speech of two or more speakers; and Readability
estimation - techniques to determine the quality of speech signals. System
descriptions must be classified "secret" if NSA "determines that they represent
major advances over techniques known in the research community".</font></font><a href="#N_91_">(91)</a><a NAME="_Toc448565572"></a>
<dir>&nbsp;
<br><b><u><font face="Arial"><font size=+1>"Workfactor reduction"; the
subversion of cryptographic systems</font></font></u></b></dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>39. From the 1940s to date, NSA has undermined
the effectiveness of cryptographic systems made or used in Europe. The
most important target of NSA activity was a prominent Swiss manufacturing
company, Crypto AG. Crypto AG established a strong position as a supplier
of code and cypher systems after the second world war. Many governments
would not trust products offered for sale by major powers. In contrast,
Swiss companies in this sector benefited from Switzerland's neutrality
and image of integrity.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>40. NSA arranged to rig encryption
systems sold by Crypto AG, enabling UKUSA agencies to read the coded diplomatic
and military traffic of more than 130 countries. NSA's covert intervention
was arranged through the company's owner and founder Boris Hagelin, and
involved periodic visits to Switzerland by US "consultants" working for
NSA. One was Nora L MacKabee, a career NSA employee. A US newspaper obtained
copies of confidential Crypto AG documents recording Ms Mackebee's attendance
at discussion meetings in 1975 to design a new Crypto AG machine".</font></font><a href="#N_92_">(92)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>41. The purpose of NSA's interventions
were to ensure that while its coding systems should appear secure to other
cryptologists, it was not secure. Each time a machine was used, its users
would select a long numerical key, changed periodically. Naturally users
wished to selected their own keys, unknown to NSA. If Crypto AG's machines
were to appear strong to outside testers, then its coding system should
work, and actually be strong. NSA's solution to this apparent condundrum
was to design the machine so that it broadcast the key it was using to
listeners. To prevent other listeners recognising what was happening, the
key too had also to be sent in code - a different code, known only to NSA.
Thus, every time NSA or GCHQ intercepted a message sent using these machines,
they would first read their own coded part of the message, called the "hilfsinformationen"
(help information field) and extract the key the target was using. They
could then read the message itself as fast or even faster than the intended
recipient</font></font><a href="#N_93_">(93)</a>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>42. The same technique was re-used
in 1995, when NSA became concerned about cryptographic security systems
being built into Internet and E-mail software by Microsoft, Netscape and
Lotus. The companies agreed to adapt their software to reduce the level
of security provided to users outside the United States. In the case of
Lotus Notes, which includes a secure e-mail system, the built-in cryptographic
system uses a 64 bit encryption key. This provides a medium level of security,
which might at present only be broken by NSA in months or years.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>43. Lotus built in an NSA "help information"
trapdoor to its Notes system, as the Swedish government discovered to its
embarrassment in 1997. By then, the system was in daily use for confidential
mail by Swedish MPs, 15,000 tax agency staff and 400,000 to 500,000 citizens.
Lotus Notes incorporates a "workfactor reduction field" (WRF) into all
e-mails sent by non US users of the system. Like its predecessor the Crypto
AG "help information field" this device reduces NSA's difficulty in reading
European and other e-mail from an almost intractable problem to a few seconds
work. The WRF broadcasts 24 of the 64 bits of the key used for each communication.
The WRF is encoded, using a "public key" system which can only be read
by NSA. Lotus, a subsidiary of IBM, admits this. The company told Svenska
Dagbladet:</font></font>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<dir><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>"The difference between the American
Notes version and the export version lies in degrees of encryption. We
deliver 64 bit keys to all customers, but 24 bits of those in the version
that we deliver outside of the United States are deposited with the American
government".</font></font><a href="#N_94_">(94)</a></i></dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
<font face="Arial"><font size=-1>44. Similar arrangements are built into
all export versions of the web "browsers" manufactured by Microsoft and
Netscape. Each uses a standard 128 bit key. In the export version, this
key is not reduced in length. Instead, 88 bits of the key are broadcast
with each message; 40 bits remain secret. It follows that almost every
computer in Europe has, as a built-in standard feature, an NSA workfactor
reduction system to enable NSA (alone) to break the user's code and read
secure messages.</font></font>
<p><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>45. The use of powerful and effective
encryption systems will increasingly restrict the ability of Comint agencies
to process collected intelligence. "Moore's law" asserts that the cost
of computational power halves every 18 months. This affects both the agencies
and their targets. Cheap PCs can now efficiently perform complex mathematical
calculations need for effective cryptography. In the absence of new discoveries
in physics or mathematics Moore's law favours codemakers, not codebreakers.</font></font>
<br>&nbsp;
<br>&nbsp;
<dir>
<dir>
<dir>
<center><img SRC="line1.gif" height=6 width=548>
<p><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Illustrations : D Campbell; US Air
Force; IPTV Ltd; Stephen King; Charles V Pick; IPTV Ltd;</font></font></i>
<br><i><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Jim Bamford, GCHQ; US Navy; KGB/Russian
Security Service; D Campbell.</font></font></i>
<p><img SRC="line1.gif" height=6 width=548></center>

<dir>
<dir><a NAME="Glossary"></a>
<p><b><i><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+3>Glossary and definitions</font></font></i></b>
<br>&nbsp;</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>
</dir>

<table BORDER=0 CELLSPACING=2 CELLPADDING=7 WIDTH="955" >
<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ATM</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Asynchronous
Transfer Mode; a high speed form of digital communications increasingly
used for on the Internet</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>BND</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Bundesachrichtendienst;
the foreign intelligence agency of the Federal Republic of Germany. Its
functions include Sigint</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CCITT</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Consultative
Committee for International Telephony and Telegraphy; United Nations agency
developing standards and protocols for telecommunications; part of the
ITU; also known as ITU-T</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CEPT</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Conference
Europeene des Postes et des Telecommunications</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CLID</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Calling Line
Identification Data</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Comint</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Comint Communications
Intelligence</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>COMSAT</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>(Civil or commercial)
communications satellite; for military communications usage, the phraseology
is commonly reversed, i.e., SATCOM.</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CRIM</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CRIM Centre
de Recherche Informatique de Montreal</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CSDF</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CSDF Collected
Signals Data Format; a term used only in Sigint</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CSE</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CSE Communications
Security Establishment, the Sigint agency of Canada</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CSS</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>CSS Central
Security Service; the military component of NSA</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>DARPA</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>DARPA Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (United States Department of Defense)</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>DGSE</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Directorate
General de Securite Exteriere, the foreign intelligence agency of France.
Its functions include Sigint</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>DSD</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>DSD Defence
Signals Directorate, the Sigint agency of the Commonwealth of Australia</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>DODJOCC</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>DODJOCC Department
of Defense Joint Operations Centre Chicksands</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>E1, E3 (etc)</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Standard for
digital or TDM communications systems defined by the CEPT, and primarily
used within Europe and outside North America</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ENFOPOL</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>EU designation
for documents concerned with law enforcement matters/police</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FAPSI</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Federalnoe
Agenstvo Pravitelstvennoi Svyazi i Informatsii, the Federal Agency for
Government Communications and Information of Russia. Its functions include
Sigint</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FBI</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FBI Federal
Bureau of Investigation; the national law enforcement and counter-intelligence
agency of the United States</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FDF</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FDF Fast Data
Finder</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FDM</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FDM Frequency
Division Multiplex; a form of multi-channel communications based on analogue
signals</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FISA</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FISA Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (United States)</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FISINT</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>FISINT Foreign
Instrumentation Signals Intelligence, the third branch of Sigint</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Gbps</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Gigabits per
second</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>GCHQ</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>GCHQ Government
Communications Headquarters; the Sigint agency of the United Kingdom</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>GHz</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>GigaHertz</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Gisting</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Within Sigint,
the analytical task of replacing a verbatim text with the sense or main
points of a communication</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>HDLC</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>HDLC High-level
Data Link Control</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>HF</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>HF High Frequency;
frequencies from 3MHz to 30MHz</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>HMM</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>HMM Hidden
Markov Modelling, a technique widely used in speech recognition systems.</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ILETS</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ILETS International
Law Enforcement Telecommunications Seminar</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Intelsat</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>International
Telecommunications Satellite</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>IOSA</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>IOSA Interim
Overhead Sigint Architecture</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Iridium</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Satellite Personal
Communications System involving 66 satellites in low earth orbit, providing
global communications from mobile telephones</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ISDN</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ISDN Integrated
Services Data Network</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ISP</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ISP Internet
Service Provider</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ITU</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>ITU International
Telecommunications Union</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>IUR</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>IUR International
User Requirements (for communications interception); IUR 1.0 was prepared
by ILETS (qv) in 1994</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>IXP</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>IXP Internet
Exchange Point</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>LAN</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>LAN Local Area
Network</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>LES</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>LEA Law Enforcement
Agency (American usage)</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Mbps</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Megabits per
second</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>MHz</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>MegaHertz</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Microwave</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Radio signals
with wavelengths of 10cm or shorter; frequencies above 1GHz</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Modem</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Modem Device
for sending data to and from (e.g.) a computer; a "modulator-demodulator)</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>MIME</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>MIME Multipurpose
Internet Message Extension; a systems used for sending computer files,
images, documents and programs as "attachments" to an e-mail message</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>&nbsp;N-gram
analysis</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>A system for
analysing textual documents; in this context, a system for matching a large
group of documents to a smaller group embodying a topic of interest. The
method depends on counting the frequency with which character groups of
length N appear in each document; hence N-gram</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>NSA</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>NSA National
Security Agency, the Sigint agency of the United States</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>OCR</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Optical Character
Recognition</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>PC</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Personal Computer</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>PCS</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Personal Communications
Systems; the term includes mobile telephone systems, paging systems and
future wide area radio data links for personal computers, etc</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>POP/ POP3</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Post Office
Program; a system used for receiving and holding e-mail</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>PTT</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Posts Telegraph
and Telephone (Administration or Authority)</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>RAID</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Redundant Array
of Inexpensive Disks</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SCI</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Sensitive Compartmented
Intelligence; used to limit access to Comint information according to "compartments"</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SCPC</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Single Channel
Per Carrier; low capacity satellite communications system</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SMTP</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Standard Mail
Transport Protocol</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Sigint</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Signals Intelligence</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SONET</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Synchronous
Optical Network</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SMDS</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Switched Multi-Megabit
Data Service</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SMO</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Support for
Military Operations</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SPCS</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Satellite Personal
Communications Systems</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>SRI</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Signal Related
Information; a term used only in Sigint</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>STOA</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Science and
Technology Assessments Office of the European Parliament; the body commissioning
this report</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>T1,T3 (etc)</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Digital or
TDM communications systems originally defined by the Bell telephone system
in North America, and primarily used there</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>TCP/IP</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Terminal Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>TDM</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Time Division
Muliplex; a form of multi-channel communications normally based on digital
signals</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Traffic
analysis</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Within Sigint,
a method of analysing and obtaining intelligence from messages without
reference to their content; for example by studying the origin and destination
of messages with a view to eliciting the relationship between sender and
recipient, or groups thereof</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>UKUSA</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>UK-USA agreement</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>VPN</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Virtual Private
Network</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>VSAT</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Very Small
Aperture Terminal; low capacity satellite communications system serving
home and business users</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>WAN</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Wide Area Network</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>WRF</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>Workfactor
Reduction Field</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><b><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>WWW</font></font></b></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>World Wide
Web</font></font></td>
</tr>

<tr>
<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="12%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>&nbsp;</font></font></td>

<td VALIGN=TOP WIDTH="88%"><font face="Arial"><font size=-1>X.25, V.21,
V.34, V.90, V.100 (etc) are CCITT telecommunications standards</font></font></td>
</tr>
</table>

<dir>
<dir>
<dir>&nbsp;</dir>
<a NAME="Notes"></a><b><i><font face="Comic Sans MS"><font size=+3>Notes</font></font></i></b></dir>
</dir>
<a NAME="N_1_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>1.UKUSA
refers to the 1947 United Kingdom - United States agreement on Signals
intelligence. The nations of the UKUSA alliance are the United States (the
"First Party"), United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (the
"Second Parties").</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_2_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>2."An
appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control", Steve Wright, Omega
Foundation, European Parliament (STOA), 6 January 1998.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_3_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>3."They've
got it taped", Duncan Campbell, New Statesman, 12 August 1988. "Secret
Power : New Zealand's Role in the International Spy Network", Nicky Hager,
Craig Potton Publishing, PO Box 555, Nelson, New Zealand, 1996.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_4_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>4.National
Security Council Intelligence Directive No 6, National Security Council
of the United States, 17 February 1972 (first issued in 1952).</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_5_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>5.SIGINT
is currently defined as consisting of COMINT, ELINT (electronic or non-communications
intelligence and FISINT (Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence).</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_6_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>6.Statement
by Martin Brady, Director of DSD, 16 March 1999. To be broadcast on the
Sunday Programme, Channel 9 TV (Australia), May 1999.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_7_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>7."Farewell",
despatch to all NSA staff, William Studeman, 8 April 1992. The two business
areas to which Studeman referred were "increased global access" and "SMO"
(support to military operations).</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_8_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>8.<i>Federalnoe
Agenstvo Pravitelstvennoi Svyazi i Informatsii</i>, the (Russian) Federal
Agency for Government Communications and Information. FAPSI's functions
extend beyond Comint and include providing government and commercial communications
systems.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_9_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>9.Private
communications from former NSA and GCHQ employees.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_10_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>10.Sensitive
Compartmented Intelligence.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_11_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>11.See
note 1.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_12_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>12.
Private communications from former GCHQ employees; the US Act is the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_13_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>13.
See note 6.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_14_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>14.
In 1919, US commercial cable companies attempted to resist British government
demands for access to all cables sent overseas. Three cable companies testified
to the US Senate about these practices in December 1920. In the same year,
the British Government introduced legislation (the Official Secrets Act,
1920, section 4) providing access to all or any specified class of communications.
The same power was recodified in 1985, providing lawful access for Comint
purposes to all "external communications", defines as any communications
which are sent from or received outside the UK (Interception of Communication
Act 1984, Section 3(2)). Similar requirements on telecommunications operators
are made in the laws of the other UKUSA countries. See also "Operation
SHAMROCK", (section 3).</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_15_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>15."The
Puzzle Palace", James Bamford, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1982, p331.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_16_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>16.Personal
communications from former NSA and GCHQ employees.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_17_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>17."Dispatches
: The Hill", transmitted by Channel 4 Television (UK), 6 October 1993.
DODJOCC stood for Department of Defense Joint Operations Centre Chicksands.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_18_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>18."The
Justice Game", Geoffrey Robertson, Chapter 5, Chatto and Windus, London,
1998</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_19_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>19.Fink
report to the House Committee on Government Operations, 1975, quoted in
"NSA spies on the British government", New Statesman, 25 July 1980</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_20_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>20."Amerikanskiye
sputniki radioelektronnoy razvedki na Geosynchronnykh orbitakh" ("American
Geosynchronous SIGINT Satellites"), Major A Andronov, Zarubezhnoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye, No.12, 1993, pps 37-43.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_21_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>21."Space
collection", in The US Intelligence Community (fourth edition), Jeffrey
Richelson, Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1999, pages 185-191.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_22_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>22.See
note 18.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_23_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>23.Richelson,
op cit.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_24_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>24."UK
Eyes Alpha", Mark Urban, Faber and Faber, London, 1996, pps 56-65.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_25_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>25.Besides
the stations mentioned, a major ground station whose targets formerly included
Soviet COMSATs is at Misawa, Japan. Smaller ground stations are located
at Cheltenham, England; Shoal Bay, Australia.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_26_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>26."Sword
and Shield : The Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus", Jeffrey Richelson,
Ballinger, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_27_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>27."Les
Francais aussi ecountent leurs allies", Jean Guisnel, Le Point, 6 June
1998.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_28_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>28.Intelligence
(Paris), 93, 15 February 1999, p3.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_29_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>29."Blind
mans Bluff : the untold story of American submarine espionage", Sherry
Sontag and Christopher Drew, Public Affairs, New York, 1998.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_30_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>30.Ibid.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_31_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>31.Ibid</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_32_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>32.A
specimen of the IVY BELLS tapping equipment is held in the former KGB museum
in Moscow. It was used on a cable running from Moscow to a nearby scientific
and technical institution.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_33_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>33.TCP/IP.
TCP/IP stands for Terminal Control Protocol/Internet Protocol. IP is the
basic network layer of the Internet.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_34_"></a><font size=-1><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF">34.GCHQ
website at </font></font><a href="http://www.gchq.gov.uk/technol.html">http://www.gchq.gov.uk/technol.html</a></font>
<p><a NAME="N_35_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>35.Personal
communication from DERA. A Terabyte is one thousand Gigabytes, i.e., 1012
bytes.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_36_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>36.Personal
communication from John Young.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_37_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>37."Puzzle
palace conducting internet surveillance", Wayne Madsen, Computer Fraud
and Security Bulletin, June 1995.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_38_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>38.Ibid.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_39_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>39."More
Naked Gun than Top Gun", Duncan Campbell, Guardian, 26 November 1997.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_40_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>40."Spyworld",
Mike Frost and Michel Gratton, Doubleday Canada, Toronto, 1994.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_41_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>41.The
National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights, Hearings before the
Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activitities, US Senate, Washington, 1976.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_42_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>42.Letter
from, Lt Gen Lew Allen, Director of NSA to US Attorney General Elliot Richardson,
4 October 1973; contained in the previous document.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_43_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>43.Private
communication.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_44_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>44.World
in Action, Granada TV.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_45_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>45.This
arrangements appears to be an attempt to comply with legal restrictions
in the Interception of Communications Act 1985, which prohibit GCHQ from
handling messages except those identified in government "certificates"
which "describe the intercepted material which should be examined". The
Act specifies that "so much of the intercepted material as is not certified
by the certificate is not [to be] read, looked at or listened to by any
person". It appears from this that, although all messages passing through
the United Kingdom are intercepted and sent to GCHQ's London office, the
organisation considers that by having British Telecom staff operate the
Dictionary computer, it is still under the control of the telecommunications
network operator unless and until it is selected by the Dictionary and
passes from BT to GCHQ.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_46_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>46.Private
communications.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_47_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>47."Naval
Security Group Detachment, Sugar Grove History for 1990", US Navy, 1 April
1991.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_48_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>48.Missions,
functions and tasks of Naval Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT) Sugar
Grove, West Virginia", NAVSECGRU INSTRUCTION C5450.48A, 3 September 1991.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_49_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>49.Report
on tasks of Detachment 3 , 544 Air Intelligence Group, Air Intelligence
Agency Almanac, US Air Force, 1998-99.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_50_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>50.Ibid,
Detachment 2, 544 Air Intelligence Group.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_51_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>51.Information
obtained by Bill Robinson, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario. CDF
and CFS documents were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, or
published on the World Wide Web.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_52_"></a><font size=-1><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF">52.Career
resume of Patrick D Duguay, published at: </font></font><a href="http://home.istar.ca/~pdduguay/resume.htm">http://home.istar.ca/~pdduguay/resume.htm</a></font>
<p><a NAME="N_53_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>53.CSE
Financial Status Report, 1 March 1996, released under the Freedom of Information
Act. Further details about "ECHELON" were not provided. It is therefore
ambiguous as to whether the expenditure was intended for the ECHELON computer
system, or for different functions (for example telecommunications or power
services).</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_54_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>54."Secret
Power", op cit.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_55_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>55.Twenty/Twenty,
TV3 (New Zealand), October 1999.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_56_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>56.Interview
with David Herson, Head of Senior Officers' Group on Information Security,
EU, by staff of Engineering Weekly (Denmark), 25 September 1996. Published
at <u>http://www.ing.dk/arkiv/herson.htm</u></font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_57_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>57.Council
Resolution on the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications, 17 January
1995, (96C_329/01)</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_58_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>58."International
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Legal Interception of Telecommunications",
Resolution 1115, Tenth Plenary meeting of the ITU Council, Geneva, 27 June
1997.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_59_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>59.ENFOPOL
98, Draft Resolution of the Council on Telecommunications Interception
in respect of New Technology. Submitted by the Austrian Presidency. Brussels,
3 September 1998.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_60_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>60.ENFOPOL
19, 13 March 1999.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_61_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>61.European
Parliament, 14 September 1998.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_62_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>62."Uncle
Sam's Eavesdroppers", Close Up North, BBC North, 3 December 1998; reported
in "Star Wars strikes back", Guardian, 3 December 1998</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_63_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>63."Dispatches
: The Hill", Channel 4 Television (UK), 6 October 1993</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_64_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>64.Ibid.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_65_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>65."Mixing
business with spying; secret information is passed routinely to U.S.",
Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, 1 November 1996.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_66_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>66."UK
Eyes Alpha", op cit, p235.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_67_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>67.Private
communication.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_68_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>68.See
note 62.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_69_"></a><font size=-1><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF">69.Raytheon
Corp press release: published at: </font></font><a href="http://www.raytheon.com/sivam/contract.html">http://www.raytheon.com/sivam/contract.html</a></font>
<p><a NAME="N_70_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>70."America's
Fortress of Spies", Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, Baltimore Sun 3 December
1995.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_71_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>71."Company
Spies", Robert Dreyfuss, Mother Jones, May/June 1994.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_72_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>72.Financial
Post, Canada, 28 February 1998.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_73_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>73.European
Parliament, 16 September 1998.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_74_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>74.See
note 56.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_75_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>75.Equivalent
communications may be known as Synchronous Transport Module (STM) signals
within the Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (ITU standard); Synchronous Transport
Signals (STS) within the US SONET system; or as Optical Carrier signals
(OC).</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_76_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>76.The
information about these Sigint systems has been drawn from open sources
(only).</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_77_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>77.In
April 199, the peak data rate at MAE West was less than 1.9 Gbps.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_78_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>78.Redundant
Arrays of Inexpensive Disks.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_79_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>79.Very
Small Aperture Terminal; SCPC is Single Channel Per Carrier.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_80_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>80."Collected
Signals Data Format"; defined in US Signals Intelligence Directive 126
and in NSA's CSDF manual. Two associated NSA publications providing further
guidance are the Voice Processing Systems Data Element Dictionary and the
Facsimile Data Element Dictionary, both issued in March 1997.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_81_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>81.The
Data Workstation processes TCP/IP, PP, SMTP, POP3, MIME, HDLC, X.25, V.100,
and modem protocols up to and including V.42 (see glossary).</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_82_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>82."Practical
Blind Demodulators for high-order QAM signals", J R Treichler, M G Larimore
and J C Harp, Proc IEEE, 86, 10, 1998, p1907. Mr Treichler is technical
director of AST. The paper describes a system used to intercept multiple
V.34 signals, extendable to the more recent protocols.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_83_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>83.The
tasks were set in the second Text Retrieval conference(TREC) organised
by the ARPA and the US National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST),
Gaithersburg, Maryland. The 7th annual TREC conference took place in Maryland
in 1999.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_84_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>84."Method
of retrieving documents that concern the same topic"; US Patent number
5418951, issued 23 May 1995; inventor, Marc Damashek; rights assigned to
NSA.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_85_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>85.Address
to the Symposium on "National Security and National Competitiveness : Open
Source Solutions" by Vice Admiral William Studeman, Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence and former director of NSA, 1 December 1992, McLean,
Virginia.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_86_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>86.For
example, IBM Via Voice, Dragon Naturally Speaking, Lemout and Hauspe Voice
Xpress.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_87_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>87."A
Hidden Markov Model based keyword recognition system", R.C.Rose and D.B.Paul,
Proceedings of the International Conference on Accoustics, Speech and Signal
processing, April 1990.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_88_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>88.Centre
de Recherche Informatique de Montreal.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_89_"></a><font size=-1><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF">89."Projet
detection des Themes", CRIM, 1997; published at </font></font><a href="http://www.crim.ca/adi/projet2.html">http://www.crim.ca/adi/projet2.html</a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF">.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_90_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>90.Private
communication.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_91_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>91.NSA/CSS
Classification Guide, NSA, revised 1 April 1983.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_92_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>92."Rigging
the game: Spy Sting", Tom Bowman, Scott Shane, Baltimore Sun, 10 December
1995.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_93_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>93."Wer
ist der Befugte Vierte?", Der Spiegel, 36, 1996, pp. 206-7.</font></font></font>
<p><a NAME="N_94_"></a><font face="Arial"><font color="#0000FF"><font size=-1>94."Secret
Swedish E-Mail Can Be Read by the U.S.A", Fredrik Laurin, Calle Froste,
Svenska Dagbladet, 18 November 1997.</font></font></font>
</body>
</html>
Login or Register to add favorites

File Archive:

March 2024

  • Su
  • Mo
  • Tu
  • We
  • Th
  • Fr
  • Sa
  • 1
    Mar 1st
    16 Files
  • 2
    Mar 2nd
    0 Files
  • 3
    Mar 3rd
    0 Files
  • 4
    Mar 4th
    32 Files
  • 5
    Mar 5th
    28 Files
  • 6
    Mar 6th
    42 Files
  • 7
    Mar 7th
    17 Files
  • 8
    Mar 8th
    13 Files
  • 9
    Mar 9th
    0 Files
  • 10
    Mar 10th
    0 Files
  • 11
    Mar 11th
    15 Files
  • 12
    Mar 12th
    19 Files
  • 13
    Mar 13th
    21 Files
  • 14
    Mar 14th
    38 Files
  • 15
    Mar 15th
    15 Files
  • 16
    Mar 16th
    0 Files
  • 17
    Mar 17th
    0 Files
  • 18
    Mar 18th
    10 Files
  • 19
    Mar 19th
    32 Files
  • 20
    Mar 20th
    46 Files
  • 21
    Mar 21st
    16 Files
  • 22
    Mar 22nd
    13 Files
  • 23
    Mar 23rd
    0 Files
  • 24
    Mar 24th
    0 Files
  • 25
    Mar 25th
    12 Files
  • 26
    Mar 26th
    31 Files
  • 27
    Mar 27th
    19 Files
  • 28
    Mar 28th
    0 Files
  • 29
    Mar 29th
    0 Files
  • 30
    Mar 30th
    0 Files
  • 31
    Mar 31st
    0 Files

Top Authors In Last 30 Days

File Tags

Systems

packet storm

© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.

Services
Security Services
Hosting By
Rokasec
close