exploit the possibilities
Home Files News &[SERVICES_TAB]About Contact Add New

ciac.i-042.sgi.lp

ciac.i-042.sgi.lp
Posted Sep 23, 1999

ciac.i-042.sgi.lp

SHA-256 | f7a8b3e0d87a51f95c8b7228f381ffe52c007a080cfeb728f1337e44ceb9c079

ciac.i-042.sgi.lp

Change Mirror Download

From ciac@tholia.llnl.gov Thu Apr 9 17:14:14 1998
From: CIAC Mail User <ciac@tholia.llnl.gov>
To: ciac-bulletin@tholia.llnl.gov
Date: Wed, 8 Apr 1998 08:18:30 -0700 (PDT)
Subject: CIAC Bulletin I-042: SGI IRIX lp(1) Security Vulnerability

[ For Public Release ]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

__________________________________________________________

The U.S. Department of Energy
Computer Incident Advisory Capability
___ __ __ _ ___
/ | /_\ /
\___ __|__ / \ \___
__________________________________________________________

INFORMATION BULLETIN

SGI IRIX lp(1) Security Vulnerability

April 7, 1998 20:00 GMT Number I-042
______________________________________________________________________________
PROBLEM: SGI has identified a vulnerability in the lp(1) program and
associated printing subsystem.
PLATFORM: IRIX 5.0.x, 5.1.x, 5.2, 5.3, 6.0.x, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4.
DAMAGE: If exploited, a buffer overflow condition may occur. This
vulnerability may also be utilized to gain root access. A local
account is required.
SOLUTION: Apply patches or workaround.
______________________________________________________________________________
VULNERABILITY This vulnerability has been publically discussed. Silicon
ASSESSMENT: Graphics Inc. HIGHLY RECOMMENDS that these measures be
implemented on ALL SGI systems.
______________________________________________________________________________

[ Start Silicon Graphic Inc. Advisory ]

- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

Title: lp(1) Security Vulnerabilities
Title: AUSCERT AA-96.12
Number: 19980402-01-PX
Date: April 2, 1998
______________________________________________________________________________

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________

- ------------------------
- ---- Issue Specifics ---
- ------------------------

The lp(1) program is used to submit files for printing.

A potential buffer overflow condition has been identified with the lp(1)
program and associated printing subsystem. With an appropriately crafted
set of arguments, arbitrary user commands could be executed with elevated
privileges.

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. This issue will
be corrected in future releases of IRIX.


- ---------------
- ---- Impact ---
- ---------------

The lp(1) program and printing subsystem are installed by default on all
IRIX systems.

A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability both
locally and remotely.

This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root
privileges.

This vulnerability has been publically discussed and related issues have
been reported in AUSCERT advisory AA-96.12.


- ---------------------------
- ---- Temporary Solution ---
- ---------------------------

Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.

The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing
the printing subsystem.


***************
*** WARNING ***
***************


Removing the print subsystem will remove all printing
capability from the system. Installing the patches below is
recommended over removal of the print subsystem.

If the print subsystem is removed, at a later time when the
patches below are to be installed, the print subsystem will
first have to be reinstalled from original IRIX distribution
CDs before the patches.



1) Become the root user on the system.

% /bin/su -
Password:
#


2) Remove the vulnerable subsystem.

# /usr/sbin/versions -v remove print


3) Return to previous level.

# exit
$


- -----------------
- ---- Solution ---
- -----------------


OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------

IRIX 3.x no
IRIX 4.x no
IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.3 yes 2166
IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.2 yes 2167
IRIX 6.3 yes 2168
IRIX 6.4 yes 2169


NOTES

1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section.



Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.

The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.



##### Patch File Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:

Filename: README.patch.2166
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33606 8 README.patch.2166
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23714 8 README.patch.2166
MD5 checksum: 95B0AB6CE4C96D7BA22F520360B9A4F7

Filename: patchSG0002166
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39199 1 patchSG0002166
Algorithm #2 (sum): 29039 1 patchSG0002166
MD5 checksum: E44479E23F273051BFA04491524B2C8F

Filename: patchSG0002166.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 41214 1 patchSG0002166.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 37103 1 patchSG0002166.idb
MD5 checksum: B855B3AFEBC0606F88697EC1EA961824

Filename: patchSG0002166.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 64133 81 patchSG0002166.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 39793 81 patchSG0002166.print_sw
MD5 checksum: F3ADEE60570BF69DE537D16CCE7D35D0

Filename: README.patch.2167
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54129 8 README.patch.2167
Algorithm #2 (sum): 24902 8 README.patch.2167
MD5 checksum: CAD788CE10F8C26EF5ECB1CBBBB9990F

Filename: patchSG0002167
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32110 1 patchSG0002167
Algorithm #2 (sum): 31366 1 patchSG0002167
MD5 checksum: CC3EE93FE5D4A52E394D6F2FE82F787E

Filename: patchSG0002167.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 11685 1 patchSG0002167.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 36835 1 patchSG0002167.idb
MD5 checksum: E568F4180BE18E2183E65FAAD7CE342B

Filename: patchSG0002167.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 14051 101 patchSG0002167.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 31600 101 patchSG0002167.print_sw
MD5 checksum: 7EDB4F42375940427B97EC2E8F949C70

Filename: README.patch.2168
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22298 8 README.patch.2168
Algorithm #2 (sum): 25041 8 README.patch.2168
MD5 checksum: 9C63BB8A301C8052BECB0B02A741A94F

Filename: patchSG0002168
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 11594 1 patchSG0002168
Algorithm #2 (sum): 31103 1 patchSG0002168
MD5 checksum: 934E0CC9BC24F87A74668A00EDE3DC71

Filename: patchSG0002168.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 12942 1 patchSG0002168.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 36247 1 patchSG0002168.idb
MD5 checksum: 97BB1C7385D71AC836C7A884ABE60D15

Filename: patchSG0002168.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 19989 100 patchSG0002168.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 39255 100 patchSG0002168.print_sw
MD5 checksum: 228F3EB30E9A62166EA7A489F4D5FFEF

Filename: README.patch.2169
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18635 8 README.patch.2169
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22236 8 README.patch.2169
MD5 checksum: D624EEF3039F8F9A0F429982A3FBB356

Filename: patchSG0002169
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52493 1 patchSG0002169
Algorithm #2 (sum): 34907 1 patchSG0002169
MD5 checksum: 31F5566CEA24C3679E659E449B5A23E6

Filename: patchSG0002169.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54959 1 patchSG0002169.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 35889 1 patchSG0002169.idb
MD5 checksum: D0B5BDA2F16F2B47C74ED1F40C4179B2

Filename: patchSG0002169.print_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 08735 82 patchSG0002169.print_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 20700 82 patchSG0002169.print_sw
MD5 checksum: 8B6C0769E99B57381395570946C0C348


- -------------------------
- ---- Acknowledgments ---
- -------------------------

Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the Internet community and
AUSCERT for their involvement in this matter.


- ------------------------------------------------------------
- ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- ------------------------------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.

------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert@sgi.com.

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.

------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.

% mail wiretap-request@sgi.com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d

In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.


------oOo------

Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/Secur/security.html.

------oOo------

For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert@sgi.com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.

______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.


- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2

iQCVAwUBNSQBkrQ4cFApAP75AQGcXAP/YnqAM+PC41nsGBXFf3RKk3MkY8S5lMm+
9QkDddi6FVrLaL4cJjARmChzPelidkFyw+PqsZPeGzbaqeUPzcoSlrbvU5RfAmm6
8cOZobntpuE9GTgAETot/ZvtOmxbeclyaZwPGMT9i/8Z4lLWfNf//bozuxUclcnl
BHX1KBatNhE=
=ecND
- -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


[ End Silicon Graphic Inc. Advisory ]

______________________________________________________________________________

CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Silicon Graphic Inc. for the
information contained in this bulletin.
______________________________________________________________________________


CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer
security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National
Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding
member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a
global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination
among computer security teams worldwide.

CIAC services are available to DOE, DOE contractors, and the NIH. CIAC
can be contacted at:
Voice: +1 925-422-8193
FAX: +1 925-423-8002
STU-III: +1 925-423-2604
E-mail: ciac@llnl.gov

For emergencies and off-hour assistance, DOE, DOE contractor sites,
and the NIH may contact CIAC 24-hours a day. During off hours (5PM -
8AM PST), call the CIAC voice number 925-422-8193 and leave a message,
or call 800-759-7243 (800-SKY-PAGE) to send a Sky Page. CIAC has two
Sky Page PIN numbers, the primary PIN number, 8550070, is for the CIAC
duty person, and the secondary PIN number, 8550074 is for the CIAC
Project Leader.

Previous CIAC notices, anti-virus software, and other information are
available from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.

World Wide Web: http://www.ciac.org/
(or http://ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
Anonymous FTP: ftp.ciac.org
(or ciac.llnl.gov -- they're the same machine)
Modem access: +1 (925) 423-4753 (28.8K baud)
+1 (925) 423-3331 (28.8K baud)

CIAC has several self-subscribing mailing lists for electronic
publications:
1. CIAC-BULLETIN for Advisories, highest priority - time critical
information and Bulletins, important computer security information;
2. SPI-ANNOUNCE for official news about Security Profile Inspector
(SPI) software updates, new features, distribution and
availability;
3. SPI-NOTES, for discussion of problems and solutions regarding the
use of SPI products.

Our mailing lists are managed by a public domain software package
called Majordomo, which ignores E-mail header subject lines. To
subscribe (add yourself) to one of our mailing lists, send the
following request as the E-mail message body, substituting
ciac-bulletin, spi-announce OR spi-notes for list-name:

E-mail to ciac-listproc@llnl.gov or majordomo@tholia.llnl.gov:
subscribe list-name
e.g., subscribe ciac-bulletin

You will receive an acknowledgment email immediately with a confirmation
that you will need to mail back to the addresses above, as per the
instructions in the email. This is a partial protection to make sure
you are really the one who asked to be signed up for the list in question.

If you include the word 'help' in the body of an email to the above address,
it will also send back an information file on how to subscribe/unsubscribe,
get past issues of CIAC bulletins via email, etc.

PLEASE NOTE: Many users outside of the DOE, ESnet, and NIH computing
communities receive CIAC bulletins. If you are not part of these
communities, please contact your agency's response team to report
incidents. Your agency's team will coordinate with CIAC. The Forum of
Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) is a world-wide
organization. A list of FIRST member organizations and their
constituencies can be obtained via WWW at http://www.first.org/.

This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an
agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States
Government nor the University of California nor any of their
employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or
usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products,
process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or
otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement,
recommendation or favoring by the United States Government or the
University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed
herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States
Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.

LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)

I-032: Sun Solaris Vulnerabilities (vacation, dtaction)
I-033: Sun Solaris Vulnerabilities (ndd, rpc.cmsd)
I-034: Internet Cookies
I-035: SGI Vulnerabilities (startmidi/stopmidi, datman/cdman, cdplayer)
I-036: FreeBSD Denial-of Service LAND Attacks
I-037: FreeBSD mmap Vulnerability
I-038: Ascend Routing Hardware Vulnerabilities
I-039: HP-UX inetd Vulnerability
I-040: SGI Netscape Navigator Vulnerabilities
I-041: Performer API Search Tool 2.2 pfdispaly.cgi Vulnerability



-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 4.0 Business Edition

iQCVAwUBNSqtMLnzJzdsy3QZAQEvIAQA9533ElleLiTlYz7bFwnzHUIj4FxBbr0x
quvvf7FwyIycPLtpTb1P7usBvw30TIr1Rvme1WFSwjjZbEXl3iA+J7wzD8rUQZzI
B+mS/h6wr/eVvO1njmlztiTjAYDphFSGLu6caCtin8a/95cqo46JwPlm0AmQV7Br
VH+ZRRrx4Xg=
=T5lH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Login or Register to add favorites

File Archive:

March 2024

  • Su
  • Mo
  • Tu
  • We
  • Th
  • Fr
  • Sa
  • 1
    Mar 1st
    16 Files
  • 2
    Mar 2nd
    0 Files
  • 3
    Mar 3rd
    0 Files
  • 4
    Mar 4th
    32 Files
  • 5
    Mar 5th
    28 Files
  • 6
    Mar 6th
    42 Files
  • 7
    Mar 7th
    17 Files
  • 8
    Mar 8th
    13 Files
  • 9
    Mar 9th
    0 Files
  • 10
    Mar 10th
    0 Files
  • 11
    Mar 11th
    15 Files
  • 12
    Mar 12th
    19 Files
  • 13
    Mar 13th
    21 Files
  • 14
    Mar 14th
    38 Files
  • 15
    Mar 15th
    15 Files
  • 16
    Mar 16th
    0 Files
  • 17
    Mar 17th
    0 Files
  • 18
    Mar 18th
    10 Files
  • 19
    Mar 19th
    32 Files
  • 20
    Mar 20th
    46 Files
  • 21
    Mar 21st
    16 Files
  • 22
    Mar 22nd
    13 Files
  • 23
    Mar 23rd
    0 Files
  • 24
    Mar 24th
    0 Files
  • 25
    Mar 25th
    12 Files
  • 26
    Mar 26th
    31 Files
  • 27
    Mar 27th
    19 Files
  • 28
    Mar 28th
    42 Files
  • 29
    Mar 29th
    0 Files
  • 30
    Mar 30th
    0 Files
  • 31
    Mar 31st
    0 Files

Top Authors In Last 30 Days

File Tags

Systems

packet storm

© 2022 Packet Storm. All rights reserved.

Services
Security Services
Hosting By
Rokasec
close