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fedcirc.98.21.txt

fedcirc.98.21.txt
Posted Sep 23, 1999

fedcirc.98.21.txt

SHA-256 | f24c0d5f4df097ba576227761651fed30f01d978caed09fbf73b3ce8965ab259

fedcirc.98.21.txt

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A D V I S O R Y

FA-98.21
******************************************************************************
Topic: SGI Vulnerabilities
Source: CIAC

Creation Date: March 13, 1998
Last Updated:

To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, FedCIRC
is forwarding the following information from CIAC bulletin I-035.
FedCIRC urges you to act on this information as soon as possible.

If you have any questions, please contact FedCIRC:

Telephone: +1 888 282 0870
Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov



=======================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================

[ For Public Release ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

__________________________________________________________

The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________

INFORMATION BULLETIN

SGI Vulnerabilities
(startmidi/stopmidi, datman/cdman, cdplayer)

March 13, 1998 21:00 GMT Number I-035
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: SGI has found vulnerabilities in the following programs,
startmidi/stopmidi(1), datman/cdman(1), and cdplayer(1).
PLATFORM: Digital Media Tools on IRIX 5.X and IRIX 6.X
DAMAGE: If exploited, local and remote users may cause a buffer overrun
Condition which could lead to executing commands with root
privileges.
SOLUTION: Apply patches or change permissions of the vulnerable programs.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY These vulnerabilities has been publically discussed in Usenet
ASSESSMENT: newsgroups and mailing lists and also reported in AUSCERT
AA-96.11, AA-96.20 and AA-97.05. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED that
these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems.
______________________________________________________________________________

[ Start Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ]

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

Title: startmidi/stopmidi, datman/cdman, cdplayer Vulnerabilities
Title: AUSCERT AA-96.11, AUSCERT AA-96.20 and AUSCERT AA-97.05
Number: 19980301-01-PX
Date: March 11, 1998
______________________________________________________________________________

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________

- ------------------------
- ---- Issue Specifics ---
- ------------------------

Under normal operation, the IRIS Digital Media Execution Environment and
related subsystems provide software to support Silicon Graphic's Multimedia
(audio, MIDI, video, compression and movie) hardware.

Unfortunately, several buffer overruns which could allow arbitrary
commands to be run as the privileged user root have been discovered in the
following Digital Media Tools: startmidi/stopmidi(1), datman/cdman(1),
cdplayer(1) and the CDROM Confidence Test program.

Respectfully, the startmidi/stopmidi(1) programs control the MIDI
daemon, the datman/cdman(1) programs control audio CD and DAT tape
operations, the cdplayer(1) program plays audio CDs on a CD-ROM drive,
and the CDROM Confidence Test tool verifies the CDROM is working properly.

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. This issue will
be corrected in future releases of IRIX.



- ---------------
- ---- Impact ---
- ---------------

The IRIS Digital Media Execution software and related subsystems and are
loaded by default on all IRIX systems. The Digital Media Tools on
IRIX 5.X and IRIX 6.X are vulnerable to these buffer overflows.

With a local account, these buffer overrun vulnerabilities can be exploited
locally and remotely.

These buffer overrun vulnerabilities can be utilized to execute commands with
root privileges.

These vulnerabilities has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups
and mailing lists and also reported in AUSCERT AA-96.11, AA-96.20 and AA-97.05



- ---------------------------
- ---- Temporary Solution ---
- ---------------------------

Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.

The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerabilities by changing
the permissions of the vulnerable programs.



1) Become the root user on the system.

% /bin/su -
Password:
#

2) Change the permissions on the vulnerable programs.

On All IRIX Releases
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/datman
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/Confidence/cdrom

On IRIX 5.3 Only
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/startmidi

On IRIX 5.3 and IRIX 6.2
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/bin/X11/cdplayer

On IRIX 6.3 and IRIX 6.4
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/datplayer
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/bin/X11/cdheadphone


************
*** NOTE ***
************

Removing the permissions from the vulnerable programs will
prevent non-root users from using the vulnerable programs.


3) Return to previous level.

# exit
$



- -----------------
- ---- Solution ---
- -----------------

OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------

IRIX 3.x no
IRIX 4.x no
IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.3 yes 2563
IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.2 yes 2564
IRIX 6.3 yes 2565
IRIX 6.4 yes 2291


NOTES

1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section.



Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.

The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.



##### Patch File Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:

Filename: README.patch.2563
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64246 9 README.patch.2563
Algorithm #2 (sum): 3508 9 README.patch.2563
MD5 checksum: 38FE820C54053677D87F66EC1E14CD38

Filename: patchSG0002563
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33633 3 patchSG0002563
Algorithm #2 (sum): 44339 3 patchSG0002563
MD5 checksum: 23E2FD7D5C7762F4D2B7DB43D2F4DC0B

Filename: patchSG0002563.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33441 97 patchSG0002563.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 19666 97 patchSG0002563.desktop_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: ED3403B0CFF39C22236493F6F27D35EA

Filename: patchSG0002563.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15897 12 patchSG0002563.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 21619 12 patchSG0002563.dmedia_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 8FA8DBB16A50BADC6C30539FB4F781A5

Filename: patchSG0002563.dmedia_tools_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32937 782 patchSG0002563.dmedia_tools_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 26674 782 patchSG0002563.dmedia_tools_sw
MD5 checksum: 4B7568DE78B07ED50EE41C6D0804030A

Filename: patchSG0002563.eoe2_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 58928 139 patchSG0002563.eoe2_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 64284 139 patchSG0002563.eoe2_sw
MD5 checksum: 0E8DC3A5F5716440E065F7EA45D663B9

Filename: patchSG0002563.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 57817 2 patchSG0002563.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 17902 2 patchSG0002563.idb
MD5 checksum: 962FB5E6BA16F8AB0F8B6A016D59184E

Filename: README.patch.2564
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 34028 9 README.patch.2564
Algorithm #2 (sum): 242 9 README.patch.2564
MD5 checksum: E4674E474941BE71057588CACDE10DDB

Filename: patchSG0002564
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 28664 5 patchSG0002564
Algorithm #2 (sum): 53837 5 patchSG0002564
MD5 checksum: D095BCF415F25208A3E7A6DF632B1D68

Filename: patchSG0002564.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15389 595 patchSG0002564.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 21291 595 patchSG0002564.desktop_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 159A78FE9A7D9ECF30AC0467CCAADF6C

Filename: patchSG0002564.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 46712 750 patchSG0002564.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 30765 750 patchSG0002564.dmedia_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: AB34E9C0C1865778ADE576D2E2AFF75A

Filename: patchSG0002564.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40819 252 patchSG0002564.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 57504 252 patchSG0002564.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: C00F91E8CCC468693D6B0B500E7D6C03

Filename: patchSG0002564.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64183 8 patchSG0002564.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 16316 8 patchSG0002564.idb
MD5 checksum: EF9810A1C10E06CDE22B2BB88202D3DD

Filename: README.patch.2565
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 31164 14 README.patch.2565
Algorithm #2 (sum): 34494 14 README.patch.2565
MD5 checksum: FC8A8F31517252DBE11DF961E60E1A0D

Filename: patchSG0002565
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 48368 7 patchSG0002565
Algorithm #2 (sum): 52893 7 patchSG0002565
MD5 checksum: 40B36A34F28FFBE7E356D1FA581DE39E

Filename: patchSG0002565.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 56716 46 patchSG0002565.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 1798 46 patchSG0002565.desktop_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: C0975BFFCCA459F4E4DD65DDBC1EFAFC

Filename: patchSG0002565.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 27513 4688 patchSG0002565.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 35889 4688 patchSG0002565.dmedia_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: DD8F49EDD0226A4CF673CA5E2397DE3A

Filename: patchSG0002565.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39776 228 patchSG0002565.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 27743 228 patchSG0002565.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: FF3A4E5544CB78AEBACF3DD40914BB1A

Filename: patchSG0002565.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05831 9 patchSG0002565.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 41323 9 patchSG0002565.idb
MD5 checksum: 85C7411466FF2A833781C4DC6B7AD468

Filename: patchSG0002565.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05151 24 patchSG0002565.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 53754 24 patchSG0002565.sysadmdesktop_sw
MD5 checksum: 139B633A63728FF57FF6A902747299C0

Filename: README.patch.2291
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40374 33 README.patch.2291
Algorithm #2 (sum): 40054 33 README.patch.2291
MD5 checksum: F69F5CC8EF70F444979050DF2D0C62B9

Filename: patchSG0002291
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45762 16 patchSG0002291
Algorithm #2 (sum): 15350 16 patchSG0002291
MD5 checksum: A9D31B4EADE732390C0FEC20FD8E2D44

Filename: patchSG0002291.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00837 48 patchSG0002291.desktop_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 14894 48 patchSG0002291.desktop_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 9AF97B0870ECF0AA2C55BD0E7F229BE0

Filename: patchSG0002291.dmedia_dev_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 26486 51 patchSG0002291.dmedia_dev_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 26722 51 patchSG0002291.dmedia_dev_man
MD5 checksum: 700D287F5A02173EFD68B34E7434AF68

Filename: patchSG0002291.dmedia_dev_src
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32452 201 patchSG0002291.dmedia_dev_src
Algorithm #2 (sum): 62658 201 patchSG0002291.dmedia_dev_src
MD5 checksum: DC371E55D70A262B06BB9E42CACA44C5

Filename: patchSG0002291.dmedia_dev_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64921 4977 patchSG0002291.dmedia_dev_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 39316 4977 patchSG0002291.dmedia_dev_sw
MD5 checksum: E7C89E694135D13C4C5A2CA8CF984978

Filename: patchSG0002291.dmedia_eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 49711 154 patchSG0002291.dmedia_eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 24512 154 patchSG0002291.dmedia_eoe_man
MD5 checksum: A9C551DA77F45B0D12549B3DAC9AD6C3

Filename: patchSG0002291.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05209 12929 patchSG0002291.dmedia_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 28248 12929 patchSG0002291.dmedia_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: D4FD84A8D6796786086756693B6D5EBB

Filename: patchSG0002291.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 09998 227 patchSG0002291.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22889 227 patchSG0002291.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 25A84D429953AE8AD5E74890173F0EEE

Filename: patchSG0002291.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 21588 43 patchSG0002291.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 52171 43 patchSG0002291.idb
MD5 checksum: 5A0EF5DC304866D2C8FFB26F8A762868

Filename: patchSG0002291.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 13267 27 patchSG0002291.sysadmdesktop_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 54771 27 patchSG0002291.sysadmdesktop_sw
MD5 checksum: A941345B943078F98B77E64AC2E86618



- -------------------------
- ---- Acknowledgments ---
- -------------------------

Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT and the Internet community
for their assistance in this matter.





- ------------------------------------------------------------
- ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- ------------------------------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.

------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.

------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.

% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d

In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.


------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.

------oOo------

For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.


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[ End Silicon Graphics Inc. Advisory ]

______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphics Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________


CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
(or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
(or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)

CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.

Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:

E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name
e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin

You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the
instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure
you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question.

If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)

I-025A: Windows NT based Web Servers File Access Vulnerability
I-026: Vulnerability in ssh-agent
I-027B: HP-UX Vulnerabilities (CUE, CDE, land)
I-028: Vulnerabilities in CDE
I-029: IBM AIX Telnet Denial-of-Service Vulnerability
I-030: SunOS volrmmount (1) Vulnerability
I-031A: WindowsNT-95 Attacks on DOE Sites
I-032: Sun Solaris Vulnerabilities (vacation, dtaction)
I-033: Sun Solaris Vulnerabilities (ndd, rpc.cmsd)
I-034: Internet Cookies



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========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE=============================

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
established a Federal Computer Incident response Capability (FedCIRC)
to assist federal civilians agencies in their incident handling
efforts by providing proactive and reactive computer security related
services. FedCIRC is a partnership among NIST, the Computer Incident
Advisory Capability (CIAC), and the CERT* Coordination Center
(CERT/CC).

If you believe that your system has been compromised, please contact
FedCIRC:

Telephone: +1 888 282 0870
Email: fedcirc@fedcirc.gov
Web Server: http://www.fedcirc.gov/

* Registered in U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

The CERT Coordination Center is part of the Software Engineering
Institute. The Software Engineering Institute is sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Defense.

CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
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